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Abstract
Through a historical account of the Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network
(PCN/ACN), this dissertation examines coalition formation among social movements.
It argues that the complex process of cross-sectoral coalition formation and thus the
potential for convergence of social movements can best be understood by combining
elements of different analytical frameworks.
This dissertation draws on elements of the two dominant paradigms for the
study of social movements, resource mobilization theory and new social movement
theory. Specifically, it utilizes the formers' attention to the specifics oforganization
and structure and the latter's focus on the discursive formation of identities. Both are
then combined with the uniquely Canadian but theoretically underdeveloped concept
of the popular sector and a neo-gramscian perspective on social formation and
mobilization that draws on political economy and class-analytical traditions.
With its formation in 1988 around opposition to the Canada - U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, the PCN/ACN was an early example ofa broader trend for trade and
investment to become key arenas for social and political contention at the tum ofthe
century. This dissertation challenges the assumptions ofmost analytical frameworks
concerning the limits to coalition formation and argues that the nature of the unifying
issue is an important determinant of the potential for the growth and deepening of
social alliances.
After reviewing the historical conjuncture in which the PCN/ACN emerged,
this dissertation traces the history ofkey sectors and member organizations -labour.
women and ecumenical justice - paying specific attention to their approach to
political engagement and the issue of free trade. As a result, it establishes the
necessary background to understand both the initial basis for unity and the Network's
progression beyond a lowest common denominator alliance around a single issue, to a
broader mandate.
3This dissertation provides empirical evidence on which to judge the potential
of social movements to displace other discourses and agencies on the left. Given the
contemporary interest in the role of social movements, NGOs and civil society. this
dissertation provides some essential signposts for two types of practitioners:
academics seeking to understand outcomes and activists hoping to determine them.
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Preface
It is "not sociology, but social practice, [which] may decide which theories are
correct and which are not," and this is equally true for political science and political
practice. 1 This account of the formation and development ofthe Pro-Canada! Action
Canada Network (PCN/ACN) was undertaken in this spirit. My interest in the
questions regarding the prospects for coalitions ofsocial movements posed and
examined herein was, in part, a result ofhaving served in a staffposition as
Coordinator ofthe PCN between August 1988 and October 1990. Consequently, the
research project that led to this dissertation was very much inspired by issues and
questions raised by social practice.
The research for this dissertation was gathered after this period of direct
involvement in the PCN and thus is not strictly the product ofa 'participant-observer'
or observation process. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that my personal experience as
a participant in a period of the Network's development had an effect on the
subsequent research project. Specifically, my experience has served to identify
avenues of inquiry and given me access to data that might not have been equally
accessible to another researcher. For example, because of the relatively informal
approach to record keeping by the Pro-Canada Network itself, data was often obtained
from the organizational and personal files ofparticipants. In addition, interviews with
these participants served to supplement this data as well as identify other fruitful
sources.
In order to address any potential concerns regarding research methodology, I
have taken great care to rely on documentary evidence (publications and interviews)
to establish the historical record and to substantiate claims and arguments made here.
In addition, wherever possible I have made use of multiple sources of evidence in
order to enhance "the validity and reliability" of the case study?
I George Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Classes: French Critiques," Theory and Society 5, no. 2
(1978): 189.
2 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research; Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994),96.
9Research for this study covered three broad areas each requiring a slightly
different emphasis in techniques. In general, I have relied on documentary research
and interviews. The historical review of social movement politics and coalition
formation in the Canadian context is based on primary sources, for the most part
publications and internal documents of the movements and organizations in question
and media accounts, as well as secondary sources. The assessment of sectoral
approaches to the FTA and coalition politics as well as of the formation of the Pro-
Canada Network relied on the publications and records of organizations and groups
and some secondary sources. Semi-structured personal interviews with leaders and
activists in these organizations were used to confrrm and expand on evidence gathered
from documentation. Whereas interviews began with a list of specific questions
tailored to the experience and expertise of each subject, the opportunity for discussion
of a more open-ended nature was always offered and often provided valuable
information and insights.
Finally, the political and institutional development of the Network was
documented through a review ofpublications and records from various decision-
making bodies, including minutes and reports of meetings. These sources were
backed up by information from extensive personal interviews with PCN/ACN
participants as well as published media reports. Where necessary, interview data was
used to correct gaps in other data sources, notably organizational records.
This account of the unique experience of the Canadian popular sector and the
Pro-Canada/Action Canada Network provides empirical evidence on which to judge
the potential of social movements to displace other discourses and agencies on the
Left. Given the contemporary interest in the role of social movements, NGOs and
civil society, it is my sincere hope that this dissertation provides some essential
signposts for two types ofpractitioners: academics seeking to understand outcomes
and activists hoping to determine them.
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1. The Shifting Politics of the Left
The growing movement opposing trade liberalization has taken its place at the
centre of a second wave of social movements to emerge over the last three decades.
During a first wave of global social movement mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s
,
trade union militancy, anti-war, student, and women's movements in North America
and Europe emerged as liberation struggles continued across the Third World. More
recently, a dramatic increase in 'extra-parliamentary' and 'extra-political' forms of
social engagement has led to an explosion in the number of movements as well as
Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and Non-Governmental Organization's
(NGOs) accompanied by ever greater expectations for their potential role.'
As Hilary Wainwright has argued, "the social movements of the last twenty-
five years...have challenged the monopoly claimed by traditional left parties on the
leadership of social and economic change.t" Moreover it has been suggested that
these social movements were, at least in part, reactions to existing left-wing political
formations and the practices of these parties when they wielded state power.' On the
one hand, the revelations of the human toll of Stalinism at the twentieth congress of
the CPSU kicked offa mass exodus from Communist Parties in the West. On the
other hand, as the postwar boom ended, social democratic parties were increasingly
t Also sometimes referred to as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). See, for example, the data and
comments reported in John W. Foster, "Context," in Whose World is it Anyway? Civil Society, the
United Nations and the Multilateral Future, ed. John W. Foster with Anita Anand (Ottawa: United
Nations Association in Canada, 1999); the introduction to Robin Cohen and Shirin M. Rai, eds., Global
Social Movements (London: The Athlone Press, 2000); and Dieter Rucht, "The Transnationalization of
Social Movements: Trends, Causes, Problems," in Social Movements in a Globalizing World ed.
Donatella Della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
2 Hilary Wainwright, Arguments for a New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994), 193.
3 Gunder Frank and Fuentes suggest this failure of the left was global in scope: "Indeed much of the
membership and strength of contemporary social movements is the reflection of people's
disappointment and frustration with - and their search for alternatives to - the political process,
political parties, the state, and the capture of state power in the West, South and East. The perceived
failure of revolutionary, as well as reformist left-wing parties and regimes, in all parts of the world,
adequately to express people's protest and to offer viable and satisfying alternatives, has been
responsible for much of the popular movement to social movements." Andre Gunder Frank and Marta
Fuentes, "Nine Theses on Social Movements," ifda dossier, no. 63, January/February (1988), 37-38; on
this dynamic in the Canadian context, see Robert Laxer, Canada's Unions (Toronto: James Lorimer
and Company, 1976); in the US, see Richard Flacks, "Think Globally, Act Politically: Some Notes
toward New Movement Strategy," in Cultural Politics and Social Movements, ed. Marcy Darnovsky,
Barbara Leslie Epstein, and Richard Flacks (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
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seen as unresponsive to popular demands since, in practice, they were reduced to
crisis management when in power."
Meanwhile, attempts at a "structural reformist" strategy, both from within a
rejuvenated 'Eurocommunist' movement and by socialist parties, were doomed to
failure. Explicit attempts to break out of the crisis management model - most notably
the French Socialist Party led to power by Francois Mitterand in 1981 - met with little
success during the 1980s.5 In the wake of the fall ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989,
Communist parties either disbanded or were renamed. During this period most of the
major European social democratic parties were beginning to move to more centrist
positions following serious and serial electoral defeats, tough left-wing challenges
within, and the emergence ofnew Green and radical left parties without during the
1980s.6
This phenomenon was not limited to the political left. Indeed, increased social
movement activity during this period took place while political party systems across
the western democracies entered into various stages of crisis marked, among other
things, by significant decline in voter participation, party membership and party
activism.i In Canada, the crisis in party politics included their reduced role in
4 Leo Pan itch, "The Impasse of Social Democratic Politics," in Socialist Register J985/J986, ed. Ralph
Miliband and John Saville (London: Merlin, 1986); George Ross and Jane Jenson, "Post-War Class
Struggle and the Crisis of Left Politics," in Socialist Register J985/6, ed. Ralph Miliband, et at.
(London: Merlin, 1985).
5 On the Mitterand case, see Daniel Singer, Is Socialism Doomed? (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988).
6 On the rise of Green and other alternative left parties, see the contributions to Ferdinand Mueller-
Rommel, ed., New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise & Success ofGreen Parties and Alternative
Lists (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989) as well as Werner Hulsberg, The German Greens: A Social
and Political Profile (London: Verso, 1988) and Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes, eds., The Green
Challenge: The Development ofGreen Parties in Europe (London & New York: Routledge, 1995). On
the state of European left parties in the early 1990s, see the contributions to Perry Anderson and Patrick
Camiller, eds., Mapping the West European Left (London: Verso, 1994).
7 A comparison of nineteen OECD states shows a decline in turnout averaging 10 percent from the
1950s to the 1990s. Wattenberg points to waning partisan loyalty and party membership as causes.
Martin Wattenberg, "The Decline of Party Mobilization," in Parties without Partisans, ed Russell J.
Dalton and Martin Wattenberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Russell J. Dalton
and Manfred Kuechler, eds., Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in
Western Democracies, Europe and the International Order (London: Polity Press, 1990); Kay Lawson
and Peter Merkt, When Parties Fail (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Mark Gray and
Miki Caul, "Declining voter turnout in advanced industrial democracies, 1950 to 1997: 'The effects of
declining group mobilization," Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 9 (2000).
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"structuring the vote, mobilizing mass opinion, aggregating interest and shaping
public policy and organization ofgovernment," as well as in a dramatic increase in
partisan volatility." Here as elsewhere, leaders have overshadowed their parties,
whether in policy formation or in campaigning, while new electoral techniques and
technology have also contributed to making grassroots party activism less relevant.
Both the concentration ofpower in the hands of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) at
the expense ofParliament, and the Byzantine process of intergovernmental decision-
making driven by a loose federal structure where substantial powers are held by the
provincial governments - two defming characteristics of 'executive federalism' -
have also been seen as undermining political participation."
While there is a general acknowledgement that political parties have
undergone fundamental change, the notion that this is best described as a decline has
been challenged. From this perspective, the professionalization of mass-based parties
is seen as signalling a transformation rather than indicating a decline. For example, in
their description of "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations," Webb and Farrell
relate this dynamic to the rise of social movements since, "fewer individuals now
enact political roles as loyal party members, preferring instead to participate via non-
partisan single-issue groups." They add, "it might also be tempting to conclude that
parties are in decline in another sense, i.e., that they are increasingly unprincipled,
opportunistic power-seekers who will fail to offer voters clear or meaningful choices."
10 Hirst sums up the situation as follows:
8 Khayyam Zev Paltiel, "Political Marketing, Party Finance, and the Decline of Canadian Parties," in
Canadian Politics in Transition, ed. Brian A. Tanguay and Alain G. Gagnon (Toronto: Nelson Canada,
1996),403; volatility is assessed in Harold D. Clarke et aI., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in
Canadian Elections, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1991).
9 In Canada John Meisel has advanced this thesis. See John Meisel, "The Decline of Party," in Part"
, .. .
Politics In Canada, ed. Hugh Thorburn (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 181. He provides an
extensive catalogue of short, medium and long term causes for this decline. In addition to ~hose noted
above these include an increasingly bureaucratic state, the rise of interest groups, corporatism, the role
ofthe electronic media, investigative journalism, opinion polling, the power of dominant economic
interests and 'third party' spending. On the impact of technology, see also R.K. Carty, .. Ihree Canadian
Party Systems: An Interpretation of the Development of National Politics," in Party Democracy in
Canada, ed. George Perlin (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1988). ~.t-28.
10 Paul Webb and David M. Farrell, "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations," (Centre for the
Study of Democracy, UC Irvine 1998),22.
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If the participation of citizens in modern mass democracies is limited then on,
the contrary, the role of the major political parties is excessive ... Mass
democracy may be a minimal form of political participation for the individual,
but it gives the major parties the capacity to monopolize the mainstream
political agenda. The major parties survive and, even if they do not prosper,
they occupy political space. II
Unlike their European counterparts, Canada's major political parties did not
evolve along class lines but rather developed as what have been defined as brokerage
parties or "similar organizations opportunistically appealing to a variety of
interests.,,12 Even Canada's social democratic party, the New Democratic Party
(NDP), formed as a common endeavour of the Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation (CCF) and the largest labour federation, the Canadian Labour Congress
(CLC), in 1961, was unable to fully break out ofthis mould. Furthermore, postwar
affluence and Cold War hysteria, both particularly acute in North America, coloured
the formative period of the CCFINDP. As a result, the party evolved with strong ties
to the Canadian labour movement but bearing a rather weak variant of social
democratic reformism. 13
While economic crisis gripped the West as a whole in the early 1970s, in
Canada it took on a particular character. A continentalist postwar development model
ensured that the Canadian economy was overwhelmingly integrated with the United
States and that the Keynesian demand management tools at the state's disposal were
rather less than more effective. 14 The wave of social movement mobilization,
industrial militancy and nationalist ferment that marked the transition from boom to
economic downturn generated a left-nationalist challenge to the NDP's centrist
leadership. The Waffle, as it became known, was eventually rooted out of the party
II Paul Hirst, Representative Democracy and its Limits (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990),4.
12 See Chapter 1 in Jeanine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1988). Tanguay links the brokerage model to the 'decline of party' thesis in
"Canada's Party System in the 1990s: Breakdown or Renewal?" in Canadian Politics. ed. James
Bickerton and Alain G. Gagnon (Toronto: Broadview Press, 1999), 331. The brokerage party model
increases the importance of individual leaders and contributes to the poverty of ideological debate in
the political realm - both key factors associated with this thesis.
13 See Chapter 8 in Jeanine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1988).
14 Jane Jenson, "Representations in Crisis: the Roots of Canada's Permeable Fordism," Canadian
Journal ofPolitical Science XXIII, no. 4 (1990).
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through the combined efforts of the leadership and the international (i.e., U.S.-based)
trade unions. The Waffle episode became an important point of reference for future
debates on political agency on the Canadian Left. As the title ofa newspaper column
put it at the time, "Waffle Sharpens Old NDP Dilemma: Is it Political Party or
Movement'i"?" The group's expulsion in 1972 reinforced the critique of the limits of
party and specifically social democratic party politics."
By 1981 the Canadian economy was in the hold ofa full-fledged recession.
Following two doomed attempts at economic intervention and facing an increasingly
vocal and organized corporate sector, the Canadian government appointed a Royal
Commission to divine a way out of the impasse. The Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and the Development Prospects for Canada (Macdonald
Commission), both through its process and its conclusions, underlined the
increasingly dramatic gulf between the perspectives of a range of social movements
and organizations and the corporate sector. While relationships, both organizational
and personal, were already developing between labour, women's, church, farm and
other groups, the Macdonald Commission's eventual prescription of privatization,
deregulation and free trade provided the critical impetus for the forging of what has
become known as the "popular sector. ,,17
At the urging ofa corporate sector seeking to enhance profitability, the
Commission made itself the bearer of a neo-liberal response to the crisis. The
Commission's challenge that Canadians take "a leap of faith" on bilateral free trade
with the U.S. was taken up both by the state and the corporate sector as the
centrepiece ofa new model of development.l'' Meanwhile, free trade became the
focus around which the popular sector would build the Pro-Canada Network. a
15 Peter Regenstrief, "Waffle Sharpens Old NDP Dilemma: Is it Political Party or Movement?" Toronto
Star, 21 April 1971.
16 See, for example, the argument proposed in Gregory Albo, "The 20th Anniversary of the Waffle-
Canada, Left-Nationalism and Younger Voices," Studies in Political Economy, no. 33 (1990).
17 Daniel Drache and Duncan Cameron, eds., The Other MacDonald Report (Toronto: James l.or imer,
1985).
18 Report ofthe Royal Commission on the Economic Union and De....elopmental Prospectsfor ('''n"da
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985).
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structured alliance of movements. This would develop before the end of the decade,
creating a new and different challenge to the social democratic model for political
agency.
2. Introducing the Pro-Canada/Action Canada Network
In April 1987, groups opposed to proposals for a Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) came together to form the Pro-Canada Network (PCN). Within two
years, the PCN had developed a broad membership base of more than thirty national
organizations and member coalitions in nine of ten Canadian provinces. Under the
Network's banner, these groups campaigned against the proposed FTA in the run-up
to the 1988 federal election where it proved to be the central issue of debate. After the
election resulted in a renewed majority government for the Progressive Conservative
Party, the only federal party backing the FTA, the agreement was signed and then
enacted in January 1989.
Despite clear defeat on the issue around which it had been formed, the Pro-
Canada Network did not fold. In fact, the Network moved beyond an initial 'single-
issue' focus to a unity rooted in first identifying and then opposing a broad social and
economic agenda. As a result, the PCN engaged in campaigns on a series of issues
and, as its base and discourse broadened and the scope of its activities became more
ambitious, flirted with more permanent status.
Along the way the Network overcame a number of important hurdles
beginning with participation in the 1988 Federal Election and a re-mandating process
immediately thereafter. With a broader mandate defmed with free trade as the
centrepiece, the PCN campaigned against the implementation of the Goods and
Services Tax (GST) and a string ofneo-liberal policies targeting social programs. As
it engaged a series of issues, the Network employed a variety of tactics, adapted its
structure and increased its resource base and staff complement.
In response to proposals to extend trade liberalization across the North
American continent, the Network developed working relationships with Mexican and
19
American counterparts leading to a cross-national campaign to oppose the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The April 1991 renaming of the Network
as the Action Canada Network was an attempt to present the cross-movement
coalition in a more positive light to its North American counterparts as well as
respond to a growing consensus on Canadian constitutional issues among member
organizations.
As part of its NAFTA effort and in dealing with issues like the GST as well as
its intervention in the Canadian constitutional debate, the PCN/ACN further
developed a common discourse across various movements. While most efforts
remained committed to defensive struggles, the Network also began to articulate and
advance policy alternatives.
During its first five years the Pro-Canada Network exceeded the expectations
of most observers, formed on the basis ofdifferent analytical perspectives, as well as
the hopes of most participants, based on their activist experience. Whether from a
traditional pluralist, rational choice or class-analytical perspective, the Network was
generally viewed as a momentary phenomenon whose unity would dissolve in
conjunction with an electoral resolution to the free trade debate in 1988. For social
movement activists, previous experience of the difficulty in maintaining a coalition of
groups around one specific issue laid the basis for relatively limited expectations for
the PCN.
Over the longer run these initial outlooks were borne out as the Network
showed signs ofdefmite decline. Beginning in 1992-93, decreased participation and a
reduced scale of involvement diminished the scope of the ACN's activities. The
Network became progressively less relevant to its own member groups as well as on
the broader political stage. In 1998, the ACN was downgraded to an informal
information-sharing network with extremely limited resources and no campaigning
mandate and was renamed the Solidarity Network.
Social, political and economic developments, both Canadian and global, have
conspired to amplify the relevance of the story of the Pro-Canada!Action Canada
20
Network. Much as the 1989 FTA became a model for a series of bilateral and
multilateral agreements targeting the liberalization of trade and investment the PCN
,
was a Canadian innovation and possibly a global first. Beyond the obvious interest of
an expansive cross-movement coalition that defies most predictions by achieving a
broad basis ofunity and approaching some degree of permanence, the Network was a
precursor of the global trend for trade and investment policy to become key arenas for
social and political contestation.
Over the last decade, campaigns and movements opposed to trade and
investment liberalization have sprung up on all continents. Some of these movements
have also been at the forefront of coalition building both domestically and on a
transnational basis. The most spectacular examples to date of international
collaboration by these movements have been the successful campaign to oppose the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) in 1997, followed by the mobilization
around the WTO Seattle Round. 19
3. Arguments
Neither the trials of social democratic and other left parties nor the enthusiasm
for civil society - under whatever nomenclature - were entirely new phenomena by
the 1980s and 1990s.20 Political agency has been at the centre ofdebate on the Left
through the twentieth century. Since the 1960s, arguments have focused on the nature
19 Madeleine Drohan, "How the Net KiJled the MAl," Globe and Mail, 29 April 1998, A7; Stephen J.
Kobrin, "The MAl and the Clash of Globalizations," Foreign Policy, no. 109 (1998); Peter Bleyer,
"The Other Battle in Seattle," Studies in Political Economy, no. 62 (2000); Mary Kaldor, "Civilizing'
Globalization? The Implications of the 'Battle in Seattle,'" Millennium: Journal ofInternational
Studies 29, no. 1 (2000); Peter J. Smith and Elizabeth Smythe, "Globalization, Citizenship and
Technology: the MAl meets the Internet," Canadian Foreign Policy 7, no. 2 (1999).
20 The term 'civil society' has a long pedigree; its use here reflects more contemporary interpretations.
Civil society has re-emerged, first, in opposition Eastern European party/states in the 1970s and 1980s
and, second, as a description of a sphere of coJlective activity that is autonomous from the state. In both
instances, the revival of the term has included ''the broadening of the terrain on which politics could be
conducted." Philip Resnick, Twenty First Century Democracy (Montreal: McGill Queens University
Press, 1997), 10I. Although the scope of 'civil society' varies substantially depending on the
definition, social movements are generally viewed as among its central actors. See, in particular. the
introduction to John Keane, ed. Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London:
Verso, 1988) as well as his Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988); Paul Hirst,
Representative Democracy and its Limits (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); and Jean L. Cohen and
Andrew Arato, "Social Movements, Civil Society and the Problem of Sovereignty," Praxis
International 4, October (1984).
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and efficacy of working class-based political vehicles and the potential of emerging
new social movements. Nevertheless, there is now a new momentum and energy
behind this debate on political agency and specifically the significance of these
movements for the future of democratic governance.
The Pro-Canada Network is an important example of coalition formation
among social movements - a contemporary form of the alliance politics long
practiced by the Left. There have been relatively few empirical studies ofcoalitions of
social movements and even less attention has been paid to specifically cross-
movement coalitions or to evaluating claims and counterclaims concerning the ability
of these projects to move beyond the limits of single-issue concerns.i' These are
critical pursuits if we are to evaluate the potential for social movement coalitions to
challenge the political party's exclusive claim to the function of interest aggregation.
Moreover, the potential of these coalitions to form projects bearing alternative
discourses and their capacity to bring about social transformation is also in question.
This account of the formation and development of the Pro-Canada!Action
Canada Network is therefore a contribution to a broader consideration of the crisis of
political agency on the Left and, more precisely, the potential role of a convergence of
social movements. It also informs the wide-ranging contemporary debate on the role
of civil society - both national and transnational: what can we glean about the highly
touted potential of civil society, and its "strong bid to displace the discourse of class
on the left," from this example of a social movement coalition in action?"
The following arguments will be examined in the course of this research.
First cross-movement or cross-sectoral coalitions on the model of the,
PCN/ACN are an interesting, innovative and hopeful experiment in the redefinition of
political agency on the Left that, by themselves, remain inadequate." By inference,
these coalitions are unlikely to generate a counterhegemonic project - i.e., a political
21 I review this literature in Chapter 2.
22 Leo Pan itch, "Reflections on a Strategy for Labour," in Working Classes: Global Realities. ed. Leo
Panitch and Colin Leys, Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 2001), 367.
23 The terms 'cross-movement' and 'cross-sectoral' are used interchangeably herein.
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force capable of enacting a transfonnative shift in power leading to a new social
order.
Second, the successful uniting ofdiverse constituencies under the banner of
the Pro-Canada Network was greatly assisted by the nature of the free trade issue.
Specifically, the FTA carried serious policy implications for a wide range of
constituencies. Furthermore, the agreement crystallized a broader socio-economic
agenda providing a single focal point for contestation by groups with a range of
grievances. It also created a firm basis for the eventual formalization of cooperation
and for a broader common agenda and discourse.
Third, the FTA was a propitious basis for unity that emerged at a fertile
moment in the development of a collaborative environment among Canadian social
movements and their organizations. This emerging popular sector was, in turn,
marked by the ideological commitment of important elements within it to an
alternative, or at the very least a complement, to social democratic electoralism as
political agency. This history was a critical determinant of the Network's ability to
move relatively seamlessly beyond its original single-issue mandate.
Fourth, and fmally, like the emergence ofthe FTA as the centrepiece of a
continentalist neo-liberal strategy, the development of the popular sector was the
cumulative result of a series of political responses to the transition from an economic
model in crisis. In both cases the importance ofeconomic structures is reaffirmed.
4. Shaping a Theoretical Framework
Mirroring the arguments set out above, this study argues for a synthesis 0 fa
variety of analytical approaches in order to apply their different strengths to the case
of the Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network. Because both the rise and the eventual
decline of the Network are attributed to a combination of structural, instrumental and
conjunctural factors, this synthesis requires balancing attention to structure with a
focus on agency. In addition, it must also be able to draw out the interaction between
agency and structure in the critical process of identity formation, as well as
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accounting for the importance of consciousness or ideological disposition, on the one
hand, and organizational process and form, on the other.
Many theoretical arguments have focused on the potential and limitations of
social movements. The very defmition of a social movement, particularly contrasted
with the political party and the interest group, has been the subject of continuing
debate. In this context, the notion that contemporary movements constitute a
qualitatively new phenomenon (i.e., 'New Social Movements') has been posed.
Prior to the late 1960s two broad theoretical and nonnative perspectives
dominated the study ofsocial movements. With its assumptions ofa neutral state and
equal access to power within society, the liberal pluralist paradigm emphasized the
marginality of protest and questioned the ability of social movements to enter and
effectively act within the political realm." Meanwhile, Marxist class analysis
developed in tandem with a labour movement that emerged in the second half of the
nineteenth century as the "paradigm of a social movement.v" For Marxists, the
working class in various guises was the chosen historical agent for social change.
The upsurge in social movement mobilization in the 1960s led to reactions
against the traditional analytical perspectives whose explanatory potential seemed
unable to cope with these new developments. Within the pluralist paradigm, Resource
Mobilization Theory (RMT) emerged as a challenge to the dominant social-
psychological approaches to collective behaviour. The different theoretical
perspectives that have come to be considered under the rubric of RMT refute the
classical defmition of social movements as products ofdysfunctional or irrational
collective behaviour. A veritable explosion ofRMT-style theorization has taken place
over the last twenty years. The focus on organizational forms and activities is
reflected in concepts such as the Social Movement Organization (SMa) and Social
24 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni~ersity Press, 1970); A. Komh,auser,. ]]u..'
Politics ofMass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); and Nell 1. Smelser, The Theory of ( ollective
Behaviour (New York: Free Press, 1962).
25 Tom Bottomore, Political Sociology, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19(3),
30.
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Movement Sector (SMS) as well as in a focus on 'social networks. ,26 A distinct
'political process' model within RM theory points to the shifting political
environment - defmed as the "political opportunity structure" - as determining the
emergence and success of social movements." The elaboration of "collective action
framing" stands out among some of the more recent developments within RMT.28
Similarly, the emergence of the student, women's, anti-racist. peace and
environmental movements sowed the seeds for a reaction against the orthodox
Marxist view ofcollective action. Class analysis queried the salience of the social
cleavages represented by these movements and their ability to undertake
transfonnative political projects without linkages to the 'old' labour movement. New
Movement Theory (NMT) challenged the privileging ofclass and therefore the
primacy of the working class, and thus the labour movement, as agency for social
change. Exponents ofNMT have tended to focus their attention on the cultural
identity and discourses of movements and, for the most part, have underlined the
particularism ofcontemporary movements.i" A discourse-theoretical variant ofNMT,
whose most prominent exponents are Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, is of
particular interest for this account of the PCN/ACN. Laclau and Mouffe deal
explicitly, if ultimately unsatisfactorily, with the question ofpolitical agency as well
26 On SMO's and SMS's, see, among others, Mayer N. Zald and John McCarthy, eds., Social
Movements in an Organizational Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987) and Mayer
N. Zald and John McCarthy, eds., The Dynamics ofSocial Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop,
1979).
27 For an elaboration of the political process model, see Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution
(Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1978); on the structure of political opportunities, see Sidney
Tarrow, "Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest."
Cornell Studies in International Affairs Western Societies Papers No.21 (1989).
28 Snow et a1. define a frame as an "interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out
there'." David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Frontiers in
Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1992), 137. See also David A. Snow et aI., "Frame Alignment Process.
Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (1986).
29 Alberto Melucci, Nomads ofthe Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs.in Contemporo'}'
Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Jiirgen Habermas, "New SOCIal Movements,
Telos, no. 49, Fall (1981); Alain Touraine, Return ofthe Actor: Social Theory in Post-industrial Society
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988) and Alain Touraine, "Social Movements: Special Area
or Central Problem in Sociological Analysis?" Thesis Eleven 9, July ( 1984).
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as broaching the issue of movement convergence. Moreover. their discourse-
theoretical framework has been influential both in intellectual and political terms."
The study of social movements followed a somewhat distinctive evolutionary
course in Canada. While the liberal pluralism that dominated the field in the United
States was influential, its ascendancy was mitigated by the importance of a domestic
political economy tradition. Hence social movements were for the most part
considered as "political reflexes of structural contradictions defined at an economic
level.?" Descent et al. argue that the privileged approach for analyzing social
movements in Canada was eventually constituted by a combination of political
economy and resource mobilization approaches and included substantial resistance to
European (i.e., NMT) perspectives.f
Despite its characterization in much of the NMT literature, socialist
consideration ofpolitical agency has never been limited to its more orthodox variants.
This diversity is reflected in the participatory democratic inclination of pre-Marxist
utopian socialists, as well as the range of perspectives articulated by Marxist critics of
Lenin's dominant perspective on class and agency through the early twentieth
century. Most notably, the work ofAntonio Gramsci spawned a body of 'neo-
Gramscian' theorizing across a number of disciplines beginning in the 1970s.
Frameworks built around key Gramscian concepts have been particularly prominent
in the fields ofIntemational Political Economy (lPE) and Cultural Studies.r' In the
30 Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985);
Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy," in
Marxism and the Interpretation ofCulture, ed. Nelson and Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois,
1988); Chantal Mouffe, "Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy?" Socialist Review, no. 2 (1990);
Chantal Mouffe and Emesto Laclau, "Post-Marxism Without Apologies," New Left Review, no. 166,
November-December (1987).
31 William K. Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony in a Canadian Context," in
Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed. William K. Carroll
(Toronto: Garamond, 1992), 3.
32 David Descent et aI., Classes sociales et mouvements sociaux au Quebec et au Canada (Montreal:
Editions Saint-Martin, 1989),59. The notion that English Canadian theorizing of social movements
was overwhelmingly hostile to the influence of New Movement Theory would be difficult to support
only very few years later. See for example contributions to Carroll, "Social Movements and
Counterhegemony in a Canadian Context." Laclau and Mouffe's discourse-theoretical approach
became particularly influential.
33 In IPE, see for example Robert W. Cox, "Grarnsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay
on Method," Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies 1~. no. 2 (1983) and Robert W. Cox, "Social
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latter discipline, Stuart Hall is widely regarded as the primary initiator of the turn to
Grarnsci. Hall employed Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' to characterize political
domination as contested and uncertain as well as broadening its scope to include all of
social and cultural life. Hall subsequently became a prominent exponent of an
analysis of neo-liberalism in the UK (i.e., 'Thatcherism') that was influential and
controversial due its strategic implications for left political strategy." A neo-
Grarnscian perspective has also been applied to the study of social movements,
largely as a critical response to traditional class-analytical perspectives and New
Movement Theory.35 In the Canadian context, a neo-Grarnscian perspective has been
proposed as a corrective to the prevailing political economy tradition and its lack of
attention to social identity and political agency. 36
Together, the review ofanalytical frameworks and the account of the
PCN/ACN that follow jointly reinforce the case for a synthetic theoretical approach to
cross-movement coalition formation. For the investigation of specific actors - social
movements and their organizations - the valuable micro-level organizational focus of
resource mobilization theory needs to be supplemented by attention to political
discourse. This is necessary to fully understand cross-movement relationships and to
determine the extent of convergence between movements. Clearly it is also essential if
a more normative assessment ofcounterhegemonic potential is to be attempted.
Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981).
34 See inter alia Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show," in The Politics ofThatcherism, ed.
Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983); Stuart Hall, "Gramsci and Us,"
in The Hard Road to Renewal, ed. Stuart Hall (London: Verso, 1988); Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques,
eds., The Politics ofThatcherism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983); Stuart Hall, "Authoritarian
Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al.," New Left Review, no. 151 (1985); Bob Jessop, "Authoritarian
Populism, Two Nations, and Thatcherism," New Left Review, no. 147 (1984); Bob Jessop et al.,
"Thatcherism and the Politics of Hegemony: A Reply to Stuart Hall," New Left Review, no. 153 (1985);
Stuart Hall, "Thatcherism a New Stage?" Marxism Today, February 1980; Stuart Hall, "Face the
Future," New Socialist, September 1984.
35 See for example Carl Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1986); Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct
Action in the 70s and 80s (University ofCalifornia Press, 1991); Barbara Epstein, "Rethinking Social
Movement Theory," Socialist Review, no. 1 (1990).
36 For a strong statement of the weakness of the political economy approach in its consideration of
agency, see Albo, "The 20th Anniversary of the Waffle - Canada, Left-Nationalism and Younger
Voices." Carroll and Ratner's study of the B.C. Solidarity Coalition employs a neo-Gramscian
approach. See William K. Carroll and Robert S. Ratner, "Social Democracy, Neo-Conservatism and
Hegemonic Crisis in British Columbia," Critical Sociology 16, no. I (1989).
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At the macro-level, while the political process model within RMT provides a
focus on the relationship between social movements and the political system, political
economy maintains its importance for the explanation of broader structural context. A
neo-Gramscian approach places due emphasis on issues related to agency, including
identity formation and consciousness without abstracting these from the broader
material conditions. Finally, the uniquely Canadian description 'popular sector,'
which has been used to characterize the network of social movements and
organizations that was drawn together in the 1980s, has the potential to draw together
many of the strengths of these different analytical perspectives in one conceptual
package. Overall, this framework should avoid becoming imprisoned in the range of
dualisms - i.e., movement/institution, state/civil society, reform/revolution, etc. - that
have tended to encumber pluralist, RMT, NMT and some class-analytical perspectives
while, at the same time, balancing attention to macro and micro levels, agency and
structure.
5. Methodology and Structure
Alliances and coalitions of different types and forms have often been elements
of the Left's response to crisis. After reviewing the record of class, party and
movement alliances, the first chapter proceeds with an overview of the specific
conjuncture that gave rise to the Pro-Canada Network. It focuses specifically on the
developing economic crisis and various political responses including, most
importantly, the development of the popular sector.
The second chapter turns to the task of constructing a theoretical framework
equipped to interpret the PCN/ACN. It begins with a review of different theoretical
perspectives on social movements and, more specifically, coalition formation among
movements, culminating in an attempt to equip an analytical toolbox tailored to the
needs of the Canadian experience of social movement coalition building.
In order to provide the necessary background for understanding the formation
of the peN, the next chapter follows three movements that were instrumental in this
process: labour, women and ecumenical justice. By reviewing their approaches to.
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first, political engagement and movement coalition building in particular, and second.
to the policy issue of Canada-U.S. free trade, this chapter completes the picture begun
with the outline of the parameters of structural crisis and the political responses to that
crisis set out in Chapter 1.
The three subsequent chapters (4, 5 and 6) are dedicated to the case study of
the Pro-Canada Network itself. Chapter 4 documents the formation of the Network
culminating with its participation in the 1988 federal election campaign. Chapter 5
pays particular attention to a critical moment in the PCN's development - its re-
mandating in the wake ofthe election campaign - and continues to follow the
Network as its activities expand beyond the initial focus on free trade. Chapter 6 picks
up the thread as the PCN continues to expand and simultaneously returns to free trade
as NAFTA comes onto the agenda. This chapter highlights the Network's renaming as
the Action Canada Network (ACN) in April 1991, its substantial engagement in the
constitutional debate in 1992, as well as shifts to cross-national activity and the
development and promotion of alternative policy around NAFTA. Finally, in this
chapter the seeds of the Network's eventual decline are identified.
With the objective of understanding how the Network moved so rapidly from
success to an apparent fall from grace, Chapter 7 returns to review the entire
development of the ACNIPCN with a specific focus on some key themes.
Chapter 1
The Politics of the Crisis
30
1. Introduction
This first chapter explores the background to the Pro-Canada Network's
coming into being. Beginning with an overview of the place of alliances and
coalitions in the politics of the Canadian and broader Western Left allows continuities
and differences with the specific case of the Pro-Canada Network to be established. A
review of the conjuncture and social formation - in effect, the parameters of the crisis
- out ofwhich the Network emerged, provides the background necessary for these
differences to be understood. The chapter's focus then shifts to the politics of the
crisis including responses by the state and capital and, most importantly, the shaping
of the popular sector. Tracing the development of the popular sector reveals the
contemporary roots of social movement coalition building as well as a nascent focus
on bilateral free trade, the two central elements in the formation of the Pro-Canada
Network. This chapter provides some of the key building blocks for a framework that
will help us to understand both the rise and the roots of the eventual decline of the
Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network.
2. Coalitions and the Politics of the Left
The consideration of alliances, coalitions, and more recently the convergence
of movements, has been at the centre of vigorous theoretical and strategic debate on
the Left. Theory and strategy have been well intertwined since, in the quest for a
sociological and political majority, socialist and social democratic politics have more
often than not been about the consideration of alliances and coalitions, from the most
superficial level of parliamentary and electoral alignments to more substantial
attempts at class alliances.
The construction ofunity either in theory or in practice has been driven by two
independent though interrelated rationales. First, tactical and strategic alliances are
put forward as a means for winning power in the face of apparently increasingly poor
odds and capitalism's unexpected resilience. Second. unity is viewed as necessary in
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the face of common and highly virulent enemies. Przeworski expresses the electoralist
version ofthe first dilemma in this way:
The combination of minority status with majority rule constitutes the historical
condition under which socialists have to act. This objective condition imposes
upon socialists parties a choice: socialists must choose between a party
homogeneous in its class appeal, but sentenced to perpetual electoral de teats,
and a party that struggles for electoral success at the cost of diluting its class
character. J
For Gunder Frank and Fuentes the identification of common fearsome enemies is a
key and determining ingredient in the mobilization ofunity:
[B]oth the opportunities for coalition and the massiveness and strength of
social mobilization are probably enhanced when people perceive that they
must defend themselves against these enemies.i
Eduard Bernstein set the groundwork for modem European social democracy.
In his theoretical revision of class theory, Bernstein argued, among other things, for a
parliamentary alliance with the liberal middle class and the peasantry to bring about a
gradual democratic transformation ofcapitalism. This strategy for constituting an
electoral majority for socialism was rooted in Bernstein's rejection of the inevitability
of capitalist crisis and the impoverishment of the middle class.' The German SPD
eventually adopted it during the Weimar period, as did most social democratic parties
after 1917.
Facing the rise of fascism, yet another form of coalition or alliance building
was put forward as a strategic response on the Left. Pioneered on the French Left, the
Front populaire saw the Communist and Socialist parties agreeing to a Unity program
in 1934. Later, after it was joined by the centrist Radical Party, the Front populaire
swept into office. Taking its lead from French developments and following Stalin' s
directives for the defence of the Soviet Union and 'socialism in one country' against
fascism, the Communist International officially adopted the popular front tactic.
I Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," New Left Review, no. 122
(1980): 39.
2 Andre Gunder Frank and Marta Fuentes, "Nine Theses on Social Movements," ifda dossier, no. 63,
JanuaryfFebruary (1988): 43.
3 Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (New York: Schocken, 1961); Peter Ga:-> Thc.Dile~m/(J (?l
Democratic Socialism; Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York.: Columbia University Press,
1952).
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[T]he core ofthe Popular Front strategy was unity. It was a set of concentric
cir~les .of unity: at its center the United Front of the working class movement,
which In tum formed the basis ofan even broader anti-fascist People's Front."
This strategy did not gain unanimous support on the European Left. Critics
ranged from George Orwell who imagined the "nauseous spectacle ofbishops,
Communists, cocoa magnates, publishers, duchesses and Labour MP's marching arm
in arm to the tune of Rule Britannia" to the Trotskyist Left Opposition.' Whereas
Trotsky himself had, as early as 1933, advocated the 'united front' of the Left as a
tactic in the war against fascism, he opposed the "diluting of an energetic working
class response" in the broader cross-class alliance represented by the popular front."
In the aftermath of the Second World War, American pluralist social scientists
identified a burgeoning middle class as a new, moderate political centre and
consequently the key to American capitalism's stability. During the 1950s this
analysis was exported to Europe where it influenced the German SPD's revisionist
awakening at its Bad Godesberg conference in 1959, and to England forming the basis
for a series of sociological treatises used to support similar strategic changes within
the British Labour Party in the wake ofa crushing electoral defeat in the same year.
The embourgeoisement thesis argued that Labour's traditional working class base was
being eroded by an increasingly affluent society. While the sociological argument did
not go unchallenged, the political logic generated a spate of literature and its own
momentum.' Abrams, Crosland and others drew strategic conclusions from the basic
4 Eric Hobsbawm, "Forty Years of Popular Front Governments," Marxism Today, July 1976,23.
5 George Orwell quoted in John Coombes, "British Intellectuals and the Popular Front," in Class,
Culture and Social Change, ed. Frank Glovesmith (Sussex: Harvester, 1980), 72.
6 Leon Trotsky, The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971): On the
popular front and social movements in Canada in the 1930s, see Joan Sangster, Dreams ofEquality:
Women on the Canadian Left 1920-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1989).
7 See for example John Westergaard, "The Withering Away of Class," in Towards Socialism, ed. Perry
Anderson and Robin Blackburn (London: Fontana, 1965); John Westergaard and Henrietta Resler,
Class in a Capitalist Society: a Study ofContemporary Britain (London: Heinemann, 1975)~ and John
Goldthorpe, The A.fJluent Worker in the Class Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1969). A long tradition of sociological analysis that attempts to draw causal linkages be~ween ch~ges
in class structure and the decreasing strength of the labour movement has played a dominant role in
debates of the Western left. Comparing wave after wave of these theorizations, Cronin notes, for
example, the similarities between Laclau and MoufTe's NMT ar~en~tion (see Chapte~ 2 below) and
the embourgeoisement thesis that drove social democratic moderation m the ~ostwar ?erlod: James L
Cronin, Labour and Society in Britain 1918-1979 (London: Batsford Academic and E.ducatlOna.1. .
1984), 9. Cronin concludes elsewhere that: "[tjhough the labels attached to the analysis have shifted It
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premise that class was losing its salience as a socio-economic category." The central
political goal of the revisionist project was to expunge Clause Four, which included a
commitment to common ownership of the means of production, from the Labour
Party's constitution in an effort to moderate it and gain popular support. 9
During this same period the Communist Parties of Western Europe were
undergoing their own process of theoretical and strategic change. The exposure of
Stalinist crimes, the Eastern European revolts and the rise ofEast- West detente,
combined with an assessment ofchanges in social structure in postwar capitalism, led
to the gradual development ofEurocommunism out ofpopular frontism. 10 The Italian
Communist Party (PCI) was the first to venture down this path with a series of
organizational changes beginning in the 1940s culminating in Enrico Berlinger's
enunciation of the "compromesso istorico' in 1973. By accepting the challenge of
electoralism, the Italian, Spanish and French parties all accepted alliances as both
possible and necessary. The PCl's compromesso istorico led to that party supporting
the Christian Democrats in power while the PCF eventually developed a common
program with the French Socialist Party. At the level of class analysis these parties
developed theoretical justifications for their new strategic direction. For the PCF, state
monopoly capitalist theory was, as Althusser called it, "a theory made to order."!' It
articulated the PCF's new political project with monopoly capitalism by arguing that
the monopoly stage ofcapitalism had developed the basis for a broad anti-monopoly
alliance. To wit, the rapidly emerging 'couches intermediaires' as well as non-
monopoly fractions of the bourgeoisie are increasingly alienated by a state which is
itself more and more directly involved in the formation of monopoly projects at the
has a continuity and a continuing allure." in James E. Cronin, "Politics, Class Structure, and the
Enduring Weakness of British Social Democracy," Journal ofSocial History 16, no. 3 (1983): 130.
8 Ross "Marxism and the New Middle Classes: French Critiques," 163.,
9 Colin Leys, Politics in Britain (London: Verso, 1983); Peter Bleyer, "The N.ew ~ealism: A Socialist
Response to the Crisis in Britain" (BA Honours Research Paper, Carleton University, 1985).
10 Boggs suggests that "Eurocommunism represents the continuous redefinition and transformation of
frontism to suit an evolving Mediterranean Socialist strategy." Carl Boggs, The Impasse ofEuropean
Communism (Boulder: Westview Press, 198~), ..tl.
II Louis Althusser, "What Must Change in the Party," New Left Review, no. 109 (1978): 36.
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expense of all others sectors in society. In this context, they argue, the working class
must moderate its position and assume a hegemonic role in an anti-monopoly
alliance. 12
The anti-monopoly capital alliance was not in any real sense a new concept.
More radical elements in the Front populaire of the 1930s justified their tactics by
arguing that the enemy behind fascism could be limited to the '200familles', the
small monopoly fraction of the French bourgeoisie. Eurocommunism simply marked
the internalization ofmany components of frontist politics and their development into
a comprehensive strategic vision. The defensive tactics developed to deal with a
specific and particularly lethal conjunctural threat were reinterpreted to form the basis
for a conception of the transition to socialism, with the fear of fascism now reflected
in a vigilant defence of liberal democracy. Ross' warning that "such alliance
construction rests on a complicated, and quite precarious, political calculus" was
formulated with regards to monopoly capital theory but could easily be applied to a
broader range of similar projects. 13
A new wave of sociological obituaries for class analysis and the working
class' potential as political agency accompanied the end of the postwar boom and the
growing crisis in Western capitalism. 14 In The Forward March ofLabour Halted?
Eric Hobsbawm draws a direct correlation between decreasing electoral support for
the British Labour Party since the end of the 1940s and the numerical decline of the
12 See for example Paul Boccara, Le Capitalisme monopoliste d'Etat (Paris: Editions sociales, 1976);
other theoretical concepts developed in France during this period include: the new working class in
Serge Mallet, La Nouvelle c1asse ouvriere (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969); and the nouvelle petite
bourgeoisie in Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books,
1975).
13 Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Classes: French Critiques," 169. "Because Eurocommunism
places almost exclusive emphasis on an electoral-parliamentary strategy it narrows conflict to the
"bourgeois political institutional realm." Boggs, The Impasse of~uropeanCommunism., 135: E~~SI
Mandel adds that "Relations between classes are reduced to relations between leaderships at political
parties." Ernest Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism (London: New Left Books, I l>78), 197.
Similarly, Fernando Claudin, theorist and leader of the Spanish Communi~t.Party, charg~,s .
Eurocommunism with "the dissociation of the social struggle from the political struggle. Fernando
Claudin, Eurocommunism and Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), 108.
14 See inter alia Andre Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class: an Essay on Post-industrial Socialism.
(London: Pluto, 1982).
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manual working class. 15 Meanwhile, seeing little hope of challenging the Labour
Party's status as the pre-eminent political organization of the working class, the
British Communist Party (CPGB) had evolved its own variant of the Eurocommunist
project by 1977. Given the Labour Party's quasi-exclusive relationship with the trade
unions, the CPGB's 'broad democratic alliance'tended to echo the aspirations of
other social movements. 16 After the Labour government's defeat in the general
elections of 1979, Thatcherite Toryism in power became the driving force behind this
and a wider range ofalliance building strategies. The 'New Realists' identified the
radicalism and populism ofThatcherism as a novel and significant threat. In the
Politics ofThatcherism, Hall and Jacques proposed that the labour movement
construct the "broadest set of alliances against Thatcherism involving, in the initial
instance, quite modest objectives.t'V
More recently, European social democracy has been revived under the banner
of the Third Way. This moniker is currently associated with the programs and policies
adopted by European labour and social democratic parties and most specifically by
the UK's 'New Labour' government led by Tony Blair. 'New Labour' initially
engaged in limited parliamentary alliance building with the Liberal Democratic Party
on specific issues (e.g. proportional representation). More importantly, by retaining a
measure of the Thatcherite program that preceeded it, Labour aspires to provide a
basis for a cross-class alliance of the moderate Left, Centre and moderate Right that,
15 Eric Hobsbawm, The Forward March ofLabour Halted? (London: New Left Books, 1981).
Hobsbawm goes on, in the early 1980s, to tie together this fact, his esteem for the popular front tactic -
whose legacy he believes includes "the greatest advances for the Left in Europe since the Russian
Revolution" - and the threat of Thatcherism, to argue for an electoral pact between the Labour Party
and the centrist SOP-Liberal Alliance. See Eric Hobsbawm, "The Retreat into Extremism," Marxism
Today, April 1985, 10 and Eric Hobsbawm, "Labour: Rump or Rebirth?" Marxism Today, March 1984,
10.
16 Sarah Benton "Eurocommunism and The British Road to Socialism," in Socialist Strategies, ed.,
David Coates and Gordon Johnston (London: Martin Robertson, 1983). Forgacs explains the limits of
the CPGB's alliance strategy as follows: "the CP arrived at a radical programme for building
progressive social alliances but without any equivalent renewal of the political forms and agencies
necessary for carrying out such a programme... How, for instance, could one reconcile in the political
practice of the post-1977 CP an advocacy of a plurality of prowessive mo~e~ents, in which no one
movement claimed supremacy or a monopoly of knowledge, WIth the Leninist .form ofth~ p~
governed by the principle of democratic centralism'?" David Forgacs, "Grarnsci and Marxism In
Britain," New Left Review, no. 176, July-August (1989): 85.
17 Hall and Jacques, eds., The Politics of Thatcherism. 16.
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its proponents claim, would in effect supersede class and, some have recently argued,
party as well. 18 The nature of the electoral system affects the relative importance of
parliamentary and electoral coalition building on the Left. Whereas proportional
representation tends to result more often than not in parliamentary or governmental
coalitions, this result is much less common under the Westminster-style first-past-the-
post system shared by Canada and the UK. While alliances are less frequent at the
electoral/parliamentary level, they have been an important part of the extra-
parliamentary and internal party dynamics of social democratic parties in both
contexts, as have frequent and urgent appeals for party unity often accompanied by
dramatic disciplinary action to ensure it."
2.1 The Canadian Left
In 1929, the various labour and socialist parties in western Canada established
a Western Conference ofLabor Political Parties "to unify the activities of the
affiliated parties... and to bring about he entire unification of the Labor and Socialist
Movement throughout Western Canada.t'/'' The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation (CCF), formed in 1933 with the drafting ofthe Regina Manifesto, was
itself a project ofalliance building. While the labour movement remained largely
aloof from a formation that defmed itself as "farmer, labour, socialist," the CCF did
bring socialists into an alliance with grassroots agrarian radicalism and a powerful
social gospel tradition, both important forces on the prairies."
18 See Peter Mair, "Partyless Democracy: Solving the Paradox of New Labour?" New Left Review 2,
no. 2 (2000).
19 For references to studies indicating link between proportional representation and the emergence of
parties rooted in social movements, see Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An
Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 268.
20 Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, ed. John Meisel, vol. 4, Studies in the Structure of
Power: Decision-making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 2.
21 On the social gospel tradition, see Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in
Canada, 1914-28 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). As Morley notes "an extraordinary
proportion of the early leadership were clergymen." J.T. Morley, Secular Socialists: the CCFli\DP in
Ontario, A Biography (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 126. On
agrarian radicalism in 1920-30s Western Canada, see the classic text by William Irvine, 711(' Farmers
in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); see also David La~cock: Populism and
Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Pres~,
1990) and Chapter 6 in Norman Penner, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis (Toronto: Prentice-
Hall, 1977).
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The next phase in the evolution of the dominant social democratic strand of
the Canadian Left was the formation ofNew Democratic Party in 1961 with the
support of the CCF and the newly formed Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). The
resolution passed by the CLC endorsing the formation of a new party. indicated ..the
fullest desire for the broadest possible participation ofall individuals and groups
genuinely interested in basic democratic social reform." Moreover, the new party
would be "a political instrument of the Canadian people.':" It would represent a
"fundamental realignment ofpolitical forces in Canada in ... a broadly-based people's
political movement which [would embrace] the CCF, the labour movement, farmer
organizations, professional people and other liberally minded persons interested in
basic social reform and reconstruction through our parliamentary system of
government. ,,23
The formation of the NDP both followed and flowed from a continuous and
seemingly irreversible decline in postwar electoral support for the CCF. Having
reached its high point during wartime, the CCF could not break through at the federal
level due to its lack of success beyond the prairies." The first response to this impasse
was the gradual modification and moderation of the party program culminating in the
replacement of 'anti-capitalist' language of the Regina Manifesto with a less
combative Winnipeg Declaration as the party's platform document in 1956. Despite
these efforts, the 1958 federal election dealt the CCF a further, and it would tum out
final. blow. The party was reduced to five western seats while the leader, M.l.
Coldwell, lost his own."
~2 Keith Archer, Political Choices and Electoral Consequences: A Study ofOrganized Labour and the
New Democratic Party (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990),23:
Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, 203.
23 Bryan Palmer, Working-Class Experience: the Rise and Reconstitution ofCanadian Labour, 1800-
1980, ed. George A. Rawlyk and Bruce W. Hodgin, Political Issues in their Historical Perspective
(Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1983),288; Young, The Anatomy ofa Party: The National CCF 1932-
1961,132.
24 See Chapter 2 in Archer, Political Choices and Electoral Consequences: A Study ofOrganized
Labour and the New Democratic Party: CCF historian Walter Young refers to this as the period when
"the party had been slowly bleeding to death at the polls." Young, The Anatomy ofa Party: The
National CCF 1932-1961,128.
~5 Archer, Political Choices and Electoral Consequences A Study ofOrganized Labour and the New
Democratic Party, 23.
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Just as the NDP's strategic shifts and policy reformulations of the fifties and
early sixties were at least in part responses to a historical period dominated by
postwar prosperity and the Cold War, the rebirth of a broader Left, nationalist ferment
and the early stages of economic downturn combined to create a new dynamic.
Against the centrist alliance building of the party establishment, the Waffle proposed
a new alliance politics intended to harness both nationalism and New Left.26 While its
own proposed manifesto and leadership candidate were defeated, the 1969 NDP
convention adopted resolutions partly inspired by the Waffle. One of these identified
"millions of Canadians [who] share our faith in Canada and our determination to
strengthen and enrich Canada's independence and place in the world" because
"continental integration has become so pervasive that Canadians who value an
independent Canada and New Democrats who reject the values of corporate
capitalism now share a common agenda.?"
While the NDP had only limited success at the federal level over the next
thirty years, the party's provincial wings formed governments several times in
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Unexpectedly, Bob Rae led the
Ontario wing to power for one difficult term in 1990. In 1985, two elections prior to
this victory, the ONDP had supported a minority Liberal government on the basis of a
post-election accord on a shared legislative agenda." In his history of the Rae
government, Thomas Walkom describes the party's lack of serious consideration of
the ramifications ofparliamentary coalitions as it debated the merits ofa more formal
governing coalition versus a more limited accord." In 1999, the Saskatchewan NDP
would form just such a coalition government with the provincial Liberal Party after a
poor poll result greeted its quest for a second term.
26 Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, 273.
27 Quoted in ibid., 274~ The Waffle's Manifesto 'For an Independent and Socialist Canada' presented -
and defeated - at the 1969 NOP convention helped place economic nationalism on the public agenda
and lay the groundwork for the battle against continentalism then, and later around the Free Trade
Agreement.
28 Alan Whitehorn, "Audrey McLaughlin and the Decline of the Federal NOP." in Party Politics in
Canada, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn (Toronto: Prentice Hall. 1994),323.
29 Thomas Walkom, Rae Days: The Rise and Fall ofthe NDP (Toronto: Key Porter, 1995).
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Alliances, of class and of party, have been critically important to the politics
ofthe Left beginning in the late nineteenth century. In the Canadian context this has
included electorally driven attempts at class alliances as well as the odd parliamentary
coalition. Against this backdrop the formation of the Pro-Canada Network appears as
an attempt at coalescing progressive social forces beyond the parameters of more
narrow parliamentary politics.
The PCN's formation in response to the perceived danger of Canada-U.S. free
trade does evoke memories of popular frontism. Similarly, the broad nature of the
social forces it brought together in the attempt to defeat free trade - reaching beyond
the labour movement and, to some extent, the traditional constituencies of the Left -
is reminiscent of both social democratic and Eurocommunist calculations and
aspirations of the postwar period.
Most importantly, in the Canadian context, the PCN represented a break with
the narrower focus on parliamentary party politics that emerged out ofa specific
historical conjuncture. As the postwar boom ended and economic crisis took hold, a
variety of old, new and renewed social forces developed a new dynamic. It is to the
parameters and politics of this crisis that we now turn in our quest to understand the
emergence of a Canadian popular sector and, out of it, the Pro-Canada Network.
3. Parameters of the Crisis
Whereas the American economy had ruled the postwar period unchallenged,
by the early 1960s the defeated superpowers of World War II - West Germany, at the
heart of the European Community, and Japan - were re-emerging as economic
powerhouses. By the 1970s, western economies faced the additional challenge of
competition from the newly industrializing countries in Asia and a dramatic indicator
that access to cheap natural resources - a key engine of postwar capitalist
development - was crumbling. The two oil shocks, the OPEC oil embargo in 1973
40
and the Iranian Revolution in 1979, would drive oil prices up by as much as fifteen
hundred percent in the course of a decade'"
While the structural economic crisis that developed in Canada during the
1970s and culminated in the 1981-82 recession was clearly part of a broader
international phenomenon, it also owed much to the particular nature of Canada's
economic development. Because it was highly dependent on primary sector exports,
the Canadian economy was directly affected by international developments such as
the increasing production ofminerals in the Third World and its manufacturing sector
was crippled by high levels of foreign (mostly American) ownership which limited
investment in R&D and technological innovation. A series of government reports and
an explosion of academic literature detailed the damaging consequences of
dependence'"
Even more fundamentally, the continentalist orientation of Canadian postwar
mode of development - defined by some as "permeable fordism"-left it vulnerable to
the economic vagaries of its giant southern neighbour and limited the effectiveness of
Keynesian demand management tools.f Canada's vulnerability was exposed by the
failure to be exempted from Nixonomics - "a series of draconian measures to shore
up the American economy at the expense of its trading partners. ,,33
After the protectionist measures initiated by the Nixon Administration in an
attempt to solve its own domestic economic problems, it appeared that the Canadian
economy was tightly tied to a falling star. The United States faced daunting
challenges from new economic rivals and its share of world exports fell to 10 percent
30 Jeanine Brodie, The Political Economy ofCanadian Regionalism (Toronto: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1990), 183.
3\ Among the most prominent reports were Foreign Ownership and the Structure ofCanadian
Industry: Report ofthe Task Force on the Structure ofCanadian Industry, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1968) and Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report, (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1957). Bashevkin provides an extensive bibliography in the notes to Chapter I of True Patriot
Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991).
32 Jane Jenson, "Representations in Crisis: The Roots of Canada's Permeable Fordisrn.' Canadian
Journal 0/ Political Science XXIII, no. 4 (1990); Rianne Mahon, "Post-Fordism: Some Issues for
Labour," in The New Era ofGlobal Competition, State Policy and Market Power, 00. Daniel Drache
and Gertler (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1991).
33 Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1985), 8.
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in 1980 from 22 percent in 1950.34 By the mid-1970s the Canadian economy faced a
plummeting rate of productivity combined with booming inflation and high
unemployment. While productivity continued to grow at an average annual rate of2.3
percent between 1967 and 1973, from 1974 to 1981 it was at a virtual standstill. 35 In
1975, inflation hit 10.8 percent and by 1978 unemployment was pushing 9 percent."
In a new era characterized by global economic instability, the domestic crisis reached
its full proportions after the second oil shock in 1979 and as the impact of the
implementation of monetarism, in both the U.S. and Canada, began to be felt. By
1981, the Canadian economy had collapsed into a full-fledged recession with
unemployment peaking at 12.3 percent in 1983 and an additional 2.9 percent of the
workforce not actively seeking employment due to market conditions" From 1979 to
1983, business bankruptcies doubled in number - from 5,474 to 10,913 - and more
than quadrupled in net losses - from $342 million to $1,885 million.38 The recession
was hard felt in Canada's manufacturing sector with 194,000 jobs lost in one year
alone." A plummeting rate of manufacturing capacity utilization that went from a
peak of95.2 percent in 1974 to 66.3 percent in 1982 as corporations moved
production out of Canada provides further dramatic evidence ofeconomic decline."
As international demand decreased, continuing fiscal stimulation drove domestic
demand for imports resulting in an increasing current account deficit.41
34 Jack Warnock, Free Trade and The New Right Agenda (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1988),58.
35 Quoted in Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, 296; see also Manuel Castells, The Rise
ofthe Network Society, First ed., 3 vols., vol. I, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 72 table 2.2.
36 Warnock, Free Trade and The New Right Agenda, 44.
37 Ibid., 4 table 6.
38 Ibid., 46.
39 James Laxer, Leap ofFaith: Free Trade and the Future ofCanada (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers,
1986), 12; see also Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, 297 and Brodie, The Political
Economy ofCanadian Regionalism, 184.
40 Warnock, Free Trade and The New Right Agenda, 47.
41 David A. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-
1982," in Modern Canada: 1930s - 1980s, ed. Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1984), 64-71; David Wolfe, "The Canadian State in Comparative
Perspective," Canadian Review ofSociology and Anthropology 26, no. I (1989): 118.
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4. The Politics of the Crisis
Following on the tails of the postwar boom, economic crisis was joined by a
broad wave of collective protest that swept Canada and the world. A major
component of this upsurge in contestation was increasing labour militancy. Economic
growth and the development of the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) set the stage for a
rapid increase in the rate of unionization as well as changes in occupational structure
that began to transform the labour movement in all capitalist countries starting in the
1960s. The proliferation and extension of state programs and trade union rights drove
an upsurge in public sector employment and unionization. In Canada, by 1986 the
public sector accounted for 26.2 percent ofall employment; by 1980, 45.8 percent of
union members worked in the public sector - in the U.S. the equivalent figure was
only 34.9 percent.Y Organizing workers in public, health and educational institutions
was the basis for more than two-thirds of the increase in union membership from 1966
to 1976.43 Combined with continuing economic expansion, the result was not only
rapid growth for the labour movement but its demographic recomposition as more
women employed in the public sector and the private service sector entered the mix.
The change was dramatic: whereas women accounted for 15.4 percent of union
membership in 1962, by 1986 this figure was up to 36.4 percent. 44
The size and influence of Canadian as opposed to 'international' (i.e.,
American) unions also increased substantially. Whereas 70 percent of trade unionists
belonged to international unions in 1965, only 50 percent did in 1975, and this
number fell to less than 40 percent a decade later." Canadianization was, at first,
largely a consequence of growth in public sector employment with the Canadian
Union ofPublic Employees (CUPE), the National Union ofProvincial and General
42 Ian Robinson, "Economistic Unionism in Crisis: The Origins, Consequences, and Prospects of
Divergence in Labour-Movement Characteristics," in The Challenge .ofRestructuri~g: N.0rth American
Labor Movements Respond, ed. J. Jenson and R. Mahon (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1993),31.
43 Larry Katz, "The Attack on the Public Sector: Counter Strategy," This Magazine 1979,43.
44 Mary Lou Coates, Arrowsmith, David and Courchene, Melanie, "The Current Industrial Relations
Scene in Canada," Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. Kingston, Ontario, 1989.
45 Leo Pan itch and Donald Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: from Wage Controls to
Social Contract (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1993), 142.
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Employees, the Public Service Alliance and the Canadian Union of Postal Workers
coming to represent a large proportion oforganized workers. By mid-1975. with
210,000 members CUPE had become the country's largest union." By the early
1970s, the number of Canadian sections disaffiliating from their U.S.-based parent
unions was also contributing to the trend."
The growth and changing composition of the labour movement combined with
other factors - including a still tight labour market and shifting perspectives because
of challenges to Cold War assumptions -led to increasing militancy. While working
time lost to strikes and lockouts averaged one percent from 1960 and 1965. from 1966
to 1975 it more than tripled to 3.6 percent." Militancy was not limited to traditional
'bread and butter' demands. Unions and union activists were increasingly engaged in
struggles around a variety of social and economic demands." The new face of labour
- Canadian, public sector, women, and minorities - also brought new issues to the
bargaining table. 50 As Katz explains:
The narrow, business unionist approach to trade unionism, which has been the
predominant characteristic of Canadian labour history, is particularly
unsuitable to the public sector. It isolates workers form their natural allies and
in far too many cases it has paved the way for employers successfully dividing
public sector workers from the citizens they serve.51
Nor was militancy limited to the labour movement as anti-war, student.
women's and labour struggles in Europe and North America were added to continuing
liberation struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America.Y In Canada, these struggles
46 Palmer, Working-Class Experience: the Rise and Reconstitution ofCanadian Labour, 1800-1980,
265.
47 See Robert Laxer, Canada's Unions (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1976).
·18 Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social
Contract, 15.
49 See Palmer, Working-Class Experience: the Rise and Reconstitution ofCanadian Labour, 1800-
1980,264-65; and Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls 10
Social Contract.
50 Briskin and Yanz also argue that this new 'face' created a more receptive audience for the strategy of
coalition building. Linda Briskin and Linda Yanz, eds., Union Sisters: Women in the Labour Movement
(Toronto: Women's Press, 1983), 67-199, 259-376.
51 Larry Katz, "The Attack on the Public Sector: Counter Strategy," This Magazine, March 1979.43.
52 As we have seen, these developments posed a substantial challenge to the traditional pluralist
perspective on collective action and social movements as well as to those holding, political and
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were joined by an increasing organized commitment to social justice activism from
within Canada's mainstream Christian churches, a growing sentiment and organized
advocacy for cultural and economic nationalism in 'English Canada' and elements of
a national liberation movement in Quebec.
In Canada as elsewhere, the 1960s saw the rebirth ofthe women's movement
with the arrival of its second wave: the women's liberation movement. This period ran
from the formation of the Voice of Women in 1960, through a multiplicity of feminist
organizations and projects, and culminating with the founding of the National Action
Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). NAC was formed in 1972 with the
objective of monitoring the federal government's implementation of the
recommendations made by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW).
NAC subsequently broadened its mandate and evolved into a mammoth coalition of
women's organizations with 130 member groups in 1977 and more than 500 member
groups by the mid-1980s.53
Thanks to its growing strength, the feminist political process it practiced, and
its particular discourse, the women's movement played a central role in the
development ofa Canadian popular sector and consensus-based coalition politics. 54 In
their account of the emergence ofNAC at the centre of the women's movement,
Vickers et al. argue that the Canadian women's movement does not fit easily into any
of the categories put forward in a standard typology ofwomen's activism - i.e.,
interest group, ideological/left-wing, or state equality feminism. They suggest that in
the case ofEnglish Canada there is "evidence instead of the emergence of an
integrative model that includes aspects ofall three. ,,55 They argue further that the
economic power.
53 Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 138.
54 For more background on the politics of the Canadian women's movement, see Jill Vickers, "Bending
the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Debates on Feminization of Organization and Political Process in the
English Canadian Women's Movement, 1970-1988," in Women and Social Change: Feminist Activism
in Canada, ed. Jeri D. Wine and Janice L. Ristock (Toronto: Lorimer, 1991) and Nancy Adamson,
Linda Briskin, and Margaret McPhail, Feminist Organizing/or Change (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1988); see also Chapter 3 below.
55 Jill Vickers, Pauline Rankin, and Christine Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political
Analysis ofthe National Action Committee on the Status ofWomen (Toronto: University of Toronto,
1993),699.
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movement was characterized by a "radical liberal" worldview that "embodied a
commitment to the ordinary political process, a belief in the welfare state, a belief in
the efficacy of state action in general to remedy injustices, a belief that change is
possible, a belief that dialogue is useful and may help promote change, and a belief
that service or helping others is a valid contribution to the process of change." Vickers
et al. conclude that this perspective predisposed the Canadian women's movement to
work effectively in coalitions while limiting the sway of American feminist ideas that
were far more likely to tend towards anti-statism.56
A Canadian peace movement with two strands - one focused on opposition to
the war in Vietnam, the other galvanized by the purchase of the nuclear capable
Bomarc-B missiles in 1959 and their arrival on Canadian soil in 1963 - joined the
fray. As the names ofprominent peace groups indicate (e.g. Combined University
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Student Union for Peace Action) students
played a central role. 57 Along with its sister movements in Europe and the United
States, the Canadian peace movement entered a new phase of activism after the two-
track Pershing and Cruise Missile decision by NATO in 1979 and the Canadian
government's 1983 agreement to test the Cruise on its soi1.58
The activist ethos of the times even infected Canadian churches. The five
mainstream Christian churches - Roman Catholic, United, Anglican, Presbyterian and
Lutheran - worked together to form a series ofecumenical coalitions all broadly
targeting social justice work. GATT-Fly, the coalition on international trade and
development issues, was one of the first of these. At least 11 more interchurch
coalitions would form over the course of the decade including the Task Force on
Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TICCER), Ten Days for World
Development, and Project North (now the Aboriginal Rights Coalition). All of these
56 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of H'omen, 36.
57 Myrna Kostash, "The New Left," This Magazine, December 1980, 30~ see also G. Moffatt, A History
ofthe Peace Movement in Canada (Ottawa: Grapevine Press, 1982).
58 Kostash, "The New Left."
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projects became vehicles for social change work and for more learning about the
many intricacies of coalition building.59
Last but not least, this was a period of increasing interest in and mobilization
around nationalist themes, particularly economic and cultural. These were reflected in
the demands of other movements - peace, labour, church, and women - and embodied
in the formation ofthe Waffle and, one year later, the Committee for an Independent
Canada (CIC). Founded in 1970 by former Liberal cabinet minister Walter Gordon,
Toronto Star editor Peter C. Newman, and Canadian Forum magazine editor Abraham
Rotstein, the CIC's steering committee was made up of thirteen Canadians from
different partisan political backgrounds, including Edmonton publisher Mel Hurtig,
former Tory cabinet minister Alvin Hamilton, Le Devoir editor Claude Ryan, and past
NDP party president Eamon Park. In June 1971 a CIC delegation presented Prime
Minister Trudeau with a petition bearing 170,000 signatures calling for greater
Canadian independence. 60 While the Waffle and CIC were the most prominent
organizational vehicles for cultural and economic nationalism, it was also reflected in
efforts to create Canadian Studies programs and curricula, to oppose the dominance of
American periodicals Time and Readers Digest and to scuttle resource mega
projects.61
These were challenging times for the liberal democratic status quo. It faced
criticism of corporate power from the 'old' and 'new' Left, nationalist ferment across
59 See Chapter 3 below.
60 Nancy L.M. Russell, "The Return of the Nationalists," Canadian Forum, October 1985, 7: on
conflict between the CIC and the Waffle, see Christina McCall Newman, "Growing Up Reluctantly."
Maclean's, August 1972. McCall Newman describes the formation of the CIC as in part a competitive
response to the Waffle: "That the Waffle was the only organized independentist movement in the
country dismayed Gordon and Rotstein because they believed it would isolate nationalistic ideas in a
fringe movement so remote from the Canadian political mainstream that they could never be realized."
McCall Newman, "Growing Up Reluctantly," 58. Hurtig confirms the rivalry between the CIC and the
Waffle, describes the intensity of dislike for the CIC within the CLC-affiliated labour movement and
discusses the history of the CIC in detail. Mel Hurtig, At Twilight in the Country, Memoirs ofa
Canadian Nationalist (Toronto: Stoddart, 1996), 102-03, 13-16, 98-32.
61 In fact, Laxer argues that Canadians were driven to develop a variety of independent nationalist
campaigns by the absence of support from the mainstream labour and NDP leaderships for nationalist
causes. "At the beginning of the 1970s, the first rumblings of change in the Canadian union movement
held out little hope that transformation of the NOP into a left-nationalist party would be possible. Many
Canadians had begun to look elsewhere for a political or cultural expression of their developing
nationalism." Laxer, Canada's Unions, 311.
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the political spectrum, new social forces testing the limits ofacceptable protest, while
militarism and discrimination were under the microscope. The emergence of these
voices and their mobilization was a significant and necessary moment in the
development of the Canadian popular sector. Many of the movements and
organizations that would constitute it (e.g. NAC, ecumenical coalitions) were formed:
a key theme (nationalism) took shape; and cracks in the 'two-and-one-half party
system opened space for extra-parliamentary politics. To understand the next step in
the process that led to the formation of the Pro-Canada Network we first need to
examine how the state and capital responded to the challenge.
4.1 The State
Initially, the Canadian state responded to the evolving crisis on two fronts.
First, the Trudeau Liberal government borrowed from the nationalist critiques of
foreign ownership, undertaking a series of tentative interventions in the economy.
These included the Canada Development Corporation (CDC) in 1971, the Foreign
Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and a publicly owned oil company, Petro Canada,
in 1973. While clearly targeted at diminishing foreign investment and economic
dependence on the United States, these measures fell far short of the coherent
industrial strategy suggested from different perspectives by the Gordon, Watkins and
Gray Reports.f
Second, guided by first the Pearson and then the Trudeau government, the
state responded to the growing demands ofnew social actors by proposing
consultation and providing some support. The Pearson government initiated the
groundbreaking Company of Young Canadians (CYC) in the mid-1960s. 63
Subsequently, and particularly from 1968 to 1972, funding for citizens groups or non-
governmental organizations from the department of Secretary of State increased
dramatically. Federal funding rose from $9,578,115 in 1962 to $51,467,044 in 1972,
62 See above; Brodie and Jenson, Crisis. Challenge and Change, 312-18.
6.1 Susan Phillips, "How Ottawa Blends: Shifting Government Relationships with Interest Groups," in
How Ottawa Spends, ed. Frances Abele (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), 189.
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moving from 45 to 64 percent of these groups' overall budgets." Important initiatives
undertaken during this period include the establishment of the Women's Program
through the Department of Secretary of State and the funding of the National Indian
Brotherhood (later the Assembly ofFirst Nations).65
The impact of state funding has been the subject ofdebate, especially within
the women's movement. Many have argued that government support served either to
coopt - i.e., "reincorporate potentially dissident groups into the mainstream of
society," to reinforce more conservative forces within movements or as an,
"inexpensive alternative to a coercive approach and a way ofdefusing criticism."66
Referring specifically to the CYC initiative that targeted youth in the heyday of the
New Left, Kostash refers to the "cooptive tactics of the state tarted up as community
action projects with lots of bucks.t''" Indeed, Pal points to evidence that most
programs were designed with a "cooptive strategy in mind. ,,68 While there is no doubt
the Liberal nationalist initiatives ofthis period were similarly intended to coopt or
harness some of the public support for left nationalism, Watkins points out that,
there is considerable consensus among a variety of commentators that the
Waffle and the CIC were critical ingredients in creating the environment that
forced Trudeau's hand with respect to CDC, FIRA and to some extent Petro-
Canada.69
64 Martin Loney, "A Political Economy of Citizen Participation," in The Canadian State, ed. Leo
Panitch (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1977).
65 Sue Findlay, "Facing the State: The Politics of the Women's Movement Reconsidered," in Feminism
and Political Economy: Women's Work, Women's Struggles, ed. Heather Jon Maroney and Meg Luxton
(Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1987); Loney, "A Political Economy of Citizen Participation" ; David
Long, "Culture, Ideology, and Militancy: The Movement ofNative Indians in Canada, 1969-91," in
Organizing Dissent, ed. William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond, 1992).
66 Arguments proposed, in order by Loney, "A Political Economy of Citizen Participation," 448;
Phillips, "How Ottawa Blends: Shifting Government Relationships with Interest Groups," 198; and
Roxana Ng, The Politics ofCommunity Services: Immigration, Women, Class and State (Toronto:
Garamond Press, 1988), 27.
67 Kostash, "The New Left," 32.
68 Leslie A. Pal, Interests ofState: The Politics ofLanguage, Multiculturalism and Feminism in
Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993),48; with regard to funding of native
groups, see Sally Weaver, "The Joint CabinetINIB Committee: A Unique Experiment in Press~e
Group Politics," Canadian Public Administration 25 (1982); on the women's movement, see VIckers,
Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis 0/ the National Action
Committee on the Status 0/ Women; Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail, Feminist Organizing/or Change ;
Findlay, "Facing the State: The Politics of the Women's Movement Reconsidered"; and Pal, Interests
0/State: The Politics 0/ Language. Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada, 50-5 I.
69 Mel Watkins, "Where is the Waftle Now that We Need it?" This Magazine, November-December
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Overall, a picture of an intricate and sometimes delicate dance between the
state and these social forces emerges: co llective actors driving the state towards
economic intervention and social consultation while, at the same time, the state
attempts to integrate these voices and their demands, and grapple with persistent
economic decline. As it turned out, half steps could carry the dance only so far.
4.2 Capital's Reaction and the Liberal Retreat
As Langille, Ernst and others reveal in their studies of various corporate
interest groups in formation, capital's attitude towards the initial Liberal social and
economic strategy for dealing with the crisis was less than enthusiastic. Its
profitability was caught between competition from Germany and Japan and the wage
pressure generated by the industrial militancy itself freed up by full employment,
trade union rights and an expanding KWS. Straight wage demands were, in turn,
accompanied by demands from labour and others for a further expansion of the social
wage. Canadian capitalists were also worried that the social stability essential to
profitability would be threatened by "democracy gone wild." 70 Nor was the two-and-
one-halfparty system seen to be dealing with the crisis effectively. During Trudeau's
frrst mandate, the Liberals appeared far too willing to cater to movements and their
demands. Adding insult to injury, the New Democratic Party's populist - and popular
- attack on "Corporate Welfare Bums" during the 1972 federal election campaign did
nothing to improve the image of entrepreneurship.
Between the failure ofKeynesian demand management to 'fix the economy'
and the cacophony of social and economic demands, a broader organic crisis appeared
to be in the offing and serious measures were called for. Canadian capital adopted a
new strategic orientation: first, a more sophisticated and strategic collective
organization to advance its po litical purposes, and second, a shift from support for the
1979,41.
70 David Langille, "The Business Council on National Issues," Studies in Political Economy, no. 24
(1987); Alan Ernst, "From Liberal Continental ism to Neoconservatism: North American Free Trade
and the Politics of the C.D. Howe Institute," Studies in Political Economy, no. 39 (1992).
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liberal continentalist status quo to an aggressive backing of neo-liberal continentalism
and free trade.
The limited nature of the Liberal government's early 1970s intervention
doomed it to failure. Moreover, by discrediting traditional Keynesian demand
management it laid the basis for a dramatic shift to the policy orientation now being
advocated by corporate interests. The abandonment ofKeynesian demand
management actually began in 1975 with the implementation ofa monetarist
tightening ofthe money supply by the Bank of Canada and the Liberal government's
adoption ofan Anti-Inflation Program legislating wage and price controls (the former
quite effective but the later only theoretical) and suspending free collective bargaining
for all workers."
While this policy shift was highly appreciated by Canada's corporate elite, it
did place both capital and the state in something of a quandary. With the politicization
of the economic sphere brought about by wage controls, the narrow sectional
concerns oftraditional business organizations such as the Canadian Manufacturers
Association (CMA) and the Canadian Federation ofIndependent Business (CFIB) left
a critical void: a collective body that could represent capital's broader interests and
participate in a tripartite bargaining on its behalf This critical lacuna was filled with
"one of the most interesting developments to come out ofthe recent tripartite
discussions [is] the formation of the BCNI. It has been the inner council of this group,
containing many of the leading personnel of the big bourgeoisie, which has been
engaged on the business side of the tripartite discussions of 1977 and 1978.,,72
In 1976, the chief executive officers ofone hundred and fifty leading
Canadian corporations formed the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI).73 As
co-chair, AlfPowis the president ofNoranda was in a good position to describe the
71 Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social
Contract.
72 Leo Pan itch, ''Corporatism in Canada," Studies in Political Economy, no. 1, Spring (1979): 79.
73 These corporations held more than $700 billion in assets, had annual revenues of more than $250
billion and employed more than 1.5 million Canadians. In Langille, "The Business Council on National
Issues," 73.
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circumstances that gave the impetus to the formation of the Council. He identified,
"the apparent inability of the Canadian economy to operate with maximum efficiency,
the increasing confrontation between and among various segments of society, and the
growing worry that the increasing share of the nation's production being handled
through government was not an efficient and effective way to assure the highest
standard of living for most Canadians.r '"
The BCNI's more selective and sophisticated approach - including setting up
a virtual shadow cabinet - was complemented by other organizations taking on the
same battle on complementary fronts. For example, the corporate-funded, Vancouver-
based Fraser Institute became the home for intellectual advocates of neo-conservatism
and played a critical role in developing elite and public support for its policies."
The establishment of the BCNI was an important moment. It was another
piece in the emerging network oforganizations established to do battle for capital.
Because of its cross-fraction and high-level membership, the BCNI marked a turn
towards collective corporate activism. Capital and its new commitment to neo-liberal
continentalism now had an instrument worthy of the name.
4.3 The Emerging Popular Sector Response
4.3.1 Another Liberal Retreat, the Bishops and Ethical Reflections
After the brief tenure of the Progressive Conservative government led by Joe
Clark in 1979, the re-elected Trudeau Liberals once again put forward a nation-
building strategy in 1980 with the National Energy Program (NEP) at its core. But
this attempt at a 'Third National Policy' was extremely short-lived." As a global
recession hit in 1981, the interventionist pretence was once again abandoned as the
Liberals beat a hasty retreat under substantial corporate and U.S. pressure." Building
74 Quoted in ibid.: 48.
75 William K. Carroll, "Neo-Liberalism and the Recomposition of Finance Capital," Capital and Class
38 (1989): 102; Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, 312.
76 D.V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 179.
77 The Liberals received plenty of positive reinforcement for this shift in direction. For example, a letter
to the Finance Minister from the BCN) dated November 30, 1981 notes that "the apparent shift by the
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on the initial abandonment ofKeynesianism in 1975, spending on social programs
was cut, including Unemployment Insurance benefits, post-secondary education and
health care, and social security benefits were deindexed. As a result, the share of total
government expenditures going to social programs fell from 46 percent in 1976 to 40
percent in 1982.78 In that year the federal government introduced a new set of wage
controls, the '6 and 5' program. By limiting the right to strike and setting maximum
wage increases, the state moved to a policy that Panitch and Swartz have termed
"permanent exceptionalism":
It [6 and 5] made explicit the ad hoc, selective, ''temporary'' use ofcoercion,
not merely directed at the particular groups ofworkers affected or at the
particular issue of "emergency" at hand but rather designed to set an
example.79
The Liberal government's second retreat from interventionism within less than
a decade was accompanied by two specific developments that would have a
significant impact on the development of the Canadian popular sector. First, whether
searching for solutions to a worsening economic crisis or hoping to be perceived as
such, the federal government appointed the Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Macdonald Commission) with a
mandate to recommend "appropriate national goals and policies for economic
development. ,,80 Second, also in the fall of 1982, having closed the file on the
repatriation of Canada's constitution which had dominated his government's agenda
since its re-election in 1980, Prime Minister Trudeau took to the airwaves for a series
Government towards a less interventionist stance in the economy on the whole is one of the most
encouraging hallmarks of your initiative." Quoted in Langille, "The Business Council on National
Issues," 59.
A strong correlation has been drawn between the areas of BCNI policy interest and activity and
eventual government decisions and state policy. These include the demise of the National Energy
Program (NEP), privatization of public assets, and an aggressive anti-inflation stance. BCNI and broad
corporate resistance to the tax reforms included in Liberal Finance Minister Allan McEachen's 1981
budget led to his removal. His replacement Marc Lalonde met with BCNI head Thomas d' Aquino at
his home. There, he is alleged to have negotiated a peace pact that included modifying the Liberal
government's interventionist economic policies. Murray Dobbin, "Thomas d'Aquino: The De Facto
PM," Canadian Forum, November 1992, 8.
78 Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change, 304.
79 Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social
Contract, 26.
80 Report ofthe Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Developmental Prospectsfor Canada.
vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), xvii.
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of what came to be known as televised sermonettes addressed to the Canadian people.
In the context ofrecessionary gloom, spending cuts and wage controls, Trudeau's
"moral defence of the free market system" was the spark that motivated Canada's
Catholic Bishops unprecedented foray onto the political scene."
The public statement issued by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops
(CCCB) on New Year's Day 1983 became a rallying point and a key moment in the
development of the popular sector. Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis was
openly critical of the direction of the government's social and economic policy; it
questioned the morality ofmonetary policy that prioritized control over the money
supply and consequently the fight against inflation, over dealing with rapidly
increasing unemployment. The statement was particularly significant because it went
beyond critique to offer guidelines for alternative policies and, all the more
unexpectedly, suggest political action. In their document, the bishops set out the basic
principles that would underlie an alternative economic strategy and proposed a
political strategy that reflected ecumenical developments in the 1970s by emphasizing
movement and coalition building.V Bishop Remi De Roo, then Chairman of the
Social Affairs Commission of the CCCB, explained their purpose:
What we hope to do ... is contribute to the building of a social movement for
economic justice in Canada. And there are signs of great hope, signs that
people from so many walks of life and such a cross-section of interests can
come together to look at what can be done - in solidarity and co-operation - to
build this kind of social movement.83
While the response Ethical Reflections elicited from friends and foes alike was
without precedent, the statement actually continued in the same vein as previous
interventions by the bishops on issues of economy and society over the course of the
1970s. During this period, the Social Affairs Commission issued a series of statements
in line with its mandate which included three areas of social justice concerns: general
81 Tony Clarke, Behind the Mitre: The Moral Leadership Crisis in the Canadian Catholic Church
(Toronto: Harper Collins, 1995), 50.
82 CeCB. Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis (Ottawa: Concacan, lnc., 1983).
83 Remi De Roo, "What's Wrong with Canada? Facing Up to the Crisis." Alternatives, Spring-Summer
1983. 7~ see also Tony Clarke. "Coalition Building: Towards a Social Movement for Economic
Justice," Alternatives. Spring-Summer 1983.
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questions of faith and justice, justice in Canada, and justice in the Third World. The
statements included: Northern Development: At What Cost? (1975), From Words to
Action (1976), A Society to be Transformed (1977), Witness to Justice (1979), and
Unemployment: the Human Costs (1980). In this company, Ethical Reflections
distinguished itself by its timing as a clearly political intervention. 84
The bishops could hardly have predicted the dramatic impact their statement
would have. Ethical Reflections gained immediate and overwhelming attention in the
mass media and became the focus for a sustained society-wide debate for weeks
thereafter. The sources, vehemence and scope of the responses brought out by the
statement hinted at a dramatic realignment of social forces.
While a fiery retort from conservative forces within the Church hierarchy was
certainly predictable, shocked representatives ofcapital, as well as individual business
people, generated a chorus ofcriticism. Prime Minister Trudeau's own negative
reaction was accompanied by less prominent Liberal backbenchers of the Catholic
faith tripping over each other in their haste to defend their government and their
leader. 85
Within the churches themselves, Ethical Reflections was an important shot in
the arm for those engaged in social justice struggles. The bishops' stance became a
source of legitimation for these activists. This was very important for Catholics who
faced difficult battles within their own institutions, as one activist put it:
It's in the language that I have long wanted the church to speak in. A few
years back when we would talk about workers' struggles we were looked at
strangely. You just didn't use that kind of language. We would have been
84 The first step towards Ethical Reflections was the drafting of a critique of the substance of Trudeau' s
televised addresses. Indeed, until the very last draft, Ethical Reflections was conceived of as an open
letter to the prime minister. In the end this format was considered too "political" and abandoned. Tony
Clarke, Interview by author, Ottawa, 31 October 1991.
Substantiated in Michael T. Kaufinan, "Catholics Attack Trudeau policies," New York Times, 5 January
1983, A6: "Though their report did not mention the Prime Minister or any politicians by name, the
bishops made it clear that they were responding to Mr. Trudeau's economic message to the nation in
October in which the Prime Minister, appearing on television urged Canadians to ensure the sacrifices
needed to increase productivity and so better compete in world markets."
85 For an extensive listing of responses to Ethical Reflections, see CCCB Social Affairs Office. "An
Initial Report on the Statement of the CCCB Social Affairs Commission 'Ethical Reflections on the
Economic Crisis,''' Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, January 1983.
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happy if that kind of statement had been made a long time ago. But thank God
it's being made now. 86
The leadership and activists of other mainline Christian churches also welcomed
Ethical Reflections. Among others, the Moderator of the United Church of Canada
and the Primate of the Anglican Church issued strong supportive statements.V
As far as Tony Clarke, co-director of the Social Affairs office at the time, is
concerned, Ethical Reflections became"... an even more important document for
people outside the church then for people within it ... by far.,,88 For the staff of the
Social Affairs Commission attending follow-up workshops across the country it
became clear that the statement was serving as a catalyst - it was bringing activists
from different sectors together."
The leadership of the labour movement also warmly received Ethical
Reflections. As commentator Wilfred List noted, this development was rather
unexpected:
The bishops' statement caught the labour hierarchy by surprise. Most
members of the commission were unknown to the labour leadership. There
was a scurrying to fmd out who they were. But once that was established, the
labor leaders lost no time in sending out messages ofapplause and support.Y
Indeed, Canadian Labour Congress president Dennis McDermott greeted the bishops'
statement as "the most significant to appear in this country in decades. It's clear,
lucid, and courageous. It cuts right to the heart of the problem, which is the blatant
86 Activist Marg Bacon quoted in Ellie Kirzner, "Catholics' Class Act," Now Magazine, 6 January
1982.
87 "Moderator Supports Bishops," The United Church Observer, February 1983, 16; "Anglican Leader
Backs Catholic Bishops' Stand," Ottawa Citizen, 12 January 1983.
88 Clarke, Interview by author. As one media report described it: "A blistering critique by a group of
Roman Catholic bishops on the government's handling of Canada's recession appears to have achieved
part of its objective by stimulating discussion at the grassroots level." "Bishop's Critique Causing
Grassroots Talk, Priests Say," Toronto Star, 10 January 1983, A4.
In a confidential memorandum, a senior labour official compared Ethical Reflections to what was being
accomplished within his own movement: "We really should expect more from our central documents.
In part the problem is the labour movement's intellectuals - the church intellectuals have done much
more impressive work from a left perspective." Sam Gindin, Confidential Memorandum to Bob White,
26 April 1984.
89 Michael Mcbane. Interview by author, Ottawa 5 November 1991: De Roo, "What's Wrong with
Canada? Facing Up to the Crisis:'
90 Wilfred List, "Links with Bishops would benefit CLC." Globe and Mail, 10 January 1983, B5.
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immorality as well as unworkability of the neo-conservative medicine the Liberals
have been force-feeding us for the last several years.'?" And the leader of the United
Autoworkers (Canada) Bob White drew out some of the implications of the bishop's
initiative:
Really, when you look at it, the bishops were saying a number of things that
we had been saying. The tragedies of unemployment, the suicides, mental
breakdowns, family stress. But the fact that the church was saying it added a
whole new status. If it was just the labor movement doing it or the NDP doing
it, then you get dismissed as a narrow self-serving group or a narrow political
group; but that's a little more difficult when it's the bishops [emphasis
mine].92 .:
Against the background of previous statements by the Catholic bishops
promoting social justice and condemning the vagaries ofcapitalism, Ethical
Reflections was particularly helpful in building bridges with the labour movement.
Within days of the statement's release, the United Autoworkers (VAW-Canada)
ordered copies ofEthical Reflections for all of its leadership and staff 93 Over the
course of the next few years, Remi De Roo, Adolphe Proulx and other bishops on the
Social Affairs Commission, were invited to participate in a number of labour events.94
Support for Ethical Reflections also came from academics and intellectuals from
coast-to-coast.95
Within weeks of the release of Ethical Reflections, the Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives (CCPA) convened a conference to discuss its implications.
According to one report, church, labour, anti-poverty and other leaders agreed to
91 Quoted in Ed Finn, "Church, Labour Agree on Need for 'New Social Movement, '" Alternatives,
Spring-Summer 1983, 11.
92 Quoted in Sheila McGovern, Toronto Star, 18 April 1983.
93 "The statement by the Canadian Roman Catholic bishops was quite amazing. Its analysis is, in fact,
more clearly left than either the NDP or the CLC... This statement and its calls for widespread
discussion and radical change must be built on. It will lead to major divisions in the church and
progressives will need support." Sam Gindin, Memorandum to Bob White, 4 January 1983.
94 These included conferences of the B.C. Federation of Labour. the Confederation of Canadian
Unions, the Confederation des syndicats nationaux, the United Auto Workers (Canadian Council), the
National Farmers Union and the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW). CUPW invited De Roo
to address its negotiating committee and national executive committee in the midst of bargaining in
1984. De Roo subsequently gave the opening address to CUPW's biannual convention in 1986. Geoff
Bickerton, Interview by author, Ottawa, 15 March 1992.
95 Correspondence in CCCB Social Affairs Office files; McBane, Interview by author.
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"work together in a new social movement that would develop more equitable and
workable economic policies.t''" In his closing statement to the conference, CLC
president McDermott called it "the beginning of an extremely meaningful dialogue ...
not just a one-day love-in, but the formative stage of an important social coalition. ,,97
While the meeting contributed to developing positive relationships between
participants and support for a coalition of social forces was clearly building, more
questions were raised than were answered. No organizational format for such a
project was proposed and, when McDermott told journalists the meeting had seen the
birth of a "new social movement," Bishop Proulx was bound to explain, "[I]t's a
coalition in a very broad sense. It has always been there without our knowing it.,,98
Reinforcing the point, one CCCB staffer also attending the event thought the CLC had
come with "too many conditions for forming a coalition" and had, for the most part,
"just read prepared statements.,,99
Meanwhile, pressure was building on the bishops since strong labour and NDP
support for Ethical Reflections had raised the issue ofpartisanship. Along with labour,
NDP leader Ed Broadbent had praised the bishops for their initiative. Furthermore, the
NDP announced plans to set aside one of the days ofparliamentary debate in its
allocation to propose a motion condemning the government for its "outright rejection
of the sound economic advice given by the Canadian Conference of Catholic
Bishops." When the debate fmally took place, on 15 April 1983, NDP fmance critic
Nelson Riis led off by giving the bishops his wholehearted endorsement. 100
Partisanship was a powerful criticism levelled at the bishops that was difficult to
navigate given the absence of alternative sources of support in the parliamentary
realm: the Conservative Party was rapidly shifting to the right under its new leader
96 Finn, "Church, Labour Agree on Need for 'New Social Movement'''; see also Louise Crosby, "RC
Bishops Supported in Attack on Economy," Ottawa Citizen, 28 January 1983.
97 Finn, "Church, Labour Agree on Need for 'New Social Movement'," 15.
98 Quoted in Mark Nicholson. "Bishops in Politics" (MJ Thesis, Carleton University. 1985), 104.
99 Quoted in ibid.
100 Most of the remaining four hours of debate was taken up with an argument as to "just how 'Marxist'
the bishops' statement was." lbid.. 88-92.
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Brian Mulroney, and the Liberals, in government, were the primary target of the
bishops' critique.'?'
Expectations were high for the bishops to put more meat on the bones of their
statement - to operationalize their solidarity. As one activist commentator put it,
"[t]he rhetoric of social movement has to be substantiated by bishops on the picket
line, unions in the march for peace, and men in the campaign for women's' rights."J02
In light of the previous question, a second was being posed: if not partisanship, then
what?
The bishops responded to both sets of concerns with afurther public statement
issued on 23 March calling for the "building of an independent popular or social
movement for economic justice.,,103 Within the Social Affairs Commission, opinions
were divided as to the strategy to be employed to follow-up on Ethical Reflections.
While some bishops preferred a more traditional approach based on lobbying, in the
spirit of the initial statement that had gone beyond policy prescription and reflected
the Commission's unstated objectives and a growing tradition within Catholic social
justice activism, the Commission agreed to recommit to a focus on movement and
1· · b ildi 104coa ition UI mg.
The bishops were also explicit on the issue of partisanship, stating: "We wish
to re-emphasize that it is not our role to become directly involved in partisan
politics."J05 As justification, they argued that "election strategies should be avoided so
as not to lose the freedom and vitality required in organizing and maintaining a broad-
101 A number of Liberal backbench MP's were anxious to come to their governments' defence and
attack the bishops for using their authority to "put government policies on trial." Their intervention led
other Liberal backbenchers to come to the bishops' defence. "Bishops Rebuked by MPs for New Year
Message," Toronto Star, 4 February 1983, A3.
102 Don Lee, "Building a New Program," Alternatives 1983,24.
103 CCCB Social Affairs Office, "Follow-up to Statement Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis,"
23 March 1983; "RC Bishops Debate Pushing for Change," Globe and Mail, 22 March 1983, A3; John
Ferri, "Poor, Elderly, Unemployed Urged to Unite in Social Justice Fight," Toronto Star, 17 June 1983.
A6; Bruce Ward, "Bishops Urge Grassroots Campaign for More Jobs," Toronto Star, 24 March 1983.
A I; Clarke. Behind the Mitre: The Moral Leadership Crisis in the Canadian Catholic Church, 80.
104 Nicholson. "Bishops in Politics," 106; Clarke, Interview by author.
105 Social Affairs Office. "Follow-up to Statement Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis."
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b d t .c: ••• ,,106 A h' f hase movemen lor econonuc justice. s c air 0 t e Commission Bishop Remi
de Roo added, "we're suggesting they (the movement) not get tied too closely to
political groups because the short-term advantages are offset by the fact they can be
left aside when the political winds shift.,,107 In fact, the SAC bishops had intended
from the outset to play the role of catalyst for movement building. Nor were they
merely avoiding partisanship in order to protect their ecclesiastic stature. Indeed, they
were far from convinced by the NDP's strategic orientation, arguing that "it's not a
problem of the better management ofgovernment, which is the NDP argument, but
realizing it's a structural problem.,,108
Another event in March 1983 provided for follow-up to the themes raised in
Ethical Reflections and the hopes raised by the response. The CLC convened a
conference entitled "The People's Response to the Planned Recession" to launch its
campaign for an Economic Recovery Alternative in Ottawa (1-2 March 1983).
President McDermott described the objectives as follows:
Our first objective is to reach the union member with the Economic Recovery
Alternative. Our second is to continue building a broader consensus for
political and economic change, as reflected in the participation ofpeople from
outside the labour movement. Our third objective is to 'de-hire' governments
in this country, starting with the one in Ottawa, that have broken the faith and
the backs of the Canadian people. 109
According to the Congress publication Canadian Labour, the strategic conclusion to
be drawn from the event was clear:
By the fmal session, the response was plain: a new coalition is coming
together to fight back against government policies ... the core of this coalition
will be organized labour. But as the list of more than 800 delegates attending
the conference showed, it will include church people, teachers, students,
consumer groups, women's groups, unemployed people, farmers, pensioners,
human rights activities (sic), and many others. 110
106 Quoted in Louise Crosby, "Clerics Reject Party Politics in Quest for Social Justice," Ottawa Citizen,
24 March 1983, A4.
107 Ibid.
108 Clarke quoted in Nicholson. "Bishops in Politics," 102.
109 Quoted in Charles Bauer, "Labour's New ERA," Canadian Labour, March 1983.
110 lbid., 13.
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Once again, in spite of some real advances, in general, rhetoric appeared to triumph
over reality. The CLC's commitment to coalition building remained tentative and
confmed to the historical model that was the political equivalent of the 'ready-to-
wear' suit. As McDermott reconfirmed at the conference, it was yet another vehicle
for building support for the NDP.111 But when this CLC coalition initiative fizzled out
it did little to deter others from trying.
4.3.2 The Macdonald Commission
Not long after its launch in 1982 it became clear that the Macdonald
Commission would become a massive endeavour. In the end, it involved months of
consultation, received hundreds ofbriefs, and drafted hundreds of studies eventually
included in a multi-volume report. I 12 The Vanier Institute, a small Ottawa-based
family and social policy research group, initiated the first step in what would become
the popular sector response to the Commission. In September 1983, the Institute's
Director wrote to more than eighty organizations asking whether they intended to
submit briefs to the Commission. He also inquired about their interest in "maintaining
an informal network for the duration of the Commission's life." A follow-up letter
addressed to GATT-Fly elaborated the idea further:
The Vanier Institute is establishing this network at its own initiative and
expense, but with the full knowledge of the Commission. It is clearly ofvalue
to us, just as it is to you, that we are not the only ones to be heard on the need
for and direction ofalternative ways of guiding the evolution ofthe Canadian
political economy towards sustainable patterns and socially responsible goals.
You may fmd it helpful in strengthening your argument, to exchange
submissions with some other members of the network and refer to their work
• • 113In your presentation.
Feeling a similar need for consultation, the Social Affairs office at the CCCB
developed a chart that mapped out common points among the Macdonald
Commission submissions of various popular sector groups. I 14 The efforts of both the
III Nicholson, "Bishops in Politics," 106; see Chapter 3 below.
112 Daniel Drache, "Sins of Commission," CUPE Facts, March-April 1986; Richard Simeon, "Inside
the Macdonald Commission," Studies in Political Economy, no. 22, Spring (1987).
I Ll William A. Dyson, Letter to GAlT-Fly, 21 September 1983.
114 Briefs to the MacDonald Commission on the Economy: Common Links to CCCB, 1983; Clarke,
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Vanier Institute and the Social Affairs office added one more layer to the relationships
amongst popular sector groups and provided the foundation for Drache and
Cameron's compilation of alternative perspectives published as The Other
MacDonald Reporti'?
Despite the efforts of the Vanier Institute and the CCCB Social Affairs
Commission, the Macdonald Commission's recommendations - issued with its fmal
report in the fall of 1985 - paid little heed to the perspectives put to it by more than
250 labour and community sector groups during its hearings. This was clearest on the
increasingly pertinent issue ofa bilateral free trade agreement with the United States.
While popular sector groups had roundly panned free trade in their submissions, a
comprehensive bilateral trade agreement with the United States was the centrepiece of
the Macdonald Commission's recommendations. 116 Meanwhile Macdonald's
prescription for resolving Canada's economic woes - freeing up the market and
reducing state intervention - were welcomed by the new Conservative government
elected a year earlier and committed to an agenda of spending cuts, deregulation, and
privatization.
The Macdonald Commission, both through its process and its
recommendations, played a key role in the forging of the logic that was eventually to
lead to the formation of the Pro-Canada, later Action Canada, Network. By largely
ignoring the voices of labour, women, church, farmers and other social groups, the
Commission achieved a number ofresults. First, it helped to legitimize a free market
Interview by author; Michael McBane, Memorandum, 5 March 1987.
115 Daniel Drache and Duncan Cameron, eds., The Other MacDonald Report (Toronto: James Lorimer.
1985).
116 "Hugh Thorburn, a well-known political scientist from Queen's University, was hired by the
Macdonald Commission to analyze which interest groups made submissions to it. Among other things.
he found that there were many new types of groups submitting briefs to this commission that had not
done so to the previous Royal Commissions on the Canadian economy. Macdonald received 741 briefs
in total compared with 297 to the Gordon Commission (1957) and 331 to the Rowell-Sirois (1937).
Business associations and private companies made 250 submissions compared with 59 for labour. For
the popular sector, the breakdown was as follows: Native peoples' organizations, 27; women's groups,
34; religious organizations, 1~; social service and health agencies, 37; and voluntary and special
interest associations, 97." Ibid., ix, footnote 1 [NOTE: this adds up to 266 for labour and popular sector
com bined, as opposed to 250 for business].
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ideology, heretofore largely viewed as a foreign phenomenon. I I? Second, it
demonstrated the growing unanimity among the different components of Canadian
capital and the important role the Business Council on National Issues was playing in
generating this consensus. 118 Third, by promoting a bilateral free trade agreement
with the U.S. as the centrepiece of the Canadian variant ofneo-liberalism or neo-
conservatism, the Macdonald Commission contributed to the increasingly clear
demarcation between the corporate vision for Canada and a popular sector
perspective. Putting the core component for a Canadian neo-conservative project
prominently on display also handed its opponents a shiny new target. As we shall see,
the clarified map of social forces also helped to undermine any further serious attempt
at tripartite consensus building.
4.3.3 Dialogue 186
During the 1984 federal election campaign, Brian Mulroney pledged that a
Conservative government would call together labour and business for a dialogue on
the economy. To meet this commitment the new government convened the National
Economic Conference (NEC) on 22-25 March 1985 only six months after coming to
power. However, few participants or observers consider the event to have marked the
beginning of a dialogue on economic priorities. 119 Indeed, following the new
government's first budget in May, fifty-eight representatives of labour, church, social
and community groups who had participated in the conference, signed an open letter
to the prime minister. In it they questioned whether the budgetary measures taken by
117 According to Doern, " ... business interests almost uniformly told Macdonald they could compete
with the Americans." G. Bruce Doem and Brian W. Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story
(Toronto: Stoddart, 1991), 54. He also notes that "Prime Minister Mulroney was well aware of the
partisan value he could draw from the Macdonald Commission Report including using the imprimatur
of its chair, a former Liberal cabinet minister, to provide bipartisan legitimacy for a bilateral trade
initiative. The volumes of the report arranged on his desk, Mulroney spread his hands over them and
told officials present in his office that summer day that he would use the report to beat John Turner in
the next election." Doem and Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story, 29.
118 Langille details the work done by the BCNI promoting and orchestrating support for a
comprehensive bilateral trade agreement both in Canada and in the US from the fall 1982 onward. In
Langille, "The Business Council on National Issues."
119 See, for example, the CLC's perspective on the Conference: "Two solitudes - one extolling the
virtues of the market, leaner government and the entrepreneurial spirit; the other putting people first.
their quality of life, their job and income security - trying to talk to each other, but finding little
common ground." "National Economic Conference." Canadian Labour, April 1985.
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the government reflected the majority opinion voiced at the NEC only two months
earlier and called on the prime minister to redirect the government's socio-economic
priorities. The letter's text provides an interesting contrast. On the one hand, it reflects
a growing sense of popular sector consensus, to wit: "The conference presented an
opportunity for a number of groups in our society to talk to each other, in some cases
for the first time. In that process our groups realized we had common views in a
number of areas." On the other hand, the text demonstrates a lingering if cautious
openness to consultation:
We expected that you would take our views into account. But you have
disappointed us. Nevertheless, via this letter we are continuing the process of
consultation with your government ... there appears to be a defmite contrast
between our agenda and the government's ... it doesn't have to be this way.
As your government enters the second year of its mandate, we urge you to
begin listening to all Canadians, not just those that reinforce your
government's views. This surely is the road to genuine consensus within the
Canadian community. 120
Building on the process that led to the drafting ofthis joint letter, the Canadian
Labour Congress set about planning its own attempt at uniting diverse opinions in one
conference. Representatives of a number ofpopular sector groups were invited to sit
on a steering committee to plan Dialogue '86, with CLC president McDermott,
National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) president Chaviva Hosek,
the head of the National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO), Patrick Johnston and
Denyse Rochon of the Federation des femmes du Quebec (FFQ) serving as co-chairs.
A number of participants quickly developed misgivings with this new process
culminating in the representatives of the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC)
withdrawing from the steering committee in the run-up to the event. The CCC' s
representatives, John Foster (United Church - Division of Mission in Canada) and
Tony Clarke (CCCB) expressed a number of concerns. They questioned the objectives
for the event as well as the assumption that its format should be modeled on that of
the government's NEe. They argued that the sequence of events that followed the
120 Reprinted as "Open Letter to the Prime Minister on Socio-economic Priorities," Canadian Labour,
October 1985.
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NEC - including the critical evaluation put forward in the joint letter from church,
labour, and other popular sector leaders - "called for a change of strategy on the part
of labour and community groups.,,121 Foster and Clarke's eventual decision to
withdraw was in reaction to Conference organizers' decision to extend invitations to
representatives ofbusiness groups. The two church representatives argued for just the
opposite orientation in their letter to the CCC explaining their decision:
We felt, at this particular historical moment, it critically important for people
involved in labour unions and community groups to truly 'dialogue' with one
another in an effort to develop more meaningful and effective working
relationships around common economic and social policy concerns. It is too
simplistic to assume that labour and community groups already have common
understanding and agreements around major policy issues. The priority now,
however, must be to consolidate links between labour and community groups
with a view to developing a common platform of economic and social policy
concerns. 122
Dialogue '86 and the events surrounding it marked the further ascent of
"movement building" as referred to by Clarke and Foster, on the popular sector's
political agenda at the expense of tripartite strategies. Despite the invitation, the BCNI
declined to participate, as did other business groups. Their lack of interest further
confirmed the growing divide between business and the popular sector.
In a positive vein, the conference and the series of organizing meetings
leading up to it provided one more forum for the nurturing of interpersonal and
interorganizational relationships. For example, representatives from NAC and the
CCCB, historically unlikely allies, developed a positive working relationship. 123 And
while free trade was not on the formal agenda for Dialogue '86, discussions between
NAC vice-president and trade expert Marjorie Cohen and representatives of the
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) led to a supplementary session dedicated to
121 Tony Clarke and John Foster, "Report and Recommendations to the Canadian Council of Churches
concerning Sponsorship and Participation in the Follow-up to the National Economic Conference
called 'Dialogue 86'," November 12 1985; Tony Clarke, "Notes for Response reo Dialogue '86," CCCB,
30 October 1985.
122 Clarke and Foster, "Report and Recommendations to the Canadian Council of Churches concerning
Sponsorship and Participation in the Follow-up to the National Economic Conference called 'Dialogue
86'."
123 Marjorie Cohen, Interview by author, Vancouver, II December 1991; and Clarke. Interview by
author.
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free trade and a subsequent invitation to Cohen to address the USWA national
conference. 124
Confusion remained regarding how the potential for coalition building
clarified by Ethical Reflections and Dialogue '86 would be actualized. A staffer for a
large national union, reflecting on possible follow-up to Dialogue '86, reported to her
umon:
It is not clear that the CLC is in a position to playa leadership role in
organizing a coalition from the conference, nor is it clear that the other
participants would accept such leadership.. .It might be more useful for the
Congress to playa support role and let some other organization lead the
coalition. 125 . .
Subsequent correspondence and publications from the CLC were rather more
optimistic and viewed the organization's role as central. Executive Vice-President
Dick Martin wrote to participants proposing to publish a newsletter "outlining current
developments on the free trade debate" and asking for "information or documentation
you think might be of interest and assistance in furthering a wider understanding of
the free trade question.,,126 The CLC's house organ Canadian Labour was
characteristically enthusiastic in its account of the event and its results:
A positive outcome of the conference was the establishment of a network of
organizations concerned about free trade. The network will share information
about the issue and the CLC, which is co-coordinating the network, will
publish a newsletter for circulation among concerned groups. 127
Yet, only two months later, further correspondence from the Dialogue '86
Steering Committee co-chairs was far more sanguine and limited in its hopes for
follow-up. They concluded that: "It was not feasible to consider the development of a
permanent coalition of groups represented at the Conference. Rather, it was felt that
we should try to facilitate and encourage spontaneous developments to deal with
specific issues." The same memorandum implicitly confrrmed that organized follow-
124 Cohen, Interview by author; Dialogue '86, "Workshop Reports," Workshop Reports, Ottawa, 12-14
January 1986.
125 Kathy O'Hara. Memorandum to Sam Gindin, 29 January 1986.
126 Dick Martin, 1.etter to Laurell Ritchie. 19 February 1986.
127 Susan Attenborough. "Dialogue '86," Canadian Labour 1986.
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up to the meeting by its hosts was unlikely and that the issue of free trade had moved
to the top of the collective agenda. To wit, it concluded: "We hope that you will use
this material (attached) to forge links with others who attended Dialogue '86 so that
you can develop common strategies to deal with issues of mutual concern. This sort of
collective action is already taking place on issues like free trade.,,128
4.3.4 The Working Committee for Social Solidarity
Follow-up to Dialogue '86 - at least in the sense of the coalition building that
was implied by statements during and after the conference - was not immediately
forthcoming from the CLC or the event's steering committee. 'Another initiative
following close on its heels did begin a process that would lead to the founding of the
Working Committee for Social Solidarity (WCSS). In May 1986, the Social Affairs
Commission of the CCCB brought together forty representatives ofpopular sector
organizations for a meeting on the theme "Disenchantment with Co-optation: A
Critical Look at Current Social Policy Trends in Canada.,,129 As those who chose the
title had no doubt intended, discussion quickly came around to the debate broadly
opposing movement building and tripartism that had been prominent in the Dialogue
'86 process. 130 A subsequent session on focused on the issue of income security and
concluded with a consensus that a declaration of social vision was required to
"provide a framework of analysis and help foster an alternative social policy agenda
for popular groups.t'':"
On 22 October 1986, a drafting committee for such a declaration met for the
first time. The composition of the Working Committee for Social Solidarity was
128 Dialogue '86 Co-chairs, Letter to Delegates, 21 April 1986; reports from workshops at the event
indicate that free trade and coalition building were prominent themes in the sessions on unemployment
and the role of government. See Dialogue '86, "Workshop Reports."
129 The list of participating groups includes the National Council of Welfare, NAC, the CCPA, the
Assembly of First Nations and the Canadian Council for Social Development.
130 The May 1986 meeting was not the first in "a series of consultations on the current socio-economic
crisis." A first meeting held in the aftermath of the 1984 Federal Election in January 1985 had as its
topic "Federal Economic Policies: What New Directions?"
131 Michael McBane, "A Brief Chronology: the CLC and the Social Solidarity Project," Canadian
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Social Affairs Department, 1988.
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diplomatically presented as "twelve representative persons who relate to various
I t .. ,,132 Whipopu ar sec or orgamzations. I1e the church sector was well represented and a
number of labour research officers took part, only one elected labour official, Laurel
Ritchie, a vice-president of the small Confederation of Canadian Unions (CCU), was
of the group. Over the next six months the declaration went through a number of
drafts and revisions and was endorsed by the National Farmers Union, the United
Church of Canada and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops. In March 1987,
the draft declaration was circulated to representatives of provincial coalitions for
comment.Y' While CLC research director Bob Baldwin had participated in the
process, the Congress leadership's response was, at best, lukewarm. Failure to obtain
CLC approval led to the cancellation of a launch for the declaration planned for May
Day. A call from CLC executive assistant Ron Laing expressing strong disagreement
with the content of the declaration led Bishop Proulx to request a meeting with
Congress president Shirley Carr on behalf of the WCSS. On 23 June 1987 Proulx,
Eilert Frierichs (United Church) and Tony Clarke met with Carr and Laing. As Proulx
noted in a subsequent letter to Carr, NAC, the CSN, the CCU, and the Assembly of
First Nations had by then also endorsed the declaration. After an initial decision not to
back the declaration and three further months of intrigue, the CLC agreed to
endorse.l'" Only weeks later A Time to Stand Together... A Time for Social Solidarity
was made public. Its stated goal was to help create the "political and social vision
required in order to provide a framework of analysis, avoid co-optation by
governments and business, and foster an alternative social and economic policy
d f.': I ,,135agen a lor popu ar sector groups.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Bishop Adolph Proulx, Letter to Shirley Carr, 26 June 1987; Shirley Carr. L~tter to Tony Clarke. 10
November 1987; Tony Clarke, Letter to Shirley Carr, 7 December 1987. A detailed account of the
difficulties involved in engaging the CLC in this process is given in McBane, "A Brief Chronology: the
CLC and the Social Solidarity Project." The report of the CLC Executive Council meeting (December
1987) includes a reference to the Social Solidarity Statement as the "Catholic Bishop's Statement." In
Minutes, PCN, First Assembly. Ottawa, 18-19 October 1987.
1]5 Working Committee for Social Solidarity. "Background Paper," Ottawa, 1990.
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While there had been many twists and turns in the road - and many more were
to come - by late 1987, the outline of a Canadian popular sector was becoming
clearer. There was no clear collective path from crisis to political response but new
relationships and alliances were taking shape. Much remained to be determined and
yet the important roles of specific groups and individuals were already apparent. In
some cases these were unlikely candidates.
In the spring of 1986, a self-described "internal working paper" entitled
"Toward the Formation of a Popular Sector Council" was circulated to a number of
groups. A personal initiative of SAC co-director Clarke, the paper nevertheless
provides a useful distillation of the strategic conjuncture. Through its title and its
content, the document confirms the extent to which collective organization was
viewed as critical to confront capital's own efforts in this regard. Clarke and the
Social Affairs Commission's intent to strive towards this objective are also very
evident. 136 Finally, that this document went to a second draft, but as far as can be
determined no further, reflects the fact that a key ingredient was still missing from the
mix. Indeed, by the fall of 1986 another process focused on uniting and mobilizing
opposition to free trade was underway. This process became the focal point for the
further development of the popular sector and the formation of the Pro-Canada
Network.
136 Tony Clarke, "Towards the Formation of a Popular Sector Co~cil:' ~wa, August 1986. The.
broader objective behind the WCSS initiative is also made clear m Canadian Conference of Catholic
Bishops, "Social Solidarity Project," Background Notes, 1987.
Chapter 2
Toward a Theoretical Framework
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1. Introduction
The emergence of a popular sector made up ofprogressive social movements
and their organizations was, along with an increasingly organized and radicalized
engagement by capital, a key characteristic of the politics of the crisis in Canada.
Within the course of a few years, the Canadian state shifted gears, moving from half-
hearted attempts at developing an industrial strategy and supporting non-state actors
in the early 1970s to a monetarist war on inflation and a full-fledged retreat from
interventionism culminating in the Macdonald Commission's advocacy of a "leap of
faith" on Canada-U.S. free trade in 1985.
With the formation and development of the Business Council on National
Issues, the various fractions of Canadian capital now increasingly spoke with one
voice. Meanwhile, the global upsurge in social movement activity included a number
ofnew and invigorated 'older' collective actors in Canada. Together, activists and
leaders from the women's, labour, church, farm and other movements were beginning
to consider alternative forms ofagency - beyond both party politics and tripartism -
to advance their constituencies' interests. There were also early signs of a quest for a
common alternative social project.
This chapter attempts to identify building blocks for a theoretical framework
to help explain, first, the formation of the Pro-Canada Network out of the Canadian
popular sector, then its consolidation, and fmally, its decline. It reviews the suitability
ofanalytical tools to the study of a coalition of social movements. More specifically,
this chapter will consider which framework can best help to explain the PCN' s
tentative steps beyond a lowest common denominator alliance where movements,
organizations and their interests unite around a single issue; and to assess its potential
as a convergence with a developing general will and democratic formation.
A review and evaluation of the dominant analytical models for the study of
social movement mobilization serves as a starting point. This is followed by the
sketching of a framework that draws together elements of these dominant paradigms -
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resource mobilization theory and new social movement theory - with other important
components. These include distinctly Canadian contributions that reflect the "definite
sense ofplace" Canadian political science and sociology have managed to retain. I
Both the uniquely Canadian but theoretically underdeveloped concept of the popular
sector per se and a neo-gramscian perspective on social formation and mobilization,
drawing on political economy and class-analytical traditions, that has proven its value
for understanding the conjuncture of crisis and its politics, will feature prominently
here.
Many concepts and terms will be raised and, hopefully, defmed in the course
of this chapter. One does demand some clarification at the outset. Bottomore defines a
social movement as, quite simply, "a collective endeavour to promote or resist change
in the society of which it forms part.t" The study of social movements has a long
history across a number ofacademic disciplines. Social historians - initially, mostly
European - examined nineteenth and twentieth century social movements and
sociologists and political scientists - for the most part, American - defmed pressure
groups and interest groups while their colleagues in social psychology focused on
social protest as 'deviant behaviour' in the postwar period. This reflects the state of
play in the field until the upsurge in contestation in the 1960s kicked off a boom in
competing analyses.
Despite Bottomore's succinct contribution, an agreed defmition of the social
movement has been elusive. Certainly, the involvement of different fields of study has
added a layer ofcomplexity. In addition, as Petracca notes, "definitions have varied
over time. Some offer normative appraisal; others reflect the analytical goals of the
scholar using the terminology.l" In his review of analytical frameworks for the study
of social movements. Ayres notes that "although recent research has provided a
I William K. Carroll, ed., Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and
Practice, Second ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1997),4.
2 rom Bottomore, Political Sociology (London: Hutchinson. 1979),41.
3 Mark P. Petracca, "The Rediscovery of Interest Group Politics," in The Politics ofInterests: Interest
Groups Transformed, ed. Mark P. Petracca, Transforming American Politics (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992). 5.
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lengthy inventory of conditions that matter in the rise of movements, frequently what
is left is a growing array of models whose differences reflect more the divergent
interests of scholars than empirical factors." That the study and categorization of
social movements has been a crowded and highly competitive environment, where
defmitions vary over time and the line between assessment and prescription is often
blurred, should not be surprising. Two related causes can be identified: the
contemporary relevance of the subject(s) and the high political stakes involved since
these competing analyses and defmitions have the potential to legitimate specific
social voices and demands.
Perhaps for similar reasons, the field of social movement analysis has tended
towards posing dramatic polarities. New social movement theory highlights
distinctions between 'old' and 'new' movements, interest group theory counterposes
politics to protest while a tendency to view movements through the prism ofa
movement/institution or movement/party dualism persists more or less across the
board.' Underlying all of these pairings, this paper will argue, is a disinclination to
allow for the complex and critically important interplay of structure and agency.
The following review of theoretical frameworks for the study of social
movements, and their relevance to the case ofa social movement coalition, will lay
the basis for an account of the formation and development of the Pro-Canada
Network.
2. Classical Pluralist Theory
Pluralism became the "empirical account and nonnative vision of American
politics.t" Social movements are viewed through its basic assumptions regarding the
nature of power in liberal democracies: the neutrality of the state and a wide
4 Jeffrey M. Ayres, Defying Conventional Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention
against North American Free Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998),20.
5 To some extent, these polarizations were reinforced by the wave of popular mobilization beginning in
the 1960s. which was often inspired by anti-state and anti-party themes. Wainwright, Arguments fur (J
New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right.
6 Petracca, "The Rediscovery of Interest Group Politics," 5.
73
distribution and equality ofaccess to power on a level playing field for competing
interests. In his classic statement of the pluralist model, Dahl argued that these
conditions provided for consensus, stability and the public good.' As MacAdam notes,
"the implication is clear: groups may vary in the amount of power they wield. but no
group exercises sufficient power to bar others from entrance into the political arena.t"
Furthermore, "[b]ecause one center ofpower is set against another, power itself will
be tamed, civilized, controlled and limited to decent human purposes, while
coercion...will be reduced to a minimum.?" Conflict could thus be peacefully
resolved through institutionalized politics; social protest and the movements that carry
it forward are consequently irrational and, deservedly, marginal.
Classical liberal approaches to the study of social movements emphasized the
marginality ofprotest with the movement's detachment from existing political
systems leading to long-term ineffectiveness and, fmally, the recovery of these
movements within a new societal equilibrium. 10 In various ways, social order and
disturbance theory, mass society theory, relative deprivation theory, and collective
behaviour theory all attempted to explain individual participation in protest
movements as a consequence of the structural strains of rapid social change. 11 As a
result, "movement participation was relatively rare, discontents were transitory ... and
movement actors were arational if not outright irrational."12
7 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956)~
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
8 Doug MacAdam, Political Process and the Development ofBlack Insurgency (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982). 5.
9 Robert Dahl quoted in ibid., 6.
10 See inter alia 1. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization theory and the Study of Social Movements,"
Annual Review ofSociology 9, no. 527-53 (1983)~ Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New
Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," Social Research 52, no. 4, Winter
(1985): 671.
II For social order and disturbance theory, see David Truman, Governmental Process; Political
interests and Public Opinion, Second ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971); for mass society theory, see
Kornhauser, The Politics ofMass Society; for relative deprivation theory, see Gurr, Why Men Rebel:
and collective behaviour theory, see Smelser, The Theory ofCollective Behaviour.
12 Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization theory and the Study of Social Movements," 528: see also
MacAdam, Political Process and the Development ofBlack Insurgency.
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A number of challenges to the classical explanations for social protest and the
formation of social movements emerged within the liberal pluralist paradigm. Elite
critics argued that access to power was not in fact equal. 13 Both within political
science and sociology, Olson's critique was most influential. 14 Firmly rooted in neo-
classical economic theory, Olson's approach focused on individuals as rational actors
interested in maximizing their interests and minimizing their costs. The result was a
methodologically individualistic basis for an approach to collective action. 15 Olson's
work had a substantial impact within the American social sciences. As McCann notes,
Olson's analysis "most effectively cut into the heart of the pluralist assumptions about
group mobilization.?"
Olson's approach became the target of revision and critique in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. The mobilization of millions ofAmericans, among others, around a
variety ofcauses and movements undermined the simple economistic assumptions
concerning human nature that had led Olson to the pessimistic conclusion that
collective action for collective goods would not be supported by large groups. 17
Within political science, interest group theory evolved from the Olson-like
economism of"exchange theory" to a more inclusive version capable of conceiving of
some individual commitment to "providing collective goods, rather than simply
maximizing their own material well-being." I8
3. Resource Mobilization Theory
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) in its different variants refutes the
classical defmition of the type of collective behaviour exemplified by social
13 Theodore J. Lowi, The Politics ofDisorder (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Elmer E.
Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Winston, 1960).
14 Mancur Olson, The Logic ofCollective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
15 Ibid.; Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization theory and the Study of Social Movements," 536.
16 Michael W. McCann, Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1986), 174.
17 Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization theory and the Study of Social Movements"; McCann. Taking
Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism.
18 Paul A. Sabatier, "Interest Group Membership and Organization: Multiple Theories," in The Politics
ofInterests: Interest Groups Transformed. ed. Mark P. Petracca (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 109.
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movements as dysfunctional and irrational. It also rejects the concomitant emphasis
on integration, equilibrium and harmony. In fact, RMT posits social movement
participants as rational actors and collective action as a reflection of substantive
societal cleavages not merely the result of the impact of short-term social change. 19
Consequently:
The "rational actor" (individual and group), employing strategic and
instrumental reasoning, replaces the crowd as the central referent for the
analysis of collective action."
As McCann points out, most revisions of Olson maintained "his focus on the vital role
oforganizational forms themselves as key variables of effective citizen
mobilization?" Indeed, "organization and rationality are ... the catchwords of this
(resource mobilization) approach" and, consequently, movements are validated as
"credible political agencies.t''"
Some critics have argued that the economistic, rational choice and strategic
bias ofthe RMT approach is not well-suited to the study of the development of the
collective identities which, in turn, form the basis for social movements.r' It is
important in this regard to distinguish between two strands ofRMT: an organizational
approach best exemplified by McCarthy and Zald and a political process version
developed by Tilly and Tarrow among others." In both of these variants, resource
19 Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements";
Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization theory and the Study of Social Movements."
20 Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements,"
674-5.
21 McCann, Taking Reform Seriously: Perspectives on Public Interest Liberalism, 175.
22 Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements,"
676 and Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony in a Canadian Context," 7.
23 See, among others, Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary
Social Movements."
24 Zald and McCarthy, eds., Social Movements in an Organizational Society; Zald and McCarthy, eds.,
The Dynamics ofSocial Movements; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization
and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal ofSociology 82 (1977). Charles Tilly,
Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1975); Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. Sidney Tarrow, "Comparing Social
Movements." International Journal ofMass Emergencies and Disasters -t, no. 39-54 (1986); ibid.,
"National Politics and Collective Action: A Review of Recent Research in Western Europe and the
United States." Annual Review ofSociology 1.J. no. -121--10 (1988); ibid., "Struggle, Politics and
Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest." Cornell Studies in International
Affairs Western Societies Papers No.21 (1989): and ibid., Power in Movement: Social Movements,
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mobilization theory does help to explain similar processes at the level of coalition
formation amongst already existing social identities represented by movements and
movement organizations. Yet, despite this potential, studies ofcoalition formation or
social movement convergence are relatively infrequent within the body ofRMT
work, 25
Some initial points can be made with regard to an RMT-based approach to
coalitions of social movements. First, where coalition formation is considered the
emphasis is placed squarely on the organizational dynamics involved. Second, the
weaknesses ofan excessively economistic approach to social movements that focuses
on the maximization of resources are replicated here. Consequently, in the fmal
analysis coalition formation is viewed as unlikely." An overview ofone of relatively
few RMT-inspired case studies ofmovement coalitions serves to illustrate these
points.
Staggenborg examines the formation ofan American Pro-Choice coalition. In
this context she specifies two sets of "environmental conditions" conducive to
coalition formation:
[C]oalitions were formed to take advantage ofenvironmental opportunity in
the period after 1970, the year in which repeal victories were won in four
states including New York ... Secondly, coalitions were formed in the face of
environmental threat.27
Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
25 As Zald perhaps the most prominent practitioner of the RM approach points out: "Although there is
still much to be learned about the internal operations of SMOs (Social Movement Organizations) - in
particular, about the processes of schisms or mergers - I do not think that it is a major gap in our
knowledge. But such a gap does exist in our understanding of social movement industries." Mayer N.
Zald, "Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past and Future of the Resource
Mobilization Research Program," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and
Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993),337. Hathaway and
Meyer confirm the inadequacy of the literature on social movement coalitions drawing particular
attention to the "relative paucity of studies." Will Hathaway and David S. Meyer, "Competition and
Cooperation in Social Movement Coalitions: Lobbying for Peace in the 1980s," Berkeley Journal of
Sociology XXXVIII (1993-1994): 160.
26 Bert Klandermans, "Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in the Netherlands," in
Challenging the Political Order, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (London: Polity Press,
1990), 125.
27 Susan Staggenborg, "Coalition work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and
Environmental Opportunities and Obstacles," Social Problems 33, no. 5 (1986): 380.
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Environmental conditions also indirectly influence coalition formation by affecting
the level ofresources available to individual social movement organizations. With the
interaction of environmental conditions and resources, coalition formation becomes
most likely when individual organizations lack the resources to take advantage of
opportunities, fend off threats or when coalition work allows movement organizations
to conserve resources for other tactics.
Hence Staggenborg concurs with an argument often made within RMT-
while the formation of coalitions amongst social movements is possible, these are
highly unlikely to be cnduring.i"
Once exceptional environmental conditions subside, ideological conflicts and
the organizational maintenance needs of individual movement organization are
likely to cause conflicts within coalitions which may lead to their
dissolution"
Coalition formation, from this perspective is very much a function of strategic-
instrumental resource maximization; consequently "competition is equally likely.,,30
The economism of the rational choice model at the root of this analysis is quite
clear in Staggenborg's conclusions. Her proposals for overcoming this apparent built-
in obsolescence of coalitions involve limiting the "resource strain" on participating
groups. This is achieved by three means: first, by minimizing or even avoiding
completely the development of an organizational structure at the coalition level;
second, by focusing coalition activities in areas which would be inaccessible cost-
28 Klandcrmans, "Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in the Netherlands," 125~ Bert
Klandermans, "Interorganizational Networks: Introduction," in Organizing/or Change: Social
Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, ed. Bert Klandermans, International Social
Movement Research (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1989),304.
29 Staggenborg, "Coalition work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental
Opportunities and Obstacles," 388.
30 Klandermans, "Interorganizational Networks: Introduction," 304. In any case Zald points to the
impetus for broad coalition formation coming from electoral politics: "The possibility of a "rainbow
coalition" bringing together ethnic groups defined as "have-nets" and other "have-riots" as a significant
entity could presage a significant shift in the control of party policy. It does not, I believe, portend a
new left social movement, since its advocates tend to operate largely in the arena of electoral politics."
Mayer N. Zald, "The Future of Social Movements," in Social Movements in an Organizational Society,
ed. Mayer N. Zald and John McCarthy (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books, 1987), 325.
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wise to individual organizations; and fmally, by depending on the resource base of a
participating group with a well developed infrastructure.'!
3.1 Continuity
An important contribution of the resource mobilization paradigm to the study
of social movement coalitions is the ability to identify and highlight contemporary as
well as historical similarities amongst social movements.Y The emphasis on
continuity in social movement forms and activities is rooted in both divergent strands
ofthe RMT approach. In their analysis of eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century
collective actors, Tilly and Tarrow adopt a historical method providing a fum basis
for comparison over time." In this context inaccurate assumptions regarding 'old'
movements become less likely and past precedents for contemporary movements are
highlighted. For example, the authors of studies of three 'old' social movements
conclude respectively with regard to movement form and movement participants:
[T]he accent on consensual and decentralized decision making is not,
however, new to social movements. As the Oneida community (American
communal experiment of the mid-nineteenth century) illustrates, the affairs of
'old' social movements were often handled in a decentralized and
participatory manner. 34
Just as the Chartist movement was composed of both working and middle
classes, participation in the West German peace movement cut across class
1· 35me.
31 Staggenborg, "Coalition work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental
Opportunities and Obstacles," 388. In their subsequent study of the coalition of US peace groups
lobbying for a nuclear freeze, Hathaway and Meyer focus on framing the strategic trade-off between
"cooperation" and "differentiation" a calculation that is clearly less relevant in the case of a cross-
movement coalition. Hathaway and Meyer, "Competition and Cooperation in Social Movement
Coalitions: Lobbying for Peace in the 19805." A similar framework is also adopted by Diani in his
account of Italian ecological groups. Mario Diani, Green Networks: A Structural Analysis ofthe Italian
Environmental Movement (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).
32 Eduardo Canel, ''New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization: the Need for
Integration," in Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed.
William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond, 1992),43.
33 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution; Sidney Tarrow, "National Politics and Collective Action: A
Review of Recent Research in Western Europe and the United States," Annual Review ofSociology 14,
no. 421-40 (1988)~ Tarrow, "Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and
Cycles of Protest": Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and
Politics, ed. Peter Lange, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
;~ D'Anieri, Ernst, and Kier, "New Social Movements in Historical Perspective," Comparative Politics
22, no. ·t, July (1990): 451.
15 Ib'd .1 - ...
. I.: 'i.:U.
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On the question of values, the authors note that the post-materialist or qualitative
values identified as driving recent movements - e.g. personal autonomy and self-
actualization - were central to the Oneida community in the mid-nineteenth century. 36
The historical approach - political process or what Cohen terms the strategic-
interaction paradigm - also shares a primary emphasis on organizational forms with
the other major tradition within RMT. In fact, it has been argued that the
organizational-entrepreneurial approach (Zald and McCarthy) tends to predetermine
continuity amongst movements because of the more narrow and formal organizational
defmition of social movements it adopts:
Neglecting the difference between a movement and its organizational
representations will almost inevitably lead to the conclusion that there is
nothing 'new' about the contemporary movements."
But this assessment is perhaps too harsh; strong roots in organizational theory are
helpful for assessing continuity over time and, crucially, for the explanation of
coalition formation across movements.
While critics highlight the inability to deal with the formation of social
identities as a key weakness of organizational theory vis-a-vis the study of social
movements, this limitation is less of a handicap when dealing with coalition
formation. Indeed, in the consideration of the coalescing of previously, if not
permanently, formed identities, movements and their organizations, a focus on the
rational choice perspective of these actors is far from irrelevant."
3.2 Linkages
Another strength of an approach informed by organizational theory is the
focus on linkages that emerges from its examination of social networks,
organizational dynamics and political processes. McCarthy and Zald describe "the
36 Ibid.: 455.
37 Dalton and Kuechler, eds., Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in
Western Democracies, 279.
38 For example, OfTe & Wicsenthal refer to the "transitory rationality of opp~rtunism" ,~~ an atte~pt to.
contextualize strategic decisions taken by labour. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, [\,,0 LogICS of
Collective Action," Political Power and Social Theory I (1980).
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variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other
groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the
tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements. ,,39
In spite ofthe relatively limited number of studies ofcoalitions it has
spawned, RMT's organizational approach opens the door to this work by emphasizing
that social movements are themselves far from monolithic. Rather they consist of
shifting coalitions of constituents and can thus be considered as networks of
networks." Furthermore, there is an understanding that "as a rule, social movements
do not act as isolated units but exist within the context of other overlapping,
complementary or oppositional movements.'?"
This recognition is reflected in a series ofconcepts that are of interest for the
study ofcoalition formation. Curtis and Zurcher place social movement organizations
(SMO) within 'multi-organizational fields.' These are defmed as "the total possible
number oforganizations with which the focal organization might establish specific
linkages.,,42 These linkages can be established on the organizational level "by joint
activities, staff board of directors, target clientele, resources, etc." and on the
individual level "by multiple affiliations of members. ,,43
39 Zald and McCarthy, eds., Social Movements in an Organizational Society, 1213.
40 Neidhart quoted in Dalton and Kuechler, eds., Challenging the Political Order: New Social and
Political Movements in Western Democracies, 289. Indeed, as Tarrow argues, many early movements
were in fact coalitions: "Though early analysts insisted on the importance of class in galvanizing these
movement, it was through the interclass and translocal coalitions created through print and association
that the first successful movements took shape." Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements,
Collective Action and Politics, 191.
He adds: "Social coalitions, sometimes purposefully constructed but often contingent and provisional,
concerted collective action against elites and opposites in the name of general programs. The escalation
of specific group demands into general programs was, itselfa product of the need to raise common
umbrellas above a plethora of petty claims." Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements,
Collective Action and Politics, 78.
41 Rucht quoted in Tarrow, "National Politics and Collective Action: A Review of Recent Research in
Western Europe and the United States," 431.
42 LL. Curtis and L.A. Zurcher, "Stable Resources of Protest Movement: The Multi-Organizational
Field." Social Forces 52 (1973): 53.
4.1 Curtis and Zurcher quoted in Klandermans, "Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in
the Netherlands." 123.
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The prevailing conception of inter-movement cooperation as contingent and
temporary and lacking institutional materiality is reflected in the ·alliance system'
framework." Focusing primarily on resource maximization - albeit broadly defined
and including, for example, tangible and non-tangible resources along with extended
communication and recruitment networks involving creation ofpolitical opportunities
- Klandermans also highlights relationships between old and new movements.
Old social movements, like unions, can, and as shown by our study of the
Dutch peace movement, in fact do become part of the alliance system ofnew
social movements. New social movements use the resources and opportunities
provided by old movements. Old movements revive in the wake of the protest
cycle using resources innovations and opportunities created by the new social
movements." .
Klandermans' study of the Dutch peace movement also, not surprisingly, leads him to
forcefully challenge the notion that the newness ofNSM's is necessarily rooted "in
terms of marginality or detachment from existing social and political institutions. ,,46
Klandermans distinguishes between the supportive 'alliance system' and
opposing 'conflict system.' While the former provides resources and political
opportunities to movement organizations and the latter drains resources and restricts
opportunities, the boundaries between the two constructs "remain vague and may
change in the course of events.,,47 He draws on the example of the American women's
movement in the 1970s to explain the dynamic relationship between movements and
these two systems. Without a well developed opposition (conflict system) in the
1970s the women's' movement saw no need to develop a strong coalition of support
(alliance system). The election ofa neo-conservative government and growing
influence of the New Right provided the movement with a substantial conflict system
at which point the absence of an effective alliance system became a liability.
44 Klandermans, "Interorganizational Networks: Introduction," 304.
4S Bert Klandermans, "Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in the Netherl~ds," in
Challenging the Political Order, ed. Russell 1. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (London: Poltty Press,
1990), 135.
46 Ibid.
47 Klandennans, "Interorganizational Networks: Introduction:' 303.
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It was only when the women's movement appeared to be on the defensive that
it started to build new coalition - but too late to save the Equal Rights
Amendment.48
Finally, the Social Movement Sector (SMS) concept represents an extensive
attempt to contextualize the phenomenon ofcontemporary social movements.
McCarthy and Zald first develop it as a composite picture of Social Movement
Industries (SM!) and Social Movement Organizations (SMO) in a given society."
Garner and Zald broaden the defmition and parameters for the SMS through a
comparative study of the United States and Italy.
The Social Movement Sector is the configuration of social movements, the
structure of antagonistic, competing and lor cooperating movements that in
turn is part ofa larger structure ofaction (political action in a very broad
sense) that may include parties, state bureaucracies, the media, pressure
groups, churches, and a variety ofother organizational factors in a society.
Configuration refers both to the amount and structural relation of social
movements activity and the orientation or goals ofaction. 50
While this defmition is insufficiently focused to be ofparticular use for the study of
coalitions, Tarrow subsequently provides a narrower, more appropriate, definition:
[A] configuration of individuals and groups willing to engage in disruptive
direct action against others to achieve collective goals. This includes formal
SMOs, but it also extends to those who participate only sporadically in their
activities, but who participate in a movement subculture and act as an informal
support structure. It can also include ordinary interest groups when these adopt
the tactics of disruptive direct action, or cooperate with those who do...
Tarrow continues:
It (the SMS) is a communications network that facilitates the diffusion and
testing of new action forms, organizational styles, and particularly ideological
themes. Within it, there are often one or two movements that color the
preoccupations and methods used by other movements during the era. Within
48 Ibid.
49 McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." See also
Mayer N. Zald and John McCarthy, "Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation
Among Movement Organizations," in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change. ed. Louis
Kriesberg (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1980). The roots of these concepts in an economic model- i.e..
analogous to firms, industries and industrial sectors - is symptomatic of the economism of the
organizational approach. In this same vein, McCarthy and Zald's highlighting of social movement
'entrepreneurs' seems less problematic if one understands that"... they had in mind a concept very
close to that of 'moral entrepreneurs' who had been observed in social movement activity since the
Reformation." Tarrow, "Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and
Cycles of Protest," 29.
50 Roberta Ash Gamer and Mayer N. Zald, "The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors," in
Social Movements in an Organizational Society, ed. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald
(Transaction Books, 1987), 294.
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the SMS, forms of collective action and interpretive themes spread from one
movement organization to another, often across broad ideological divides... 51
Garner and Zald sketch the dimensions along which a given Social Movement
Sector can be assessed and compared as well as the factors that determine these
results. Among the dimensions they include, size, degree of organization, social
location of support and locus of action, ideological orientation, autonomy and
character of change over time. 52 They consider a broad range of determinants
including constraints - i.e., the extent of spatial and functional centralization of the
political system, the relative weight ofprivate and public sectors, and the degree to
which political rights are legally enshrined. The nature of political parties is given
particular attention including the level and nature of party organization and
constitutional or other limitations on the formation of new parties. Garner and Zald do
not limit themselves to political and organizational factors. They include the
embedding of national structures in the global political economy and phases of capital
and the business cycle since "in every society, the mode ofproduction is a major
determinant of the nature of political action and of the Social Movement Sector.,,53
Some practitioners of what has been considered the 'political process' variant
of resource mobilization theory reject the association with RMT. For example,
Charles Tilly seeks to distance his work from a theory that "identifies the amassing or
spending of resources as the absolutely central phenomenon, and to that extent
distracts attention away from power struggles and from group organization.T"
According to MacAdam, in the political process approach "a social movement is held
to be above all else a political rather than a psychological phenomenon. That is, the
51 Tarrow, "National Politics and Collective Action: A Review of Recent Research in Western Europe
and the United States," 432; see also Tarrow, "Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social
Movements, and Cycles of Protest," 16-19.
52 Gamer and Zald, "The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors," 296.
53 Ibid., 303; Tarrow argues that Gamer and Zald's politicization of the SMS concept is a ~ignifi~nt
step towards tying movements to politics. Tarrow, "Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action,
Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest:' ~q, 32-33.
54 Quoted in Ayres, Defying Conventional Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention
against North American Free Trade. 19.
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factors shaping institutionalized political processes are argued to be of equal analytic
utility in accounting for social insurgency.,,55
From this perspective the 'political opportunity structure' is defmed as "the
dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people
from using collective action.v" Tarrow describes the four aspects of opportunity as:
the degree ofopenness or closure of the polity, the stability or instability of political
alignments, the presence or absence ofallies and support groups, and divisions within
elite or its tolerance or intolerance ofprotests." Tarrow suggests that social
movement mobilization also requires sufficient pre-existing organization to take
advantage of opportunity as well as moral commitment to a movement on the part of
activists.58
4. New Movement Theory
The emergence of the student, women's, anti-racist, peace and environmental
movements in the 1960s and their problematic relationship with the traditional
political agencies of the Left - trade unions and political parties - sowed the seeds for
a reaction against an orthodox Marxist view ofcollective behaviour. The label New
Movement Theory (NMT) is now attached to the broad and heterogeneous range of
perspectives on contemporary social movements that do nonetheless share a number
of basic characteristics. First, they challenge the privileging ofclass as fundamental
societal cleavage and therefore the primacy of the working class and the labour
movement as agencies for social change. Secondly, they view 'new social
movements' as constituting a clear break with the forms and practices of previous
collective actors - specifically the labour movement. Thirdly, having broadened the
range of social groups relevant to social and political change they focus on the social
and cultural identity of these actors.
55 Quoted in ibid., 14.
56 Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 18.
5? Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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Beyond these three important points ofagreement, the various variants ofNew
Movement Theory part ways. They differ in their account of the emergence of 'new
movements' and in their political prescriptions. Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci
both tie new movements to the emergence of 'post-industrial society' where struggle
no longer takes place over political or material demands but rather over the
"production of symbolic goods." Ronald Inglehart posits a shift to 'post-materialist'
values across the Western world as the driving force behind new movements. Jurgen
Habermas sees new social movements as attempting to protect lifestyles in the wake
of an assault on the "lifeworld" by both the market and the state.?"
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is the flagship ofErnesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe's contribution to the realm ofNMT. Laclau and Mouffe's distinctive
approach to new social movements is worthy ofattention for a number of reasons.
First, their paradigm is explicitly targeted as a critique of a class-theoretical tradition
while at the same time reinterpreting and appropriating a number of concepts culled
from the work of Antonio Gramsci. Second, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse approach
has been influential garnering a significant following and generating vigorous critical
responses. Third, and most significantly for the purposes of this paper, their approach
has attracted attention because it deals explicitly, if as it will be argued
unsatisfactorily, with the question of political agency in capitalist democracies and,
consequently, with the potential role of social movements and social movement
coalitions.
In Laclau and Mouffes account ofhistory, the French Revolution takes on
dramatic importance as the chronological starting point of the "Democratic
Revolution," the historical phase in which the western world, their argument goes,
remains ensconced. This period, now over two hundred years old, is characterized by.
59 Alain Touraine The Voice and the Eve: An Analysis ofSocial Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, '1981), 774; Melucci"Nomads ofthe Present: Social Movements and Individual Yc'ed'l
in Contemporary Society. Ronald lnglehart. The Silent Revolution: Changing ~ 'alucs and Political
Styles among Western Publics. vol. 16 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977): Habermas, "New
Social Movements:' 33.
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the profound subversive power of the democratic discourse which would allow
the spread of equality and liberty into increasingly wider demands and
therefore act as a fermenting agent upon the different forms of struggle against
subordination.r''
A two-edged political logic emerges within this optic. On the one hand, class struggle
becomes merely one instance of the broader democratic struggle. On the other hand,
the democratic revolution opens the historical space to an ever-growing number of
antagonisms or struggles of subordination."
Once the conception of the working class as a 'universal class' is rejected, it
becomes possible to recognize the plurality ofthe antagonisms which take
place in the field ofwhat is arbitrarily grouped under the label of 'workers'
struggles. ,62 . .
The consolidation ofnew struggles around these antagonisms in the 1960s and 1970s
is traced to a series of structural developments which have "provided the objective
conditions.v'" Thus, social movements only "fully develop" out of the pre-existing
antagonisms made possible in an earlier stage of the democratic revolution and
specifically in response to the changing face ofwestern capitalist social formations in
the aftermath of the Second World War. These changes include the establishment of a
new hegemonic formation characterized by the changes in the labour process
associated with Fordism, growing intervention in social life by the newly established
Keynesian Welfare State and, finally, the increasing uniformity of social life brought
about by a media-driven mass culture. Together these developments have constituted
an "intensive regime ofaccumulation" involving a radical commodification of social
life.64
4.1 The Radical Democratic Project
The lynchpin of Laclau and Mouffe's political argument is a far-reaching
reinterpretation of the Gramscian concept ofhegemony. Gramsci has been the object
60 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 155.
61 Peter Osborne, "Radicalism Without Limit? Discourse, Democracy and the Politics of Identity," in
Socialism and the Limits ofLiberalism (London: Verso, 1991),211.
62 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 167.
63 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy:' 91.
64 Ibid., 91-93; Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 161-65.
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of a vigorous intellectual tug-of-war in which Laclau and Mouffe are important
participants.f While they appropriate Gramsci's notion of hegemony, their critics
argue that Laclau and Mouffe dispose ofa number of its defming characteristics.
First, hegemony is stripped of its class content as the leading role of the working
class, explicit in Gramsci, now vanishes. Second, the disappearance ofthe political
role of the working class is rooted in the elimination ofany relationship between
hegemonic projects and the mode of production. As a result, the "organic crisis."
which for Gramsci was a generalized crisis of the economic and social basis 0 fa
social formation, is transformed into a more ephemeral breakdown ofa "unifying
symbolie order. ,,66
This radically revised conception of hegemony becomes the constitutive
principle for the democratic revolution as the universal aspirations of the socialist
project are welcomed back through the rear door:
If every antagonism is necessarily specific and limited, and there is no single
source for all social antagonisms, then the transition to socialism will come
about only through political construction articulating all the struggles against
different forms of inequality.67
And consequently:
Everything depends on the left's ability to set up a true hegemonic
counteroffensive to integrate current struggles into an overall socialist
transformation.68
The two key concepts that emerge to consolidate the basis of the democratic
political project seem ofparticular interest for the study of coalition formation. Again,
Gramsci's paternity is invoked for an "expansive as opposed to neutralizing
hegemony." An 'expansive hegemony' links demands ofdifferent struggles in order
to create 'chains of equivalence. ,69 Thus the Left must create an "expansive
65 Forgacs, "Gramsci and Marxism in Britain."
66 Mike Rustin, "Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist Concept of Hegemony," Ne...r
German Critique. no. ..l3 (1988): 159.
67 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy," 98.
68 Ibid., 99.
69 Ibid., t03; see also Laclau and Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
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hegemony, a chain of equivalences between all the democratic demands to produce
the collective will ofall those people struggling against subordination. ,,70
To some extent, the discourse approach addresses an important weakness in
other theoretical frameworks: the lack of attention paid to the process of social
identity formation. As Rustin points out,
the insight at its core (Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy)
is that social and political identities are constructed ideologically, and are not
merely passive reflections of other levels in the social structure. The process of
definition needs to be given due weight in the theory ofagency [emphasis
mine]."
Furthermore, the emphasis Laclau and Mouffe place on the fluidity of social identities
is an essential precondition for any political project with hegemonic and
transformative aspirations.f And, at least at the abstract level, their emphasis on an
expansive hegemony and chains ofequivalence between struggles would seem a
priori to privilege the formation of coalitions at the practical level.
The discourse-theoretical variant ofNMT does nevertheless bear some
important flaws. While the emphasis on the fluidity of social identity opens the door
to a consideration of the importance ofpolitical practice for the construction of any
potentially hegemonic project, the simultaneous demand that the components of a
radical pluralism remain indeterminate creates a seemingly irresolvable contradiction.
Adding to the confusion, Laclau and Mouffe accord sufficient stability to social
identities for them to be translated into struggles. As Osborne notes they allow for
"fluidity of social identity but also sufficient stability in discourse construction for a
shift from subordination to oppression and therefore a basis for political
organization.r " This fundamental contradiction is reflected in Laclau and Mouffe's
political argument insofar as their hegemonic project depends at the same time on the
70 Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy," 99~ see
also Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 182.
71 Rustin "Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist Concept of Hegemony." 167.,
72 Ibid.: 161; Osborne, "Radicalism Without Limit? Discourse, Democracy and the Politics of ldentitv."
217.
73 Osborne, "Radicalism Without Limit? Discourse, Democracy and the Politics of Identity," 217-8.
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construction of some form of unity amongst struggles and movements and, on the
irreducible separateness of these struggles. According to Osborne:
We are thus confronted with an argument for the 'autonomisation of spheres
of struggle' and the 'multiplication of political spaces' as the condition for a
hegemonic unity of oppressed groups at another level.i"
It has also been argued that the discourse paradigm is of little assistance in the
study of actual social phenomena for, in its obsession with fluidity and contingency, it
leaves "structure and fixity unexplained.':" With regard to Laclau and Mouffe's
formulations this is even truer of their radical democratic prescription than it is of
their critical description of the socialist tradition. Indeed, beyond the valuable yet
vague commitment to an expansive hegemony, no hint ofthe type oforganizational
forms or institutions that might carry forward this project is revealed, leaving it to
depend on ''the persuasive power of an inherently unstable hegemonic discourse.t"
We now approach the fundamental weakness of the identity-discourse
paradigm that seriously undermines both its explanatory and hortatory power vis-a-vis
social movement coalitions. Ironically, these problems are rooted in the determinism
ofan approach pledged above all to the rooting out ofall essentialism. IfLaclau and
Mouffe are unable to explain the formation of social identities, such as those behind
social movements, despite their emphasis on the openness of the social, it is primarily
because of the direct, unmediated correspondence they draw between changes in the
socio-econornic formation in the postwar period and the emergence of new social
identities. Such clear structural determinism combined, strangely enough, with a
highly abstract provision of quasi-absolute fluidity in social identity leads to the
conclusion that "any form of political subjectivity can be conjured up at any time
provided one has the right discourse." 77
74 Ibid., 212.
75 Allen Hunter, "Post-Marxism and the New Social Movements," Theory and Society 17 (1988): 893~
in Mouffe, "Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy?" 104, Mouffe's interviewer remarks: 'It (your
approach) gives a more optimistic political prognosis, but it fails to connect discourse to actual social
groups and institutions."
76 Bob Jessop, State Theory: PUlling Capitalist States in their Place (London: Polity Press, 1990), 301.
77 Osborne, "Radicalism Without Limit? Discourse, Democracy and the Politics of Identity," 217~ see
also Nicos Mouzelis, "Marxism or Post-Marxism?" New Left Review. no. 167. January-February
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5. Class Analysis and the Politics of Alliance
While following two of the earliest theorists of social movements Marx and
Engels, many socialists have challenged the transformative potential of 'non class'-
based movements. Generally, they question the salience of the societal cleavages
represented in these movements for a transformative political project. As Scott argues:
Despite methodological differences, social movements are accorded a no less
anachronistic status within structural Marxism than they were within
functionalism, though for rather different reasons. Social movements are
defmed negatively as not-quite-class-movements. Like institutions in
functionalism, class movements in Marxism provide a norm against which
other forms ofactivity are measured; a norm in terms of which other social
movements constitute deviant cases. 78
But many contemporary critiques of the Marxian approach to social
movements, including Scott's and some of those within the realm ofNMT, are
premised on a narrow reading of what has been a rich and diverse perspective on
political agency. Before, for example, accepting Laclau and Mouffe's reinterpretation
ofGramsci, a broader body of theory and the wider variety of political projects it has
influenced must be considered. As Lynne Segal has put it:
There are many weaknesses in the Marxism that has inspired most of the Left
for over a hundred years... But that tradition was never synonymous with the
elitism and authoritarianism that has characterized Leninist notions of the
vanguard party substituting itself for mass support, any more that it was
synonymous with the paternalism that has characterized Fabian notions of the
democratic state reforming from above and hostile to extra-parliamentary
culture, movements and struggles.79
It has, in fact, been argued that the emergence of 'new movements' is more
appropriately understood as a reaction to the failure ofthese specific forms ofagency
- i.e., Communist (East and West) and Social Democratic political projects." Many
of the criticisms applied to Marxist theory and practice as a whole would be more
appropriately directed to the specific instances of narrowly determinist variants of a
(1988); Terry Eagleton, Ideology; an Introduction (London: Verso, 1991).
78 Scott, Ideology and the New Social Movements, Controversies in Sociology (London: Unwin Hyman,
1990),39.
79 Lynn Segal, "Whose Left: Socialism, Feminism and the Future," New Left Review. no. 185, January-
February (1991): 90.
80 See inter alia Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, "Socialists and the 'New Conservatism'." in The
Socialist Register, ed. Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch, and John Saville (London: The Merlin Press,
1987); Gunder Frank and Fuentes. "Nine Theses on Social Movements."
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socialist worldview and political project. Gramsci' s remark made in a different if not
wholly unrelated context that "it often happens that people combat historical
econornism in the belief that they are attacking historical materialism," could quite
easily be applied to those critiques premised on an account of the broad range of
socialist thought and experience as uniformly and homogeneously economic
reductionist and class determinist."
A more even-handed, if nonetheless necessarily brief, overview of the
spectrum ofMarxian and other socialist considerations of political agency is essential
to any assessment of the relevance of class analysis to the study of social movement
convergence or coalition formation. No doubt this task is rendered more difficult by
the fact that more deterministic traditions, whether merely by virtue of the
conjuncture in which they emerged or, as some have argued, a sinister teleology, have
come to dominate the historical record. As is generally the fate of the defeated in the
realm ofhistory, less 'successful' socialist projects have been overshadowed if not
completely obscured.
Lynne Segal has called the propensity of the "identity-based Left" to
prematurely bury more recent socialist experiments, in her own specific experience
the libertarian Left of early 1980s Britain, "a wilful, deliberate forgetting.,,82 Nor is
Segal alone in drawing such conclusions." The basis for this dissent from an
increasingly dominant intellectual perspective lies in a rather more positive
assessment of the creative contributions emanating from debates within socialist
theory and practice of the recent past. As Wilde notes,
there are many socialists who have used what is essentially class theory to try
to understand and encourage new forms of resistance, not to reduce the
81 Antonio Gramsci, ed., Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers,
1971), 163.
82 Segal, "Whose Left: Socialism, Feminism and the Future," 91.
83 See inter alia Norman Geras, "Post-Marxism?" New Left Review, no. 163 (1987); Norman Geras,
"l.x-Marxism without Substance: Being A Real Reply to Laclau and Mouffe," New Left Review, no.
169 (1988); Laurence Wilde, "Class Analysis and the Politics of New Social Movements," Capital and
Class, no. 42 (1990).
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struggles of groups to simple conception of tensions within the economic
structure."
A brief overview of the theoretical innovation and debate during this period provides
an alternative perspective on the relevance of class analysis to the consideration of
political agency.
5.1 Economic and Sociological Determinism and Political
Substitutism
An alternative reading of the Marxist tradition must deal with the oft-made
accusation ofeconomic reductionism. The irony of the characterization ofMarxism as
ineluctably tied to a simplistic base/superstructure model is that it emerged at the tail-
end of the period during which this model was most firmly and widely challenged
and, in most cases, rejected. Debate over the nature ofthe state took Marxist theory
far beyond these narrow limits, leading amongst other developments to the notion of
its 'relative autonomy' and the mushrooming of interventions on the 'boundary
question' wherein the nature and composition ofclasses were subject to vigorous
debate.
While earlier challenges questioned the very salience of class analysis and the
existence of the working class per se, the questions and issues which can loosely be
defmed as relating to the 'boundary question' - where to draw the line among the
various classes characteristic of capitalist social formations - came to preoccupy
theorists still struggling to construct a socialist project.85 Rather than serving to
"render class analysis obsolete," a plethora of formulations ranging from Erik Olin
Wright's 'contradictory class locations' through the Poulantzian emphasis on the
manual/non-manual divide to Ehrenreich's definition of the 'Professional-Managerial
Class' served to highlight the complex and heterogeneous nature of classes in
capitalist society.86
84 Wilde, "Class Analysis and the Politics of New Social Movements," 74.
85 Peter Meiksins, "Beyond the Boundary Question," New Left Review, no. 157, May-June (1986): 102.
86 Wilde, "Class Analysis and the Politics of New Social Movements," 63. See also Erik Olin Wright,
Class. Crisis and the State (London: New Left Books, 1978); Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary
Capitalism and Guillermo Carchedi, On the Economic Identification ofSocial Classes (London:
Routledge, 1977).
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In Marxism and Politics, Ralph Miliband drew the implications of this
heterogeneity for 'working class' politics:
The problem of'substitutism' arises in various forms and degrees because the
working class is not a homogeneous entity, and that the 'unity of the working
class,' which the party seeks or claims to embody must be taken as an
exceedingly dubious notion... On this view, a united party of the working
class, speaking with one voice, must be a distorting mirror of the class. 87
Political substitutism - the process whereby the political agent proceeds down the
slippery slope from class to party to vanguard, leading fmally to Stalin - is indeed the
second major charge levelled at Marxism. Hirst describes the first step in this descent
as follows: "[B]ecause of the fundamental political unity of the working class,
parliamentary forms ofdemocracy based on multiparty elections will become
obsolete. The people have a single interest and a plurality ofparties is no more than a
obstacle to its realization.v'" Whereas 'post-Marxists' like Laclau and Mouffe argue
that this degeneration of the Marxist political project was inevitable given some pre-
ordained teleology, Miliband sees the roots ofa conjunctural as opposed to
essentialist approach in classical Marxism. He places Marx at one end of the spectrum
"insofar as his own emphasis falls very heavily on the action of the class" and
contextualizes Lenin's vanguard party with the demands of the historical moment.89
In any case, as we have seen above, Miliband contends that "more than one
party is in fact the 'natural' expression of the politics of labour.T" While his argument
is rooted in the heterogeneity ofa working class composed ofdifferent fractions, a
similar conclusion has been drawn by reference to what some posit as Marx's
methodological individualism. Mcquarie and Spaulding, for example, reconsider
contemporary Marxism's failure to account for and ally itself with 'non-class' -based
87 Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics, ed. Raymond Williams and Stephen Lukes, Marxist
Introductions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 126-7.
88 Paul Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism: Democrucv. Civil Society and Global Politics (London: VCL
Press. 1997), 73.
89Ibid., 19. Miliband is far from alone in this regard, Macquarie and Spaulding refer to Marx as
slipping into the usage of "class as social actor" in Donald McQuarie and Marc Spaulding, "The
Concept of Power in Marxist Theory: A Critique and Reformulation." Critical Sociology 16, no. l.
(1989): 18-~O.
90 Miliband, Marxism and Politics. I ~9.
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social movements. They conclude that calls for a theoretical and political realignment
away from an exclusive revo lutionary subject and towards broad anti-capitalist
coalitions are not fundamentally at odds with Marxism. In their own words:
[W]e need not see this as such a radical break with Marxist theory... once we
remember that the working class is not a monolithic structure but is composed
of a plurality of individuals with a variety of class and non-class-based
emancipatory interests."
5.2 A Broader Tradition?
Another reading of the Marxist political project lies in its broader
emancipatory vision. For Marx, and for many who followed him, the emancipation of
the proletariat was a first stage in the full emancipation of'humanity.Y Whether or not
Marx himself or subsequent theorists or projects taking his name ended up
substituting the emancipation of the proletariat for human emancipation, the
universalist liberatory potential ofthe working class is clearly set out as an objective.
Working backwards from this goal, Panitch identifies the role ofthe working class
within the socialist project as not only a consequence of its objective oppression but
as a result of the position of potential power it occupies within the relations of
production, i.e., through the ability to withdraw labour POwer.93 In a similar vein, in
his own critique ofLaclau and Mouffe, Rustin speculates that the terms on which
their conception of "equivalence" might be achieved may not be class but rather
"resistance to capital. ,,94
Giddens builds on Marx's position in The Jewish Question to note the broader
positive impact the emancipatory struggles of oppressed groups might have on others.
Those who fought for the emancipation of the Jews from religious oppression
and persecution were not, Marx asserted, struggling for purely sectional
interests for in freeing the Jews from such oppression they were liberating
91 McQuarie and Spaulding, "The Concept of Power in Marxist Theory: A Critique and
Reformulation," 23.
92 For example, according to Kautsky: "Socialism as such is not our goal, but rather the abolition of
every kind of exploitation or oppression, be it directed against a class, a party, a sex. or a race." Karl
Kautsky, The Dictatorship ofthe Proletariat, trans. H.J. Stenning (Ann Arbor: 1971),3.
93 Panitch, "The Impasse of Social Democratic Politics," 24; Bleyer, "The New Realism: A Socialist
Response to the Crisis in Britain," 84.
94 Rustin, "Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist Concept of Hegemony," 17).
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human beings as a whole. In Marx's argument this was a generalized freedom
from the constraints ofreligion. But one might generalize the principle yet
further: struggles to emancipate oppressed groups can help liberate others by
promoting attitudes ofmutual tolerance which in the end could benefit
everyone [emphasis mine].95
Drawing on what he views as a long alternative tradition in socialist thought,
Bronner stresses the "political moment" over the "empirical-structural moment" of
class and calls for a new category, the "class ideal," with a new perspective rooted in
a socialist ethic. 96 The ideas that Bronner and Giddens, like Rustin and Segal, can
draw on are also numerous outside, or at the margins, ofMarxism. The first usage of
the term socialism recorded by Russell was in 1827 as applied to the followers of the
English Utopian Robert Owen." Raymond Williams records the first usage of the
term as being in the Owenite Cooperative Magazine in the same year and
subsequently in France in 1833.98 Barbara Taylor documents the struggle for
participatory democracy as well as women's rights undertaken by the Owenites as
well as among those associated with the French Utopians, Fourier and Saint-Simon."
As Hirst notes, "the nineteenth century was the century of socialism, rather of
socialisms, for it offered a vast array of systems, differing as much from one another
as they did the opposing liberal and free market doctrines."loo
Wainwright draws our attention back to those Marxists who contested Lenin's
perspective on class and agency or the subsequent hardening of a political instrument
designed in a particular historical moment into a model relevant for all time. 101
Luxemburg simultaneously challenged Leninist vanguardism and Bernsteinian
95 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity; Selfand Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1991), 230.
96 Stephen Bronner, Socialism Unbound (New York: Routledge, 1990), 155-69.
97 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, and its Connection with Political and Social
Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. (New York: Simon, 1945), 781.
98 Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Flamingo, 1981),287.
99 Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem; Socialism and Feminism in the Ninctccm}: Century
(London: Virago, 1983); Segal, "Whose Left: Socialism, Feminism and the Future" ; G~der Frank and
Fuentes, "Nine Theses on Social Movements," 41; Lorna Weir, "Limitations of New Social Movement
Analysis:' Studies in Political Economy, no. 40, Spring (1993): 93; Bottomore, Political Sociology,
505.
100 Hirst. Representative Democracy and its Limits, 84.
101 Wainwright, Argumentsfor a New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right.
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revisionism while emphasizing class self-emancipation. 102 Pannekoek and Gorter
were the most prominent of the Council Communists who engaged in an extended
polemic with Lenin and Bolshevism. 103 Their conception of 'revolution as process'
led them to fiercely oppose vanguardism and build instead on the initial role of the
Russian Soviets. Against the German SDP, which was then engaged in its tum
towards social democratic parliamentarism, Pannekoek argued that,
parliamentary activity is the paradigm of struggles in which only the leaders
are actively involved and in which the masses themselves playa subordinate
role.... Parliamentarism inevitably tends to inhibit the autonomous activity by
the masses that is necessary for revolution. 104 ..
In the wake of the First World War, and social democracy's abandonment of
internationalism, the Austro Marxists, led by Bauer and Adler, elaborated their own
critiques of the bureaucratization and statism increasingly associated with
Leninism. 105 Together with the Council Communists their perspectives were
condemned by Lenin in Left-wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. 106 Schecter
argues the importance of this tradition, and Pannekoek's 1920 plea to Lenin and the
Comintern entitled World Revolution and Communist Tactics in particular, which he
believes outlines the key themes later raised in Western Marxist theory from Antonio
Gramsci to the Frankfurt School. I07
6. Alliance vs. Convergence: a Gramscian approach
There is no doubt that the most prominent and influential strand of this
broader class-analytical tradition is that associated with Gramsci. Indeed, as we noted
above, a virtual intellectual tug-of-war developed over Gramsci's theoretical legacy in
the postwar period. First appropriated by Dmitrov and Togliatti to legitimize the
102 Stephen Bronner, A Revolutionary for Our Times: Rosa Luxemburg (London: Pluto Press, 1981) and
Bronner, Socialism Unbound
103 Bronner, A Revolutionary for Our Times: Rosa Luxemburg.
104 Quoted in Mark Shipway, "Council Communism," in Non-Market Socialism in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries, ed. Maximilien Rubel and John Crump (London: MacMillan Press, 1987), 110.
lOS On Austro-Marxism. see Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode. eds., Austro-Marxism (London:
Oxford University Press, 1978).
)06 Raimund Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism," New Left Review, no. 118 (1979).
107 See Chapter 3 in Schecter, Radical Theories: Paths Beyond Marxism and Social Democracy.
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Comintern's formulation 0 f popular frontism, Gramsci was then used by Togliatti
again and later Berlinguer to justify the pel's Eurocommunist turn. Gramsci has been
claimed by a range of theorists as an intellectual precursor, while some of the
concepts he originated have, in some shape and form, come to play prominent roles in
a number of fields, most notably International Political Economy and Cultural
Studies. 108
The concept of hegemony is at the heart of Gramsci's theoretical project.
Hegemony, for Gramsci, described the combination ofconsent and coercion
necessary to advance 'Fordism' - the phase ofcapitalism characterized by mass
production - i.e., "an ultra-modern form ofproduction and ofworking methods - such
as is offered by the most advanced American variety, the industry of Henry Ford" -
and mass consumption. 109 To ensure its stability and legitimation, Fordist capitalism
required a range of economic, social and cultural arrangements later defmed as
Keynesian demand management and the Welfare State. This reading of the nature of
contemporary capitalism led Gramsci to a different view of political agency from the
dominant Leninist 'dual power' perspective. Rather than a frontal assault - i.e., 'war
of manoeuvre' - to seize state power, Gramsci suggested a broader and more
protracted 'war of position' would be necessary to shift the balance of social forces
under the conditions of advanced capitalism. 110 Whereas Leninist class alliances were
largely instrumental in keeping with the needs of a 'war of manoeuvre,' Gramsci's
'war of position' required 'organic alliances' of class forces in order to construct a
new political subject - 'historical bloc' - with the capacity to fundamentally
transform or replace the existing hegemonic project. I II Nevertheless, Gramsci's
108 Donald Sassoon, On Gramsci and other writings by Palmira Togliatti (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1979) and Forgacs, "Gramsci and Marxism in Britain." On neo-Gramscian IPE and Cultural
Studies, see Introduction above.
109 Gramsci, ed., Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 280-81; Epstein, "Rethinking Social Movement
Theory," 46.
110 Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York: New York University
Press, 1982), 150; see also William K. Carroll and Robert S. Ratner, "Between Leninism and Radical
Pluralism: Gramscian Reflections on Counterhegemony and the New Social Movements," Critical
Sociology 20, no. ::: (199~): 10.
III Epstein, "Rethinking Social Movement Theory," 51.
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political project retained a working-class led alliance at its centre and included the
formation ofa mass party as the "central site and vehicle for alliances" and the
capture of state power. I 12
Taken as a whole, Gramsci's Marxism is considered to avoid both the
reductionism and determinism of other class-based worldviews as well as the
paralysing "all encompassing and all-flattening" openness of discourse theory. I 13
Moreover the combination ofa 'whole system' perspective on the social formation
that pays due attention to the specificity ofa given historical conjuncture while
focusing on the function ofalliances in the development of political agency is clearly
relevant to the case at hand.
7. A Theoretical Framework for Canada?
In Canada, the study of social movements has gone through its own distinctive
evolution. Benefiting from a degree of 'relative autonomy' from the classical liberal
tradition dominant in the United States, early analysis of Canadian social movements
was rooted in a political economy approach. 114 The groundbreaking work ofLipset
and Macpherson located the prairie protest movements in the context of the
development of Canadian capitalism.l " Through the sixties and seventies this
political economy perspective was supplemented and transformed by an emphasis on
the inequities ofclass, region, nation, and later, gender. Within the 'New Canadian
Political Economy' that emerged out ofa combination of a left-nationalist perspective
112 Forgacs, "Gramsci and Marxism in Britain," 86. See also Grarnsci, ed., Selections from the Prison
Notebooks; Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State (London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1980); Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1987).
113 Bob Jessop, "Accumulation Strategies, State Forms, and Hegemonic Projects," Kapitalistate 13
(1983): 108.
114"In English Canada, the intellectual forces that collected together to press for Canadianization' in the
late 1960s and that consolidated the field of Canadian studies and reshaped the agendas of sociology
and political science, were themselves part of a social movement opposing the continentalizing impact
of Americanization." Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony in a Canadian Context," 2.
115 Seymour Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950); C.S. Macpherson,
Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953).
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and traditional Innisian political economy, the identification of social actors has been
a continuing focus ofcontroversy and debate. I 16
For the study of social movements, the political economy perspective - in both
its older and newer variants - has been found wanting. Not unlike Marxism and, as
we have argued, the NMT approach which emerged in reaction, it has tended to
explain the existence and relevance of social movements, "directly from the master
narrative of political economy itself, rather than by building up an understanding
through close observation and theorization of actual movemcnts.v'I" More
particularly, Descent et al. take English Canadian analysis of social movements to
task for its failure to focus the symbolic and subjective aspects ofcollective identity
and for an overly utilitarian assessment of social action and social actors. I 18 The
authors point to what they consider a more fruitful analytical framework developing
in Quebec influenced by European identity-oriented NMT. 119
Responding to similar concerns, NMT has recently been increasingly preferred
as an alternative approach for the study of social movements in English Canada. 120
The NMT paradigm's claim to challenge an economistic bias has gained it currency in
a realm with a dominant political economy tradition and facing the looming shadow
of the RMT approach so influential in American sociology. The specific popularity of
Laclau and Mouffe' s discourse-theoretical approach is no doubt linked to the fact that
they appear to explicitly broach some of the key political dilemmas facing progressive
social movements in Canada and in other western capitalist societies.
Canadian 'autonomy' being relative, both with regard to theory and to actual
practice, classical pluralist theory also flourished, for the purposes of this paper the
116 Descent et al., Classes sociales et mouvements sociaux au Quebec et au Canada.
117 Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony in a Canadian Context." 4.
118 Descent et al. argue that, historically, a combination of RM theory and Marxian political economy
has been predominant in the English Canadian study of social movements Descent et aI., Classes
sociales et mouvements sociaux au Quebec et au Canada, 59.
119 Descent et al., Classes sociales el mouvements sociaux au Quebec et au Canada.
120 See, for example, some contributions to Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony in a
Canadian Context."
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most relevant manifestation being interest group theory. Given the basic assumptions
of an elite pluralist paradigm, 'lobbying' is considered the natural form for interest
mediation. Pross laid the basis for Canadian research in this area.!" He defines
interest groups as "organizations whose members get together to influence public
policy in order to promote their common interest."I22 In his contribution to a
comparative study of analysis of 'First World' interest groups, Pross notes that the
Canadian experience generally "confirms pluralist theory" on this question. He
nevertheless goes on to identify one exception: state sponsorship and support for
many such groups. 123
In the Canadian context, defming what constitutes an 'interest group' has
proved to be as confusing a terminological conundrum as it has elsewhere. While
Bashevkin views the categories developed by Pross as establishing a distinction
between groups that "engage in policy advocacy and those that proceed to the level of
policy participation," Phillips argues that interest groups "are willing to conform to
the accepted norms ofadvocacy in order to achieve their desired outcomes.v'<'
Meanwhile, Pross himself draws a polar distinction between interest groups that
"exert influence" and political parties that "exercise responsibilities of
govcrnment.t'" Clearly, in this pluralist rendition of a straitjacket much of value can
be lost.
Attempts by the state itself to resolve this defmitional riddle have been no
more helpful. This includes distinguishing between 'special interest' and 'public
interest' groups. Whereas public interest groups "promote public policies which
121 A. Paul Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986); Paul
Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hili Ryerson, 1975).
122 Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, 2; Pross, Group Politics and Public
Policy, 84.
123 A. Paul Pross, "The Mirror of the State: Canada's Interest Group System," in First World Interest
Groups: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Clive Thomas (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1993),68-
69.
124 Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 48 and Susan D. Phillips,
"New Social Movements and Unequal Representation: The Challenge of Influencing Public Policy," in
Democracv with Justice: Essays in Honour ofKhayyam Zev Paltiel, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and A. Brian
Tanguay (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992),262.
125 Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, 24.
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produce collective benefits to many Canadians," special interest groups "mainly seek
to advance the material interests of members." 126 Since the adoption of the Canadian
Charter ofRights (1982) the category of' charter interests,' referring to organizations
that advocate rights guaranteed under the Charter ofRights has been added to the
mix.127 More recently, the nomenclatural package headlined by terms like civil
society and NGO has had pride of place. Here, as Morris-Suzuki describes it, the
riddle becomes more like an alphabet soup cooked up in the Marx Brothers' kitchen:
The amorphousness of the boundary between 'state' and 'civil society' has
given rise to some ironic hybrids like the BONGO (Business Organized NGO)
and the oxymoronic GRINGO (Government Run/Initiated NGO).128
Indeed, in spite ofan interesting genealogy, the concept of 'civil society' has also
been widely critiqued. Reviewing different definitions, Resnick suggests that civil
society may very well amount to a ''utopian construct" and queries the value in
referring to a collection of social actors in this manner. 129 The use of the concept also
unleashes yet another simplified dualism - state/civil society - that may, in the end,
serve to conceal more than it explains. 130 As Hirst points out, "both state and civil
society are made up of large complex organizations, and the boundary between the
two is not all that clear."13 1
126 Peter Finkle et aI., Industry Canada: Federal Government Relations with interest groups: a
Reconsideration (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994).
127 Ibid. A full discussion of the importance of the Charter and its relationship to social struggle is
beyond the purview of this dissertation; see Michael. Mandel, The Charter ofRights and the
Legalization ofPolitics in Canada (Toronto: Wall, 1989); see also Linda Cardinal, "Les mouvements
sociaux et la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes," International Journal ofCanadian Studies, no.
7-8 (1993).
128 Teresa Morris-Suzuki, "For and Against NGO's: the politics of the lived world," New Left Review 2,
no. 2 (2000): 69.
129 Philip Resnick, Twenty First Century Democracy (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press,
1997), 107.
130 "Civil society is just such a projection of our desires. Worse, it gravely misdescribes the world we
actually confront. As a concept, it has almost no specific gravity. It is little better than a Rorschach blot,
the interpretations of which have been so massaged and expanded over the past fifteen years that th~ .
term has come to signify everything - which is to say nothing." David Rieff, "The False Dawn of Civil
Society," The Nation, 22 February 1999.
131 Paul Hirst, "Democracy and Civil Society," in Reinventing Democracy, ed. Paul Hirst and Sunil
Khilnani (Oxford: Basil Blackwell/ The Political Quarterly, 1996), 99.
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Returning to interest group theory, Phillips points out that "this focus also has
a limitation, because [it] has had little to say about activities other than lobbying and
the provision of selective incentives.t''Y Schwartz describes it thus:
An interest group centres around a set of paid organizers who seek to
accomplish social change through direct contact with the institutional leaders
responsible for policy. 133
This approach has little to offer for the analysis of coalition formation given its
narrow rational choice assumptions and simplistic understanding of social
mobilization.
When it comes to the study of coalition formation or movement convergence it
is not surprising that the strengths and weaknesses that the RMT and NMT
frameworks exhibited elsewhere have been replicated in the Canadian context. Dennis
Howlett, for example, draws on the concepts of expansive hegemony and chains of
equivalence put forward by Laclau and Mouffe to argue that in the Canadian context:
Coalition building is a key to the political success ofeach of the social
movements struggles as well as critical to whether the politics of social
movement struggles are merely populist/reformist or radical
/transformational.i"
Others have used a discourse-theoretical analysis to deepen the understanding of a
variety of social identities. 135 Meanwhile the work of some Canadian proponents of a
discourse-theoretical approach highlights the depth of the contradiction at the heart of
Laclau and Mouffe's argumentation and thus its limits. For example, Magnusson and
Walker challenge Laclau and Mouffe's reintroduction of an "essentialist unity":
They (Laclau and Mouffe) may not want a working class party, but they do
want a counterhegemonic force to contend with capitalist hegemony.
Recognizing the unity of capital and the diversity of the social movements that
respond to it, they want somehow to reduce that diversity to a unity - to
132 Phillips, "New Social Movements and Unequal Representation: The Challenge of Influencing
Public Policy," 24.
l33 Michael Schwartz and Shuva Paul, "Resource Mobilization versus the Mobilization of People: Why
Consensus Movements Cannot be Instruments," in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D.
Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, \992),221-22.
134 Dennis Howlett, "Social Movement Coalitions: New Possibilities for Social Change," Canadian
Dimension, November-December 1989, \29.
m See, for example, Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony in a Canadian Context," and
Carroll, ed., Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice.
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hegemonize it - and so to create a unified force capable of overcoming capital
itself... 136
Indeed Magnusson puts himself squarely in the anti-hegemonic camp ofdiscourse
theorists with his explicit criticisms of any attempt to articulate together a plurality of
struggles:
Even thinkers like Laclau and Mouffe, who have tried hard to break free from
the monologic of the struggle for socialism, fall back on the idea that there
must be a "chain of equivalences" that links the various struggles in which we
must engage. This betrays the continuing influence of the logic of identity.
There may be no equivalences - no way of relating our need for living well
now to our duty to maintain the diversity of life on earth. 137 .
The propensity ofNMT formulations to see these movements as oriented
towards lifestyles, focusing exclusively on cultural aspects, and fmally, viewing civil
society as their only field of activity, is a serious weakness in the Canadian context.
There is overwhelming evidence that 'new' movements such as the women's,
ecological, native, peace and lesbian and gay movements operate on a terrain which
includes, at a minimum, interaction with the state either in defence ofacquired rights
or to make new gains, and at times within state structures themselves.l " This reality
poses serious problems for the dramatic, polarized relationship NMT tends to draw
between old and new movements. 139 And while the focus on social identities and
136 Warren Magnusson and R.J. Walker, "De-centring the State: Political Theory and Canadian Political
Economy," Studies in Political Economy 26 (1988): 46.
137 Warren Magnusson, "Decentring the State, or Looking for Politics," in Organizing Dissent:
Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed. William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond
Press, 1992), 79.
138 See inter alia Weir, "Limitations ofNew Social Movement Analysis," 87; Adamson, Briskin, and
McPhail, Feminist Organizingfor Change; on First Nations, see Long, "Culture, Ideology, and
Militancy: The Movement of Native Indians in Canada, 1969-91"; on the peace movement, see David
Langille, "Building an Effective Peace Movement: One Perspective," in Social Movements/Social
Change: The Politics and Practice ofOrganizing, ed. Frank Cunningham, et aI., Socialist Studies
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 1988); on the environmental movement, see Thomas Conway,
"Sustainable Development and the Challenges Facing Canadian Environmental Groups in the 1990s,"
in Democracy with Justice: Essays in Honour ofKhayyam Zev Paltiel, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and A.
Brian Tanguay (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992); Gary Kinsman, "Managing AIDS
Organizing: 'Consultation,' 'Partnership,' and the National Aids Strategy," in Organizing Dissent:
Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed. William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond
Press, 1992).
139 Olofssons distinction between new movements oriented towards "cultural revolution" and others
working for the "defence of real social consumption" is of some interest though it appears to effectively
undermine the very need for a category of 'new' movements. Gunnar Olofsson, "After the Working
Class Movement? An Essay on What's "New" and What's "Social .. in the New Social Movements,"
Acta Sociologica 31 (1988).
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their formation is a powerful asset of New Movement Theory and its discourse-
theoretical variant, it is accompanied by an overwhelming confusion on the question
of political agency.
In contrast, because it is rooted in historical and organizational analysis the
Resource Mobilization approach allows for an assessment of continuity both over
time and across movements. As a result, an emphasis on commonalities between old
and new social movements and linkages between different constituencies emerges,
while simplistic and dichotomous characterizations of relationships such as that
between political parties and social movements are generally avoided. .
The focus on social movement organizations and social movement sectors has
proven particularly useful for the study of feminist organizations in Canada. Phillips
uses social network analysis to demonstrate the level of integration that has developed
in the Canadian women's movement. In so doing she highlights the role of action and
structure, and not merely identity, in the construction of "meaning."140 Vickers and
Bashevkin, like Phillips, have used variants oforganizational theory to assess the
Canadian women's movement. In their study ofNAC, Vickers et al. are expressly
attentive to the variety ofdiscourses brought to NAC by participants and how their
interactions, as well as issues of structure, affect NAC's future prospects. 141
Gunder Frank and Fuentes' identification of the inheritance of organizational capacity and leadership
from old movements (e.g. labour and church) as a ''new characteristic of many contemporary social
movements" is also valuable in the Canadian context: "A new characteristic of many contemporary
social movements, however, is that - beyond their spontaneous-appearing changeability and
adaptability - they inherit organizational capacity and leadership from old labour movements, political
parties, churches and other organizations, from which they draw leadership cadres who became
disillusioned with the limitations of the old forms and who seek to build new ones. This organizational
input into the new social movements may be an important asset for them, compared to their historical,
more amateurishly (dis) organized, forerunners but it may also contain the seeds of future
institutionalization of some contemporary movements." Gunder Frank and Fuentes, ''Nine Theses on
Social Movements," 29. On this theme, see also Bert Klandermans, Organizingfor Change: Social
Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement
Research (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1989), 10.
140 Susan D. Phillips, "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the Network of National
Canadian Women's Organizations," Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science XXIV, no. 4, December
(1991): 757.
141 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women and Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian
Nationalism.
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In attempting to build some distance from the traditional interest group
approach, Phillips draws a distinction "in the nature of representation itself." Whereas
interests are "struggles of specificity," the politics of identity are "struggles of
imagination and connectivity through which collective identities are created and new
political spaces are opened.,,142 She also adopts the concept ofNew Social Movement
Organizations (NSMOs), symbolically and practically pointing to a possible synthesis
of the dominant paradigms. 143
Unfortunately, studies primarily grounded in Resource Mobilization Theory
tend to remain limited by a bias to quantitative analysis and, more specifically, a
quasi- mathematical calculus of resource maximization. Bashevkin' s cost-benefit
analysis ofNAC's participation in the fight against the Canada-U.S. FTA reflects this
weakness. 144 As MacAdam remarks in extremis, "In some hands, this perspective
reads like little more than an organizer's manual on fundraising.t''Y
Overall, it is quite clear that in the Canadian context as elsewhere neither
RMT nor NMT provide all the tools necessary for the study of social movement
coalition formation. While New Movement Theory can help to introduce a necessary
corrective to the more ham-fisted variants ofclass-analytical and political economy
approaches and to the organizational focus ofRMT, it cannot deal with the structural
issues raised by social movement coalitions or the process of identity formation at the
heart of movement convergence.
Thanks to their grounding in organizational theory, some incarnations of RMT
are useful for understanding the factors underlying social movement coalition
formation, maintenance and decline. Also, the broader context established by the
notion of a Social Movement Sector and through the conception of a structure of
142 Phillips, ''New Social Movements and Unequal Representation: The Challenge of Influencing
Public Policy," 255-6.
I,ll 'New' social movements do self-organize though Phillips argues they do so differently: "NSMO's
cannot act as conventional lobbyists, and in many cases, do not have the inclination to do so." Ibid.,
257.
IH Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism.
145 MacAdam, Political Process and the Development ofBlack Insurgency, I.
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political opportunities seems promising. And yet, this approach still generally fails to
fully consider the importance of discourse and agency. Nevertheless, in their
respective studies ofNAC, Vickers et al. and Phillips demonstrate the potential for
organizational theory to be enhanced by an attentive ear to discourse which, the case
of the NAC demonstrates, is a key element in coalition formation, mandating and
survival.
Despite their dominant status in academia, RMT and NMT are not the only
perspectives on offer for the study of social movement coalitions. We now move on to
consider some other theoretical frameworks, or elements thereof, that have either
emerged out of, or been strongly influenced by, Canadian experience and analysis.
8. The Popular Sector: a Canadian Alternative?
Introducing their 1985 collection ofbriefs presented to the Royal Commission
on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (MacDonald
Commission), Drache and Cameron argued that an alternative consensus was
ernergmg:
It is a consensus ofwhat we call "the popular sector": churches, trade unions,
women's groups, social agencies and organizations representing Native
People, farmers and the disadvantaged. This fundamental regrouping of forces
represents an alternative to the rigidities of Canada's two-and-a-halfparty
system and the simple two-class model of society. In a period when Canadian
society is supposedly shifting to the right, there are more forces ready for
social change than either the general public or the traditional left can
• 146
recognize.
While the popular sector concept was not subsequently further developed
theoretically, it has been widely used by Canadian social movement students and
activists alike. 147
Drache and Cameron's conception of the popular sector has a number of
strengths. First, as a broader construct around the activities of social movements and
14b Drache and Cameron, eds., The Other MacDonald Report, ix.
147 Cameron explains the use of the term popular: "because they represent people, and because they
mostly have some form of democratic operating procedure." Duncan Cameron, "A Game With New
Rules," This Magazine, MarchiApril 1988,22.
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social movement organizations, it challenges the traditional pluralist categorizing of
organized interests other than political parties as 'interest groups' or 'pressure
groups.' It is a framework for the study of the interaction of movements and their
organizations that need not succumb to simplistic categorizations like those based on
degrees of institutionalization rooted in a reductionist movement/institution
polarity. 148
Second, Drache and Cameron clearly tie the political discourse of the popular
sector to social struggle recognizing that its relevance is only fully understood when it
is rooted in the social experience out of which the discourse emerges. They place the
popular sector's discourse exactly in this context:
Reflecting the increased ideological conflict engendered in Canada by the
economic crisis, groups unhappy with reliance on market and state rationality
for the resolution of social problems began to use a new language in public
debate. This political discourse was generated by the struggle between capital
and labour, by women struggling on their own behalfand by native peoples,
farm groups, social agencies, churches, environmentalists, peace activists,
youth, and seniors [emphasis mine].
They emphasize further:
The true importance of popular-sector discourse however is its social
foundation. It springs from the opposition of many groups to what has become
the new orthodoxy in government: neo-liberalism. Ideological conflict arises
out of practical struggles for concrete objectives. 149
Drache and Cameron do not succumb to a determinism that sees identities and
discourses as being 'read off' ofeconomic structures in what Tarrow describes as the
148 Olofsson sees the difference between old and new social movements as "partly overlapping a
famous conceptual pair in social theory; the polarity movement-institution." Olofsson, "After the
Working Class Movement? An Essay on What's "New" and What's "Social" in the New Social
Movements." Pross and other interest group theorists propose yet another conceptual pair: party-
interest group. Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics, 3. In this company, the
distinction drawn between social movements and social movement organizations or SMO's bears a
considerable comparative advantage as an analytical tool. See for example McCarthy and Zald,
"Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," 1217-18.
"Although movements are inchoate and movement organizations are purposive, the relationships
between them cannot be reduced to the symmetry between spontaneity and consciousness." Tarrow,
"Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest," 18.
14Q Duncan Cameron, "Political Discourse in the Eighties," in Canadian Parties in Transition:
Discourse, Organization, Representation, ed. Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay (Toronto:
Nelson Canada, 1989), 74-75.
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"transmission belt" view of politics. ISO Rather, social as well as political identities
emerge out of the struggles actors engage in, influenced, of course, by their social and
economic location.
The popular sector concept also seeks to move beyond tactical alliances to
identify convergence and recognizes the possibility that a broader - indeed universal -
emancipatory vision, and not merely the maximization of resources, might underlie
this convergence. Along with a general lack of theoretical elaboration, it is perhaps
this last characteristic that leads Drache and Cameron to make rather ambitious claims
on behalf of the popular sector. These include posing an alternative to the traditional
political system, sharing an alternative discourse and bearing transformative as
opposed to reformist political demands. lSI In retrospect, it seems possible that Drache
and Cameron have overestimated the depth and breadth of the consensual alternative
discourse that developed within the popular sector. Indeed, their enthusiastic account
- to wit, "the groups active in these coalitions are Canada's counter-institutions, and
they draw on a counter-discourse ofpolitical economy" -must be placed into proper
context. IS2 While the labour, women's and ecumenical social justice movements'
views ofdevelopments in contemporary capitalism were increasingly similar as
Canada entered a prolonged period ofeconomic crisis in the 1970s, differences in
analysis and in prescription clearly remained. The notion that a clear alternative vision
emerged, only a decade later, out ofpresentations by popular sector groups to the
Macdonald Commission in 1982-84 has been challenged. Assessing the situation from
a vantage point five years on, Jenson describes the very real limits of the consensus
achieved by these groups:
150 Tarrow, "National Politics and Collective Action: A Review of Recent Research in Western Europe
and the United States," 423.
151 "Coalition building, though difficult to work out in the face of important differences among groups
is the favoured strategy for political intervention. In contrast to the nco-interventionists, the popular
sector practices transformative politics rather than reformism. Politically, its rallying points have been
full employment rather than welfare, more national self-reliance rather than increased dependence on
export markets, and democratic control over decision-making rather than attachment to technical
knowledge and management rationality."Cameron, "Political Discourse in the Eighties," 74-75.
152 Drache and Cameron, eds., The Other MacDonald Report, ix.
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A broad-based coalition of the popular sector insists upon using nation-
building language to describe its alternative future ...The alternative they
propose, however, remains underdeveloped and defensive; it cannot yet claim
to be a clearly articulated paradigm for future social relations. 153
Jenson challenges the transformative potential - let alone the transformational
character - of an alternative discourse that is "poorly linked to any real
comprehension of the innovations in production relations." As a result she reasserts
the importance of studying the formation of social and political identities by
identifying social and economic locations and placing all ofthis within a broader
analysis of developments in modes ofproduction and regulation. 154
The question of identity is placed in context when Jenson reminds us that
identity politics are not the exclusive purview ofnew social movements but rather that
all politics have in fact always been about identities. 155 For Jenson, identities emerge
in discursive struggle:
Politics is about conflict over or acceptance ofcollective identities - about
who has a right to make claims - as much as it concerns conflict among
groups and organizations over disputed claims about who gets what, when and
how. The terrain on which actors struggle for representation is the universe of
political discourse, a space in which socially constructed identities emerge in
discursive struggle. 156
With the recognition of the plurality of groups and interests engaging in this process
comes an acknowledgment of the popular sector as a space or terrain for discursive
struggle and identity formation. Identifiable relationships, processes, and institutions
define this terrain or space; it is a material network, not merely a theoretical construct.
The constituencies Drache and Cameron identify as part of the popular sector
engage in discursive struggle, initially through a series of relatively ad hoc
relationships, both organizational and personal, and later in more formal relationships
which are themselves issue of this struggle. As they form cross-sectoral coalitions
153 Jane Jenson, "All the World's a Stage: Ideas, Spaces and Times in Canadian Political Economy,"
Studies in Political Economy, no. 36, Fall (1991): 65.
154 lbid.: see also Greg Albo and Donald Swartz, "The Free Trade Papers," Studies in Political
Economy, no. 24, Autumn (1987).
155 Jenson, "All the World's a Stage: Ideas, Spaces and Times in Canadian Political Economy," 48.
156 Jenson, "Representations in Crisis: The Roots of Canada's Permeable Fordism." 663: Jenson, "All
the World's a Stage: Ideas, Spaces and Times in Canadian Political Economy," 52.
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around single issues, and at times on the basis of a broader common agenda, these
actors engage in the defmition and redefmition of their own social and political
identities and discourses as well as the collective identity and discourse of these
specific moments of convergence (i.e., coalitions and alliances) and of the popular
sector as a whole. An emerging and evolving common discourse, combined with
developing personal and institutional relationships, lays the basis for yet further
identity formation and for collective action.
The limits to the discourse and identity ofa given movement are not
influenced by its social and economic location alone. The process of identity
formation through the day-to-day activities of movement building itself sets further
constraints. As Brenner notes:
Worldviews are carried by groups who by their social location and experience,
their everyday experience as well as their experience in reform movements,
are more or less open to one set of ideas or another.l'"
Contrary to discourse theory, which posits identity as entirely indeterminate and
therefore all relationships as possible, 158 Phillips points out that the collective identity
ofa movement,
provides a structure in which only some political discourses are possible, in
which only some, but not all, issues can be supported as causes of the
movement, and in which only some actions are possible. 159
In a more positive vein, approaching the question from the perspective of
proponents ofcoalition building, the editors of a collection of studies of a dozen
contemporary social movements argue that:
Coalition politics link and integrate struggles and ideally help each constituent
to broaden consciousness of the others oppression, and to take seriously a
much wider range of issues than it otherwise rnight.l'"
157 Johanna Brenner, "Feminism's Revolutionary Promise: Finding Hope in Hard Times," in Socialist
Register 1989: Revolution Today, Aspirations and Realities, ed. Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch, and John
Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1989),247.
158 See, for example, Mouzelis, "Marxism or Post-Marxism?"
159 Phillips, "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the Network of National Canadian
Women's Organizations," 780.
160 Frank Cunningham et al., eds., Social Movements/..Social Change: The Politics and Practice of
Organizing, Socialist Studies (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1988),25.
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The space where movements and their organizations interact is both relatively more
forgiving and more limiting than that within a given social movement on this score. A
well-developed terrain for interaction is certainly a propitious ground for solidarity
and learning and is therefore likely to facilitate ongoing discursive and political
convergence. But movements and their organizations bring with them substantial
baggage. This includes previously, if not permanently, formed identities, generated by
social and economic location, through struggle, as well as distinct organizational
cultures and styles. All of these factors pose real limits to the possible discursive and
strategic outcomes.
The formation of a social movement coalition inevitably involves some level
of discursive struggle and the potential to create new political identities bearing an
alternative discourse. Coalition building also involves maximizing the collective
political resources ofparticipating movements as well as resource maximization in a
more traditional sense. 161 It is therefore also a process of inter and intra-organizational
struggle with organized movements bearing not only discourses but distinct
organizational traditions, decision-making styles, and approaches to resourcing and
tactics.
An analysis that hopes to predict the outcome and understand the scope and
complexity of coalition formation must be informed by the micro-level focus of
organizational theory drawing attention to the "importance of strategic-instrumental
action" and "higWight(ing) the contingency ofdemocratic structure development.v'P'
9. A Neo-Gramscian Counterhegemonic Project?
Moving beyond both the limited rational choice conception of resource
maximization and crass Marxian economism as the sole relevant calculations of
161 Flacks gives an example of what could be considered coalition formation for the maximization of
political resources in the American context: "In recent years, movement activists have worked toward
coalition to find the numbers and leverage necessary to advance a credible program largely to defend
against the Reaganite effort to destroy the rights and reverse the gains won in earlier struggles." Dick
Flacks, "The Revolution of Citizenship," Social Policy, no. Fall (1990): 46.
162 Canel, "New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization: the Need for Integration," 45-
46.
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collective action means going further than a politicized defmition of self-interest. The
discourse and policy positions of many popular sector groups include explicit
commitments to broader emancipatory goals for their own constituencies as well as
for othersl'" As we have seen above, an ideological commitment to a broader
emancipatory project has imbued a long historyof socialist and radical theories and
practices.
Assessing the prospects for this broader project is at the heart ofthe neo-
Gramscian enterprise. In contrast with Laclau and Mouffe' s discourse-theoretical
interpretation, neo-Gramscians maintain the continuing relevance ofclass and the
essential, if not dominant, role ofthe working class in this political project. 164 They
expand on the central Gramscian concepts of hegemony and, more particularly,
counterhegemony, reflecting the "practical need for subordinate groups to move
beyond a defensive understanding oftheir own immediate interests, to create their
own hegemonic conception ofthe 'general interest' .,,165 Two critical traits of the neo-
Gramscian approach are reflected here. First, it is highly normative. This is made
clear by the centrality of the notion of counterhegemony - i.e., "aspiring to build
consensus around an emancipatory project.,,166 Second, in keeping with Gramsci's
own rejection of determinism, it maintains a dialectical relation between agency and
structure - "articulating the actor to real processes ofstructural transformation" - and
highlights the "interdependence of subject and object.,,167
Given this sophisticated understanding of the relationship between agency and
structure and its conception of a convergence of forces around a broad transformative
163 See Chapters 1 and 3.
1M See, for example, Chapter 6 in Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power.
165 William Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and
Canada.," Canadian Review ofSociology and Anthropology 27, no. 3 (1990): 392.
166 Carroll and Ratner, "Between Leninism and Radical Pluralism: Gramscian Reflections on
Counterhegemony and the New Social Movements," 13.
167 Henri Lustiger-Thaler, "New Social Movement Discourse: the Unsolved Democracy." in
Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed. William K. Carroll
(Toronto: Garamond, 1992), 176; Carroll and Ratner. "Between Leninism and Radical Pluralism:
Grarnscian Reflections on Counterhegemony and the New Social Movements," 15; see also Boggs,
Social Movements and Political Power, 19 and Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent:
Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada," 393.
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political project, Carroll and Ratner have argued that a neo-Gramscian viewpoint
offers the best prospect for analyzing contemporary social movements. 168 More
broadly, Carroll proposes a Gramscian reinterpretation of political economy that "may
be said to mediate between abstract structures of capital and concrete instances of
agency" and consequently, generate an analysisof the transformation of capital and
consent as well as an appraisal of ''the opportunities that these changes present for
emancipatory movements.v'I"
9.1 B.C. Solidarity
Carroll and Ratner use this neo-Gramscian perspective to assess British
Columbia's Solidarity, a major cross-sectoral coalition that developed at the
provincial level. 170 After establishing the historical conjuncture, including the
specificity of the province ofBritish Columbia in Canada's political economy and the
nature ofthe crisis faced in the early 1980s, the authors proceed to identify the
strategies and tactics adopted by capital and the state to deal with the crisis, and to
assess the responses of labour and other social movements.
The crisis facing the Fordist hegemonic project built around mass production
and consumption and an expansive KWS took on specific characteristics in a regional
economy heavily dependent on export-oriented resource extraction. While the
openness ofBC's economy amplified the impact of the 1981-82 recession, it had also
been a factor in provincial po litics being "clearly framed in terms of capital-labor
struggle for most of the twentieth century."I?1 A strong labour movement led to the
election of a first NDP government in 1972 that introduced a series of reforms that
168 Carroll and Ratner, "Social Democracy, Neo-Conservatism and Hegemonic Crisis in British
Columbia,"; Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and
Canada"; William K. Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony: Canadian Contexts and
Social Theories," in Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed.
William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond, 1997).
169 Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada,"
393,90.
170 Carroll and Ratner, "Social Democracy, Neo-Conservatism and Hegemonic Crisis in British
Columbia."
171 Ibid.: 33.
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"strengthened labor's position but also provoked a counter-mobilization in both the
ideological and political fields."I72 This counter-mobilization included the founding of
the Fraser Institute, which became the intellectual vanguard ofneo-conservatism in
Canada, and the reunification of the political right under the banner of the Social
Credit Party, which reclaimed power in 1975. Until the end ofthe decade, a buoyant
economy moderated the Social Credit government's policies, but the fiscal crisis of
1981-82 opened the door to a major assault on the postwar social contract. When the
Social Credit Party won a second term in government in 1983, it set about
implementing an aggressive and highly ideological program. The government
announced a series of measures placing it at the forefront ofneo-conservatism side by
side with Thatcherism and Reaganomics. These included an austerity budget and
twenty-six pieces of legislation which, among other things, radically limited the
bargaining rights ofprovincial public employees, gave employers in the public sector
the right to fire employees upon expiration of collective agreements and abolished the
province's human rights commission. Within days of the announcement of these and
other measures, meetings and demonstrations swept the province leading eventually
to the formation of the Solidarity Coalition. 173 As Carroll and Ratner conclude: "The
highly visible means and ends ofgovernment austerity thus forged a conjunctural
basis of unity between organized labour and a wide range of popular-democratic
forces." 174
While this new grouping brought together a broad spectrum of opposition, it
also raised a number of problems. The Solidarity Coalition was closely tied to the
B.C. Federation of Labour's own labour-based Operation Solidarity and the
coalition's structure was topped off by a triumvirate of co-chairs: Art Kube, president
of the Federation and head of Operation Solidarity, and two community (i.e., non-
m Ibid.: 34.
173 Peter Bleyer, "Coalition Building and the Canadian Popular Sector," in From Resistance to
Transformation: Coalition Struggles in Canada, South Africa, the Philippines and Mexico (Ottawa:
Canada-Philippines Human Resources Development Program, 1996).
174 Carroll and Ratner. "Social Democracy. Neo-Conservatism and Hegemonic Crisis in British
Columbia," 38.
115
labour) representatives. While the co-chairs and a steering group were responsible to
an assembly ofgroups from across the province, the coalition was almost entirely
dependent on the Federation and Operation Solidarity for its funding and seconded
staff.175 The result was a coalition which combined grassroots initiatives with a 'top-
down' process dominated by provincial labour bodies still largely committed to a
narrow electoralist political strategy of support for the NDP. 176
Among the positive attributes of the Solidarity experience, Carroll and Ratner
highlight the bringing together ofworkers in the public service with 'clients' of the
welfare state and activists in other social movements. As a result, Solidarity
"contained the promise of moving beyond a defence of the Fordist project toward
counterhegemonic politics."l77 Unfortunately, neither Solidarity nor a subsequent
mobilization against yet another wave ofausterity measures in 1987 met this
potential. Carroll and Ratner attribute this failure to an inability to move from a war of
manoeuvre to a war of position wherein a counterhegemonic principle or collective
will is formulated. Not moving beyond reactive fightback discourse and tactics to a
longer-term strategy where new relationships are developed and alternatives
proposed, precluded the formation ofa historical bloc. 178 At the most superficial level,
this was reflected in the shopping list approach to issues adopted by Solidarity with no
priorities assigned. Carroll and Ratner also identify the labour movement's strong
attachment to social democratic electoralism as a significant barrier to Solidarity
becoming more than a tactical conjunctural alliance with a rather mechanical and
opportunistic character.l "
m Bleyer, "Coalition Building and the Canadian Popular Sector."
176 Carroll and Ratner, "Social Democracy, Neo-Conservatism and Hegemonic Crisis in British
Columbia."
\77 Ibid.: 46.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.: 46-47: Panitch and Swartz add: ..... obsessive electoralism led to the extra parliamentary
mobilization of the coalition being set aside in favour of relying on the electoral prospects of the NOP
'next time'." Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to
Social Contract, 151.
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Palmer provides a somewhat different perspective on the B.C. Solidarity
experience. 180 Like Carroll and Ratner, as well as Panitch and Swartz, he concludes
that Solidarity's failure was rooted in the.labour movement's commitment to social
democratic reformism and electoralism. As a counterpoint to "those who champion
the capacity of the new social movements to displace the working class as the central
agent of social change," Palmer develops a spirited defence of working class
leadership. He argues, "without the material power of the working class, the various
'sectors' are ultimately impotent when confronted with the force and resources of the
capitalist order.,,181 Palmer goes a step further to launch a spirited defence of
revolutionary 'vanguardism' quoting Lenin's comments on the Russian Soviets:
How inadequate a temporary non-partisan organization is, which at best, may
supplement a stable and durable militant organization of a party, but can never
replace it. 182
From a traditional class-analytical point of view, Palmer constructs an
interesting account of Solidarity and develops a clear answer to the question "What
went wrong?" While Palmer reinforces the point that spontaneity is not sufficient, that
organization and leadership - though, ofcourse, not beholden to "reformism" - are
required, much else of import is lost in the analysis and the conclusions reached are,
not surprisingly, far too simple. The complexity and contingency of democratic
development demands a much more delicate touch than this.
10. The FTA and the Popular Sector
At the pan-Canadian level the neo-conservative project took on a similar if
necessarily different character. While it also aimed to push back the bounds of the
public sector through privatization and to 'free-up the market' via deregulation, it
adopted as its centrepiece a bilateral trade agreement with the United States - the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement - or as then U.S. president Ronald Reagan put it,
"a new economic constitution for North America."
180 Bryan Palmer, Solidarity: The Rise and Fall ojan Opposition in British Columbia (Vancouver: New
Star Books, 1987).
181 lbid., 10J.
182 Quoted in ibid., 105.
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Proponents - the federal Conservative government, neo-conservative think-
tanks and business associations - promoted the FTA as a means of securing access to
the American market, boosting economic growth and employment and keeping
consumer prices down. All ofthis was to be achieved by rationalizing and
restructuring the Canadian economy within a North American framework. Critics
meanwhile noted the profound impact the FTA would have on Canada's socio-
economic development. They identified a 'hidden agenda' behind the agreement - a
'levelling of the North American playing field' which would threaten social and
regional development programs as they were defmed as 'unfair subsidies' or ·non-
tariffbarriers' to trade. Downward pressure on the social wage would accompany cuts
in real wages, and the Canadian State's already severely circumscribed ability to
intervene in the economy, for example through the development of industrial policy,
would be further constrained, if not entirely eliminated, by provisions such as those
according 'national treatment' to U.S-based firms.183
Carroll argues that while the FTA did pre-empt future policy options, it
"avoided an open declaration ofwar on the Fordist bloc.,,184 Consequently, he
suggests that the Gramscian concept of 'passive revolution' is an apt description for
the Canadian neo-conservative strategy developed with free trade as its centrepiece. 185
First formulated by Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks, the passive revolution has been
defined as an alternative strategic option that falls short of an expansive hegemony
while avoiding the full frontal assault characteristic ofa war of manoeuvre. Jessop
sees this strategy as involving the "reorganization of social relations (revolution)
while neutralizing and channelling popular initiatives in favour of the continued
domination of the political leadership (passive).,,186 Whereas an expansive hegemony
183 See inter alia Duncan Cameron, ed., The Free Trade Papers (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1986);
Duncan Cameron, ed., The Free Trade Deal (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988); Ed Finn, John Calvert,
and Duncan Cameron, eds., The Facts on Free Trade (Toronto: Lorimer, 1988); Laxer, Leap ofFaith:
Free Trade and the Future ofCanada.
184 Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada,"
407.
185 Ibid.
186 Jessop, State Theory: PUlling Capitalist States in their Place, 213; see also Buci-Glucksmann,
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such as that developed around Fordism provides real benefits as a trade-off for
popular participation, a passive revolution imposes the interests of dominant forces on
the rest of society through a war of position where popular gains, if there are any, are
achieved through a mechanical game of compromise. 187
The FTA's place at the centre of the neo-conservative agenda was to some
extent indicative of the need to introduce the latter through the "back door" or by the
introduction ofa "Trojan horse.,,188 Grinspun and Cameron argue that trade
agreements such as the FTA constitute a novel and permanent form of"conditioning
framework" which they defme as "a mechanism that effectively restricts policy
choices and promotes a certain policy package at the nation-state level.,,189 Indeed, the
leading lights of the increasingly neo-conservative think tank, the C.D. Howe Institute
(CDHI), argued that trade agreements should be pursued in order to "make it more
difficult to shield the domestic economy from the effects ofchange.,,190
Representatives of the Canadian Manufacturers Association (CMA), quoted by
Rocher to back his claim that business groups were clear as to the consequences ofa
bilateral trade agreement, are worth citing at length:
It is simply a fact that, as we ask our industries to compete toe to toe with
American industry under a full free product flow basis, we in Canada are
obviously forced to create the same conditions in Canada that exist in the US
whether it is the unemployment insurance, Workmen's Compensation, the cost
ofgovernment, the level of taxation, or whatever. The whole socio-economic
policy environment would have to be reasonably comparable with that of the
US in order to give Canadian industry a reasonable chance to manufacture at a
competitive cost, and that means that we would have less freedom to create in
Canada an environment that is very much different from that which exists in
Gramsci and the State; and Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods.
187 Jessop, State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place, 213.
188 This argwnent is presented in a number of places including Ramesh Mishra, The Welfare State in
Capitalist Society: Policies ofRetrenchment and Maintenance in Europe, North America and Australia
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 77; Wolfe, "The Canadian State in Comparative
Perspective," 120; Leo Panitch, "Capitalist Restructuring and Labour Strategies," Studies in Political
Economy 24, no. Autumn (1987): 143; Cameron, ed., The Free Trade Papers, xli: and Mel Hurtig, The
Betrayal ofCanada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1991).
189 Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron, "The Politics ofNorth American Integration: Diverse
Perspectives, Converging Criticisms," in The Political Economy ofNorth American Free Trade, ed.
Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1993).
190 Quoted in Ernst, "From Liberal Continentalism to Neoconservatism: North American Free Trade
and the Politics of the C.D. Howe Institute," 131.
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the United States. Basically, I think that is what we are really talking about.
ultimately, as a country when we talk about free trade. 191
Canada and the US have mutually agreed to play the game by the rules and to
consult each other, which should accentuate competition and real comparative
advantages. Are these constraints acceptable? From the point of view of the
CMA's philosophy, the answer is yes for this agreement will bring us closer to
a market-based economy, de-politicize economic decisions and eliminate
generally unproductive and discriminatory state interventions [emphasis
mine]. 192
In Canada, neo-liberalism or neo-conservatism initially rejected, but soon
reconsidered and courted bilateral free trade. During its fITst term (1984-88) the
federal Conservative government was confronted by continuing public support for key
programs and institutions of the KWS. This was most graphically demonstrated in
1985 when strong opposition to the de-indexation ofold age pensions proposed in the
federal budget forced the government to retreat on this front. Dramatic examples of
this support included senior citizens demonstrating against the measure on Parliament
Hill and ofone in particular, Solange Denis, posing the consequences of de-indexing
to the Prime-Minister's career as "Goodbye Charlie Brown" on national television. 193
In his quest for the Progressive Conservative Party's leadership in 1983, Brian
Mulroney explicitly opposed bilateral free trade. By 26 September 1985, when he rose
in the House of Commons to announce that the two countries would be exploring
options in this direction, Mulroney had become "free trade's cheerleader.v"
191 Quoted in Francois Rocher, "Canadian Business, Free Trade and the Rhetoric of Economic
Continentalism," Studies in Political Economy 35, no. Summer (1991): 143.
192 Quoted in ibid.: 144.
193 Claude Galipeau, "Political Parties, Interest Groups, and New Social Movements: Toward New
Representation," in Canadian Politics in Transition, ed. Alain G. Gagnon and Brian A. Tanguay
(Toronto: Nelson, 1989),408; Stephen McBride and John Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and
the New World Order (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1993); Mishra, The Welfare State in Capitalist
Society: Policies ofRetrenchment and Maintenance in Europe, North America and Australia.
194 Cameron, ed., The Free Trade Papers; Glen Williams, Not for Export: Toward a Political Economy
0/Canada's Arrested Industrialization (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987). Williams' analysis
focused primarily on Canadian capital protecting its access to the US market and consequently failed to
realize the full scope of the objectives aimed by capital and its political allies under an ITA. For
example, with regard to upcoming trade negotiations, Williams argues as follows: "If they [the Tories],
or the bureaucrats that advise them, discover that the logic of the current negotiation process can do
little to provide them with the leverage they will need to extract a better deal for Canada from the
multinationals, or, worse, that a free trade pact will institutionally remove whatever leverage Canadian
governments did have in the past to ensure minimum performance standards, we could see our position
in the treaty talks evolve into nothing more than a desire for a symbolic statement of free and fair trade
principles between the two countries." Williams, Not/or Export: Toward a Political Economy of
Canada's Arrested Indwtrialization, 186.
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Canada's federal system with its division of constitutional powers was a
further factor mitigating the introduction ofausterity measures and marketization.
While jurisdiction over key sectors of the KWS such as health and education opened
the door to these policies in a more virulent Thatcherite 'authoritarian populist' form
at the provincial level, it also created an institutional impediment to attempts at
similar measures at the federal level. 195 As MacBride and Shields note: "The
implication is that external pressures may accomplish for the neo-conservative
approach what domestic politics cannot.,,196
The project might also be usefully conceptualized as a passive revolution on
other grounds. Whereas the clear articulation ofneo-liberal or neo-conservative
values with continentalism was novel, continentalism per se was already a dominant
characteristic of Canada's permeable Fordist mode ofdevelopment. Even the series of
nationalist interventions briefly undertaken by the Canadian state during the early
1980s were limited to attempts to enhance domestic ownership of industry without
"nationalizing the circuit ofcapital." 197
In his analysis of the evolving policy position of the C.D. Howe Institute
(CDHI), Ernst argues that 1981-82 marked the "last gasp ofeconomic nationalist and
statist industrial policies.,,198 The always-tentative Canadian embrace of
Keynesianism gave way to a rearticulation ofcontinentalism with the core elements of
195 McBride and Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order, 68,84; Hall
defines 'authoritarian populism' as "... an exceptional form of the capitalist state which, unlike classical
fascism, has retained most (though not all) of the formal representative institutions in place, and which
at the same time has been able to construct around itself an active popular consent." In Hall, "The Great
Moving Right Show," 22.
flail in essence is combining Poulantzas' notion of 'authoritarian statism' with Laclau's conception of
the 'popular democratic.' Bleyer, "The New Realism: A Socialist Response to the Crisis in Britain."
Hall argues that Thatcherism combined a "creeping authoritarianism masked by rituals of formal
representation" which first appeared under social democracy, with a populist discourse which
neutralizes the contradiction between the people and the power bloc. In Alan Hunt, Marxism and
Democracy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980). He suggests further that the success of
Thatcherism had fundamentally altered the terrain on which a counterhegemonic project would have to
be organized. Bleyer, "The New Realism: A Socialist Response to the Crisis in Britain."
196 McBride and Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order, 85.
197 Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada."
198 Ernst, "From Liberal Continentalism to Neoconservatism: North American Free Trade and the
Politics of the CD. Howe Institute," 134.
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neo-conservatism. rom t IS pomt onwards, the CDHI, always a strong proponent
of freer trade, would now link this position to neo-conservative objectives, primarily
the dramatic reduction of the role of the public sector and the state. 200
The adoption of free trade as a touchstone was, according to Carroll, part of an
attempt to shift from the "exceptionalist crisis management" to a more expansive
hegemonic project involving the creation of a new ruling or historical bloc dominated
by capital. A bilateral free trade agreement not only delivered a conditioning
framework for the Canadian economy and polity, it also constituted an attempt to win
'the people' to the new historical bloc by appealing to consumers with the promise of
lower prices and more jobs resulting from lower tariffs and access to the massive U.S.
market. This project could thus be termed a passive revolution.i'"
While the pairing ofneo-conservatism with continentalism in the form of the
FTA served as a strategic end run around continuing popular support for the
institutions and benefits of the KWS, this linkage also created a focal point for the
development and mobilization ofopposition to this agenda. The popular sector's
critique of the FTA, and subsequently of the broader neo-conservative agenda, was
easily rooted in a nationalist discourse.i'" Furthermore the crystallization of a broader
agenda in one specific political project, indeed in one document, provided a clear
rallying point for opponents. As Campbell and Pal argue:
The FTA like previous attempts to forge a free trade deal with the US became
a quivering lightening rod for all the electric storms ofnationalism and
identity that have beset the country's history ... The FTA as text powerfully
199 Brodie and Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change.
200 Ernst reminds us of the fundamentally anti-democratic nature of this agenda while evoking the
memory of Milton Friedman's friendship with General Pinochet. Ernst notes that the CDHl's
publication Policy Review and Outlook 1991 refers to the need for capital to allay the "danger that
public opinion may be organized around the need to reverse previous policy directions, regardless of
their rationale." Ernst, "From Liberal Continentalism to Neoconservatism: North American Free Trade
and the Politics of the C.D. Howe Institute," 135.
201 Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada."
102 These same factors might have inherently limited the counterhegemonic potential of opposition to
neo-conservatism by tying it to a defence of the KWS. See Peter Bleyer, "Coalitions of Social
Movements as Agencies for Social Change: the Action Canada Network," in Organizing Dissent:
Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed. William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond,
1992) and Leo Panitch, "The Ambiguous Legacy of the Free Trade Election," Canadian Dimension,
January 1989.
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condensed symbols and issue over which Canadians have been divided for
generations.P"
11. Convergence and Counterhegemony: the PCN/ACN and Adequate
Agency
The specific form taken by the neo-conservative project established limits as
well as opportunities for a popular response. A passive revolution with hegemonic
aspirations could not successfully be opposed by a short-term, defensive war of
manoeuvre. Rather, opposing social forces would have to achieve a convergence ofa
more than defensive nature in order to constitute a counterhegemonic project. This
would be no small feat since simply holding an alliance of social forces together
around the most limited agreement or basic objectives is difficult enough. The
complex process involving the formation ofa new social and political subject,
creating a new democratic formation and general will is a task of a much higher order.
Miliband attaches the simple label of "adequate agency" to this vehicle with the
potential to bring into being a transformative social project.204
The PCN is particularly interesting because a key component of the
convergence it represents has been the relationship between labour and other social
movements. Advocates of convergence as a route to counterhegemony argue that a
central role for the labour movement is an essential precondition.i'" Additionally,
Boggs argues further "real convergence is inconceivable without the appearance of a
203 Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, The Real Worlds ofCanadian Politics: Cases in Process and
Policy, 3rd ed. (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1994),232-3.
204 '''Adequate agencies' in this context means political formations which can effectively give political
coherence to a vast constituency of workers, white and black, men and women, young and old, and to a
host of other people in other classes as well, and mobilize them in support of a transformative
programme that would speak to their needs and aspirations." Ralph Miliband, Leo Pan itch, and John
Saville, "Problems and Promise of Socialist Renewal," in The Socialist Register, ed. Ralph Miliband,
Leo Panitch, and John Saville (London: The Merlin Press, 1988), 7.
205 Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power, 242-49; Boris Frankel, The Post-Industrial Utopians
(London: Polity Press, 1987),242; Miliband and Panitch, "Socialists and the 'New Conservatism',"
513. Miliband and Panitch, like Frankel, are arguing in effect for a reconstruction of the socialist
project. To this end Rustin contends, "the unifying principle of socialism - the objective foundation on
which, in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, equivalence can be achieved - may in fact be resistance to
capital, not class." Rustin, "Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist Concept of Hegemony,"
171. Approaching the same question from the opposite direction, Wilde concludes that: "The wider
focus of new social movements raises the possibility that activists will begin to ask the 'big' questions
about the nature of society and its future development and come to realize that their particular goals are
blocked by one major barrier. capitalism." Wilde, "Class Analysis and the Politics of New Social
Movements," 66.
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new kind of labour movement and perhaps a redefinition of new movement initiatives
as we11.,,206
To what extent was the Pro-Canada Network a nascent counterhegemonic
project? How closely did it approach the status of adequate agency? As a step towards
the democratization of the Canadian popular sector the Network appeared to have this
potential. As Wainwright points out, the process of democratic debate and decision-
making is often, wrongly, undervalued. It is just as important and contingent as the
development ofa common and alternative discourse.i'" Still, whether in the case of
the Pro-Canada Network an increasingly strong unifying principle in fact shifted gears
to the development of a 'general will' or counterhegemonic theme is a more difficult
question to answer in the affirmative. Certainly, counterhegemony cannot be
considered as a teleological outcome - an automatic result oforganizational
development or the heavy weight of late capitalism. The historical record shows that
defensive, reactive political projects are a far more likely outcome and, in the case of
the initial basis for unity of the PCN, this was certainly the case. But the Network
survived and grew beyond this first phase and was to some degree transformed. The
nature and extent of this transformation, as well as the factors leading to the eventual
decline of the PCN/ACN, bear further examination.
11.1 Quantifying Convergence: Master framing as "Cognitive
Counterhegemony"
Among the methodological challenges to be faced in this assessment of the
PCN/ACN is the need for a means by which to judge the counterhegemonic potential
of the project. In their study of social movement activists in Vancouver, British
Columbia, Carroll and Ratner build on the concept ofcollective action frames and
master frames.i'" First elaborated out of the Resource Mobilization paradigm,
206 Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power, 20.
207 Wainwright, Arguments for a New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right.
208 William K. Carroll and Robert S. Ratner, "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in
Contemporary Social Movements," The Sociological Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1996)~ William K. Carroll
and Robert S. Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary
Social Movements," Canadian Review ojSociology and Anthropology 33, no. 4 (1996).
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collective action frames are "interpretive schemata through which movements define
certain conditions as unjust, attribute responsibility for the injustices and point to
alternatives that might be achieved through collective action.,,209 For their study,
Carroll and Ratner build on framing analysis of specific movements and SMOs to
explore master frames, which they defme as "general conceptions of injustice and
general visions of socio-political alternatives.Y'" They suggest that these master
frames "can be seen as the cognitive aspect ofcounterhegemonic politics.'?"! Their
conclusions provide some useful indicators for a study of the PCN/ACN. Based on in-
depth interview data from 212 activists in a variety of social movements, the authors
identify "a tendency for the use of a broadly resonant master frame - the POlitical-
economy account of injustice - to be associated with the practice ofcross-movement
activism.,,212 Broadly defmed, the "political economy frame" views power as
systemic, oppression as a matter of material deprivation, and resistance as attempts to
transform the system. In contrast, a competing "identity politics frame" attaches
power to identity markers, ties oppression to exclusion and opposition to
empowerment. Finally, in the "liberal frame" a plurality ofgroups vying for power
mobilize resources (i.e., money), opposition is expressed through judicial,
parliamentary or commercial means while injustice is viewed as rooted in the denial
of rights. 213
The study's relevance to the PCNIACN case ofcross-sectoral coalition
formation is accentuated by the fact that the data was gathered from activists from
movements and organizations that, in many cases, have been involved in the Network.
209 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary
Social Movements," 411. See in particular Snow et aI., "Frame Alignment Process, Micromobilization,
and Movement Participation" and Snow and Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest."
210 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary
Social Movements," 411. For Tarrow master frames "help to animate an entire Social Movement
Sector." Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 131.
211 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in Contemporary Social
Movements," 602; Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in
Contemporary Social Movements," 412.
212 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in Contemporary Social
Movements," 616.
213 Ibid.: 609.
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In fact, between one-third and one-half of the respondents indicated that they had
personally participated in the activities of the national network's provincial affiliate-
ACN_BC.214
12. Conclusion
In the introduction to their 1988 collection of studies of social movements.
Cunningham et al. pose a series of questions concerning the future of coalition politics
in Canada:
What will bind these groups together in a common effort to achieve
widespread radical change? How will the hegemonic project emerge from the
differences they represent? Are there affmities among the various coalitions
that are obscured by the political lenses we normally use to focus our
understandings? What new forms ofpolitical leadership are emerging from
our practice?215
From different perspectives, varying assessments of the Pro-Canada Network's
prospects were made in the late 1980s. From a class-analytical perspective, Albo and
Swartz argued that the passage ofthe FTA would lead to dissolution of the PCN given
its lack of "any coherent general view.,,216 From a traditional pluralist viewpoint,
Doern also considered the PCN's disappearance as a likely result of the FTA receding
as a focal point for political battle and of the reintegration of many of the coalition's
components into traditional agencies of Canadian politics.r'" Somewhat more
adventurously, Bashevkin wondered whether the PCN could provide a "societal
214 Ibid.: 605~ Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in
Contemporary Social Movements," 428. In keeping with the dialectical bent of their neo-gramscian
perspective, the authors also suggest that "practices of master framing and cross-movement networking
probably condition each other. On the one hand, cross movement networking forms an experiential
basis for a more comprehensive critique of injustice, and the political economy frame is favoured for
that task, compared to other more particularistic or conventional frames. On the other hand, it is
probably activists with a political-economic critique who are drawn to cross-movement networking in
the first place." Carroll and Ratner, "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in
Contemporary Social Movements," 616.
215 Cunningham et al., eds., Social Movements/Social Change: The Politics and Practice ofOrganizing,
14.
216 Albo and Swartz, "The Free Trade Papers," 156; for more aggressive statements of class-theoretical
positions, see David McNally, "Beyond Nationalism. Beyond Protectionism: Labour and the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement," Capital and Class, no. 43 Spring (1991) or Francois Moreau, "Free
Trade, Canadian Style," Against/he Currents, no. 33, July!August, (1991).
217 Doern and Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story, .269.
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alternative" to the "powerful business coalition that supported free trade. ,,218 Using a
neo-Gramscian framework, Carroll was cautious about coalition formation in general,
drawing clear distinctions between defensive and counterhegemonic projects, yet
relatively optimistic regarding the project constituted by Pro-Canada Network."?
Mahon saw in the PCN a prefiguration of the kind oforganic alliance, which, if
consolidated, could form the basis for an alternative project. 220
The following account ofthe emergence and development of the Pro-
Canada!Action Canada Network will provide the basis for an evaluation of the
predictive capacity of these analytical frameworks. In addition, it will permit an
assessment ofDrache and Cameron's claims for the popular sector of which the
Network was the most structured collective manifestation. Continuing in a long
intellectual tradition identified by Petracca, Drache and Cameron generated both a
helpful, if largely underdeveloped, analytical tool and a hopeful normative
appraisal.r" Until now, the explanatory strength and potential of the former has been
lost in the immediacy of the engagement ofthe latter. Examining the PCN experience,
we will consider the potential for the 'popular sector' as an analytical concept while
reviewing Drache and Cameron's nonnative judgment.
As we move on to an account of the PCN/ACN, some appropriate building
blocks for an analytical framework are now in evidence. From RMT we retain, in
particular, the focus on organizational factors, including structure and process and, of
course, the mobilization of resources. Similarly, the mapping of the political
opportunity structure as well as the more general emphasis on continuity and linkages
stand out as important contributions. While the focus on identity and discourse so
prominent within NMT is clearly relevant to this project, a neo-Gramscian perspective
that includes these variables without abstracting agent from structure or promoting
particularism seems preferable. Moreover, a neo-Gramscian approach retains the
218 Bashevkin, True Patriot Lon': the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 130.
219 Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada."
220 Mahon "Post-Fordism: Some Issues for Labour," 25.,
221 Drache and Cameron, eds., The Other Macbonald Report.
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strengths of political economic analysis while integrating the importance of ideology
or consciousness. Finally, the descriptive term popular sector might, in the Canadian
context, provide the basis for an analytical concept that synthesizes the strengths of
these different frameworks: combining consideration of structure with attention to
agency as well as the structure of agency.
Reviewing some of the key sectors, movements and organizations that formed
the PCN, we will quickly see the importance of a framework that pays heed to
resource maximization and leadership models as well as policy positions and political
discourses. In the following chapter we focus our attention on the labour, women's
and ecumenical social justice movements and more specifically their approaches to
trade policy and coalition politics.
Chapter 3
Three Sectors, Political Agency and Free Trade
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1. Introduction
As a climate of social and economic crisis took hold in the 1970s and early
1980s, the elements of an emerging popular sector were slowly taking shape. As
groups and sectors shared concerns and cooperated on initiatives, they also rejected
the politics of tripart ism, in the case of the labour movement, and moved beyond the
narrow confmes of interest group pluralism, in the case of other sectors.
The release of the Macdonald Report in 1985 contributed to a clear
demarcation between a neo-conservative corporate vision of Canada - increasingly
with unambiguous state support - and a range ofopposing views from popular sector
groups. With his endorsement of free trade, Macdonald also framed the issue that
would ultimately bring the popular sector together in the form of the Pro-Canada
Network.
Along with the Macdonald Report and the response it elicited, other events
over the course of the 1980s marked the progression of the popular sector. Ethical
Reflections, the bishop's statement on the economy in 1983, was a lightning rod for
state and corporate derision and a rallying cry for the formation of a broad coalition of
social forces. Later, events such as the Dialogue '86 meeting, sponsored by the
Canadian Labour Congress, and the Working Committee for Social Solidarity,
convened by progressive church and labour activists, were stepping stones for
evolving relationships, both organizational and personal, that would form the basis for
the Pro-Canada Network.
In this chapter the focus of attention is on three sectors that were instrumental
in this process: labour, women, and church social justice. Reviewing their approaches
to political engagement and specifically coalition building, and secondly, to the policy
issue of Canada-U.S. free trade, will help us to understand the dynamics that would
eventually lead to the formation of the PCN in 1987. In keeping with the elements of
a theoretical model sketched out in the previous chapter, attention to organizational
factors will be balanced with sensitivity to policy and discourse. As we explore the
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roots of the engagement with the FTA and coalition building sector by sector, we will
highlight the importance of a key variable in this process: an ideological commitment
to broad social change.
This chapter tells the story ofCanadians from different backgrounds and
perspectives coming to a similar stance on bilateral free trade and, for differing
reasons and with varying modus operandi, adopting coalition building as a political
strategy, culminating with the formation ofthe Pro-Canada Network in 1987.
2. Ecumenical Social Justice
2.1 Early Developments and a Model Established: 1965-1981
Coalitions have long been a strategy ofchoice for social justice advocates
within Canada's mainstream Christian churches. In turn, church-based social justice
work has deep roots in Canadian political culture, not least in the development of the
CCF. 1 In the 1920s and 1930s evangelical activists, particularly in Western Canada,
actively developed ties with urban labour and rural farm activists. The 'social
gospellers' were key players in the formation of the CCF in 1933 and provided the
new political movement with many of its early leaders.'
From the 1940s to the mid-1960s institutional cooperation between churches
and the labour movement at the national level largely took place within the Religion-
Labour Foundation and, beginning in 1959, the Religion-Labour Council. These were
ecumenical, voluntary organizations "dedicated to the promotion and extension of
social and economic justice in the industrial life of the nation.?'
In the second halfof the 1960s, a series of initiatives established the
groundwork for future developments. In 1965, the national social action offices of the
Catholic and Protestant Churches formed the National Committee on the Church in
Industrial Society (NCCIS). According to a 1966 review of the Catholic Conference
I See Chapter 1 above.
2 Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-28.
.1 "Structures for Ecwnenical Social Action." Inter-Church Consultative Committee on Development
and Relief, Toronto, 1984. 2.
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Social Affairs office, participation in this committee was "the single most important
item among our ongoing activities ... it provides for personal acquaintance among
executives of all the major churches in the social field.?" The NCCIS played a key
role in organizing the Working Conference on the Implications of a Health Charter for
Canadians held in Ottawa in 1965. The Conference was co-sponsored by the
mainstream churches and various other national organizations including the Canadian
Labour Congress.'
The Christian Conscience and Poverty Conference was the next major step in
the evolving relationship. Held in Montreal in May 1968, the conference was
sponsored by twelve churches, the federal and provincial governments, and labour
and private sector groups and attracted more than 500 delegates." Conference
participants agreed on the need for a "practical strategy ofunited action?" These
conferences "whetted the church leaders' appetite for more inclusive coalitions than
had been provided by the Religion-Labour Council" and marked the beginning ofa
mushrooming of ecumenical and broader projects, committees and working groups
that would continue through the 1970s.8
A strategy committee formed to follow-up on the Poverty Conference issued
50,000 copies of its report Towards a Coalition/or Development in May 1969. Jointly
published by the Canadian Catholic Conference (the predecessor of the Canadian
-l Nicholson, "Bishops in Politics," 64.
5 John Lucal, "Coalitions for Social Ecumenism: the Canadian Story," SODEPAX Committee Meeting
XVII, Geneva, 18-19 November 1980; see also Bishop Remi De Roo, Cries of Victims - Voice ofGod
(Ottawa: Novalis, 1986).
6 De Roo, Cries of Victims - Voice ofGod ; see also "Structures for Ecumenical Social Action," Inter-
Church Consultative Committee on Development and Relief, Toronto, 1984,5.
7 Lucal, "Coalitions for Social Ecumenism: the Canadian Story"; see also De Roo, Cries ofVictims »
Voice ofGod
8 There was an overall increase in mutual trust between the various Protestant and the Roman Catholic
Churches during this period. In Canada, Catholic social justice work was inspired by the Vatican II call
for wider vision and involvement. A key moment in this transformation of the Catholic Church in
Canada was the establishment of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace
(CCODP) in 1967. See "Structures for Ecumenical Social Action," 2; and W.E. Hewitt, "Roman
Catholicism and Social Justice in Canada: a Comparative Case Study," Canadian Review ofSociology
and Anthropology 28, no. 3 (1991): 306. On the important role of the (Protestant) Canadian Council of
Churches (CCC) as an incubator of ecumenism and social action, see De Roo, Cries (i( Victims - Voice
ofGod
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Conference of Catholic Bishops) and the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC), the
pamphlet made its debt to liberation theology very clear. It also reaffirmed the 1968
Conference's call for the church to "actively support the powerless in our society as
they seek their share in decision-making and in determining their own destiny.?"
Viewed by Nicholson as "an informal but broadly-based coalition," the strategy
committee proposed a four-part strategy for ecumenical development work. 10 The
central proposition was for the formation ofa national coalition of churches and
NGOs engaged in development work. But the Canadian Coalition for Development,
formed at a forum in March 1970, was short-lived. Subsequent critics have argued
that the coalition was too ambitious and simply became far too broad, far too fast. II
While the inclusion of business groups like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
reflected the budding tripartite mood ofthe moment, according to Tony Clarke, who
joined the CCCB's Social Affairs Commission staff in 1971, it led to the result that
"not all the partners were compatible." Clarke adds that there was no consideration of
the strategic implications of involving these groups.V Meanwhile, to the extent that
there was increasing mutual trust between church, labour and other likeminded groups
during this period, it was not accompanied by the development of structures suitable
for the longer-term maintenance of these relationships. The apparent predisposition to
organizing brief large-scale events was one likely obstacle.
A veritable proliferation of interchurch committees took place during the next
decade; a directory published by the CCC in 1980 listed thirty-eight. 13 Hoping to
9 Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and Canadian Council of Churches, "Strategy Committee
Report: Towards a Coalition for Development," Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and
Canadian Council of Churches, May 1969.
10 Nicholson, "Bishops in Politics," 43.
II This is suggested in Lucal, "Coalitions for Social Ecumenism: the Canadian Story" and confirmed in
Clarke, Interview by author.
12 Clarke, Interview by author.
13 "Structures for Ecumenical Social Action:' 38. Bishop Remi De Roo, among others, argues that
inter-church coalitions are a "particularly Canadian form of ecumenism." According to De Roo, "the
uniqueness of the Canadian experience lies in the fact that a coalition model has been followed rather
than a structural association model. The latter would structure ecumenical organizations as departments
of national churches. whi Ie the former encourages action-oriented coalitions with minimal structures
formed by the churches in order to achieve specific tasks. The coalitions require ecumenical good will.
adequate resources and personnel supplied by the various churches, as well as basic agreement on the
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build on the experience of the failure of the Coalition for Development, these
interchurch committees were each given specific, targeted and, theoretically
manageable, mandates. In practice, as the case of GATT-Fly demonstrates, these
initial plans tended to underestimate the breadth of issues and the demand for the sort
of work these coalitions could accomplish. Nevertheless, these committees were for
the most part much more successful than was their, even more overly ambitious,
predecessor.
2.2 Trade and Development: GATT-Fly
Until the late 1960s, ecumenical social justice work in Canada was largely
oriented around the issue of poverty. In the case ofthe Catholic Church this focus was
strongly influenced by developments in the Third World. The 'theology of liberation'
developing in Latin America particularly swayed the church. Specifically, the concept
ofa 'preferential option for the poor' first enunciated at the Second General
Conference ofLatin American bishops at Medillin, Columbia in 1968 became a
touchstone. 14
The choice ofhealth care (1965 Conference) and housing (Canadian
Conference on Housing in October 1968) as priorities for ecumenical action reflected
an ecumenical emphasis on domestic poverty. The CCCB Social Affairs
Commission's year-end report in 1967 considered that 60 percent of staff time and
resources had been committed to the issue ofdomestic poverty. IS
At the end of the decade, developments in Nigeria-Biafra and elsewhere in the
Third World raised the profile of global poverty, which became more prominent on
the ecumenical agenda. The availability of state funding for development and relief
work via the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) no doubt aided
thrust of social issues." De Roo. Cries or Victims - Voice ofGod, 97.
14 Christopher Lind, "Ethics, Economics and Canada's Catholic Bishops," Canadian Journal of
Political and Social Theory 7, no. J (1983): 153.
15 On the emphasis on domestic poverty, see Lucal. "Coalitions for Social Ecwnenism: the Canadian
Story"; the CCCB report is quoted in Nicholson. "Bishops in Politics:' 43.
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and abetted this shift. 16 These resources were not, for the most part, available for work
on similar domestic issues.
The formation ofone of the first interchurch social justice coalitions - GAIT-
Fly - reflected this changing agenda. Canadian church representatives attending the
1972 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III) in
Santiago, Chile were less than impressed with the official Canadian delegation ~ s
performance, noting that "on twenty-six major votes, Canada had voted with the rich
countries and against the poor ones.,,17 At a follow-up seminar in June 1972. the
returning observers concluded that a coalition was needed to do further work on trade
and related issues. 18 GATT-Fly was given limited resources, one staffperson, and a
mandate "including animation and constituency building as well as research." 19
Within a year of GATT-Fly's founding, it became apparent that the trade issue was
"larger than initially thought." Now, concern also emerged that the new coalition's
work might undermine the churches' important funding relationship with CIDA.2o
GATT-Fly's focus and perspective evolved over the course of the next few
years culminating in a stance in favour of economic 'self-reliance.' By counter posing
self-reliance to dependence, GATT-Fly linked domestic and international issues and
struggles. By working with peoples' organizations within and outside the ecumenical
movement, both at home and abroad, rather than international development agencies,
GATT-Fly helped to prepare the groundwork for the trade issue to become a critical
component in the coalescing of the Canadian popular sector a decade later.
16 Minutes, Inter-church Consultative Committee on Development and Relief, Toronto, 28 October
1971 indicates that participants were aware that CIDA funds available for distribution through NOOs
had increased from $5 million to $13 million.
17 CCCB official Bernard Daly quoted in Nicholson, "Bishops in Politics," 64.
18 lbid., as well as Lucal, "Coalitions for Social Ecumenism: the Canadian Story" and Dennis Howlett,
"The Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice," in Coalitions for Justice: the Storv ofCanada's
Interchurch Coalitions. ed. Christopher Lind and Joe Mihevc (Ottawa: Novalis, 1994).
19 Roger Hutchison. "Ecumenical Witness in Canada: Social Action Coalitions," International Review
ofMission 71 (1982).
20 Minutes. Inter-church Consultative Committee on Development and Relief. Toronto, 17 February
1973.
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One of earliest attempts to state briefly and pragmatically the case for self-
reliance was Canada's Food Trade - By Bread Aloner" It includes the following
defmition of the three basic principles of self-reliance, which are regularly repeated in
subsequent GATT-Fly publications.
1) Canadians produce the essential goods and services they need in the
quantity and quality needed.
2) Families and individuals who now receive an average or below average
incomes and who make up the vast majority of Canadians, have enough
income to purchase the goods and services which they collectively produce.
3) Canada's foreign trade continues, but only as a planned extension of
production and trade at home. 22 .
Based on this perspective, GATT-Fly's response was immediate when Donald
Macdonald advocated a "leap of faith" into bilateral free trade with the United States.
In an article entitled "Free Trade or Self-Reliance?" GATT-Fly made its position
clear:
Today's advocates of free trade seem to want to forget history. They assume
that everyone shares their faith in the universal benefits of free trade. They are
inclined to ignore some very serious questions that have been raised about the
supposed virtues ofunfettered commerce.v'
GATT-Fly also reflected the general ecumenical commitment to coalition
building and was very supportive of initiatives to bring groups together around the
issue of free trade. In fact, GATT-Fly staff attended the first meetings of the nascent
Toronto-based Coalition against Free Trade in November 1985.24 GATT-Fly also
convened two important meetings early in 1986: a two-day consultation on free trade
in Toronto (24-25 January) and the Ecumenical Conference on Free Trade, Self-
reliance and Economic Justice at Orleans, Ontario (26 February - 1 March). The list
21 GA'IT-Fly. "Canada's Food Trade - By Bread Alone?" GATT-Fly, Toronto, August 1978. In fact
GATT-Fly's first staff person made the case for self-reliance even earlier. In John Dillon, "Limitations
of the Trade Issue," GAIT-Fly. Toronto, ]973. Another GATT-Fly employee suggests theorists such
as Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank were a strong influence on the group. Howlett, "The
Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice."
22 For a restatement of GAIT-Fly's self-reliance perspective. see GATT-Fly, "GAIT-Fly Report."
June 1985.
B Ibid.
24 Minutes. Coalition against Free Trade. Toronto. 8 November 1985; Dennis Howlett. Interview by
author. Toronto. ) March 1992.
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ofparticipants at both these events reads very much like a •Who's Who ~ of
organizations and individuals who would later come together under the banner of the
Pro-Canada Network.25
The conclusion ofthe report of the Orleans conference makes explicit the
second facet ofGAIT-Fly's agenda on free trade. To wit:
We challenge the CHURCHES to declare themselves more clearly and more
strongly on the official level against free trade and to make more concentrated
efforts to involve their grass-roots members in a movement against free
trade."
While GATT-Fly was committed to cross-sectoral coalition building across sectors on
free trade, it was apparent that pushing its own member institutions to take a stronger
stand on the issue was an equally important and difficult task. This dynamic was
symptomatic ofGATT-Fly's role as an amalgam ofa voice for grassroots church
activists and a vanguard for change vis-a-vis the leadership of the mainline Christian
churches. Similarly, as an institution that had carved out its own space in the
ecumenical realm, GATT-Fly was also a convenient home for church activists and
staffwho had difficulty getting official sanction for participation in cross-sectoral
coalition work from their own churches."
As the free trade debate moved towards its high point, GAIT-Fly published
Community Self-Reliance: A Canadian Vision ofEconomic Justice. Its objective was
to clarify the meaning of self-reliance for Canada and contribute to the national debate
concerning alternatives to continental integration." Along with the results of the
25 "Churches Enter Free Trade Debate," Catholic New Times, 9 February 1986, 1; "Churches Urged to
Oppose Free Trade with the U.S.," GATT-Fly Report, March 1986; GAIT-Fly, "Free Trade or Self-
reliance: Report of the Ecumenical Conference on Free Trade, Self-Reliance and Economic Justice,"
GATT-Fly, Orleans, 26 February - 1 March 1987.
26 GAIT-Fly, "Free Trade or Self-reliance: Report of the Ecumenical Conference on Free Trade, Self-
Reliance and Economic Justice."
27 Confirmed in Clarke, Interview by author and Howlett, Interview by author. This issue was identified
by the General Secretaries of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops in response to Tony
Clarke's designation as chairperson of the Pro-Canada Network in 1987. As they wrote at the time
"even though you were named by GAIT-Fly to this position you are a CCCB representative to GAIT-
Fly and as such must represent and defend CCCB policy publicly." CCCB General Secretaries,
Memorandum to Tony Clarke, 18 November 1987.
28 GAIT-Fly, "Community Self-Reliance: A Canadian Vision of Economic Justice," GAIT-Fly,
Toronto, 1987.
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Toronto and Orleans conferences on free trade and self-reliance this document,
reflects GAIT-Fly's important contribution to the evolving analysis and critique of
free trade. Similarly, GATT-Fly and the social justice units of its member churches
brought both their experience and commitment to coalition building to the broader
popular sector.
3. The Labour Movement
3.1 'Ready-to-wear' Coalitions and Beyond: 1974-1986
The Canadian labour movement's experience with coalition or alliance
building can be traced back to the formation of the Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation (CCF) in the 1930s, when organized labour stayed aloof from the founding
ofa party that defmed itself as "Farmer, Labour, Socialist." In 1961, the Canadian
Labour Congress (CLC), itself formed out ofa merger of two labour federations, the
Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and the Canadian Congress ofLabour (CCL)
played a central role in the CCF's transformation into the New Democratic Party
Beyond its core alliance with the NDP, the CLC engaged in very few formal
coalitions during its first decade of existence. Where they were formed, coalitions
tended to be short-lived, broad in membership, but limited in scope.i" During this
period, most of the CLC's political eggs remained in the lobbying basket with an
emphasis on a "consultative relationship with government" to deliver results. The
CLC's relationship with the NDP was limited to formal endorsement accompanied by
fmancial and in-kind contributions"
The CLC began its flirtation with tripartite planning structures in the early
1970s. In contrast with existing consultative relationships, tripartism along the
29 See Chapter 1 above. On the history of the CLC and the Canadian labour movement, see Palmer,
Working-Class Experience: the Rise and Reconstitution ofCanadian Labour, 1800-1980.
30 See, for example, the Medicare and poverty initiatives involving church groups and others noted
above.
31 On the evolution of CLC political strategy in this period, see Chapter 2 in Miriam Smith, "Labour
Without Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988" (Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation, Yale University, 1990).
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European model would institutionalize labour participation in some state decision-
making. While tripartism suffered serious blows in the 1970s, including strong
opposition at a series of CLC conventions and a less than enthusiastic response from
labour's putative partners, it remained a strategic option in the mind of some of the
labour leadership well into the 1980s.32
Even as the CLC leadership was meeting with government and business to
consider options for tripartism in the summer of 1976 it carried a mandate from the
May 1976 convention to call a general work stoppage to oppose wage controls" On
14 October 1976, more than one million trade unionists participated in the National
Day ofProtest. From the CLC's perspective, this event marked its 'coming of age' as
the senior partner for a broader coalition of social forces. Ten years later, its house
organ Canadian Labour took a self-congratulatory look back:
The CLC emerged from these battles as a credible and strong defender of
people's social and economic concerns. On the day of protest in 1976 it
proved that it not only speaks for its two million direct members but also for
other sectors of Canadian society whose members do not have the power or
organization to speak for themselves.
Since the day ofprotest, the CLC has repeatedly shown Canadians that it is
their best - if not the only - national organization willing and able to come to
the rescue ofall those hurt by the system, and by insensitive governments.34
A senior official with a leading Congress affiliate gave a quite different assessment of
the CLC's record in a memorandum to his president:
Coalition building! I kept blinking as I read the sections about the great
coalition work that's been done by the CLC. In most cases, the CLC has been
a barrier, not a catalyst; things have happened in spite of, rather than because
of the CLC (due to the CLC's paranoid protection of its 'territory'L'"
Whatever its success, the 1976 Day ofProtest was more typical ofCLC
initiatives for its failure in terms of coalition building. In this sense, it was an
32 On the former. see Panitch, "Corporatism in Canada" and Chapter 3 in Smith, "Labour Without
Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988" ~ on the latter, see Chapter 3 in Smith,
"Labour Without Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988" and Chapter I above.
33 Panitch, "Corporatism in Canada," 76; Charles Bauer, "Looking Back: the National Day of Protest,"
Canadian Labour 1986. 12.
34 Bauer, "Looking Back: the National Day of Protest," 14.
35 Sam Gindin, Memorandum to Bob White, 22 April 1988.
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appropriate precursor to a series of superficial coalition initiatives that were broad in
scope of membership, narrow in mandate and ultimately unsuccessful. Most were
coalitions in name only, as one observer put it: "They were CLC-dominated with little
or no coalition process: basically declare it a coalition and voila.":"
Under pressure from affiliates concerned about its tripartite ambitions and
looking for a more activist orientation, the CLC's 1978 convention adopted a proposal
for "a 'people's coalition for jobs' that would embrace the unemployed, trade unions,
students, pensioners, churches, political parties and those concerned with the need to
turn the economy around.Y' In 1979, the CLC joined with other groups-to form the
Canadian Health Coalition (CHC).38 Two years later the CLC organized a major rally
against high interest rates bringing more than 100,000 Canadians onto Parliament Hill
on 21 November 1981. In theory, the mobilization was the work of the Coalition on
Interest Rates. In practice, the coalition was a top-down CLC construct. In the words
of the Congress publication Canadian Labour: "the CLC is the founding member"
[emphasis mine]. 39 Indeed, at its first meeting on 14 October 1981 the coalition
"confirmed the CLC's call for a mass rally in Ottawa.,,40
In 1979, following the election of the UAW's Canadian Director Dennis
McDermott as its president the previous year, the Congress launched its first "parallel
campaign." Reacting to the failure of the tripartite gambit and the imposition of wage
controls by the federal government, the CLC organized a direct labour campaign in
support of the NDP. The parallel campaign added labour efforts to directly mobilize
trade unionists' votes for the party to the other features of the CLC-NDP alliance (i.e.,
36 Personal interview with a labour activist.
37 CLC, "Political Action: People's Coalition for Jobs," Resolution, 1978.
38 "Health Coalition Wants Medicare Report Implemented," Canadian Labour, October 1980. At least
in terms of longevity, the CHC proved an exception to the rule celebrating its thirtieth anniversary in
1999.
39 Charles Bauer, "November 21, 1981: a Milestone in History," Canadian Labour, November-
December 1981; this analysis was confirmed in Bickerton, Interview by author.
40 Bauer, "November 21, 1981: a Milestone in History"; see also Smith, "Labour Without Allies: The
Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988," 212 and Charlotte A. B. Yates, From Plant to
Politics: The Aiuoworkers Union in Postwar Canada (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 199),
213.
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funding and in-kind resources to the party and formal affiliation). It was considered a
strategic breakthrough for the NDP and was repeated in subsequent election
. 41
campaigns.
With enthusiasm for tripartism on a defmite downturn, the increased
commitment to the NDP represented by the parallel campaign set the stage for a new
central strategic conflict within the labour movement that would persist for two
decades. On the one hand, the electoral success of' labour's party' - the means to
achieve broader social and economic objectives - became labour's overarching
political priority. As a resolution adopted at the 1980 CLC convention put it: "Our
aim is to elect more NDP governments. In doing so, our movement can achieve
greater social and economic justice, dignity, equality and a brighter future for all
Canadians.,,42 On the other hand, support for alliances with other social groups was
also increasing. As a result, the Congress' already stilted and dirigiste approach to
coalition building was reinforced. As one convention resolution baldly put it:
CLC affiliates and their locals should work with the NDP to build links with
community groups, such as the women's movement or the peace movement,
to increase our strength and our support.l''
It was a logical extension of the CLC's new relationship with the NDP: in addition to
being designed, determined and controlled by the Congress for its own ends,
coalitions were also counted on to buttress the party's electoral prospects. This would
culminate in a round ofrecriminations following the 1988 federal election and again
in 1993.44
During this period the CLC did participate in or support a number of smaller
single-issue advocacy coalitions. For example, the Congress and its affiliates provided
more than $100,000 in support to the Peace Petition Caravan Campaign." In their
41 Pat Kerwin, Interview by author, Ottawa, 29 October 1992; see Chapter 4 in Smith, "Labour Without
Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988," 172-82.
12 Resolution passed at CLC Convention, 1980.
43 CLC, "Affiliation to NOP, work with Community Groups," Resolution PE-9, 1984.
44 Sec Chapters ~ and 5 below.
45 Langille, "Building an Effective Peace Movement: One Perspective.'
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study ofNAC, Vickers et al. note NAC's "involvement in numerous policy coalitions
with the CLC.,,46 Indeed, largely because of the growing number of feminists active in
trade unions, there were a series of cooperative initiatives between the women's
movement and the labour movement. These women developed campaigns that
brought together different unions and in some cases ended up formally affiliated to
the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). Adamson traces the
development of the important feminist strand within the labour movement from the
first CLC Women's Conference in 1976 through a series of high profile strike actions
involving women (e.g. Fleck in 1978, Radio Shack in 1979, Fotomat in 1980, and
Irwin Toy in 1982). It also included major campaigns such as the Quebec Common
Front's successful campaign for paid maternity leave (1980) and Ontario Federation
ofLabour campaigns on day-care (1980) and mandatory affrrmative action (1981).47
3.3 Labour and Trade
3.3.1 The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)
Until the FTA we were free traders, as a matter of fact we still are. I mean we
even called for a unilateral reduction in tariffs. 48
The CL~ s~fPorted freer trade, with the consequence ofde facto continental
integration.
As befits a labour federation dominated by 'international' unions many of
whose members were employed in the primary resource extraction sector by branch
plants of American corporations, the CLC consistently favoured liberalized trade
during most of the postwar period.50 This remained the case during the upsurge in left
nationalism in the 1960s and early 1970s. In response to criticism ofa CLC statement
supporting freer trade on the convention floor in 1970, Secretary Treasurer William
Dodge argued, "we have to think in terms of the interests of the economy as a whole
46 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 143.
47 Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail, Feminist Organizingfor Change, 80.
4!! Art Kube, Interview by author, Ottawa, 29 October 1992.
4<) Smith "Labour Without Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988," 51.
,
so See Chapter 2 in ibid., 46.
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and the effects of restrictive trade approaches to employment in the economy as a
whole.?" Earlier that year, Dodge indicated that the Congress was alarmed by the
trend to U.S. protectionism and "favours trade liberalization on a worldwide basis. ,,52
That same year the left-nationalist Waft1e took centre stage at the NDP's policy
conference. The Waft1e Manifesto reaffirmed the Regina Manifesto's commitment to
public ownership of the means of production as a means to counter Americanization.
The CLC showed scarce sympathy for the Waft1e perspective with 70 percent of its
affiliated membership still in international unions and labour's position in the labour
market still relatively strong. There was little enthusiasm for "committing economic
suicide" by "kicking employers out of the country.,,53
In its submission to the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic
Affairs during its hearings on Bill C-132 (legislation to implement the Foreign
Investment Review Act) in June 1973, the CLC publicly declared its visceral
opposition to left-nationalism:
We are not impressed with the narrow economic nationalism espoused in
some circles by people who have no regard for the livelihoods and the
aspirations of average workers and their families. The latter cannot live on ...
the assumed patriotism which comes so easily to ... unthinking and unfeeling
political demagogues. Those who would have all foreign investment cut off,
irrespective of what the impact may be on men and women in the labour force,
in order to realize their own ambitions, do not express our views.54
Two years later, when the Economic Council of Canada released a report advocating
free trade in July 1975, CLC president Joe Morris and CUPE president Stanley Little
were among the co-signatories.55 In this light, it is not surprising that the CLC and its
51 Quoted in ibid.
52 Quoted in Laxer, Canada's Unions, 73.
53 Quoted in Smith, "Labour Without Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in Politics, 1956-1988,"
49; see also Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to
Social Contract.
q CLC Submission to the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade, and Economic Affairs on Bill C-132
(F1RA), June 1973, quoted in Smith, "Labour Without Allies: The Canadian Labour Congress in
Politics, 1956-1988," 45.
55 Laxer, Canada's Unions, 113.
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affiliates were, at that very time, playing a central role in the campaign to root the
Waffle out of the NDP.56
By the end of the decade, developments at different levels within the labour
movement hinted at the important shift in perspective on trade issues that was to
come. In 1979, the Twenty-third Annual Convention of the Ontario Federation of
Labour (OFL) adopted a Statement on Economic Nationalism and Foreign
Ownership. It declared:
The GATT talks did nothing for Canada. Free trade with the United States is
perilously near, the North American Common Market is on the agenda, and
continentalism is approaching reality. The fear now is that economic
integration will be followed by political integration."
Whereas the leadership and staff of the CLC were not receptive to such
arguments at this time, or even well into the next decade, a group of trade union
researchers around the OFL began working on alternative economic and trade
policy." This group was enthusiastic about critiques of export-led development and
the issue of self-reliance showed up in OFL policy documents beginning in 1982. 59
By 1986, the core document for the OFL convention - An Economic Programme to
make Ontario Work - would devote a complete section to arguments for self-
reliance.i" The CLC' s position put forward as part of a po licy review process one year
later serves up a stark contrast:
56 See Chapter 1 above; on the role of the VAW, see ibid.; see also Sam Gindin, "Breaking Away: The
Formation of the Canadian Auto Workers," Studies in Political Economy, no. 29, Summer (1989); on
the Waffle and labour, see John Hackett, "History of the Ontario Waffle," Canadian Dimension,
October-November 1980; John Bullen, "The Ontario Waffle and the Struggle for an Independent
Socialist Canada: Conflict within the NDP," Canadian Historical Review LXIV, no. 2 (1983) and
Laxer, Canada's Unions.
57 Ontario Federation of Labour, "Statement on Economic Nationalism and Foreign Ownership," 23rd
Annual Convention, Toronto, 27-30 November 1979.
58 CLC research director Ron Laing was well ensconced on the right wing of the labour movement.
During his tenure, Laing never convened the CLC researchers committee; a group he knew was likely
to dispute his perspective in certain areas. After replacing Laing as research director, Murray Randall
resumed the practice of hosting bi-annual meetings. Bickerton, Interview by author and Jim Turk,
Interview by author, Toronto, 20 February 1992.
59 Some OFL researchers were discussing self-reliance as an economic strategy with GATT-Fly at this
point. Turk, Interview by author.
60 Ontario Federation of Labour, "Document I: An Economic Programme to Make Ontario Work,"
Thirtieth Annual Convention, 24-27 November 1986.
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The CLC has long been a proponent of GATT and freer trade through
multilateral negotiations. Canada has survived and prospered because it is a
trading nation. We need our export markets. These markets have traditionally
meant jobs for Canadians and higher standard of living. It is our position that
we should continue in our efforts to increase our exports to the EEC; Third
World countries and the Pacific Rim; particularly Japan and China. We know
that it is extremely difficult to break into these latter markets because of
language and non-tariffbarriers. We are not satisfied that enough effort has
gone into opening up these markets either through GAIT or through trade
delegations to these countries [emphasis minej.?'
3.3.2 Fair Trade
While the CLC's general orientation on trade remained heavily "biased towards
liberalization into the late 1970s, its language was increasingly modified to endorse
'fair trade.' In 1978, the CLC's human face on liberalization was explained as
follows:
In reiterating our support for liberalized trade, we must emphasize, however,
that we mean fair trade in the true sense of the word. We mean trade where
advantages are gained on the basis of superior technology and not on the basis
of exploitative wages and inhuman working conditions. 62
Fair trade was understood as being far more likely in the context ofmultilateral
liberalization, a policy position developed largely as a counterpart to the Trudeau
Liberal government's ill-fated Third Option foreign policy initiative. Rather than
opposing liberalization per se, the CLC argued that trade and exports were simply too
focused on the United States. The solution consequently was to expand our trading
relationships with Europe and Asia, since "the problem isn't free trade it is just free
trade with the U.S.,,63 But with the changing dynamics in the labour market, due in
part to massive job loss in the industrial sector during the 1981-82 recession, and the
shifting balance within the labour movement towards Canadian and public sector
unions, a far more substantive change in the CLC's position on foreign investment
and trade was about to take place."
61 Canadian Labour Congress, "Policy Review," Ottawa, 1987.
62 Canadian Labour Congress, "Policy on GAIT," Twelfth Constitutional Convention, 1978.
63 Turk, Interview by author.
b4 See Chapter I above, as well as Rianne Mahon, "Canadian Labour in the Battle of the Eighties,"
Studies in Political Economy II (1983): 166; Smith, "Labour Without Allies: The Canadian Labour
Congress in Politics, 1956-1988," 292; and Panitch and Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union
Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social Contract.
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In June 1985, the CLC Executive Council issued a statement backing sector-
by-sector trade diversification. The Congress brief to the Special Joint Parliamentary
Committee on Canada's International Relations (July 1985) argued for fair trade rather
than free trade. For the CLC fair trade was now defmed as much more than a focus on
multilateral liberalization. It would include: ''the logical application of national
economic management to create jobs; to ensure a fair distribution of income; to
guarantee access to essential services; and to ensure regionally balanced growth.V"
Elsewhere, fair trade was defmed as "an arrangement that protects our jobs, our social
programs, our culture and our sovereignty.t''"
One year later, the CLC launched its Campaign against Free Trade,
Deregulation and Privatization.67 While the campaign was justified by reference to the
"substantial threats to Canadian workers" and the "common philosophy" underlying
the three policies, it was also tactically designed to gain the support and mobilize the
membership of the CLC's increasingly heterogeneous affiliates. 68 In September 1986,
the campaign was relaunched with the theme "Our Canada or Theirs." With an
announced commitment of$1.5 million the Congress aimed to educate its
membership and reach the public and politicians via "media advertising, lobbying,
demonstrations, coalition-building with like-minded groups, public forums, phone
banks, news conferences and other means. ,,69
3.3.3 Getting Serious about Trade
65 Canadian Labour, September 1985, 9.
66 "Our Canada or Theirs: CLC Unveils $1.5 million Campaign," Canadian Labour. October 1986.
67 "The CLC has Created a Potent Force for Turning Public Opinion Against Free Trade," Globe and
Mail, 5 May 1986, BIO~ Canadian Labour, July-August 1986, 3 ~ Document 19 prepared for the 1986
CLC Convention sketched the outline of the three-pronged campaign.
68 Canadian Labour, April 1986, 7~ Larry Wagg, Interview by author, Ottawa, 12 March 1992; Larry
Katz, Interview by author, Ottawa, 16 March 1992~ Kube, Interview by author.
69 "Our Canada or Theirs: CLC Unveils $1.5 million Campaign," 3. One of the CLC's senior officials
responsible for the campaign recalls that a large share of the budget was already expended on an earlier
transport deregulation campaign that was folded into the broader project. Nancy Riche, Interview by
author, Ottawa, 5 May 1992~ also noted by Wagg, Interview by author.
146
We got much more credit in that [free trade] campaign than we deserved. We
came to it late. In fact, it was the work of a whole lot of other groups. CAW
and the Council of Canadians probably played the biggest roles."
On free trade, as for that matter on its commitment to coalition building, the
CLC was often playing catch up with some of its affiliates and provincial federations.
The Ontario Federation ofLabour, for example,. had by this time already made
opposition to free trade a top campaign priority." The OFL's effort included twenty
public forums across the province from February to April 1986, and a subsequent
report Its Not Free: The Consequences ofFree Trade with the U8.72 Similarly, in
October 1986, Quebec's three major labour centrals, including the CLC's own
affiliate the Federation des travailleuses et travailleurs du Quebec, formed a provincial
coalition with the provincial farmers' organization, the Union des producteurs
agricoles. The groups also initiated a campaign that, among other things, developed a
detailed analysis of the projected sectoral impact ofa bilateral free trade agreement."
An overview ofthe CLC's move to oppose free trade shows that the national
labour body was a relatively reluctant convert to this position. The CLC's
commitment to a major campaign to oppose the FTA in 1987-88 would have been
unlikely without the continuing enthusiasm and pressure of key provincial federations
and affiliated unions. A review of the positions and politics of two CLC-affiliated
unions - the CAWand CUPW - will help to illustrate the internal dynamics driving
the CLC to oppose free trade and into coalition politics.
3.3.4 The Canadian Auto Workers
The CAW was a widely acknowledged leader of labour opposition to the FTA
. The union was sensitive to the implications of a comprehensive bilateral trade deal
for the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact and the job and investment safeguards it contained in
70 Riche, Interview by author.
7( Ontario Federation of Labour, "Document 2: Free Trade and the Market Mentality," Twenty-ninth
Annual Convention, 11-14 November 1985.
72 "OFL Book on 'Free Trade'," Canadian Labour, November 1986~ Brodie and Jenson, Crisis,
Challenge and Change, 306.
73 "Quebec Coalition against Free Trade," Canadian Labour, November 1986~ Duncan Cameron,
Interview by author, Ottawa, 29 October 1991 ~ Patrice Vezina, "La Campagne d'opposition au libre-
echange: bilan et perspectives," Centrale de I'enseignement du Quebec, Montreal, January 1989.
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particular.i" Consequently, after the Macdonald Commission's endorsement and
Prime Minister Mulroney's subsequent announcement that such a deal would be
sought, free trade became the focus of an ambitious public speaking schedule by
President Bob White in 1985 and 1986. 75
The strength and immediacy of the Autoworkers reaction to free trade was not
born solely of sectoral self-interest, it also stemmed from a political perspective which
had been forged in internal battle with the American UAW over the question of
concessions in collective bargaining and buttressed by an aggressive membership
political education program." The refusal to negotiate concessions, along with other
factors, led the Canadian section to break away from the UAWand form an
independent union, the CAW, in 1985. The UAW/CAW had also participated in the
development of alternatives on trade and economic policy around the OFL. Not
surprisingly given its stake in the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact, the union was committed to
the concept of managed or planned trade. CAW sympathy for "greater self-
sufficiency" was somewhat less predictable though certainly related to the union's
position on concessions." The CAW rejected concessions based on its objection to
"the notion that the key to workers security lies primarily in playing the game of
'international competitiveness' .,,78
74 Yates, From Plant to Politics: The Autoworkers Union in Postwar Canada, 248.
75 UAW Canada Newsletter, 27 September 1985. See also Robert White, "The Case Against Bilateral
Free Trade with the United States," 14 July 1986; Robert White, "Notes for an Address to the St.
Thomas Chamber of Commerce," St. Thomas, Ontario, 9 Apri11986; Robert White, "Free Trade and
Sovereignty: Notes for an Address," 21 November 1986; Robert White, "Notes for an Address to the
Canadian Club: the Labour Movement and Bilateral Free Trade with the United States," Toronto, 28
October 1985.
76 Yates, From Plant to Politics: The Autoworkers Union in Postwar Canada, 219; Gindin, "Breaking
Away: The Formation of the Canadian Auto Workers."
77 CAW Assistant to the President, Sam Gindin indicated CAW interest in self-reliance in his
comments on a 1984 panel. Sam Gindin," Notes for Address to CCPA Panel," Ottawa 1984. Gindin
was part of the small group of officials around the OFL considering 'self-reliance.' Turk, Interview by
author.
78 Robert White," Address to CLC Conference on the Economy: The People's Response to the Planned
Depression," Ottawa, 28 February - 1 March 1983; the relative sophistication of the analysis contained
in White's speeches is notable. The perspective on free trade parallels that of class-analytical critics
(see Chapter 2 above): "Free trade with the United States, for the Conservatives and their business
backers, was the backdoor entrance for the neo-conservative agenda. Direct competition with the
United States, along with the free flow ofjobs and investment to wherever profits dictated, would
achieve what electoral politics could not: it would shift the balance of power within Canada to the
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The refusal to bargain concessions with employers also had important
consequences for the union's political strategy. It highlighted the need to seek allies to
"increase our links to other workers and other groups in society.,,79 Furthermore,
White gave some indication ofunderstanding the limitations often implicit in labour's
traditional approach to these relationships. He argued that "[ fJorging such alliances
will not come from merely adopting supportive positions: we'll have to win such
groups to our side by concretely demonstrating our commitment.t''" In fact, over the
course of the 1980s the CAW became increasingly critical of the CLC's ability to
develop a program that would facilitate these alliances. As key CAW strategist Sam
Gindin wrote to White in 1984:
We really should expect more from our central documents. In part the problem
is the labour movement's intellectuals - the church intellectuals have done
much more impressive work from a left perspective - but I think it's unfair to
stop at this level. More important is the context in which the intellectuals
work. As long as the CLC is as bureaucratic, conservative and uninspiring as it
has become, many good intellectuals will simply not want to become part of
it.SI
The CAW's attitude to alliances was also rooted in the general doctrine of 'social
unionism' that Russell defines as ''taking the union into the community by the
pressing of extra-workplace demands."s2 The CAW's constitution explains the
linkage social unionism assumes between collective bargaining and broader social and
economic Issues:
Our collective bargaining strength is based on our internal organization and
mobilisation, but it is also influenced by the more general climate around us:
laws, policies, the economy, and social attitudes. Furthermore, our lives
extend beyond collective bargaining and the workplace and we must concern
right. " Robert White," Notes for an Address to the Summit Citizens Conference," Toronto, 17 JW1e
1988. Sim ilarly, White endorsed a broader critique that went beyond the FTA to identify free trade at
the centre of global neo-liberalism: "While we must work within GAIT in the immediate future, and
there exists some room to join others to lobby for change, GATT itself remains fundamentally flawed
as the vehicle for managing international economic relations. This is because GAIT represents the
Conservative Agenda on a global scale. Its foundation is that unfettered markets and the free flow of
capital will ultimately benefit everyone." Robert White, "Some Reflections on the Current Scene:
Notes for an Address at the University of Ottawa," 30 March 1989.
79 White "Notes for an Address to the Summit Citizens Conference:',
80 Ibid.
81 Gindin, "Confidential Memorandum to Bob White."
82 Bob Russell, "'Reinventing a Labour Movement?" in Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social
Movements in Theon' and Practice, ed. William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1997), 127.
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ourselves with issues like housing, taxation, education, medical services, the
environment, the international economy. Social unionism means unionism
which is rooted in the workplace but understands the importance of
participating in, and influencing, the general direction of society. 83
3.3.5 The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW)
As a CLC affiliate with a syndicalist tradition, a history of militancy, no direct
ties and very little sympathy for the NDP, the Canadian Union ofPostal Workers
(CUPW) was a recent convert to the benefits of cross-sectoral alliances and took the
Congress' stated commitment to coalition building very seriously. The union
submitted several resolutions to the 1986 CLC convention calling for the positive
sentiments expressed at Dialogue '86 to be put into action. One of these resolutions
called for the Congress to "mobilize a broadly-based grassroots coalition." Another
combined this sentiment with opposition to free trade and instructed the Congress "in
coalition with Dialogue '86 participants (to) mount a vigorous public campaign in
opposition to free trade and in favour of labour's alternative economic development
program.v'"
CUPW's positive perspective on coalitions was based on ideology and on
experience. The union had benefited from strong support from the women's
movement in 1981 when it decided to put paid maternity leave at the top of its
collective bargaining priorities. The National Action Committee on the Status of
Women planned rallies, held news conferences and produced materials in aid of
CUPW's demand. Julie White provides some vignettes from the campaign in her
history of the union:
In some communities the striking CUPW members were joined on the picket
line by supporters, both from other unions and from women's organizations.
In Ottawa a group of women formed a committee to support the maternity
leave demand of the strike and a demonstration was organized in July with
posters that suggested 'Treasury Board - Its Time to Deliver. ,85
83 Constitution of the Canadian Auto Workers (CA W).
84 Canadian Union of Postal Workers, "Cut-backs in Social Programs," Resolution Subm itted to the
CLC Convention, 1986 and "Free Trade," Resolution Submitted to the CLC Convention. 1986;
Bickerton, Interview by author.
85 Julie White, Mail and Female: Women and the Canadian Union ofPostal Workers (Toronto:
Thompson, 1990), 155.
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Through this experience and others, the union's leadership came to believe that cross-
sectoral relationships could assist not only with their bargaining agenda but also with
the union's quest to shift the political direction of the labour movement as whole."
While CUPW participated in all three prongs of the CLC's Privatization,
Deregulation and Free Trade campaign, its primary focus was on the more immediate
threat posed to its members by privatization. The union was slower to focus its
energies on free trade. The union's research director made this point and argued for a
shift in the following memo to his leadership:
Recommendations: 1) CUPW should start by admitting we have not been
active enough on this issue and pledge to do more, 3) work with other public
sector unions to research and publicize the effects of free trade on public
sector workers, 4) prepare a pamphlet and use national journal to expose
impact of free trade on postal workers and Canadians in general, 5) ever~
speaking engagement should include a call for an election on free trade. 7
CUPW was also among the CLC affiliates that had adopted a critical
perspective on export-led development, and its staff among those involved in the
formulation ofalternative economic and trade policy around the OFL in the early
eighties. As National President Jean-Claude Parrot repeatedly argued in his speeches
in 1987 and 1988: "We say we need an economy which is more self-reliant instead of
being more dependent on trade with the United States. ,,88 Parrot suggested that the
backers of free trade were "promoting the restructuring of Canadian society. A
restructuring which will strengthen the private sector and further weaken the public
sector. Deregulation, privatization, free trade - the result of all of these policies will
further limit the influence of the public sector in society. Instead, each of these
policies will leave us more dependent on the market to determine economic
growth. ,,89
3.3.6 The Confederation of Canadian Unions (CCU)
86 Bickerton, Interview by author.
87 Geoff Bickerton, Memorandum to Jean Claude Parrot and Darrell Tingley, 4 November 1987.
88 Jean Claude Parrot, "Notes for Address to Labour Day Rally," Windsor, Ontario, 3 September 1988.
89 Jean Claude Parrot. "Address to the Canadian lribune Forwn on Free Trade," Toronto, 8 January
1988.
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The Confederation of Canadian Unions (CCU) was not a CLC affiliate but
rather a minor competitor. No one was surprised when the CCU - a small labour
confederation with around 30,000 members, born out of the wave of nationalist
breakaways in the labour movement in the early seventies - took an early stand in
opposition to free trade. The CCU's 1985 convention adopted a resolution to
"condemn all movement in the direction of freer trade with the United States."
Subsequent resolutions in following years reinforced this position." While the CCU's
small membership base was not in-itself a huge resource, the Confederation provided
a number ofkey activists to the anti-FTA forces that was far out of proportion to its
own membership base. In BC, Sue Vohanka and Jeff Keighley, in Manitoba Susan
Spratt and in Toronto, John Lang and Laurell Ritchie (respectively, CCU secretary-
treasurer and vice-president) all played early and important roles in the mobilization
ofopposition to the deal, as well as being central players in the development of local
coalitions."
The CCU's position evolved beyond a straight left-nationalist opposition to
continental integration. A policy paper adopted by the CCU proposed the following
elements ofan alternative to free trade: "fuller trade with a wider variety of nations,
limiting foreign ownership, expanding the manufacturing and secondary industry
base, and the self-reliant development of our industries.T" The CCU's support for
self-reliance can be traced back to a joint project in the early 1980s between the CCU-
affiliated Canadian Textile and Chemical Union and the ecumenical coalition GATT-
Fly to develop self-reliance strategies for textile industry."
90 Confederation of Canadian Unions, "Free Trade," Resolution 14 Submitted to the CLC Convention,
1985.
91 Confirmed in various personal interviews; see also Bleyer, "Coalition Building and the Canadian
Popular Sector."
92 Executive Board Confederation of Canadian Unions, "Policy on Free Trade;' Vancouver, 1-2
February 1987.
93 Turk, Interview by author and Laurell Ritchie, Interview by author, Toronto, 2 March 1991. In the
follow-up to the Dialogue '86 conference, CCU representative Laurell Ritchie received a memorandum
from CLC vice-president Dick Martin addressed to all conference participants. The memorandum ends:
"There was considerable enthusiasm for this project (i.e., work on the ITA) at the time of our
Conference in January and 1can only hope that the anticipated linkage between our organizations on
this issue can become a reality." While these words were not specifically addressed to the ceu. this
unintentional message reflects the spirit of the moment. Martin, "Letter to Laurell Ritchie:'
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3.3.7 The CLC and the FTA
As affiliates from different sectors and regions unravelled the implications of
free trade for their members and engaged in coalition politics at varying paces and to
differing degrees, a few critical moments in the evolution of the CLC's own approach
to the FTA stand out. The hiring ofeconomist Mel Watkins in the fall of 1987 was
one significant signal of a commitment to take up the free trade challenge. It was a
potent symbol of the CLC's transformation since the days of the left-nationalist
Waffle opposition within the NDP of which Watkins had been a leader. Because he
reported directly to CLC president Carr, Watkins had the access and influence to
make an important contribution to anti-free trade work in the labour movement and
beyond. Here again, the influence of an affiliate was evident since CLC and Canadian
Union ofPublic Employees officials confrrm that Carr - previously an elected officer
with CUPE - was convinced to bring Watkins on board by Gil Levine, CUPE's
Research Director."
Later, in May 1988 after more than six months ofintemal debate, the CLC's
affiliates finally accepted a thirty cent per capita dues assessment to finance the
campaign against free trade." As far as one member of the Congress national
executive is concerned, "we clearly made the decision to make free trade a priority
item with the special assessment. ,,96 It is interesting to note that the decision on the
per capita assessment came during a meeting that also saw then Council of Canadians
chairperson Mel Hurtig give an hour long presentation." While it would be
inappropriate to draw a direct causal relationship between Hurtig's appearance and
the per capita decision, the timing is symbolic of the pressures that brought the
Congress to the forefront of the free trade fight.
94 Katz, Interview by author and Mel Watkins, Interview by author, Toronto, 4 March 1992.
95 Minutes, PCN, Fourth Assembly, Ottawa, 19-20 June 1988; CLC campaign coordinator Larry Wagg
noted that .30 per capita had been requested for the campaign at the CLC's National Political Action
Committee meeting on 22 October 1987. Wagg, Interview by author. See also Geoff Bickerton, "Notes
from CLC's National Political Action Committee Special Meeting," CUPW file 301-A-228-D, 22
October 1987.
% Riche, Interview by author.
91 Minutes, Canadian Labour Congress. Executive Council. Ottawa, 4 May 1988; see also PCN First
Assembly Minutes.
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Both the Watkins hiring and the per capita decision were preceeded by the
Canada Summit where labour was an important participant with leaders of several
unions at the table. In fact, as a newcomer to the national labour leadership, Congress
vice-president Nancy Riche was surprised at the number ofhigh-level labour
representatives who "showed up on a weekend." As far as Riche was concerned, the
Congress had not yet realized the importance of free trade at this point, although it
was apparent that some of the affiliates like the CAW and others might have." Slow
to jump on the free trade bandwagon, the CLC was also sluggish in adapting to the
changing circumstances for coalition building. When first approached by senior
Council of Canadians representatives about possible cooperation on free trade. the
Congress leadership appear to have responded in a rather defensive manner. The
minutes of a meeting recording this response are worthy ofextensive quotation:
Sister Carr explained that she had been contacted by Marion Dewar, John
Fryer and Grace Hartman requesting that the Council of Canadians be
accepted into our coalition. They have no money for a campaign of their own
but want to join us in ours. Those present were in favour of letting them join in
our coalition, but that it must be made clear that the Congress is leading this
campaign; they are only 'individuals,' they don't represent anyone and the
Congress must be seen to be 'out front'; they will have to be monitored and
this should be made clear to Mel Hurtig. 99
While some allowance for the vagaries of minute taking may be in order, the tone of
these minutes fits with a broader assessment of the CLC's attitude towards coalitions
during this period. Indeed, a textual analysis of Congress documents referring to
coalition formation reveals, what one labour official refers to as, a "language or
discourse ofdomination and manipulation." 100
98 Riche, Interview by author.
99 Minutes, Canadian Labour Congress, Executive Committee, Ottawa, 15 August 1986.
100 Turk, Interview by author. Examples of this attitude include the following reference in CLC
Executive Committee Minutes: "Sister Carr reported ... the Congress is in the initial stages of
contacting other organizations to form a coalition, as we have done in the past, to help with the
campaign." CLC Executive Committee Minutes, 15 August 1986. In a letter to Congress Executive
Council members introducing the Social Solidarity Declaration, the CLC president refers to "a number
of organizations which have been a part of our coalition." Shirley Carr, Letter to CLC Executive
Council, 14 July 1987. At a subsequent meeting of the CLC Executive Council, the United
Steelworkers of America's representative is recorded as calling for "the Congress to be seen as the
leader of these coalitions." PCN First Assembly Minutes.
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4. The Women's movement
4.1 NAC and coalition building
The second wave of feminism was perhaps the most important of the emerging
social forces in the 1960s. Established by the federal Liberal government in 1967, the
Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW) received 468 briefs, more than
1,000 letters of opinion, and heard more than 890 witnesses during public hearings. 101
Canadian women's groups had lobbied for the creation of the commission under the
banner of the Committee for the Equality of Women starting in 196<? After the
release of the RCSW report in 1971, these groups reformed as the National Ad Hoc
Committee on the Status of Women in order to monitor implementation of its 167
recommendations. One year later, at five hundred women representing a broad range
oforganizations attending the Strategy for Change conference founded the National
Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC).102
NAC's structure borrowed from previous initiatives in the women's
movement. In fact, NAC was the high point in the broader mode ofdevelopment of
Canadian feminism described by Vickers as follows:
The history ofthe Canadian women's movement is characterized by a
propensity to create umbrella structures based on the membership of groups of
different sizes, types and orientations and by a succession ofeffective
coalitions based on elite accommodation. 103
Starting at thirty, membership would rise to 230 groups in 1982 and more than 500 by
1988.104 As an umbrella structure, NAC brought together a wide range ofwomen's
organizations whose diversity was geographic, ideological, strategic, structural and
101 Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 137-8; Vickers, Rankin, and
Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National Action Committee on the
Status ofWomen, 20-21 ~ see also Sylvia Bashevkin, "Free Trade and Canadian Feminism: The Case of
the National Action Comm ittee on the Status of Women," Canadian Public Policy XV, no. 4 (1989).
102 Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 137; Vickers, Rankin, and
Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National Action Committee on the
Status ofWomen, 77.
103 Vickers, "Bending the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Debates on Feminization of Organization and
Political Process in the English Canadian Women's Movement, 1970-1988," 88.
104 Vickers. Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 20.
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generational. 105 Based on the NAC experience. Vickers et al. challenge the
assumption of most scholarship on the women's movement that posits a break
between the concerns of first and second wave feminism. They argue that,
an approach that discounts continuities between periods of mobilization in
Canada makes an analysis ofNAC extremely difficult. With its hybrid
political culture and its coalitions of old and new forces, NAC's very existence
constitutes a repudiation of such a view. 106
As long as it retained within its membership groups representing Liberal and
Conservative ideologies, NAC was relatively reflective of the full Canadian
ideological spectrum. As its ideological scope shifted through the 1980s with the
participation of women's organizations from an increasingly broad range of sectors,
NAC became something approaching a gendered microcosm of the emerging popular
sector. NAC internalized the cross-sectoral coalition model both structurally and
instrumentally. The election of Grace Hartman as president in 1974 symbolized this
fact. As secretary-treasurer of CUPE, Hartman - a lifelong public sector worker - was
the second highest-ranking officer of Canada's largest union. Her dual roles - with
NAC and CUPE - were a reflection of the emergence ofa 'working class feminism'
that was becoming a distinct current in the women's movement.l'" Through the 1970s
105 "NAC's role as an umbrella structure has been to organize a coalition of groups and ideological
forces within the Canadian women's movement. structurally the groups affiliated include the following
types: (I) pan-Canadian, chapter-based groups (top-down organizing), (2) pan-Canadian groups based
on individual membership, (3) alliance umbrellas which focus on the provincial state and which re-
group organizations of disparate sizes, (4) national federations of local groups, (5) national
regional/provincial networks of service groups, (6) single-issue coalitions, (7) local groups, collectives,
centres, services." In Vickers, "Bending the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Debates on Feminization of
Organization and Political Process in the English Canadian Women's Movement, 1970-1988," 88.
"Umbrella organizations and coalitions have become an important form of feminist organization as the
women's movement has come to comprise many organizations with clearly defined political analyses,
strategies, and goals. The positive aspect of this way of organizing is that it focuses on what large
numbers of organizations and individuals within the movement can agree on, and is thus able to
validate the differences among groups while concentrating on their share viewpoints. This type of
gaining presents a powerful unified face to the work and is often effective in achieving change. The
challenge is to present at the same time the complexity and diversity of the women's movement."
Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change, 245-46.
106 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 35-36. Implicit in this assessment is a critique of any
analytical framework (e.g. NMn that fails to recognize these continuities.
107 Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail, Feminist Organizingfor Change, 124.
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and 1980s, a series of trade union activists served on NAC's executive and union
women were involved at all levels of the organization. 109
Because of its own structure and composition, NAC was predisposed to
cooperating on single-issue campaigns with outside groups sometimes including
forming cross-sectoral coalitions. Yet, while NAC's own campaigns and activities
appeared to internalize and prefigure cross-sectoral alliances, Vickers et al. identify a
certain reticence to broader coalition building - i.e., beyond its gender base. This
hesitancy was rooted both in more separatist strands of feminist ideology and in the
experience of smaller grassroots member groups that felt that alliances at the
leadership level removed decision-making from their control.l'" In contrast, the
increasing influence ofunion or working class feminism created a strong voice for
collaboration with the labour movement. Many of these women were also 'socialist
feminists' and their political perspective created pressure for even broader alliances
that could bring about social transformation beyond NAC's own core constituency's
gendered demands. 11 0
Building on its roots in first and second wave feminism, which had played a
critical role in the development of the peace movement in Canada through the Voice
of Women (VOW) as well as anti-war and native rights struggles, NAC and its
member organizations did engage in joint campaigns beyond the limits of the
108 See Chapter 5 in Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis
ofthe National Action Committee on the Status ofWomen; see also Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail,
Feminist Organizingfor Change, 79; Cohen, Interview by author; Ritchie, Interview by author; Susan
Spratt, Interview by author, Winnipeg, 7 December 1991. At the height of the anti- FTA campaign in
1988 Lynne Kaye, the labour lawyer who co-chaired the Employment Committee, became NAC
president. Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe
National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 183.
109 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 221.
110 Adamson identifies some of the tensions and dilemmas socialist feminism brought to NAC and the women's
movement as a whole: "the socialist-feminist belief in the necessity of a fimdamental social transformation that
challenges not only gender relations but also relations of class, race, and sexual orientation implies a
commitment to the building of a mass heterogeneous political movement. In principle this means forming
alliances with organizations outside the women's movement, such as trade unions and progressive community
groups that organize around peace, anti-racism, and environmental issues, and, if they exist parliamentary and
extra parliamentary socialist and communist parties. In all these cases such a commitment also means
organizing with men, which raises complex questions about the relation between the building of such alliances
and autonomous feminist organizing." Adamson. Briskin, and McPhail, Feminist Organizing for Change, 252.
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, t 1l 1 Th borti h d .women s movemen . e a rnon caravan t at crosse Canada in 1970 pre-dated
NAC but represented cooperative campaigning between feminists and other
movements. A series of advocacy coalitions and campaigns for childcare, equal pay
and choice, and against the deindexing of pensions and family allowances were
formed in the 1970s and 1980s. In most cases, NAC's key partner in these endeavours
was the labour movement, often represented by the CLC. 112 Vickers et aI. argue that
these coalitions - they refer specifically to the efforts around universal childcare and
family allowance deindexation - enhanced NAC's effectiveness in terms ofaffecting
public policy.l ':' In addition, they suggest that the ad hoc coalition on family
allowances made NAC "an equal partner with the CLC and the CCCB.,,114 Since the
CLC and the labour movement formed the most prominent axis for NAC's alliances
during this period, joint initiatives tended to relate in some way to women's
employment though they were not limited by this focus. In fact, cooperation took
place around a broad range of social policy concerns including social benefit
programs, childcare, and reproductive choice.
4.2 The Macdonald Commission and Free Trade
On the day prior to the release of the Macdonald Commission's fmal report,
NAC issued a press release stating its position on bilateral free trade:
NAC recognizes the value of enhancing Canada's international trade and does
not take an isolationist position. But we feel women in this country have a
great deal at stake in this issue and that the effect on women's labour has not
been taken into account. A bilateral comprehensive trade agreement with the
US will have a disproportionately severe impact on women workers. I 15
111 One important example is the women's movement's historic engagement in the peace movement.
lhe Voice of Women was founded on July 28, 1960, "to unite women in concern for the future of the
world" and "to provide a means for women to exercise responsibility for the family of humankind." By
the fall of 1961 this non-partisan women's organization had a membership of 5,000 and a newsletter
with a circulation of over 10,000. Anti-war and native rights movement's also featured strong
participation by feminists. Ibid., 45.
112 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 143.
113 lbid., 220.
114 Ibid I'll1 ., __ •
II.~ NAC, News Release, Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, 4 September 1985; see also Marjorie Cohen. "The
Macdonald Report and its Implications for Women," Feminist Action, December 1985. Both
publications were based on a resolution opposition free trade adopted at NAC's 1984 AGM. See
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While the Macdonald Commission's recommendation of bilateral free trade as an
economic policy panacea was the brightest incoming target on NAC's radar screen,
the commission's social policy advice, specifically for reforming the Unemployment
Insurance (ill) program and implementing an incomes policy was also ofconcern. 116
NAC had been tracking the Macdonald process through its Employment and
Economy Committee. As co-chair of this committee, and a NAC vice-president,
economist Marjorie Cohen led NAC's attack on free trade. I I? The committee was
largely made up of Toronto-based union feminists and economists most of whom
were keen to take up free trade as their central focus. I 18
At NAC's 1987 AGM, delegates unanimously endorsed a resolution opposing
the negotiation ofa free trade agreement. I 19 The starting point for NAC's critique of
free trade was employment. NAC argued that job losses in vulnerable manufacturing
sectors would impact hardest on women and that there would be little prospect of re-
employment for those affected. In addition, NAC claimed that women's jobs in the
service sector would be undermined. But the critique was not limited to these 'direct'
effects offree trade. NAC argued that the cost offree trade would be highest for
disadvantaged groups in society including women through indirect impacts on social
policy. As Vickers comments, "[NAC] assumed that the liberation of women required
state programs and that these were threatened by the proposed Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement."120
Marjorie Cohen, "The Anatomy of the Decision: The Efforts of Coalitions," in The Free Trade
Agreement of1988: Implicationsfor the Future ofCanadian-American Relations, 00. Jane Jenson
(Boston: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, 1989).
116 Marjorie Cohen, "Presentation to the Ontario Cabinet Subcommittee on Free Trade," National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, Toronto, 10 October 1987.
117 See Chapter I above on Cohen's role in lobbying trade union representatives on the importance of
free trade at Dialogue'86 event.
118 Ritchie, Interview by author; Cohen, Interview by author; Spratt, Interview by author; see also Isa
Bakker, "Free Trade Could be Costly for Women Workers," Feminist Action, October 1985.
119 NAC, "AGM Delegates Approve New NAC Policies," Feminist Action, July 1987.
120 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 273; see also NAC, "Free Trade: A Bad Deal for Women;
Here's Why and What To Do..." Pamphlet, 1988; Bakker. "Free Trade Could be Costly for Women
Workers"; Cohen, "Presentation to the Ontario Cabinet Subcommittee on Free Trade."
Some Toronto-based feminists formed an organization intended to focus solely on free trade. Women
Against Free Trade (WAFT) emphasized the promotion of alternatives over opposing the proposed
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4.3 The CAFT and Pro-Canada Network
Despite the organization's national scope, NAC's leadership was largely
Toronto-based. This was particularly true of the members of the Employment
Committee that was focusing its energies on free trade. As a result, NAC
representatives were involved from the outset in the formation of the Toronto-based
Coalition Against Free Trade (CAFT). In fact, the first meeting ofCAFT, billed as
exploratory, was sponsored by NAC and held in its offices. As Laurel Ritchie, a NAC
Employment Committee member and one of the organizers explains, NAC was
viewed as the kind ofneutral territory where the diverse groups might feel most
comfortable:
We were aware ofdifferences within the labour movement - between
federations as well as between individual unions and between the cultural
community, the social policy community and the churches. We had to try to be
as neutral as possible to allow as many different constituencies as possible to
at a minimum come out to explore the issue.!"
The role played by NAC leaders in the founding of the Coalition against Free
Trade was a smaller scale version of the function of feminist activists in drawing
together the two parallel tracks ofopposition to free trade and coalition building
leading to the formation ofthe Pro-Canada Network in the spring of 1987.
5. Conclusion
In spite of their differences, by the late 1980s the Canadian labour, women's
and ecumenical justice movements were among a myriad of sectors united in their
opposition to the FTA and engaged in a major coalition effort to give their opposition
effect. That cross-sectoral coalition building was practically intrinsic to the Canadian
women's movement was reflected in the structure ofNAC, which could be considered
!"TA. WAI·T's formation was driven by the view that "the anti-free trade campaign as a whole badly
needed something more than a collection of sectoral critiques and nationalist laments." Varda Burstyn
and Judy Rebick, "How Women Against Free Trade came to Write its Manifesto," Resourcesfor
Feminist Research XVI I. no. 3 (1989): 139.
This perspective was not unique to WAFT but was rarely voiced elsewhere as energies were focused on
the shorter-term objectives of blocking the negotiation and implementation of a Canada-U.S. ITA. See
Chapters .\ 6 and 7 below.
121 Ritchie, Interview by author.
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a gendered microcosm of the popular sector,l22 Like some elements in the women's
movement, ecumenical social justice activists were practitioners of the consensus
decision-making model that would later be adopted by the Pro-Canada Network.
Church activists carried with them a long and extensive experience with ecumenical
justice coalitions, a clear commitment to cross-sectoral alliances as well as a record of
reflection on the model itself. In his assessment of these coalitions drafted in the early
1980s, Lucal identified problems with coalition formation that bear an astonishing
resemblance to issues later faced by the PCN, 123 Within the labour movement, extra-
parliamentary alliances and coalitions played second fiddle, first, to a traditional
interest advocacy model, then to a flirtation with tripartism and, of course, the
relationship with the NDP. Even when labour accepted and then tentatively embraced
coalition building, the commitment and enthusiasm varied between public and private,
industrial and resource-based unions, as well as regionally. In any case, the coalition
model more often than not adopted by the CLC was both simplistic and ham-fisted,
perhaps inevitably so given labour's overwhelming institutional weight in the popular
sector, Nevertheless, there were important differences on this score between the
Congress and some of its own affiliates.
The three sectors also tackled the trade issue from different angles. Church
social justice advocates developed their understanding of trade liberalization from an
analysis that viewed global poverty as rooted in a post-colonial model of economic
dependency. The Canadian labour movement slowly moved beyond its own
continentalism and through sectoral analysis arrived at a substantive critique of free
trade. Not surprisingly, NAC developed a gendered cross-sectoral analysis of the
122 "Political action by the women's movement has had much to do with the emergence of popular-
sector politics in the 1980s. A source of inspiration and thought, feminist groups have also provided a
new way of seeing political issues and struggles." Cameron, "Political Discourse in the Eighties," 79.
123 Lucal identified the problem of "interlocking directorships." He described advantages such as
"better coordination and atmosphere of trust, development of similar views," as well as disadvantages
including "elitism, marginalization of non-staff members ... less diffusion to and input from grassroots
elements ... resulting in narrower involvement of laity as a whole, plus an overloading of church social
action staff." Lucal, "Coalitions for Social Ecumenism: the Canadian Story." See Chapter 7 below for
an assessment of the relevance of these factors to the development of the PCN/ACN.
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FTA. This concluded with a prescient warning of the threat to social policy and the
social programs that increasingly came to defme Canadian specificity in this period.
At different paces, all three sectors moved beyond their more narrowly defined
'self-interest.' For the women's movement this process was likely inevitable given its
history, its own umbrella structure and the influential role ofa socialist feminist
politic within it. From the outset, the ecumenical critique of trade liberalization did
not bear the imprint of sectoral interest. While the employment implications of free
trade were its central concern, the labour movement never entirely limited its position
on the FTA to this point, however important.
The convergence of interests and initiatives from labour, women's and
ecumenical justice movements would form the core around which an even broader
coalition of concern with the Canada-U.S. FTA would be formed. The evolving
analysis and tactics adopted within these three key sectors were also subject to
substantial cross-pollination through personal and organizational relationships in the
early and mid-1980s. 124 The intervention by the Catholic bishops in 1983, and by
NAC at the Dialogue '86 event three years later, stand out as critical moments in a
process that transformed the Canadian labour movement's stance on free trade and
opened up space for trade unions to consider coalition politics. At the same time,
internal forces within the labour movement itself were driving its agenda in this
direction.
Despite the momentum being generated in the three key sectors dealt with in
this chapter it would take an initiative from another quarter to generate a structured
alliance and common campaign out of the Canadian popular sector's engagement with
free trade and flirtation with coalition politics.
124 See Chapter I above.
Chapter 4
The Free Trade Election
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1. Introduction
Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s important relationships were built
within and between Canadian social movement sectors. Conferences and cross-
sectoral single-issue campaigns contributed to a variety oforganizational and personal
ties. In a changing economic and political context, coalition building was emerging
within the labour movement as a strategic alternative to tripartism. Meanwhile. the
women's, environmental, and peace movements, among others, had gained an
appreciation for the benefits of this strategy in their own work. At the same time, by
the middle of the decade, the proposed ITA had become a central policy focus for a
variety of sectors and their organizations. Women, farmers, church activists and
seniors, along with labour and others were progressively uncovering the implications
of a bilateral trade agreement for their respective constituencies. 1
The identification of the FTA as the centrepiece in capital's agenda set the
stage for cross-sectoral movement convergence, first around the trade issue, and
second, due to the nature of the FTA, around a broader agenda. As it follows the
formation of the Pro-Canada Network, this chapter will continue the task of
documenting the argument that the success of movement convergence was a direct
result of the particular nature of the Free Trade Agreement as a political issue in the
context of the Canadian social and economic formation. The FTA served as a
distillation of a broader dominant socio-economic agenda and provided the basis for a
convergence of concerns. In this context, the formation of the Pro-Canada Network
was the product of a process of interpretive analysis of the FTA and organizational
interaction by the constituencies making up the popular sector.
Against the background of close to a decade of developing relationships, the
nature of the trade issue and the immediacy of the fight against the FTA were the
driving forces behind the relative institutionalization of cooperation and evolution of a
broader common political agenda. From the moment of its formation forward, the
I See Chapter 3 above.
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PCN constituted an initial institutional terrain, in terms of structure and process, for
the further development of convergence - both the rearticulation of identities and
discourses and the democratization of the popular sector - through regular
information sharing, strategic debate and the organizing ofcollective action.
This chapter follows the formation of the Pro-Canada Network culminating
with its participation in the 1988 federal election campaign.
2. The Council of Canadians
The increasingly clear continentalist orientation of the Mulroney government
and its corporate allies revived some of the nationalist sentiment more or less
demobilized by the Liberal government's initial nationalist response to the economic
crisis in the early 1980s.2 One month following the release of the Macdonald Report
in 1985, the Council of Canadians was founded in Ottawa. Prominent Canadian
nationalists assembled by Mel Hurtig, a western book publisher, one-time federal
Liberal candidate and former Committee for an Independent Canada organizer,
committed themselves to "creating the most widely based coalition possible of
Canadians in favour of maximizing Canadian cultural, economic and political
sovereignty and autonomous development, and to work for a consensus among
Canadians for this goal.,,3
The Council was, in the first instance, the coming together of committed, high
profile individuals personally stirred to action by Hurtig." The group's early
membership and program drew heavily on the experience of the Committee for an
Independent Canada (CIC). Founded in February 1970 by former federal Liberal
cabinet minister Walter Gordon, journalist Peter C. Newman and economist Abraham
Rotstein, the CIC had promoted Canadian nationalist causes - primarily of the
2 On the impact of early Trudeau policies on nationalist ferment, see Russell, "The Return of the
Nationalists. "
.1 Council of Canadians, "Goals and Priorities," (1986); see also Council of Canadians, "Statement of
Purpose," (1986) and John Trent, Memorandum to Council of Canadians Board of Directors, II March
1986.
4 According to Maude Barlow, Hurtig's personal role in the formation of the Council cannot be
overestimated. Maude Barlow, Interview by author, Ottawa, 29 October 1991.
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investment but also of the cultural variety - up until its dissolution in the fall of 1980.
The committee's constitution set out the following objectives: "The Committee is
concerned with exploring the advantages of the Canadian economy becoming more
independent; less dependent on imports of foreign capital, foreign technology, and
foreign-manufactured goods; and, less dependent on exports, particularly exports of
largely unprocessed materials.i" The CIC's core group included prominent Liberals
and Conservatives united by their support for government action on foreign
investment and their unwillingness to accept, following the Waffle, "socialism as a
precondition for independence.:" By the mid-1980s, overwhelming support for a
continentalist project amongst Conservatives and on the right of the Liberal Party
changed the mix that would constitute the Council of Canadians. In terms of partisan
affiliation, some prominent supporters of the NDP, including past leader T.C.
Douglas, City of Ottawa Mayor Marion Dewar and CUPE's Grace Hartman, now
joined Liberals in forming the Council. 7
3. The Canada Summit
Two separate but interrelated processes were underway. On one hand,
different constituencies within the popular sector were progressively uncovering the
implications of free trade for their sectors and, in many cases, coalescing at the
provincial level. 8 On the other hand, nationalism was undergoing a rebirth as
Canadians mobilized to oppose the federal government's continentalist orientation. As
Canada's foremost nationalist organization, the Council of Canadians was a key
player in this process.
5 Appended to Nydia McCool and Dennis Conly, "The Committee for an Independent Canada:
Historical and Background Information," Committee for an Independent Canada, 1979. McCool and
Conly provide details of the CIC's objectives and mandate. Bashevkin provides a categorization of the
variants of Canadian nationalism in Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian
Nationalism.
6 Rotstein quoted in Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: {he Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 23. On the
dynamic between the left-nationalist Waffle and the CIC, see also McCal1 Newman, "Growing Up
Reluctantly..-
7 Council ofCanadians, News Release, 11 March 1985 and various documents in Council files.
Background on Council's formation also from Barlow, Interview by author.
8 On sectoral developments, see Chapter J. For an overview of the provincial coalitions, see Bleyer,
"Coalition Building and the Canadian Popular Sector."
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The Council developed a new strategy rooted in an understanding of its own
limitations. By uniting key individual opinion makers and public figures at the
forefront ofa small individual membership organization - in April 1987 some 3.000
members - the Council had more or less replicated the model established by its
predecessor, the Committee for an Independent Canada, replacing Red Tories with
some, post-Waffle, chastened New Democrats. Increasingly the realization was
setting in that this approach was not proving to be an effective one for the task at
hand.9
The Council now proposed to reach out to other organizations and facilitate
their coming together. One of Council's co-chairs at the time describes this new
approach as follows:
I believed that we could never do it on our own, both financially and in
numbers, and that there were a lot of other people out there that were opposed
to free trade. And that we therefore had to become the lynchpin and inspiration
for creating a 'coalition against free trade.' 10
To fulfill this objective the Council's, two co-chairs, Trent and Maude Barlow,
approached a series of groups they believed might be interested. They also selected
the upcoming third summit meeting between Canadian prime minister Mulroney and
u.s. president Reagan as a symbolically appropriate moment to concretize their hopes
for a new alliance. Trent and Barlow cast their nets very wide, approaching groups
ranging from the Canadian Federation of Students to the Canadian Association of
Police Chiefs. 11 As it turned out, most of the positive responses they received came
from groups already identified, through work around the Macdonald Commission
9 Confirmed in Barlow, Interview by author; see also Cameron, "A Game With New Rules" and
Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 27. John Trent, the CIC's policy
director, describes his role in "shutting it down" in 1981. From his perspective, the CIC's passing was a
consequence ofa combination ofajob well done and the unwillingness of business funders to back a
necessary shift to the left. John Trent, Interview by author, Ottawa, 12 March 1992. Commenting on
CIC founder Walter Gordon's attempts to elicit backing from private sector friends, member Robin
Matthews said: "The Canadian bourgeoisie told Gordon to go suck eggs." Quoted in Russell, "The
Return of the Nationalists."
10 Trent, Interview by author.
II The groups they approached included: Canadian Frozen Food Association, Canadian Food
Processors Association, Canadian Council of Furniture Manufacturers, Canadian Poultry and Egg
Processors, Canadian Toy Manufacturers Association, Association of BC Grape Growers, and the
Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association. See Canada Summit Correspondence, Council of
Canadians files.
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process, as part of the popular sector consensus. Some of these groups were included
in the planning process and participated in negotiating the format and content in the
run up to summit. 12
On 4 April 1987, close to one hundred representatives of thirty-two national
organizations including the CLC, NAC, National Farmers Union (NFU) and the
interchurch coalition GATT-Fly came together at Ottawa's Chateau Laurier for the
Canada Summit. 13 Around the table, representatives shared their respective concerns
with the project that was rapidly moving to the top of the Conservative government's
agenda: the proposed Canada-U. S. FTA. The session concluded with unanimous
agreement with the sentiments expressed in the "Canada Summit Declaration" drafted
by the organizers. In it they declared:
We, the delegates to the Canada Summit, representing organizations whose
members form a majority of the Canadian electorate,
Demand that no Agreement of this kind be signed without first having been
submitted to the Canadian people for their explicit approval,
Declare that, in the absence of prior approval, the Government of Canada, by
signing the Agreement, would commit an undemocratic and illegitimate act.'"
12 Information on swnmit planning is from Council of Canadians files and Barlow, Interview by author,
Trent, Interview by author.
13 Participating organizations: Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA),
Canadian Apparel Manufacturers Institute, Canadian Artists Representation, Canadian Chicken
Marketing Agency, Canadian Coalition Against Media Pornography, Canadian Conference of the Arts,
Canadian Council on Social Development, Canadian Ethnocultural Council, Canadian Federation of
Students, Brewery and Soft Drink Workers, Canadian Auto Workers, National Union of Provincial
Government Employees, Canadian Nature Federation, Canadian Teachers Federation, Inuit from North
West Territories, Assembly of First Nations, Centrale de l'enseignement du Quebec, La Coalition
quebecoise en opposition au libre-echange, Confederation des travailleurs et travailleuses du Quebec,
l'union des producteurs agricoles, National Anti-Poverty Organization, National Association of
Friendship Centres, National Federation of Nurses Unions, Operation Dismantle, Playwrights Union of
Canada, Pollution Probe Foundation, and Project Ploughshares. In Council of Canadians, "Spring
Newsletter," (1987),5.
The working title for the swnmit was the Forwn for a Sane Trade Policy. It was also subsequently
referred to as the Maple Leaf Summit. See Canada Summit Correspondence, Council of Canadians
files.
).\ PCN, "Canada Summit Declaration," 4 April 1987~ also in Charles Bauer, "The Shamrock Swnmit:
A Weekend of Dissent," Canadian Labour, May 1987~ Council of Canadians' executive member and
University of Ottawa professor Theo Geraets prepared the initial draft of the summit declaration.
Confirmed in Barlow, Interview by author, Trent, Interview by author. Vice-President Nancy Riche
presented the declaration in draft form to the Executive Council of the CLC prior to the April swnmit.
PCN First Assembly Minutes.
The text of the "Canada Summit Declaration," as well as a list of participants and an announcement of
the formation of the PtN are included in Council of Canadians, "Spring Newsletter": for an early
media assessment of the PCN's potential impact, see Hugh Winsor, "Free Trade Conference Lets
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At the close of the general meeting, a smaller group was convened with John
Trent serving as chair. Leading members of the Council of Canadians - Trent. Hurtig,
Barlow - were joined by representatives of the labour movement, including CLC
president Shirley Carr and vice-president Nancy Riche, and a number of others like
National Farmers Union president Wayne Easter. Whereas the larger assembly had
arrived at a consensus on the public demand that a free trade agreement be subject to
democratic approval through a general election, this smaller gathering established
some parameters for cooperation between the various groups towards achieving this
goal. Agreement was reached on a few basic propositions: first and foremost, the
umbrella grouping for FTA opponents would be called the Pro-Canada Network. The
fact that it would be named and, consequently, defined as a network reflected the
reticence of some participants - in this case, the CLC in particular - to form a
coalition. The decision was based on participants understanding that a 'network' did
not carry the same burden ofpolitical consensus and collective financial responsibility
as might be implied by a 'coalition.' 15
Unlike previous key events in the formation of the popular sector during the
early and mid-1980s - sessions following the release ofEthical Reflections, and
Dialogue '86 for example - the Canada Summit concluded with a clear decision to
cooperate, a commitment that was reinforced by the founding of a new organization.
Previous popular sector gatherings had held out the promise of such a development
but had repeatedly failed to deliver. In retrospect, it appears that these prior events
prepared the ground for eventual success.
While the formation of the Pro-Canada Network was a step forward, this new
coalition-type formation was nonetheless characterized from its inception by a
Nationalist Genie Out of Bottle," Globe and Mail, 6 April 1987, A2.
15 Based on his recollection of events, John Trent provides an interesting assessment of the CLC's
perspective: "Mrs. Carr was there and the unions said they would not join a coalition. Their experience
during the 1970s and the 1980s had taught them two things. They provided the power and money but
were never allowed to take leadership as one member of a coalition. Secondly, they found that they (the
coalitions) were fairly badly managed and that they were usually left with two things, policies that were
untenable - too extreme for their membership - and holding the financial bag. So while they approved
of everything that we were doing, they didn't want a coalition of that nature. 1 think it was Mel Hurtig
who suggested: why don't we call it a Network, where everyone keeps their own independence." Irent,
Interview by author.
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number of serious limitations. The decision on the name - network rather than
coalition - itself reflected the limits of the consensus achieved. Participants in the
second, 'private,' session at the summit understood that the agreement of a number of
parties to proceed with some sort ofcollective organization to move forward with the
spirit of the summit declaration was dependent on acceptance of the flexible and
relatively informal network model. 16
At this stage the new formation was also hampered by its lack of a pan-
Canadian base. Other than the Coalition quebecoise en opposition au libre-echange,
none ofthe provincial coalitions already active on free trade were represented at the
summit. So while the PCN seemed poised to benefit from the rich variety of
experiences brought to its discussions by a wide-range of sectors through national
organizations, its ability to act from coast-to-coast appeared to be severely
circumscribed. 17
Within months of the Canada Summit even the breadth of the Network at the
national level looked somewhat less impressive than advertised. Although more than
thirty-two national organizations attended the summit in April, a listing of the Pro-
Canada Network's membership in September 1987 includes only eleven national
organizations. 18 Apparently, a number ofgroups remained reticent to translate their
agreement with the basic demands made in the summit declaration into participation
in an umbrella grouping clearly committed to opposing the proposed FTA.
Nevertheless, the new Network's potential was reflected in the relative importance of
the groups that remained around the table. The Canadian Labour Congress
16 lbid.; Riche, Interview by author.
17 Phillips provides an interesting description of the limitations of national organizations in the
Canadian context in "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the Network of National
Canadian Women's Organizations," 776.
On the provincial social justice coalitions active in several provinces in the mid to late 1980s, see
Bleyer, "Coalition Building and the Canadian Popular Sector."
18 The organizations listed are: Assembly of First Nations, CLC, ACTRA, NFU, COC, GAIT-Fly, One
Voice Seniors Network, NAC, Canadian Teachers' Federation, the National Anti-Poverty Organization
and the Coalition quebecoise. PCN, "Membership List," (1987). In a series ofletters dated April 26,
1987, Maude Barlow listed only five organizations other than the Council as members of the PCN.
Ihese wert." the AFN. ACTRA. CTF. NAC and the NFU. Canada Summit Correspondence in Council
of Canadians files.
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represented more than two million workers through its affiliated unions. Key affiliates
such as the CAWand CUPE claimed large memberships in the hundreds of thousands
and, like the CLC, these unions and their leaders sported relatively high public
profiles. As the lead Canadian feminist organization, itself with more than 500
member groups, NAC carried a record of "relative political success" in the 1980s into
the PCN. 19 While the 10,000 members and $40,000 "war chest" the Council of
Canadians lay claim to in 1988 was less than overwhelming, the organization's
strengths included prominent supporters and a relatively high profile leadership.i"
Other groups were also far from negligible, including the federation representing all
Canadian schoolteachers, the AFN representing 600 native band councils and through
them more than 300,000 aboriginal Canadians and GATT-Fly with its mandate from
the mainline Christian churches.
4. Bringing in the Provinces
Over the course of the summer of 1987, representatives of some of the
national organizations attending meetings of the nascent Network became
increasingly aware of its weaknesses. Just as the limited number of national groups
participating in the PCN posed a problem, the absence of representation from regional
and provincial coalitions was raised as a serious obstacle to success. As a result, a
September meeting of the Network mandated three people - Larry Wagg (CLC),
Dennis Howlett (GATT-Fly), and Tony Clarke (CCCB) - to explore the possibility of
inviting provincial groups to participate."
19 Bashevkin contrasts NAC's record favourably with those of feminist organizations in the UK and
US. Sylvia Bashevkin, "Losing Common Ground: Feminists, Conservatives and Public Policy in
Canada during the Mulroney Years," Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science XXIX, no. 2 (1996), 212.
Much ofNAC's momentum in this period was generated by the women's movements key role in
lobbying for equality rights during the repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1981-82. According
to one senior Member of Parliament at the time, "the constitutional lobby was a watershed period for
the Canadian women's movement, establishing it as a major political force." Walter Mcl.ean, PC MP
quoted in Penney Kome, The Taking ofTwenty Eight: Women Challenge the Constitution (Toronto:
The Women's Press, 1983),66. On this period, see also Penney Kome, Women ofInfluence: Canadian
Women and Politics (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1985). See also Chapter 3 above.
20 Membership and budget information is from Mel Hurtig, At Twilight in the Country, Memoirs ofa
Canadian Nationalist, 296-300.
21 Discussion of regional representation is recorded in the minutes of PCN meetings on from May to
October 1987. See. in particular. interventions by Dennis Howlett (June I, 1987) and Tony Clarke
(October 7. 1987). For the mandating of Wagg, Howlett and Clarke. see Catherine Morrisson,
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Proponents of regional representation based their arguments on a combination
of historical analysis and contemporary strategy. This included an understanding that
the FTA's political godparent, the federal Conservative Party, had adopted a 'divide
and conquer' strategy, pitting province against province and region against region to
promote the agreement. Regionalism is a profound cleavage in Canada's political
history and it was welcomed with open arms into the party's arsenal. Since the late
1970s, the Conservatives had literally abandoned 'nation-building' as an objective.
During his brief tenure as prime minister in 1979, Joe Clark elaborated on the concept
of Canada as a "community of communities." This perspective reflected the
'province-building' strategy adopted by the resource-rich Western provinces during
the 1970s that had run up against the two short-lived attempts by the Trudeau Liberal
government to reimplement some semblance of nation-building. 22
The province-building development strategy was far from a new phenomenon
in the Canadian context, having been pioneered by Ontario at the turn of the century
and brought to new heights in Quebec during the Quiet Revolution (1950s-60s). Now
though, the Conservative Party found a rationale for its neo-conservatism in "a
discourse of regionalism, provincial rights and deccntralization.Y' The Conservatives
were consequently more than willing to fan the flames of regionalism by building on
Western resentment of one pillar of the Liberal's failed Third National Policy of the
early 1980s, the National Energy Program (NEP) and fuelling Quebec's opposition to
another, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the repatriated Canadian constitution.
The Conservatives' electoral victory in 1984 was, as a result, constructed on
an alliance of disgruntled regional constituencies. In their campaign for free trade and
re-election in 1988, the Conservatives would attempt to repeat this scenario focusing
Memorandum to Tony Clarke. Dennis Howlett and Larry Wagg, 26 September 1987.
n Brodie and Jenson. Crisis. Challenge and Change; see also Chapter I above.
2.1 Jane Jenson. "Different but not 'Exceptional'; Canada's Permeable Fordisrn." Canadian Review of
Sociology and Anthropologv 26. no. I (1989): 89.
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this time on fuelling discontent with the industrial heartland - Ontario - both in the
West and in QUebeC.24
For opponents of the FTA, the ability to challenge the Tories tactics with an
alternative discourse that recognized regional differences but emphasized common
pan-Canadian class and sectoral interests would be a key asset, perhaps even a pre-
condition of success. On their own, national organizations based in Ontario and
Quebec were poorly placed to bring an understanding of the potential regional impact
of an FTA to the PCN's process. As a result, they were unlikely to prioritize the
integration of regional perspectives into the Network's analysis. A Pro-Canada
Network without provincial representation would thus be less likely to be able to
effectively confront regional antagonisms where it mattered most, at the provincial
level, or gain public legitimacy as 'pan-Canadian.'
The absence of provincial groups around the table had other serious
consequences. The political effectiveness of the Network depended on its ability to
carry out nation-wide actions that would be difficult, if not impossible, to undertake
without a strong regional base. This became evident as plans for a national petition
drive were developed. Polling results made available to the PCN by the Council of
Canadians indicated strong public opposition to free trade and thus fertile ground for
such an initiative.f Given its own limited resources, the PCN needed the activist
energy of the coalitions to get the legwork done and collect the petition signatures."
24 Campbell and Pal, The Real Worlds ofCanadian Politics; Cases in Process and Policy, 189. Graham
Fraser suggests that federal Tory cabinet minister Lucien Bouchard argued publicly that "opposition to
free trade was basically a plot by the Ontario establishment to retain its wealth and privileges at the
expense of the rest of the country, particularly Quebec." In Graham Fraser, Playingfor Keeps: The
Making ofthe Prime Minister, 1988 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1989); see also "Peterson Blasts
Bouchard's 'Plot' Comment," Montreal Gazette, 5 Novem ber 1988, 6 and David Johnston, "Free Trade
Scares 'les Anglais': Bouchard," Montreal Gazette, 16 November 1988, A 11. On shifting provincial
stances vis-a-vis the ITA, see Campbell and Pal, The Real Worlds ofCanadian Politics; Cases in
Process and Policy, 193-95, 200-06.
25 Angus Reid Associates, "Free Trade: Canadians' Perceptions of the Initiative," August 1987. Other
public opinion surveys indicated similar widespread support for an election call before a free trade
agreement was signed, see for example "75% Polled Want Free Trade Vote," Toronto Star, 3
December 1987, A8.
26 Howlett, Interview by author. For a glimpse of the state of the Network's resource base at the time,
see Ross Howard, "Hard-up Coalition of Opponents Vows to Run 'Massive' Campaign," Globe and
Mail, 8 October 1987, A5. Co-chair John Trent describes the "daily operations running on hand-to-
mouth basis" as well as "plans to rely on low-cost public meetings, media attention and its non-partisan
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Some proponents of the inclusion of provincial coalitions also argued that providing a
forum for these groups to share experiences and coordinate activities would in itself
serve to strengthen the provincial base of the movement. Finally, other participants
viewed the presence of provincial activists as a counterweight to the more cautious
orientation of the staff and leadership of national organizations already around the
table.27
Because of these pressures, twenty-five regional representatives were invited
to a two-day session October 18-19, 1987 following the Council ofCanadians'
Annual General Meeting in Ottawa. Representatives of coalitions from Prince Edward
Island, Manitoba, Quebec, Nova Scotia and Ontario joined officials from the
provincial federations of labour ofAlberta, Ontario, and New Brunswick. Adding to
the mix relatively well-established groups such as the Saskatchewan Coalition for
Social Justice, Newfoundland's Coalition for Equality, and others already engaged in
cross-sectoral campaigns on the free trade issue like the coalitions from Ontario and
Manitoba would fundamentally change the nature of the PCN.28
The October meeting was a watershed for the Pro-Canada Network's
organizational structure. The expanded format, including two categories of
membership for national organizations and provincial coalitions, constituted the
prototype for the Network's regular decision-making body. Indeed, the October 1987
meeting was retrospectively considered the group's first General Assembly.i"
image when public debates are held."
27 Interventions at PCN meetings during the summer of 1987, these points are developed in Howlett,
"Social Movement Coalitions: New Possibilities for Social Change" and elaborated in Howlett,
Interview by author.
28 Provincial representatives attending included: Jean Swanson (End Legislated Poverty, Vancouver).
Don Aitken and Carol Anne Hayes (Alberta Federation of Labour, Alberta), Susan Spratt (Manitoba
Coalition Against Free Trade), Ross Sutherland (Coalition Against Free Trade), Grace McInnis
(Ontario Federation of Labour), Peter Bakvis (Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux, Quebec), John
Murphy (New Brunswick Federation of Labour), Tom Mcllworth, Reverend Roy deMarsh (Maritime
Conference), Maureen Larkin (PT.I. Coalition Against Free Trade), Paul Burgwin (Halifax-Dartmouth
Labour Council). PCN First Assembly Minutes.
The broadening to a provincial base was very similar to the process undertaken by the Working
COI11I11 ittee for Social Sol idarity. McBane, "Memorandum reo Social Solidarity."
29 This is simply deduced from the numbering of subsequent assemblies.
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The inclusion of new participants raised a number of new issues and opened
the door to a substantive consideration of organizational structure. Since June 1987,
the Network had functioned with regular general meetings and established four
committees that were more or less active - communications, strategy, alternatives and
coordination." Larger numbers of representatives - many not based in the Toronto-
Montreal-Ottawa triangle where most national organization head offices were located
- underlined the need for more careful attention to structure. For example. full
membership assemblies were now too unwieldy to be expected to meet very often or
on short notice. To compensate, a Steering Committee with a core membership 0 f
representatives from key national organizations was created and delegated to follow-
up on Assembly decisions. As a general rule, the committee included one
representative from each participating sector - women, church, farm, labour, etc. -
except where divergent interests or historical reasons made the presence of two
organizations from a sector essential, or a lack of interest or resources meant that none
were present.31
Steering committee membership also included representatives of the Quebec
and Ontario coalitions. While there was some notion that the presence of these two
provincial coalitions would compensate for the absence ofothers whose attendance
could not be financially secured, this was not the primary reason given for their
inclusion. The place of the Coalition quebecoise on the Steering Committee was
principally a pragmatic recognition of the different concerns and the distinct approach
the campaign against free trade would take in Quebec. For some Network actors
whose own organizations had long recognized Quebec's right to self-determination-
a number of trade unions and NAC for example - it was also a small step towards
incorporating a 'two nations' vision of Canada in their political practice.
30 PCN First Assembly Minutes.
3\ In the case of the labour movement representatives of two federations - the Canadian Labour
Congress and Confederation of Canadian Unions - were included on the Steering Committee. See .
Chapter 3 above. At different moments seniors organizations and environmental groups would fall into
the latter category - i.e., lack of interest or resources. See PCN files.
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The inclusion of the Ontario coalition was inevitable and essential. Like the
Coalition quebecoise, the Coalition against Free Trade (Ontario) was at the very least
a peer to the nascent PCN. Based in Toronto, CAPT had developed and in fact
nurtured a national profile. Indeed, it was not due to an oversight that the coalition
had omitted the prefix Ontario from its name. Coalition members had shied away
from this characterization because oftheir intention to playa national role. 32
While activists elsewhere in the country tended to view the Toronto group's
national aspirations as, yet another example of metropolitan imperialism, a positive
rationale for these goals can also be constructed." First, CAPT was among the first
ant i-free trade groups established in the country and, as such, was filling an important
void. Secondly, its base in Canada's largest metropolitan area did make it strategically
well placed for the job. Toronto was, for example, also home to the national offices of
a number ofpan-Canadian popular sector organizations including NAC, GATT-Fly
and large industrial unions like the CAW and USWA, all early converts to the anti-
free trade cause.34
In the fmal analysis then the presence of the Ontario and Quebec groups on the
PCN's Steering Committee was not primarily motivated by the need for the voice of
regional groups to be heard at this level. Quite to the contrary, the fact that the only
provincial groups participating in the steering committee process were representing
the large central Canadian provinces came to be seen by activists in other provinces as
further reinforcing the dominance of national organizations within the Network. The
problem of regional representation in decision-making was clearly not resolved."
32 Based on author's interviews with key members of the CAIT including Ken Traynor, Marjorie
Cohen, Laurel Ritchie and Mel Watkins.
33 Several activists expressed this opinion to the author in interviews, including Mary Boyd and Susan
Spratt.
34 CAFT was active as early as March 1986. The "Against Free Trade Revue" at Massey Hall in
Toronto attracted an audience of more than 2,000. Speakers at the event included Bishop Remi de Roo.
UAW-Canada president Bob White and prominent cultural figures like author Pierre Berton. "~i?h­
profile Canadians Plan Anti-free Trade Drive," Toronto Star, 22 February 1986 and "Trade CrItICS
Taking Fight to Grassroots," Globe and Mail, 26 February 1986, A8.
J~ The Steering Committee also included the chairpersons of the three newly formed 'working
committees' established by the October meeting. The three committees - strategy, research and
analysis, and media and communications - were to further work on the Network's agenda in their
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5. Early Strategy
While negotiations between the Canadian and U.S. governments continued
through the summer of 1987, the deadline for the American fast track legislative
process loomed large. As the summer ran on, many Canadians came to the conclusion
that the FTA would die on the drafting board, a victim, for the most part, of
differences between the executive and legislative branches in the United States.
Among opponents of the deal, opinions were divided though the obstacles facing the
negotiators appeared important. According to Doem and Tomlin, key anti-FTA
activists thought the deal would die during the summer.36 One of them though has a
different assessment:
Virtually everyone, including the opposition parties, seemed convinced the
talks would collapse because ofU.S. unhappiness with the deal. .. The
coalition groups knew, however, that this was not true. We had good
information from Washington to indicate the U.S. negotiators were delighted
with the concessions they had gained from Canada.. .It was clear to us that a
deal would be struck."
Records of early Pro-Canada Network meetings in the fall of 1987 indicate that
substantial debate and discussion ofpossible outcomes did take place. It is also clear
that three possibilities were considered - a comprehensive agreement, a partial
agreement and no agreement - and that, in the end, no consensus opinion emerged."
On 23 September 1987, Canada's chief negotiator Simon Reisman broke off
talks with his American counterpart. Reisman's apparent gambit set the stage for the
last minute deal reached on the October weekend of the fast track deadline in
Washington after two days of resumed talks. A deal was reached on Saturday 3
October and both the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Canadian Trade
Negotiations Office (TNO) released preliminary details by the next day.
While the process of drafting a legal text for the agreement would drag on
until mid-December, the preliminary deal dramatically raised the stakes for the Pro-
respective areas between meetings of the Assembly.
36 Doern and Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story, 214.
37 Cohen, "The Anatomy of the Decision: The Efforts of Coalitions," 24.
311 PCN First Assembly Minutes.
177
Canada Network." Against this background, member groups set three strategic goals
at their first Assembly less than two weeks following what became known as the
'Washington Surprise.' First, all efforts were to be focused on the call for an election
prior to implementation of the FTA. Second, pressure on the government was to be
achieved by mobilizing public opposition to the trade deal and, third, provincial
governments would be pushed to reject, or following its adoption, to refuse to
implement the agreement."
The Assembly also identified tools to attain these objectives. These included
10bbying (defmed broadly to include petitions and other pressure tactics as well.as.. ..
face-to-face meetings) of both federal and provincial parties - including governments
at the provincial level- and popular education and media work. Finally, much
emphasis was placed on the role of a Research and Analysis Team that would
undertake a "detailed analysis of the fmal text of the free trade accord immediately
after it is available. ,,41
First conceived ofas a more limited technical sub-committee, the research
group convened by University of Ottawa political economist Duncan Cameron
marked an important expansion of the scope of the PCN's activities. 42 The academics
and researchers from different sectors and organizations produced a quick but
substantive critique of the preliminary legal text of the FTA in December 1987 that
39 On immediate reactions to the 3 October deal, see Campbell and Pal, The Real Worlds ofCanadian
Politics; Cases in Process and Policy, 210.
40 Free Trade Action Dossier 1987, 5-8; PCN First Assembly Minutes; PCN, "Strategy Chart," October
1987.
41 PCN, "Strategy Chart." In addition the PCN's plans included: analysis oflegal text, meetings with
provincial premiers and party leaders to press for provincial rejection and non-implementation, push for
signatures on petition calling for election, meetings by constituents with as many MP's as possible,
participation in hearings and press in provinces. In "Coalitions Meet to Plan Action Strategy," Free
Trade Action Dossier, 23 October 1987.
On lobbying provincial governments, see "Provincial Laws Can Challenge Trade Deal," Pro-Canada
Dossier, 27 June 1988; on actions taken by provincial governments, see, for example, William Walker,
"Peterson Challenges Free Trade Deal with New Health Bill," Toronto Star, 3 June 1988, A I: on the
introduction of legislation to protect Ontario's hydroelectric power and wine industry, see William
Walker, "Peterson Escalates War against Free Trade," Toronto Star, 28 June 1988, A I; on Manitoba's
introduction of legislation to protect land from US ownership, see Geoffrey York, "Manitoba Takes
Aim at Free Trade Pact," Glohc and Mai!, 12 February 1988, AS.
42 PCN First Assembly Minutes.
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was immediately distributed to groups across the country. This process was repeated
in May 1988 after the implementing legislation for the ITA (Bill C-130) was tabled in
the House of Commons."
Until this point, the Pro-Canada Network had operated principally as an
information clearinghouse. Following the model of the Canada Summit, sectoral and
provincial groups brought their concerns, respective analyses and strategic priorities
to assemblies. These forums were important opportunities for groups from different
sectors to share perspectives and to improve and formalize communication channels
between them. The formation of the research team opened up new opportunities. It
provided an entry point for sympathetic academics and others with relevant expertise
but who were not necessarily affiliated to member organizations, to contribute to the
Network's activities. The team also became a space for sharing and integrating
perspectives on different facets of the FTA, a process ofcollective analysis that went
a step beyond what the simple summit model could facilitate. Both ofthe research
team's early interventions, responding to the preliminary legal text and the
implementing legislation (C-130), were instrumental in building the Network's
external credibility. Particularly at this early stage in both the free trade debate and the
PCN's own development, the ability to produce substantive critiques ofpolicy
proposals helped to establish the Network is legitimacy with politicians and with the
media."
Under the aegis of its Media and Communications Committee, the PCN
developed a communications strategy reflecting both its objectives - blocking
negotiation and implementation of the FTA - and its limited resources. From the
outset, the committee identified the enormous potential for external communication at
low-cost to the Network through member organizations to their own constituencies.
4J "Analysis Team to Review Legal Text," Pro-Canada Dossier, 26 November 1987; "PCN Analysis
of Final Text," Pro-Canada Dossier, 18 December 1987; "Briefing Notes on ITA Implementing
Legislation (C-130) from the PCN Analysis Team," Pro-Canada Dossier, 1 June 1988.
.... This conclusion is based on a review of media coverage of the Network as well as interviews with
various participants in the work of the PCN's Research and Analysis Committee as well as other key
Network actors.
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Even if only a fraction of the millions of Canadians these groups claimed to represent
could be reached, this internal distribution and cross-fertilization of information could
be extremely significant. Before the Canada Summit a number of groups had already
undertaken substantial internal education campaigns on free trade." With the
formation of the Network and increasing cooperation, materials developed for this
purpose were now shared between organizations. For example, CUPE produced
40,000 copies of a special issue of its regular publication The Facts covering all
aspects ofthe case against free trade in an accessible format. Likewise, groups from
NAC to the United Church, and from the Canadian Environmental Network to the
CAW had produced a wealth of information in a variety of formats and these were
widely shared with other member groups. New materials produced by member groups
tended to include reference to the PCN and to emphasize the broadly based nature of
opposition to the FTA.46
The committee was also responsible for developing a media strategy. Again,
because of limited resources the emphasis was largely on 'earned media.' The
committee's work ranged from preparing news releases and information kits for the
media and placing analysis pieces in daily papers to lobbying, cajoling and pressuring
journalists to cover particular topics. A bank of resource people with expertise on
specific aspects of the trade deal was made available to member groups and the media
alike.47
But opponents were hamstrung in their relationship with the media. First, they
generally lacked the resources necessary to satisfy the expectations of the mainstream
media. Moreover, the media was not overly sympathetic to the message in the
45 Others include the Canadian Teachers' Federation, the National Farmers Union and organizations
representing the cultural sector. See Chapter 3 above for other examples.
46 In May 1987, GATT-Fly launched the Free Trade Action Dossier as a means of ensuring
communication between PCN member groups as well as more broadly publicizing the Network's
analysis and activities. The Dossier, which was later renamed the Pro-Canada Dossier and then
transferred to the Network's Ottawa office after the 1988 election, played an important role in
maintaining the flow of information and became a key component in the media and communication
committee's work. Howlett, "Social Movement Coalitions: New Possibilities for Social Change" and
Howlett, Interview by author.
47 Based on a report by the co-chair of the media and communications committee. Howlett. "Social
Movement Coalitions: New Possibilities for Social Change."
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discourse of popular sector groups and was far more open to the neo-conservative
logic put forward by business and articulated around concepts such as
'competitiveness. ,48 Second, the Network considered its diverse membership
reflecting the broad nature of opposition to the deal an important 'selling point' for its
message though this was not easily related to the media. Thus PCN news conferences
and other public events featuring several representatives tended to overwhelm
journalists accustomed to dealing with one leader or spokesperson at a time..l 9
Finally, the PCN also lobbied politicians directly. At the federal level, this
meant maintaining a steady flow of information to the two opposition parties. The
Network had strong, if very different, relationships with both parties. The connection
with the NDP was a result, first, of the CLC's central role in that party and, second, of
the political preferences of most member groups and their activists. The PCN's
relationship with the Liberal Party was less structured but no less important, notably
during the first phase of anti-FTA mobilization. The link between anti-free traders and
the party was largely dependent on the Council of Canadians and its two most
prominent figures, Maude Barlow and Mel Hurtig. The extent of the Liberal
connections Barlow and Hurtig brought with them is detailed in both of their
autobiographies and reflected in the number ofprominent Liberals who participated in
Council events from 1985 to 1992. As a result, PCN researchers and others had
regular access to Liberal party decision-makers - including providing briefmgs for the
parliamentary caucus and party strategists. 50
48 This argument is developed in Frances Russell, "Mass Media Shut Out Opponents of Free Trade,"
Winnipeg Free Press, 8 April 1989 and James P. Winters, 00., The Silent Revolution: Media,
Democracy, and the Free Trade Debate (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1990). See also James
Winters, Common Cents: Media Portrayal ofthe Gulf War and Other Events (Montreal and New York:
Black Rose Books, 1992).
49 In June 1988, the PCN had identified a team of four spokespersons: CLC vice-president Nancy
Riche, Council of Canadians chair Mel Hurtig, NAC vice-president Marjorie Cohen and, on a rotating
basis, a representative of one of the four unions that made up the Coalition quebecoise, reflecting the
geographic scope and sectoral diversity of the Network. See also Howlett, "Social Movement
Coalitions: New Possibilities for Social Change"; Cohen, Interview by author; Clarke et al., Absent
Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections; Bleyer, "Coalitions of Social Movements as
Agencies for Social Change: the Action Canada Network."
50 See Maude Barlow, The Fight ofMy Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian (Toronto:
Harper Collins, 1998) and Hurtig, At Twilight in the Country, Memoirs ofa Canadian Nationalist'.
Ayres quotes Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy's favourable assessment of the PCN's usefulness both 10
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6. The Action Agenda
Meeting in the aftermath of the 2 January signing of the FTA, delegates to the
PCN's Second Assembly (16-19 January 1988) made a collective commitment to
coordinate joint action strategies, move beyond research and analysis, and prioritize
information sharing and political education work. In a press release at the close of the
Assembly a six-point action plan was laid OUt.51
All the PCN's research and communications work was undertaken with one
goal in mind: raising the profile of the free trade issue and increasing opposition to the
deal in order to force the Conservative government to call an election prior to
implementation.Y The Network's Strategy Committee, chaired by Julie Davis, then
vice-president and later secretary-treasurer of the OFL, was responsible for
developing the action plan to fulfill this objective. Actions such as the countrywide
petition started at the end of 1987, as well as others taken on at the provincial level,
were often not initiated by the Network per se. Rather they began as projects of
individual national organizations - in the case of the petition, the Council of
providing a critique of the FTA and as "leverage against other members of the caucus - that it [the
PCN] might turn on us if we didn't use their information and listen to what they had to say." In Ayres,
Defying Conventional Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention against North American
Free Trade, 84.
Meanwhile PCN member coalitions were pressuring provincial government's to oppose the federal free
trade project. In a number of cases, anti-free trade groups also took their arguments to the municipal
level asking local and regional councils to pass motions opposing the FTA. See, for example, "Toronto
City Council Opposes FTA," Pro-Canada Dossier, 13 September 1987.
51 The campaign strategy included: "1) the mass distribution of two publications which provide detailed
analysis of why the Mulroney deal is a bad deal for Canada; 2) an intensive grass roots education
program within all our organizations; 3) a series of lobby actions and/or public demonstrations
designed to challenge the enabling legislation when it is put forward in Parliament this spring; 4) A
series of cultural and political events in various communities across Canada involving artists,
entertainers and public personalities from every part of this country; 5) a means for people to send a
clear protest message to the Mulroney government on this issue through their 1988 tax returns; 6) a
national action day." In "Pro-Canada Action Strategy Announced," Free Trade Action Dossier, 29
January 1988; see also PCN Assembly, News Release, Ottawa, 19 January 1988.
In a memorandum to the OFL's executive officers, Riel Miller who had represented the federation at
the peN meeting notes the success of the Assembly, highlights the theme chosen for the campaign -
It's a bad deal for Canada - and records that the two main actions agreed to were a National Day of
Action for June and a petition drive calling for an election to culminate on April 17. Riel Miller,
Memorandum to OFL Executive Officers 1988.
52 By January 1988, free trade had moved from relative obscurity to become "the issue most requiring
attention from the country's leaders" according to 3 7(} () of Canadians. The Reid Report, i\1ay 1993, 2.
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Canadians - or provincial coalitions that eventually drew support, participation and at
times some degree of ownership from other member groups.t'
The 12 June National Day of Action was the Network's first attempt at
countrywide coordinated activities. Organized around the theme 'Let Canadians
decide', most events - including a number of symbolic actions along the Canada-U.S.
border and cultural events - were small in scale but nonetheless raised the profile of
the issue as well as opponents' concerns.54
The Network continued to pay close attention to the political parties during the
spring and summer of 1988, pressing provincial governments to refuse to implement a
free trade agreement. While provincial coalitions took the lead on this front, the
Network provided a forum for the coordination of their activities.f As part of efforts
to hold the leaders of the federal opposition parties to their public commitment to
fight the deal, the PCN brought together an unprecedented number and range of
popular sector leaders to meet with, in turn, Liberal leader John Turner and NDP
leader Ed Broadbent on 30 May 1988. Observers at the daylong lobby event are
convinced that the passion and commitment expressed by representatives of so many
different sectors of Canadian society played a key role in steeling the party leaders'
resolve to oppose the FTA. It is interesting to note that despite an impressive list of
participants the meetings with the opposition leaders drew virtually no media
coverage.56
53 PCN First Assembly Minutes. The petition effort started in 1987, forms were circulated far and wide
and many signatures were collected. Unfortunately the energy behind this action seems to have
dissipated and it was not used to full effect; April 9, 1988 became 'Sign up for Canada Day' across
Ontario, with several thousand volunteers in 35 cities and towns asking people to sign the PCN
petition. "Ontario Signs Up for Canada," Pro-Canada Dossier, 29 April 1988.
54 Reports on June 12 events are in Fourth Assembly Minutes. See also "June 12th - Canadians Across
the Country Show Opposition to Trade Deal," Pro-Canada Dossier, 27 June 1988; and "Thousands
Demand Free Trade Vote," Toronto Star, 13 June 1988, A1.
55 "Letters, Meetings with Provincial Premiers Urged," Pro-Canada Dossier, 1 June 1988; "Provincial
Action Needed to Challenge Trade Deal," Pro-Canada Dossier, 27 June 1988.
56 The lobby is described in "Pf.N Leaders Present Petitions to Opposition Leaders," Pro-Canada
Dossier, 1 June 1988. Opinions of the impact of the lobby were garnered from personal interviews with
several participants.
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A third arena of political struggle emerged when Liberal leader John Turner
called on the Liberal majority in the Senate to block passage of the implementing
legislation (C-130) passed by the Conservative majority in the Commons. While the
Network eventually agreed to support the Liberal Leader and Senators in this
endeavour, the issue raised the spectre of internal partisan differences. The NDP had
long argued for the abolition of the Senate and leader Ed Broadbent used this party
policy as justification for publicly condemning the Liberal strategy.57 While the
labour movement's leadership was initially reluctant to disagree with the NDP's
position they eventually joined the consensus within the Network in mobilizing
support for the Senators' position. In justifying its support for the Liberal strategy, the
Network emphasized the role the Senators' stance might play in obtaining an election:
[I]t will also be important to mobilize support for the moves taken by Turner.
The issue of the Senate is a contentious one. But the real question - and the
one that must be put front and centre - is one ofdemocracy: will the Canadian
people have the opportunity to determine the fate of their country in an
election or will the FTA be foisted on us by a government that has no mandate
from the people for such a radical change in direction'r'"
7. Facing Electoral Politics
The 1988 federal election campaign was the Network's baptism by fire, On 1
October 1988 Prime Minister Mulroney kicked off a federal election campaign. The
fact that an election was being held before implementation of the FTA could of course
itself be considered a major victory for the PCN. In the process ofachieving this goal
the Network had rubbed shoulders with the traditional political sphere. Now, the
realities ofelectoral politics created a new dynamic for a coalition of labour and
57 Constitutionally the Liberal Senators were well within their rights, but the Conservative Government
hoped to exploit the unseemly public image of an unelected institution blocking the decision of an
elected majority in the House of Commons. The NOP's position could only help to convey this
impression. In the end the Conservative plan was undermined by the fundamentally democratic demand
the Liberal Party through its Senators was supporting: for an election before implementation. Joel
Rhimy, "Liberal Move Blow to NDP, Poll Indicates:' Toronto Star, 30 July 1988~ and Martin Cohn,
"Call Election or Trade Bill will be Stalled, Turner Warned," Toronto Star, 21 July 1988.
58 In "Senate Delay Makes Election Likely," Pro-Canada Dossier, 1 July 1988. At a PCN press
conference on July 21, Mel Hurtig applauded John Turner's move to use the Senate to force an election
on the trade deal: "Ever since this deal was first agreed to in October 1987, the Mulroney government
has tried to obstruct the established democratic tradition of open discussion of the implications of this
deal. 111ey must not be allowed to succeed." "PCN Condemns Legislative Committee's Refusal to Hold
Cross-Country Hearings on Bill C-130:' Pro-Canada Dossier, 29 July 1988.
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commumty groups. irst, the onset of a campaign unleashed the resource-rich
organizational machinery of the major political parties. Consequently, the focus of the
media's attention inevitably shifted onto these political actors. Second, the start of the
partisan battle for electoral victory would likely accentuate internal political
differences within the Network.
The central role ofpolitical parties in an electoral period was recognized
within the Network, as the following excerpt from an article in the Pro-Canada
Dossier indicates:
Like it or not, we must rely on the leaders and candidates of the opposition
parties to educate Canadians on the free trade issue. How the opposition
parties decide to cut the issue will be critical to how people vote ...
While in an election campaign most of the media attention will be focused on
the leaders and candidates, the PCN and its member organizations will have an
important complementary role to play.60
The impact of the intense partisanship associated with an electoral campaign
on the coalition process was muted by two factors. First, the experience ofdeveloping
a common perspective and strategy over the period since April 1987 had created an
unprecedented degree of trust between participants across partisan lines. Second and
furthermore, the need to maintain pressure for an election call on the Mulroney
government until the very last moment focused the energies of all trade deal
opponents on this common goal.
At the Fourth Assembly (19-20 June 1988), member groups discussed an
election strategy document produced by the Steering Committee." It divided short-
term preparatory tasks into two areas of concern: organizational preparation and
action initiatives. The first category included developing closer ties with the two
opposition parties - more specifically their respective election planning committees -
and requesting that each designate a PCN contact person for the duration of the
59 The Report of the peN's Sixth Assembly (December 1988) includes notes on a post-election
meeting with representatives of the two opposition parties. Tensions between the coalition groups and
the party representatives are retlected in this document. Summary of Discussion and Decisions, peN,
Sixth Assembly, Ottawa, 4-6 December 1988.
60 "Action," Pro-Canada Dossier, 13 September 1988.
61 Pro-Canada Network, ""\.: lcction Strategy," 19-20 June 1988.
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campaign. The document also called for member organizations to assign
representatives to work closely with the Network during this period and emphasized
the need for groups to highlight the FTA in the election literature they produced for
their own constituencies. As for action initiatives, the Steering Committee listed the
production of a pan-Canadian flyer, a questionnaire for all candidates, lobbying for a
national television debate on free trade, and the targeting of key ridings for concerted
bli . 62pu IC action.
Over the course of the summer of 1988, an election strategy was built around
these ideas. The three key goals set out reflected the importance accorded to the
electoral dynamic: providing support to parties and candidates opposed to free trade,
focusing media and public attention on the deal, and mobilizing the constituencies of
member groups at the local level. The components of the plan proposed to the PCN's
Fifth Assembly (Montreal, August 1988) were built around these goals, they included:
candidate briefmgs and resource people, election kits, visible protest activities,
cartoon booklet, TV debate, constituency mobilization, and target ridings.r'
Support for the opposition parties and their candidates was offered in the form
of briefmgs and information kits and relationships were reinforced through meetings
between members of the PCN's Research and Analysis Team and officials of the two
parties. In August, Network representatives proposed to provide the opposition
parties' candidates with briefmgs from resource people across the country on the
impact of an FTA on specific sectors and regions. The Network also developed
information kits and made these available to the close to six hundred Liberal and NDP
candidates standing for election."
At the outset of the campaign, the Conservative government was reticent to
make free trade the central issue." Indeed as Clarke et al. point out:
62 Fourth Assembly Minutes.
oJ Ibid.
M Whi lc the l.iberals enthusiastically accepted kits for all their candidates, the NOP insisted that it
needed only twelve - one for each province and territory.
M "Action," Pro-Canada Dossier, 13 September 1988. The longer-term Tory strategy is laid out in a
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The only reason free trade became the paramount issue in 1988 was because
of the delays in negotiating the Agreement and passing the enabling
legislation; Conservative party officials had expected the agreement to be in
place long before they would be called to account."
While neither one of the opposition parties initially dwelt on the issue either, Liberal
leader John Turner soon embarked on a passionate crusade against the FTA while the
NDP, which had been highly critical of a bilateral trade agreement as early as 1985.
soft pedaled its position on the issue.I" The NDP's strategy was based on opinion
polling establishing leader Ed Broadbent as the party's number one asset and showing
the party to lack credibility on "economic issues." Party strategists were also
concerned that vocal opposition to the FTA would inevitably feed Liberal Party
support. For all these reasons, free trade fell down the NDP's campaign priority list.68
The Liberal Party's stand benefited from the palpable passion of its leader on
this issue. The party's credibility was also enhanced by the Liberal Senators' action
that had ensured an election prior to a decision on the FTA. But the Liberals, and their
leader in particular, were hampered by serious internal dissension and, in the long run,
their essentially superficial position on the trade deal. Turner's emotional clarion call
played well in the televised leadership debate - ''1 happen to believe, sir, that you
have sold us out" - but lost some of its potency in the home stretch of the campaign.
The Turner-Liberal defence of sovereignty was largely a defence of the status quo
and, as such, did not effectively deal with free trade proponents' chosen theme of
confidential memorandum from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) entitled "Communications Strategy
for Canada-US Bilateral Trade Initiative," reprinted in Cameron, ed., The Free Trade Papers.
66 Clarke et al., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections, 73.
67 Ibid., 3-7. By 1986 materials produced by NDP Members of Parliament regularly highlighted the free
trade issue. For example, proposed legislation to extend prescription drug patents were opposed as the
thin edge of the free trade wedge. See, for example, Cyril Keeper, M.P., "Householder," (Winnipeg,
Manitoba: 1986), 11-12.
68 Clarke et aI., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections, 7; see also the PCN's
own analysis of the electoral dynamics as expounded in "Action," Pro-Canada Dossier, 13 September
1988. For example: "Broadbent has to stop campaigning like he would be satisfied with being Leader
of the Opposition and start campaigning to save Canada. He needs to focus his fire on the Tories and
the trade deal and less on the I.iberals." And, on the Liberals: "The Liberals will have to get their
organization together and hold otTon the infighting until after the election is over. Turner needs to
continue to throw his prepared speeches away and speak from the heart and hit hard at the trade deal.
When he has done so, he has come across well."
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"managing change.,,69 As a result, both leader and party were vulnerable to the
Conservative counterattack when it came.
With two of the three major parties reluctant to focus on free trade, and a third
often limiting the scope of its critique, the PCN decided to make the push for a
televised leaders debate on free trade a top priority. While overtures to the national
broadcasters were all rebuffed, the PCN played a role in making the general televised
leaders event a de facto debate on free trade. Information, tips and suggestions were
passed on to those responsible for the briefmg of both opposition leaders." In the end,
the defming moment of the debate was the confrontation on the trade deal between
Mulroney and Turner.
To publicize facets of the impact of a trade deal, the Network and its member
groups organized a series ofnews conferences and public events. For example, to
highlight the threat to Medicare and social programs, former Liberal health minister
Monique Begin and the head of the National Federation ofNurses' Unions Kathleen
Connors were brought together to make the case against the deal to the media.
Similarly, environmental groups held news conferences during the second week of the
campaign to raise the threat to Canada's water resources implicit in the FTA.7 1
The Network's role as a forum for information sharing was also put to the test.
Internally, this involved assisting member groups with co-ordination and publicity for
their own actions with the objective of eliminating duplication and increasing
69 Richard Johnston, Letting the People Decide: Dynamics ofa Canadian Election (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press: 1992), 10-15; Clarke et aI., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in
Canadian Elections, 3.
70 Ken Traynor, Interview by author, Toronto, 3 March 1992; Clarke, Interview by author.
71 'The most successful of these challenges (to supporters of the ITA) was the one dealing with social
programmes. Close to 30% of supporters of free trade admitted that this argument made them less
supportive of the agreement." Andre Blais, "Public Opinion on Free Trade in the 1988 Election
Campaign," in The Free Trade Agreement of 1988: Implications for the Future ofCanadian-American
Relations, ed. Jane Jenson (Boston: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, 1989), 13.
On the health care and environment interventions, see "Environmentalists Target Free Trade," Pro-
Canada Dossier, 27 October 1988 and Joyce Nelson, The Sultans ofSleaze (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 1989), 90. For media coverage of the environmental groups intervention, see, for example: "Lc
libre-echangc: tID beau gachis, pour les ecolos." Le Devoir, 23 September 1988, I; "Free Trade Deal
Called Disaster for Environment," Ottawa Citizen 1988, A4~ "Environmental Groups Fear Free-Trade
Deal Disaster for Canada," Globe and Mail, 23 September 1988, A5.
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effectiveness in the process. Externally, the anti-free trade message was carried
forward in a variety ofways. Beyond public events and the distribution of literature -
pamphlets, broadsheets, fact sheets - by member groups, the highlight was without a
doubt the distribution of over two million copies of a cartoon booklet entitled What '5
the Big Deal?
The cartoon booklet project, culminating with its insertion in daily newspapers
during the second week of the election campaign, had been carried through for the
Network by the CAFT (Ontario) and its two staffers. It was a major endeavour - from
raising close to three-quarters ofa million dollars to all the creative and logistical
problems of large-scale production and distribution. The end result was widely
considered to be impressive: twenty-four pages of text and colour illustrations
dreamed up by author, playwright and CAFT activist Rick Salutin and perhaps
Canada's foremost political cartoonist Terry Mosher (pen name Aislin).
The booklet's reported effectiveness made it even more notable. Christopher
Waddell wrote in The Globe and Mail that the "widely circulated pamphlet against
the agreement by the Pro-Canada Network has had a major impact on voter
impressions ofthe deal."72 A slew of editorial comment and interest from print
columnists over the coming days reinforced the impact. 73 Grudging admiration came
from pro-FTA consulting firm Informetrica when it compared the booklet to the
government's own propaganda:
the free trade booklets produced by the government were found to require
second- to fourth year university reading skills. This contrasts with the trashy
little comic book-like pamphlet, "What's the Big Deal,' produced by the anti-
Free Trade Pro-Canada Network which can be understood by people with a
grade 7 or 8 reading level. The alarming result is that this is one of the few
'information' pieces on free trade that is accessible and understandable to
. h f ,74erg tout 0 ten voters.
72 Christopher Waddell, "Pamphlet Attacking Free Trade Shakes Up Voters," The Globe and Mail, 26
October 1988, All; see also "Free Trade Foes Fight with Humour: Satirical Booklet Slams Tory Types
with Cartoons," Winnipeg Sun, 12 October 1988,3 and Alison Bray, "Free Trade Opponents Make
Bestseller List with Anti-Pact Booklet," Winnipeg Free Press, 13 October 1988, 5.
73 For examples of each, see "Pamphlet mensonger," La Presse, 13 October 1988, B2 and William
Watson, "What's the Big Deal? Telling the Truth is," Financial Post, 21 October 1988. 13.
74 Informetrica, Free Trade File, 31 October 1988.
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Candidates on all sides noted the booklet's impact. Conservatives produced
literature to refute its claims while many Liberals and New Democrats requested bulk
orders for use in their constituencies." Even cartoonist Mosher was impressed. He
recalls one of his encounters with the booklet's effectiveness:
One night in The Gazette lobby, a stafferyelled, "You s.o.b! You could stop
the Deal with that god-damned silly little book of yours!"
"Do you really think so?" I asked, genuinely heartened. 76
By November, opinion polling indicated that anywhere from 70 to 82 percent of
Canadians viewed the FTA as the most important issue facing the country. 77
Moreover, opposition to the agreement stood at 42 percent at the time of the election
call and peaked at 50 percent by early November."
The third component of the Network's work during the campaign was to
encourage and, where possible, coordinate action. At the most basic level this
involved trying to break through the shroud of secrecy surrounding Tory campaign
events in order to facilitate protests. The Network's staff tried to keep local activists
across the country informed of the travel plans of leading members of the
government, particularly the prime minister, to assist them in planning
demonstrations. A few unexpected and dramatic confrontations between Mulroney
and anti-FTA activists resulted including, in Saskatchewan, where the prime
minister's campaign bus was led into town from the airport by a car flying the 'Stars
and Stripes' overhead."
75 Christopher Waddell, "Pamphlet Attacking Free Trade Shakes Up Voters," The Globe and Mail, 26
October 1988, A 11 ~ Traynor, Interview by author; Nelson, The Sultans ofSleaze, 81. On the response
to the booklet, see Rick Salutin, Waiting for Democracy: A Citizen's Journal (Toronto: Viking, 1989),
74-76~ see also "Mazankowski Dismisses Booklet: Mistruths, Falsehoods," Winnipeg Sun, 12 October
1988, 3.
76 Terry Mosher, Drawing Bones (Toronto: Key Porter, 1991),24.
77 The Reid Report, May 1993, 2~ Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett, and Anthony Westell, eds., The
Canadian General Election of1988 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989), 123.
78 Gallup opinion polling reported in Clarke et al., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian
Elections, 8U
79 David Durning, Interview by author, Toronto, 26 January 1992.
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7.1 Partisan Politics and Strategic Voting
Two more elements of the PCN strategy - targeting specific ridings and
mobilizing constituencies - were very clearly intertwined with electoral politics. In
fact, these two ingredients in the campaign plan remained largely unfocused and
encountered a limited degree of success that varied from region to region. This was
for a number of reasons. First, the Network and its member groups had only limited
access to the resources necessary to mobilize successfully at the riding level. The
information necessary for sophisticated targeting ofkey ridings was only infrequently
available given the hesitancy ofboth opposition parties to part with 'sensitive'
information. In any case, the only sector with the campaign machinery necessary to
fulfill these tasks - the labour movement - had undertaken the most substantial
commitment of resources to the NDP's electoral campaign in its history.l"
Both tactics - 'mobilizing constituencies' and targeting specific ridings-
opened the door to the consideration of strategic or tactical voting, an issue that
crystallizes the dilemma faced as movements encounter elections. Opponents of the
FTA faced a predicament since the platforms of both the major opposition parties
included planks opposing the FTA. Attitudes on this question varied among Network
member organizations. For the labour movement, personal, ideological and structural
ties to the NDP largely precluded any option other than fulsome support for that party.
Because other groups were, for the most part, committed to some form of non-
partisanship, the notion of supporting candidates opposed to the FTA from either
opposition party was potentially more palatable, though for many it remained a
departure from past practice. 81
Support for a national tactical voting plan came, among others, from leading
members of the Council of Canadians. Founder Mel Hurtig, in particular, was
convinced that such a plan was necessary to defeat the Conservative government and
block the FTA. From his Edmonton office, and from hotel rooms across the country
80 Confirmed by eLC Political Action Coordinator Pat Kerwin in an intervention at the PCN's Sixth
Assembly. Reported in PCN Sixth Assembly Summary.
81 On labour's relationship with the NDP, see Chapter 3 above.
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as he traveled tirelessly speaking out against the deal, Hurtig continually lobbied the
leadership of other member groups over phone and fax to get their backing for a
tactical voting plan. 82
PCN chair Tony Clarke confmned the growing support for tactical voting at a
certain point in the campaign in a memo dated 8 November:
During the first three weeks of the campaign, however, when the polls were
showing a massive Tory majority, attention was given to several additional
strategy options that might be necessary, including strategic voting. 83
In the same communication though, Clarke also noted that shifts in opinion surveys
following the leaders debate had fmally closed the door on this option. Indeed, polls
following the debate showed a surge in support for the Liberals and John Turner
holding out the possibility of a victory and calming the sense of urgency that was
driving the proponents of tactical voting.I" Clarke had previously drawn the ire of
some PCN groups by appearing to openly support tactical voting. He was quoted in
one article as "encouraging Canadians to treat this election unlike any other election
and to exercise their vote in the most effective way possible to kill the trade pact." It
continued:
In other words the Network is asking opponents of free trade to vote
strategically - to cast aside party preference, hold their noses if necessary, and
vote for the opposition candidate most likely to defeat the Tory in their
riding ...
. . .the group recognizes that many voters aren't well enough informed to figure
out which opposition candidate is most likely to succeed in their riding.
Thus, Clarke says, the network is seriously considering whether it should
advise voters to back specific opposition candidates in specific ridings. No
decision will be made until the network has analyzed poll results following
last week's pivotal televised leaders' dcbates.f
82 Clarke, Interview by author; Mel Hurtig, Memorandum, 24 October 1988.
8~ Tony Clarke, "Election Campaign Activities," Pro-Canada Network, Ottawa, 8 November 1988. For
other signs of support for tactical voting, see James Laxer, 'This Time Out it's Who Wins, Not How
You play The Game," Globe and Mail, 20 October 1988, A7 and Bob Ages et al., "An Open Letter to
John Turner and Ed Broadbent: United Front Needed to Defeat Free Trade," Canadian Dimension,
October 1988.
84 Before the leaders' debates the general trend was 40% in favour, 40% against, and 20% undecided or
refusinu to answer. Two to three days after the debates a significant gap emerged. Cumulative results
for the ten days following the debates showed only 32~/o in favour, 47% opposed and 22% still with no
opinion. Blais. "Publ ic Opinion on Free Trade in the 1988 EJection Campaign." 11.
85 Joan Bryden. "Voting against Free Trade: Expert Warns Strategic Voting Can Be Risky," Ottawa
192
While the impact of the televised leader's debate had put an end to speculation
around tactical voting at the national level, the degree of controversy associated with
the notion of casting ballots to defeat specific targeted candidates varied from region
to region." The number of three-way electoral contests in Ontario made tactical
voting both seemingly essential and incredibly complex. But in British Columbia and
Saskatchewan the situation was very different. In these two Western provinces, the
Liberal Party had been through a long electoral dry spell and held few real hopes of
victory. Other than isolated exceptions - for example, Liberal leader John Turner in
Vancouver Quadra - the best hopes for FTA opponents lay with NDP candidates who
consequently reaped the bulk ofthe benefit from their activities.
Because most of the provincial coalitions affiliated to the PCN relied on trade
unions for a large proportion of their resources - both material and human - the level
ofcrossover between anti-deal and NDP campaigning was sometimes extremely high.
In both Alberta and Saskatchewan, provincial coalition coordinators simultaneously
served as campaign organizers for NDP candidates.V There and in British Columbia,
coalition efforts threatened to fold into the labour movement's activities in support of
the NDP. Not surprisingly, the character of local NDP campaigns in these provinces
was strongly coloured by the efforts ofanti-deal activists and the themes they
promoted. Whereas NDP candidates in central and eastern Canada were more likely
to adopt the party leadership's soft-touch approach to the campaign, Western
candidates carried the flag ofopposition to the deal. 88
Citizen, 31 October 1988, AI.
86 A last minute call for tactical voting did emerge in the final days of the campaign as the Tories
recovery in the polls became clearer. Here again Mel Hurtig was a prominent proponent. Clarke,
Interview by author; Hurtig, . Hurtig also promoted the idea of a referendum on the trade agreement
when a Tory victory was a likely outcome of the election. For example, as the results were being
tabulated he argued: "if the Conservatives win a majority tonight it will probably be a small majority.
In any event, we must immediately (beginning tonight) call for a referendum. If the argument is made
that the election was a referendum, then the answer is clear: most Canadians (likely three of every fi ve
voters) voted against the Conservatives and hence against the agreement." Mel Hurtig, Memorandum,
21 Novem ber 1988.
87 Lucien Royer, Interview by author, Edmonton, 13 December 1991; Durning, Interview by author.
88 s.c. NDP MP Nelson Riis made this point during a meeting following the PCN's post-election
assembly in December 1988. peN Sixth Assembly Summary. There were exceptions to this rule with
some candidates in Central and Eastern Canada also highlighting their opposition to the FTA whether
for ideological or pragmatic reasons. These included veteran incumbent MP's like Michael Cassidy in
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Discussions around 'tactical voting' were less easily resolved in other regions.
~~1 the Atlantic provinces, where the NDP had historically had a minimal presence,
proposals to promote anti-Tory voting posed a threat to the labour movement-NDP
linkage and, as one activist put it, "stirred the pot of controversy.Y"
8. Conclusion
Over a period of eighteen months, the Pro-Canada Network went from its
formation to extensive participation in a federal election fought almost exclusively on
its priority issue. Within this relatively short timeframe the Network expanded and
consolidated its membership and, with the addition of provincial coalitions, tied its
national table directly to a grassroots activist base. The PCN and its member groups
campaigned for an election on free trade and then launched what was probably the
largest non-party intervention in a Canadian federal election with the single exception
of the massive corporate pro-free trade lobby that would be initiated in response.
Limited at first to a summit-style information sharing mechanism overlaid on
a web ofad hoc interpersonal and interorganizational relationships, the Network soon
facilitated collective analysis by the different participating sectors. The PCN
developed a communications strategy - tailored to its limited means, non-traditional
assets, and the opportunities posed by the political balance of forces - and engaged in
collective action.
Once the electoral process was engaged, the Network navigated the choppy
waters of partisanship, both in terms of the varying commitments and expectations of
its member groups and its relationships with the opposition parties. The question that
Ottawa Centre and Dan Heap in Trinity-Spadina (Toronto). Bruce Tate, Interview by author, Ottawa,
15 March 1992.
89 Author's interview with PEI-PCN representative Mary Boyd. For the argument that
Newfoundlanders and many other Atlantic Canadians were in any case habitual tactical voters, see Joan
Marie Sullivan, "Newfoundland Returns to Tradition," This Magazine, February 1989.
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remains to be answered is whether the 1988 federal election would be the last
dramatic act in the PCN's story or truly its baptism by fire.
Chapter 5
Beyond Free Trade
196
1. Introduction
As the ballots were tallied on 24 November 1988 it became apparent that
Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system had delivered another majority
government to the Progressive Conservative Party. Despite gaining only 43 percent of
the popular vote, the FTA's backers emerged with 169 seats - an absolute majority in
the 295-seat House of Commons. The election and its results were a logical endpoint
for the Pro-Canada Network. Formed to oppose the FTA but more specifically to
demand that a federal election determine the fate of such a fundamental policy
initiative, the Network had exhausted its initial mandate.
In this chapter we resume our account by focusing on a critical moment in the
Pro-Canada Network's development. At the Sixth Assembly held in Ottawa (3-5
December 1988) less than a fortnight after Election Day, a wide-ranging discussion of
the Network's short history and possible future took place. As the previous chapter
showed, the process of collaborative research and action, seasoned by a profound
commitment to a popular sector coalition model from some, was heated to a boil in
the cauldron of electoral politics and a dramatic and polarized societal confrontation.
The product was a collective post-election decision to continue the work of the PCN,
defying most analytical frameworks and the expectations of some participants. 1 The
decision was not generally intended to provide the Network with a temporary reprieve
to allow a last gasp attempt to stop implementation of the FTA. While anti-free trade
conviction remained passionate and cancellation (technically abrogation) of the deal
was certainly on the PCN's renewed agenda, it was accompanied and perhaps even
overshadowed by both more immediate and more ambitious considerations. This
chapter will follow the PCN as it broadens its mandate and expands its activities
moving beyond the single issue of free trade to take up new challenges.
I Projections based on analytical frameworks are discussed in Chapter 2 above; "PCN, Dossier, to
Continue," Pro-Canada Dossier, 16 December 1988; see also interventions recorded in PCN Sixth
Assembly Summary.
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2. Moving on
At the PCN's December 1988 Assembly, more than forty representatives from
twenty-seven organizations gathered in a general atmosphere ofphysical and
emotional exhaustion. Together, they expressed a largely, and perhaps surprisingly
given the results, positive sense of their collective achievements. Delegates praised
specific aspects of the Network's campaign. The cartoon booklet, for example, was
viewed as a highly successful intervention and put forward as a prototype for future
endeavours. A member of the Communications Committee argued that most of the
successful elements in the communications strategy had resulted from "going around"
the mainstream media. As examples, he cited the massive distribution of the cartoon
booklet and the full utilization of member groups' own internal media organs. Other
projects, including key interventions on the Medicare and regional development
issues were also highlighted during this session'
Participants also attributed a positive overall impact to the PCN. They
perceived the Network's role in: focusing the campaign around their chosen issue-
this despite the reticence of more than one political party - and shifting public opinion
over time to the point where a majority of Canadians came to oppose the FTA. A third
result was viewed as a mixed blessing. Effective opposition had pulled the deal's
corporate backers out of the boardrooms and back rooms and onto the offensive.
Corporations, government agencies and the Conservative Party together spent a total
of more than $50 million promoting the FTA in the two years leading up to the
election, with at least $6 million in advertising purchased during the final two weeks
of the election campaign alone. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the
Canadian Manufacturers Association called on their members to hold workplace
meetings to press their employees to vote for the agreement. Some employers
included pro-FTA materials with their pay packets.'
. peN Sixth Assembly Summary.
.\ The extent of spending by pro-free trade lobby groups is described in Nick Fillmore, "The Big Oink:
How Business Won the Free Trade Battle," This Magazine, March-April 1989; Nick Fillmore, "Whose
Money Backed the Free Trade Campaign?" This Magazine, March 1990; Salutin, Waiting/or
Dcmocracv: A Citizen's Journal. 11"2; and "No Rules in Groups' Battle for Voters," Ottawa Citizen. 26
November 1988, B4.
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Discussions at the post-election Assembly also highlighted weaknesses of the
Network's campaign. The chair of the research committee reported on some of the
difficulties faced in the relationship with the political parties. Indeed, Liberal
strategists had been much more receptive to offers ofassistance than had their NDP
counterparts. While the Liberal campaign accepted and distributed a full complement
ofPCN briefmg kits to all their parliamentary candidates, the NDP accepted only
twelve - one per province plus the territories - even though hundreds were made
available. Similar problems with the relationship with the NDP were reported at the
local and provincial levels.4
Recurring themes in reports from member groups to the Assembly included
the difficulty in gaining access to the mainstream media and in mobilizing effectively
on the ground. A number of participants identified the failure to articulate alternatives
to free trade as a major flaw in their collective efforts. From this perspective, they had
left themselves powerless to counter the clarion call from free trade proponents that
there was no alternative to international competition and consequently free trade.
According to one academic observer, the FTA's opponents were "cast in the role of
narrators ofan 'anti-story' ... little more than a defensive rebuttal to the tale of
benefits advanced by the other side."s Not all PCN groups accepted this analysis;
Council of Canadians' chair Maude Barlow argued that proposing alternatives was
not the responsibility of FTA opponents prior to and during the election." A further
qualification came from economist Mel Watkins representing the Ontario CAFT:
"When you're about to jump offa cliff not doing it seems to me to be a pretty good
4 This assessment of the PCN's relationship with the two opposition parties is based on personal
interviews with Duncan Cameron, Tony Clarke and provincial coalition coordinators including Mary
Boyd (PEl) and Sue Vohanka (BC); see also PCN, Notes on Pre-election Meetings with Opposition
Parties, September 1988 and PCN Sixth Assembly Summary. On relationships at the provincial level,
see Bleyer, "Coalition Building and the Canadian Popular Sector."
5 Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian Nationalism, 112-13. Breton and Jenson
argue that the PCN's position was characterized by an important dualism. On the one hand the Network
"made extensive use of the discourse of opposition made familiar during the years of Fordism and its
crisis." On the other hand the PCN was also trying to "do politics in new ways, independent of party
politics, more democratically and with less of a statist focus.' Gilles Breton and Jane Jenson. "After
Free Trade and Meech Lake: Quoi de neuf?" Studies in Political Economy, no. 34 (1991): 209-10.
6 PCN Sixth Assembly Summary; Barlow, Interview by author.
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alternative." Nevertheless, the degree of concern on this point was reflected in the
next issue of the Pro-Canada Dossier, which, reflecting on the Assembly's
proceedings declared: "our greatest weakness as a movement [is that] we have not yet
agreed on any meaningful alternative to the FTA."7
The lack of focus on alternatives in the Network's own materials and activities
was, in part, inevitable given the limits to its internal consensus. The need to
formulate and promote an alternative vision for Canada's social and economic
development was raised repeatedly at PCN meetings from October 1987 onwards but
seemed, just as consistently, to gravitate towards the bottom of the agenda." In the
aftermath of the election, there appeared to be agreement to make the articulation of
alternatives apriority. 9
Member organizations agreed to keep the Network alive and to broaden its
resource base to deal with a wider mandate: opposing the neo-conservative agenda of
the Mulroney government and its corporate friends. While there were differences in
emphasis, the core rationale for supporting a continuation of the PCN was similar
across sectors. A first taste ofcoalition work on a large scale left most groups with a
thirst for more. Merely surviving the electoral battle with its consensus-based process
relatively unscathed was no small feat for the PCN. Tempers had been frayed and
disputes had arisen but a basic level of cooperation and trust had been maintained.
Furthermore, electoral campaigns traditionally spell marginalization for non-party
groups, as they get crowded out of the media and the public eye by the parties. While
Network member groups did take a back seat to the parties and had great difficulty in
getting through to the mainstream media, they most certainly did not disappear from
the public stage. \0
7 Watkins intervention recorded in PCN Sixth Assembly Summary; "Most Canadians Reject the FTA -
But Tories Take More Seats," Pro-Canada Dossier, 16 December 1988.
8 Based on a review of meeting records in PCN files.
9 peN Sixth Assembly Summary.
10 See Chapter 4 above.
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3. Pressures of Partisanship
Whereas partisanship had always been a pressure point for the PCN. in the
run-up to the federal election it became a central concern. The question was where the
primary loyalties ofkey member groups and their leaders would lie, with the broader
non-partisan goals of a nascent coalition, or with their traditional partisan choices.
Of all the organizational ties between Network member groups and political
parties, none was more important than that between the labour movement and the
NDP. II While its leadership would come to question this assessment in the aftermath
of the 1988 campaign, the labour movement (CLC-affiliated) was structurally the
dominant force within the political party they, in any case, called 'our party.' The
CLC and its affiliates were also the source of a huge proportion ofthe NDP's funding,
and trade union leaders held many of the top posts in the party hierarchy.
In 1988, the CLC planned and executed the largest and most ambitious
parallel campaign on the party's behalf in its history. 12 In these circumstances, the
PCN faced severe competition for labour movement resources. This extended to
volunteer human resources since officers and staff of unions playing important roles
within the Network and its affiliated provincial coalitions, were often also key players
within the party. 13
In contrast, no PCN member group carried any formal institutional link to the
Liberal Party. A number of prominent individuals - mostly active in the Council of
Canadians - had ties to the party. For example, Mel Hurtig, an unsuccessful Liberal
candidate in 1968 was a denizen of the periphery of the party for years thereafter. and
Maude Barlow, a past advisor to Liberal prime ministers Trudeau and Turner, tried
II See Chapters 1 and 3 above.
12 Interventions by Kerwin and Riche in PCN Sixth Assembly Summary. See also Chapters 3 and 4
above on the CLC-NDP relationship.
13 Julie Davis, vice-president of the Ontario Federation of Labour. served as chair of the PCN's
Strategy Committee and as president of the Ontario NDP~ Michael Lewis of the Steelworkers was his
unions' delegate to the Ontario Coalition against Free Trade and the PCN as well as a top organizer for
the provincial NDP~ Pat Kerwin's duties as CLC Political Action Coordinator gave him primary
responsibility for the CLC's parallel campaign for the NDP while he also represented the Congress at
the peN table.
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but failed to win a Liberal nomination in 1988. 14 By the fall of 1988, sympathy and
sometimes support for the Liberal Party was not limited to its traditional supporters.
Its enthusiastic opposition to the FTA had attracted broader backing. particularly
within parts of the Left where, true to the tradition of popular frontism, fears of the
irreversible implications of a Tory/FI'A victory were fuelling arguments in favour of
. I . 15tacuca votmg.
Over the course of the campaign, the labour movement's relationship with the
NDP soured dramatically, reaching an all-time low after the vote. Unlike its party,
labour was far from lukewarm in its opposition to the FTA and efforts were made to
push the NDP to grab hold of the issue and run with it. Reflecting on these futile
attempts and contrasting them with the loyalty, and generous commitment of time and
resources they had made to the party, senior labour leaders like CAW president
White, and USWA Canadian director Gerard Docquier were driven to consider the
need for an alternative political voice. 16 Internal dissatisfaction with the NDP's
performance was by no means limited to labour. Local party activists focused their ire
on what they perceived to be the overly centralized nature of the campaign. Western
New Democrats - from canvassers to candidates - questioned the central campaign's
chosen tactics including the failure to lead on the trade issue. NDP candidates in
British Columbia and Saskatchewan went so far as to abandon the strategic advice
and the materials being provided by the national campaign and were rewarded with
their party's best results."
14 According to Doem and Tom lin, Council of Canadians membership in 1988 was 25% Liberal, 15%
New Democrats and 50% non-partisan. Doern and Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story, 2 10.
On the partisan preferences of Council members, see also Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics of
Canadian Nationalism.
In contrast to Barlow, John Trent who was the PCN's other founding co-chair and the Council's chair
from 1987 to 1988 was nominated and ran as an NDP candidate in the 1988 election.
15 For example an editorial in the socialist magazine Canadian Dimension called for a 'united front' on
free trade. Ages et al., "An Open Letter to John Turner and Ed Broadbent: United Front Needed to
Defeat Free Trade."
16 Bob White. Letter to NDP Officers and Executive Members, :28 November 1988 and Gerard
Docquier, Letter to NDP Executive Members, 5 December 1988.
17 On the NDP's election strategy, see Chapter 4 above.
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In the absence of strong organizational ties to the Liberal Party, momentary
enthusiasm for popular frontist tactics, and the NDP's own strategic choices conspired
to provide better balance of partisan sympathies within the Network than might
otherwise have been expected.
4. Beyond Parliamentary Politics
The results of the 1988 election reinforced an increasing frustration with
parliamentary politics and liberal democratic electoralism more broadly, documented
as the decline ofparty identification and dealignment/realignment in Canada and
elsewhere. While disillusion was not limited to disappointed opponents of the FTA, it
was acute for them and generated two distinct reactions, though defeat was not
accompanied by the defeatism or hopelessness one might have expected. On the one
hand, some sought a solution to a split parliamentary opposition in more
'sophisticated' electoral tactics - organized strategic or partisan alliances - or
somewhat more substantial proposals for electoral reform leading to proportional
representation. IS On the other hand, frustration with electoral results gone wrong also
led to a more substantive shift - away from traditional political tactics and further
towards movement building and extra-parliamentary politics. Facing a second
consecutive Conservative majority government elected with less than 50 percent
support and a divided parliamentary opposition, PCN participants drew on what was
generally regarded as a positive experience. Most valued the support and solidarity
that had been generated, as well as the process of collective analysis where sectoral
concerns had been linked producing a sense of the FTA's place in a broader social
and political agenda. 19
18 In a letter address to Network chair Tony Clarke and intended for broader distribution, Mel Hurtig
laid out the lessons he had learned from the 1988 campaign. He expressed appreciation for the work of
the Network but bemoaned its inability to "play political hardball" or intervene even more directly -
through strategic voting - in the electoral process. Hurtig also laid out his plan for the next campaign.
Mel Hurtig, Open Letter to PCN Assembly, 28 November 1988. Others -largely outside the PCN -
would subsequently agree with Hurtig. Among others, see Kenneth Mcblaught, 'To Topple the Tories
and Save the Country," Globe and Mail, 7 March 1990, A7 and Joyce Nelson, "Voting the
Unthinkable," This Magazine, March 1990,3.
19 PCN Sixth Assembly Summary. Confirmed in personal interviews with various participants.
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Finally, the unprecedented unity and overt involvement of capital in the debate
on free trade, and in the election campaign itself, convinced many activists that the
rules of the political game were now dramatically altered. The orgy of media
advertising laid on by the FTA's corporate backers in the closing days of the
campaign, exposed as never before class divisions in Canadian society.i" It is in this
context that support for broadening the PCN's mandate beyond the trade deal to
oppose a broader 'corporate agenda' was growing. For some, the stakes involved in
the battle over the FTA now appeared much greater than they had fITst imagined.
Others were hopeful that the unprecedented public identification of corporate interests
with the trade deal would make opposition to a broader agenda more viable and less
likely to be tarred as stemming from the fertile imaginations of conspiracy theorists.
Lastly, the open and aggressive involvement of Canadian capital on one side of the
debate narrowed the strategic options for those within the labour movement still open
to tripartite solutions."
The agenda for the Sixth Assembly in December 1988 was largely dedicated
to a 'post-mortem' of the PCN's role in the fight against the FTA. From PCN chair
Tony Clarke's perspective, the Assembly was a key turning point for the Network:
The only question for the Assembly was whether or not this thing we had built
was going to continue or not. There were all the reasons not to continue. We
had come together around free trade, we had fought a battle, a decision had
been made, and we had lost. So why stay together?
20 This was the conclusion drawn by many observers. See Jeanine Brodie, "The Free Trade Election,"
Studies in Political Economy 28, no. Spring (1989): 181; Campbell and Pal, The Real Worlds of
Canadian Politics; Cases in Process and Policy, 197 and 203; Salutin, Waitingfor Democracy: A
Citizen's Journal; Mel Watkins, "The Ed Scare, A Very False Alarm," This Magazine, February 1989.
Yet another indication of the society-wide divisions exposed by the 1988 vote is the significant wage
gap between pro and anti-ITA voters documented by Blais, "Public Opinion on Free Trade in the 1988
Election Campaign."
21 David Laycock, "Organized Interests in Canada and the Free Trade Election," in The Free Trade
Agreement of1988: Implications for the Future ofCanadian-American Relations, ed. Jane Jenson
(Boston: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, 1989),20. The Toronto Stock Exchange
index and the Canadian dollar both dropped dramatically following the release of a poll putting the
Liberals firmly in the lead. On the relationship between poll results and financial developments, see
"Poll Results Spurs European Sell-otT of Canadian Stocks," Financial Post, 8 November 1988, II;
"Dollar Drops Again on l.Iection-poll Result," Montreal Gazelle, 15 November 1988, C 1; and Ted
Jackson, "Liberal Surge Sends Markets Into Tailspin," Financial Post, 8 November 1988, I. One
journalist - representing a minority opinion within his profession - argues that financial market
reactions combined with advertising blitz and threats to withdraw investment in the case of a defeat for
the FTA amounted to a virtual capital strike. In Winters, ed., The Silent Revolution: Media.
Dcmocr.u-v, and the Free Trade Debate, 67.
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I think this was one of the great moments in the history of the Network. I think
that what happened there was that we had to come to grips with a number of
things. On the positive side, people said yes we fought the battle and lost in
terms of the electoral results, but we won something much bigger. And that is
we learned how to work together and to build a network and a movement. I
think people were pretty proud that despite all the problems we had built
something of lasting importance and that was that we had put together the
ingredients of a potential social movement in the country. And people said we
want to stay together.f
Labour - notably in the person of CLC representatives at the table - appeared
depressed by their inability to influence 'their' party and its subsequent electoral
failure, despite the unprecedented material and moral support they had provided. This
gloom was also nourished by the prospect of a re-invigorated Conservative Party
carrying its neo-conservative policies into office for another term. NDP leader Ed
Broadbent merely added insult to injury when he delivered an election night speech in
which he was heard by free trade opponents to concede far more than the result of the
ballot appeared to justify.23
But the CLC's representatives also expressed a hearty scepticism as to any
future work on free trade and the PCN's prospects for survival. Though the
relationship had reached its most disappointing point in years, labour's deep
commitment to social democratic party politics was not to be abandoned quite so
easily. Indeed, given its poor electoral results, the NDP might require a huge political
and material commitment to survive and 'competing' formations could constitute a
threat." All in all, the CLC's special projects director rated the odds of the Congress
maintaining its support for the PCN or abandoning it as about even. From the
n Clarke, Interview by author.
23 The lack of combativity and degree of resignation in Broadbent's concession speech might at another
time have been considered appropriate. In this instance, it grated with many NOP supporters and others
who were very aware that the majority of Canadians had voted for parties opposed to free trade. See,
for example, Campbell and Pal, The Real Worlds ofCanadian Politics; Cases in Process and Policy,
215; H.D. Forbes, "Absent Mandate '88? Parties and Voters in Canada," Journal ofCanadian Studies
25, no. 2, Summer (1990): 12.
2-1 At a minimum this threat would be at the level of the allocation of scarce resources. Two of the
CLC's four representatives at the Sixth Assembly were key NOP players. Nancy Riche, CLC and NOP
Vice-president, had reached her position of prominence in the labour movement through her activism
in the Newfoundland NDP. In fact, Riche's introduction to Ottawa came through her role on the
CLCINDP Political Action Committee. Riche, Interview by author. Pat Kerwin's position ~ CLC
political action coordinator - was to all intents and purposes an extension of the NOP's bureaucracy
with a job description focusing on organizing labour's support for the party.
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perspective of this senior official, the decision to stick with the Network owed more
to the aggressive legislative agenda advanced by the re-elected Tories and their
corporate allies immediately following the election than to anything else."
Unlike their CLC counterparts, representatives of some affiliates were far
more positive regarding the PCN's future. Reflecting his union's commitment to
nurturing social unionism (as well as its president's soon to be published critique of
the NDP and the obsession with electoralism writ large), CAW Assistant to the
president Sam Gindin identified the need to build a broader social movement and
asked who would play this role if not the PCN. 26 Even the USWA, perhaps the NDP's
most generous and forgiving backer, combined criticism of the party's election
performance with positive noises regarding the PCN's prospects."
Most community sector groups also expressed enthusiasm for the Network's
future role. NAC and church social action groups were proponents ofa broadening of
the Network's mandate to include mobilizing opposition and developing alternatives
to the 'corporate agenda. ,28 Reflecting their own organizational roots, they were also
committed to broadening and deepening coalition participation. Many groups were
also now very aware of the needs the next phase of neo-conservative governance
would bring. NAC feared attacks on the funding it received from the federal
25 Kube, Interview by author.
26 Intervention by Sam Gindin in PCN Sixth Assembly Summary. In a memorandum to Bob White,
dealing more broadly with the future role of the NDP, Gindin makes a case for the PCN: "Perhaps it
will be impossible to make the coalitions into a social movement. But we haven't been in as good a
position for decades and have to make a committed attempt." Sam Gindin, Memorandum to Bob White
and Bob Nickerson, 6 December 1988.
A few months later as he argued for sustaining funding for the PCN, Gindin would make the following
case: "In the coming period, with closures rising and pressures for competitiveness and inflation-
reduction rising, we may be in for some major battles ... the response to 'restraint' should be militancy
to offset the impact of inflation, increased payroll taxes, and increased sales taxes. There may also be
selective sit-downs to highlight, for example, jobs moving to Mexico. This will occur in the context of
a media increasingly determined not to tell our story and an NDP that remains relatively weak. I don't
want to exaggerate the ability ofthe coalitions to help us, but 1 think there is a real need on our part
not to be isolated, to develop allies. to legitimate our struggle. The potential ofthe coalition to play
such a supportive role is there and the national vehicle to do this is the peN" [emphasis mine]. Sam
Gindin, Memorandum to Bob White and Bob Nickerson, 8 May 1989.
27 Docquicr, "Letter to NDP Executive Members."
28 I discuss the evolving discourse of the Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network in Chapter 7 below.
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government and saw the construction of defensive alliances as a top priority.29GATT-
Fly and the social justice offices within the churches also sought support for internal
battles. Stiff opposition from some church hierarchies throughout the work against the
FTA had reached a peak during the election campaign with reactions similar to the
response to Ethical Reflections five years earlier."
The results of the 1988 vote contributed to an increasing frustration with the
electoral process. For many activists, the election highlighted the need for a collective
extra-parliamentary political vehicle, a message that some brought to the table at the
December Assembly. These 'coalitionists in a hurry' -largely. community sector and
academia-based - argued that the Working Committee for Social Solidarity (WCSS)
was more likely to provide the basis for the elaboration of an alternative platform than
the PCN.3) From their perspective, the PCN was now limited by the burden of
consensus building in opposition to the FTA. In contrast, they argued, the WCSS had
adopted an explicit orientation towards alternatives and was unimpeded by past
compromise. This option - shifting energies to the Working Committee - was mooted
in and around the December Assembly but failed to win the day. Instead, a strategy of
deliberate but cautious transformation of the Network prevailed. Proponents of the
WCSS proposal had underestimated not only the collective commitment of member
groups to the PCN but their willingness to take the Network beyond its current
mandate.Y
The reaction of more narrowly nationalist groups to the election results is
instructive for an understanding of the PCN's resilience. Formed by some small and
medium-sized businesses, and led by payroll management company Comcheq's
2') Cohen, Interview by author.
30 John Foster, Interview by author, Ottawa 1997; Howlett, Interview by author; Clarke, Interview by
author. For background on the internal debates within the Catholic and other mainline churches, see
Chapters 6 and 7 in Clarke, Behind the Mitre: The Moral Leadership Crisis in the Canadian Catholic
Church
31 For background on the Working Committee for Social Solidarity, see Chapter 1 above.
32 PCN Sixth Assembly Summary. Through a review of meeting records in WCSS files and interviews
with participants a contrast emerges between the ideological commitment of participants in the Social
Solidarity process and the PCN's substantive action agenda (campaigning and organization building)
with immediate public policy objectives.
207
founder and CEO, Bill Loewen, the Business Council for Fair Trade had, for the most
part, been a half-hearted participant in the Network's activities and after the election it
ceased to participate.v' In contrast, the Council of Canadians renewed its strong
commitment to the PCN. While the Council's stated focus was on monitoring the
FTA in order to publicize its impact, this appeared to be with a view to tying the trade
agreement to the broader corporate agenda. The Council's decision to continue its
fight against free trade was not unexpected: it was the obvious path for an explicitly
nationalist group. But the group's commitment to broadening the Network's mandate
beyond a nationalist focus was less predictable. In this regard, the Council's
leadership was reflecting a change of perspective resulting from its engagement with
free trade. Chair Maude Barlow and other leading Council members felt that their
understanding of the FTA had been transformed by their work within the PCN. One
symptom of this change was an emerging rift within the Council between more
narrowly nationalist elements and Maude Barlow's leadership."
Strong support for maintaining and building the PCN also came from
provincial coalitions hoping to maintain the pan-Canadian linkages that had
developed under the Network's aegis. The coalitions valued the access and voice the
PCN provided them vis-a-vis relatively resource-rich national organizations. The
Network also opened up an alternative route for these coalitions to approach or
pressure the provincial leadership of national organizations - i.e., from the top."
The Coalition against Free Trade (Ontario) was one of the many provincial
groups strongly in favour of maintaining and expanding the PCN. The Ontario
coalition's support was particularly significant because its Toronto-based staff had
carried much of the organizing load for national activities even long after the
33 For details on the Business Council for Fair Trade, see its Mission Statement reprinted in The Fair
Trader, February 1988. Loewen and his organization were very supportive of the PCN and its anti-FlA
goals and expressed this through financial support. It was politically and organizationally more ditftcult
for this group to join in the Network's action plans and the gap widened as the PCN's mandate
broadened.
31 Barlow, Interview by author; Spratt, Interview by author.
35 Personal interviews with members and staff of the PEl, Alberta, Manitoba and Newfoundland
coalitions.
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founding of the PCN in April 1987. For example. CAFT staffers were responsible for
most of the planning and facilitation behind the May 1988 lobby of federal opposition
leaders, the 12 June National Day of Action, and the cartoon booklet. At first, the
Ottawa-based Network simply did not have the resources to assume responsibility for
these tasks. Later, the Toronto-based coalition continued to carry some of the burden
at least partly because of its reticence to trust the new national process. The central
concern was that the Network and its fledgling secretariat (at this point a two person
staff complement largely dependent on in-kind resources) might be unduly influenced
by national organizations based in Ottawa such as the CLC and the Council of
Canadians. It might consequently tend towards a bureaucratized and watered-down
opposition to the deal and end up dampening rather than building national
mobilization.36
The Toronto group only expressed real trust in the PCN's "relative autonomy'
from its largest components, and its potential effectiveness after the 1988 election.
CAFT representatives made this clear at the December 1988 Assembly and confirmed
the vote of confidence in a February 1989 memorandum to other member groups
calling for a strengthened and reconstituted Network based in Ottawa:
The Coalition Against Free Trade agreed that establishing a firmer base in
Ottawa for our movement is urgent. The free trade fight has demonstrated that
popular groups can effectively act together but we are in danger of losing the
momentum we have generated if we try to operate through a nickel and dime
approach."
This intervention marked the Ontario group's withdrawal from a front-line role at the
national level and helped to focus attention on developing a resource base for the
Network to continue its activities.
The consensus in favour of keeping the Pro-Canada Network alive at the
December Assembly led to this very question: What structure and resource base
would the PCN now need? From its inception, funding for the Network's basic
36 Personal interviews with CAFT members including Marjorie Cohen, Laurell Ritchie, and James
Turk.
.n Coalition Against Free Trade, Memorandum to PCN Member Groups, February 1989.
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operations had been both limited and tenuous. Because its largest project. the cartoon
booklet, had been largely run out of the CAFT in Toronto, the PCN had been confmed
to a very slim organizational existence. While substantial in-kind resources, both
human and material, were contributed to the Network's activities, only one staff
person was directly responsible to and paid for with PCN funds. During this period,
the Network's operations depended on huge commitments of time from some member
organizations, notably by the chair Tony Clarke, his assistant in his role as co-director
of the Social Affairs Commission of the CCCB, and the support of the staffof the
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives that had loaned office space to the
Network."
In the aftermath of the federal election, in-kind help was unlikely to remain so
plentiful. With the heat of the electoral battle subsiding, member groups would return
to their own sectoral and institutional agendas. Furthermore, many organizations
themselves faced severe fmancial difficulties. Trade unions felt the impact of a
continuing economic downturn on membership numbers while other groups were
dealing with past cuts in government support and bracing for more. Within the labour
movement, severe disappointment with the NDP's campaign performance, a
continuing commitment to a building a social democratic party as a primary strategy,
and continuing losses in membership and dues, were all factors in decisions around
support for coalition building and the PCN.
In the end, the Assembly agreed to render permanent and, as soon as possible,
increase the Network's staff complement, establish an office that would be less
dependent on in-kind resources, and attempt to regularize and broaden the funding
base. A new committee was established to advance these organizational goals and to
take on the task of paying off the debt incurred in the production and distribution of
the cartoon booklet.39
~!l See peN files and financial records in particular. The assessment of the CCPA's contribution is
based on information from an interview with the organization's administrator Diane Touchette. The
importance of in-kind contributions was also suggested by other informants.
39 PCN Sixth Assembly Summary.
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5. Budget '89: further onto the defensive
With a broader mandate in place, the Assembly also set twin tasks for the
Network: (a) reinforcing and carrying forward its new consensus and (b) advancing
into a new phase of campaigning combining opposition to government initiatives with
building a popular base for an alternative agenda."
As it happened, the impatience of the re-elected Conservative government and
its corporate allies to move forward with their own common agenda helped to buttress
the mandate-broadening process underway within the PCN. Within hours ofthe
Conservative victory on 24 November, corporate leaders started to call for the very
measures they had publicly disavowed during the election campaign. They clamoured
for a reduction in government spending and targeted social programs in particular for
cuts. The CMA proposed a royal commission on social spending, the Canadian
Chamber ofCommerce pushed for a complete overhaul of the ill system and the
BCNI demanded a drastic reduction in the federal deficit. These positions flew in the
face of these groups' own advertising messages during the campaign. Full-page ads
sponsored by the Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities, for example,
had left a very different impression. In answer to the question "Won't Canadian
Business lobby to reduce spending on social and other programs?" millions of
Canadians could read the reassuring answer "Not at all" in their newspapers as they
sipped their morning coffee.4 1
The commitment of many Network member groups was also reinforced by the
economic news that followed the election. Corporate reassurances that free trade
would bring economic revitalization and new jobs were swept away by a torrent of
mergers, plant shutdowns and job losses. Proponents of free trade were quick to argue
that the southward flow ofjobs was unrelated to the deal, merely the result of the
40 Ibid.
41 Ad reprinted in Pro-Canada Dossier, March 1989. On the onslaught of advertisements aimed at
calming Canadians fears of free trade, see Maude Barlow, Parcel ofRogues: How Free Trade is
failing Canada (Toronto: Key Porter, 1990),82-85; Salutin, Waitingfor Democracv: A Citizen's
Journal, 269-81; Nelson, The Sultans ofSleaze. For a critique of the post-FfA attack on the
Unemployment Insurance program, see Laurell Ritchie, "The Attack on Ul." This Magazine,
November 1989.
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economic downturn. For FTA opponents the distinction was spurious and for
Canadians in general it was likely cold comfort. PCN member groups, led by the CLC
and the Council of Canadians, compiled and publicized job loss statistics.Y
The renewed offensive from the corporate sector served to reinforce the
PCN's new mandate. In addition, 'trial balloons" floated by government officials
hinted at an ambitious agenda of public sector retrenchment in the upcoming first
budget of the Conservative government's new term. Anticipating this eventuality. the
PCN issued a challenge to the Conservatives to live up to promises made during the
election campaign, while linking the upcoming budget to the FTA. The statement
"Canada's First Free Trade Budget: a Declaration and a Challenge" combined a
reminder to the government of its electoral promises with a series of specific
demands. These included maintaining the universality of social programs, progressive
tax reform, opposition to an increase in the military budget, and the promotion of
employment as a priority. Detailed briefing notes making the case for the demands
accompanied the statement.43
In an effort to link its defence against expected government initiatives with
discussion of policy alternatives, the Network also developed and issued a discussion
document entitled "An Alternative Budget: a Popular Planning Process." The simple
low-cost illustrated leaflet was provided to member groups to promote discussion and
debate on the policy issues covered in federal budgets and to assist with the
formulation of popular sector demands in advance of the 1989 budget."
When the budget finally came down on 27 April, it confirmed the place of the
Free Trade Agreement in a broader neo-conservative agenda. As PCN chair Tony
Clarke noted:
42 Job loss statistics were reported in the CLC's new publication Trade Watch starting early in 1989.
'[he Council's six month Report Card claimed 33,000 jobs lost; after one year the eLC calculated more
than 77.000 jobs lost through more than fifty major plant shutdowns; see also "Network Watch," Pro-
Canada Dossier, May 1989.
43 PCN, "Canada's Free Trade Budget: A Declaration and a Challenge," March 1989; PCN, News
Release, "Popular <- 'oalition challenges Mulroney Government," Ottawa, 17 April 1989; peN, "Budget
1989 Briefing Notes."
·H Pt.N, "Alternative Budget Working Document," 1989.
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This first free trade budget is a definite move to harmonize the structure of our
economy, our society, and our culture with the requirements of the Free Trade
Agreement.45
The Conservative government had moved onto the offensive on a number of fronts:
the Unemployment Insurance program was restructured to remove the government' s
fmancial contribution, universality of the Family Allowance and Old Age Pension
programs was ended via a tax 'claw back,' privatization of publicly owned Air
Canada moved a step further, and Overseas Development Assistance (aDA) was
slashed."
Two further measures in the budget were particularly strong magnets for
opposition: cuts in government funding for advocacy groups - e.g., women and
aboriginal - and a massive reduction in the operations of VIA Rail, Canada's
passenger rail service.V NAC was one of the hardest hit advocacy groups. In a move
that looked very much like retaliation for its strong stand against free trade, the group
was dealt a 50 percent cut in the federal contribution to its budget over three years.
Spokesperson Laurell Ritchie expressed a widely held view when she declared: "We
feel this attack is because ofour effectiveness in opposing regressive government
initiatives. ,,48
The federal budget demonstrated the hollowness of the myriad promises made
by the Conservatives and their corporate allies in the course of selling free trade. The
45 PCN, News Release, "Canadians Reap the Whirlwind of Free Trade," Ottawa, 28 April 1989;
according to Winnipeg Free Press columnist Frances Russell, the PCN's response to the Budget
received little media attention. In Winters, ed., The Silent Revolution: Media, Democracy, and the Free
Trade Debate, 77.
46 "Budget Begins ITA Harmonization," Pro-Canada Dossier, May 1989. On Unemployment
Insurance (UI), see "Tories Choke Debate on UI Changes," Pro-Canada Dossier, 18 August 1989.
47 For an outl ine of the genesis of federal funding of advocacy groups, see Chapter 3 above and PaL
Interests ofState: The Politics ofLanguage, Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada. On VIA Rail,
see "VIA Analysis," Pro-Canada Dossier, 1 January 1990.
48 Quoted in ''Network Watch," Pro-Canada Dossier, May 1989, 7. For an assessment of the cuts to
women's groups, see "Ottawa Puts Squeeze on Feminists," Toronto Star, 25 February 1989, H I. One
NAC spokesperson was quoted in the media as saying: "it's just an awful day for women's groups.
They didn't know this was coming. There hasn't been another cut like it. ... This goes to the bone of
the movement." Quoted in Pal, Interests ofState: The Politics ofLanguage, Multiculturalism and
Feminism in Canada, 148. And yet. the government's move was far from unexpected, NAC president
Lynn Kaye had even raised the prospect of these actions at the PCN's post-election Assembly. In peN
Sixth Assembly Summary.
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budget also served to confrrm the PCN as a place where member groups would come
to seek support in dealing with the impact ofthe FTA and other public policies on
their constituencies. For some groups, above all those with more limited resources,
the anticipation of struggles to come contributed to their interest in seeing the PCN
continue after December 1988.49 In its post-election issue, the Pro-Canada Dossier
anticipated this function as part of a coalition model that starts to take on the
appearance of a mutual defence pact:
Many are going to be hurt by the FTA experiment we need to pull together in
defending against these attacks. The strength of the coalitional approach is
precisely that we do not leave it only to the workers who are thrown out of a
job or to their union to fight plant closures and layoffs."
Unlike most of the groups representing constituencies directly affected by
measures in the budget - e.g. labour, women, seniors - Canadian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) active in international development had not participated in the
PCN. The Conservatives frontal assault on ODA sparked substantial soul searching
among these NGOs as well as a series of meetings between PCN representatives and
two NGOs in particular - Oxfam Canada and Interpares - both of which joined the
Network during this period."
Coming hard on the heels of the PCN's post-election deliberations, the 1989
budget had a formative influence on the Network. Its impact on member
constituencies pushed the PCN into a reactive mode, putting a premium on cross-
sectoral solidarity. By reneging on commitments made in the heat of the electoral
debate, the federal government reconfirmed the validity of the PCN's core agenda-
opposition to free trade - and maintained its power to drive movement convergence.
The budget was an opportunity for the Network to make explicit the links between
49 Interventions by NAC representatives and provincial coalition activists at the December 1988
Assembly stand out in this regard. Sec peN Sixth Assembly Summary.
50 "The Struggle Enters a New Phase," Pro-Canada Dossier, 16 December 1988. The Pro-t. 'anada
Dossier's content tended to reflect the commitment to coalition or convergence politics of GATT-Fly
the organization that produced it. The ongoing misgivings of some member organizations, like the
etc, about the 'coalition approach' were rarely reflected in its pages.
51 Tony Clarke, Interview by author.
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free trade and the 'corporate agenda' targeted by its broader mandate. 52 The door to
an expanded membership also opened as outreach brought development NGOs into
the fold. At the same time, the pressure for a defensive response returned the
promotion of alternatives to the back burner. When the smoke had cleared, all that
remained of the PCN's intent to act proactively was the timing of its initial
intervention - i.e., it had anticipated the federal budget with a series of demands
rather than merely responding after the fact with a critique.
6. Get the Budget on Track
The 1989 federal budget also inspired the first substantial campaign by the
Network after the 1988 election. In a match up that would have been unlikely prior to
the popular sector cooperation that developed around the PCN, NAC and the
Canadian Brotherhood ofRailway, Transport and General Workers (CBRTGW)
joined forces to initiate a Campaign to Get the Budget on Track. Starting from
separate initiatives from the two groups, the campaign was planned by a steering
committee including representatives ofNAC, the rail union, other groups concerned
with the VIA cuts and the PCN. The focal point was a cross-country train trip by
activists - drawing on the powerful historical precedent of the 'On to Ottawa Trek' by
the unemployed during the Depression - to bring attention to the impact budget
measures would have on the lives of Canadians from coast to coast"
Thematically, the campaign built on the sectoral demands of the women's
movement and the rail unions, emphasizing their specific concerns as part of a
dismantling of the broader postwar 'social contract.' The core document for the
campaign highlighted the central role of the FTA by tying the abandonment of the
52 All PCN materials prepared around the 1989 Budget were explicit in noting the free trade - corporate
agenda link. peN files.
S) NAC, Letter to Member Organizations, 24 May 1989~ Press releases describing the campaign include
PCN, News Release, "Groups Launch Campaign to 'Get the Budget on Track'," Ottawa, 31 May 1989~
PCN, News Release, "Original Trekker Joins Cross-Country Budget Protest," Ottawa, 7 June 1989;
Pf'N, News Release, "Quilting on the Railroad," Ottawa, 7 June 1989~ PCN, News Release, "Budget
Campaign Arrives in Ottawa," Ottawa, 9 June 1989~ peN, "List of Participants, June 12th Campaign
Event," Ottawa, 1989. See also "Network Watch," Pro-Canada Dossier, May 1989, 7.
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social contract with the process of social and economic policy harmonization with the
United States.
Past and present generations of Canadians have developed a unique social
contract with their government. Through this social contract, Canadians have
claimed their basic democratic rights as citizens to a system of social programs
designed to ensure decent employment, income security, education, health
care, public services, consumer protection, cultural development, and fair
taxation... The current federal government is now breaking that social
contract.
The Free Trade Agreement has set the stage for harmonizing our economy and
social programs with the economy and social programs of the United States.
The recent Wilson budget serves to accelerate this process. Together, these
economic strategies will destroy the investment ofpast generations in our
national and democratic future.54
The Network's initial role - mobilizing broader popular sector support for the
campaign - rapidly evolved into a much larger coordinating role. With additional
donations of$4,300 from sponsoring organizations, the Network hired an organizer
and, along with NAC's secretariat, undertook the coordination of solidarity activities
across the country, as well as media relations at the national level. Despite a
shoestring budget and very shaky start, the campaign was successful in developing
some public profile and momentum.55
The train campaign continued the outreach begun with the initial response to
the budget, bringing groups like the advocacy group for rural communities Rural
Dignity into the PCN fold and enhancing the relationship between the Network and
the Assembly ofFirst Nations." It also set a pattern for the PCN's involvement in
campaigns: directly affected constituencies would initiate campaigns but look to the
Network for support in planning and coordination. The various hiccups encountered
by the train campaign indicate that the organizational model was very much a work in
54 PCN, "Breaking the Social Contract: A Joint Response to the Wilson Budget;' 31 May 1989.
55 Linda Diebel, '''Crab-grass Coalition' Takes to Rails against Budget," Toronto Star, 3 June 1989, BI;
Paul Koring, "Anti-budget Campaign by Women's Group off to Confused Start," Globe and Mail, 16
May 1989, A5; and Paul Koring, "Coalition to Ride the Rails in Fight Against the Budget," Globe and
Mail 1989, A I.
56 On Rural Dignity, see Cynthia Patterson, "Leaving Normal: Life with Rural Dignity," Action Canada
Dossier, May-June 1992; the assessment of the relationship between the AFN and the PCN is based on
materials in the Network's files as well as the author's interviews with various coalition participants
and staff. For an example, see Pro-Canada Network and Native Women's Association of Canada,
"Statement of Solidarity in Support of First Nations' Rights," Ottawa, Fall 1990.
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progress. As a member of the Network's Strategy Committee recalls, not without
humour, the campaign generated more than a little confusion:
Who's calling the shots, where are the good ideas, and how do you make it all
happen? Who is doing what? Whose train is this anyway? But none of this
stopped it from generating a lot of enthusiasm.57
Following up on the budget campaign, the PCN's Eighth Assembly (June
]989) identified the emerging struggle over taxation as a priority. 58 Proposals for a tax
on consumption (Goods and Services Tax or GST) were already being panned from
the political Right as a government tax grab. Represented by economist Marjorie
Cohen, NAC suggested that progressives could not allow the Right to carry
opposition to this measure. Already in November 1989, 31 percent of Canadian
viewed the proposed GST as the most important public policy issue.59 One month
later, polls put opposition to the tax at 61 percent while 59 percent of respondents
indicated they would not support incumbent MP's who voted for the tax.?" Cohen,
fresh from a NAC meeting that had made the GST and taxation top priorities for its
work in the coming year, made the case for cross-sectoral attention to the issue. At its
next Assembly (October 1989), the PCN launched what was initially a limited and
resource-starved campaign on the issue.?' The various materials prepared for the
campaign placed the GST in the context of a shifting overall tax mix - i.e., decreasing
corporate taxes, declining progressivity of the income tax, etc. While the proposed
consumption tax was identified as a central concern, it was also explicitly tied to other
economic policy issues such as inflation and unemployment. Finally, slated to replace
an existing tax on Canadian manufacturers, the GST was tagged as a free trade tax.62
57 Bickerton, Interview by author.
58 PCN, Ninth Assembly Summary.
59 The Reid Report, May 1993,2.
60 Angus Reid and Gallup polling quoted in Campbell and Pal, The Real Worlds ofCanadian Politics;
Cases in Process and Policy, 390.
61 "Network Launches Campaign to Beat Tories' Regressive Tax," Pro-Canada Dossier, 6 October
1989, I. The campaign launch is reported in Alan Freeman, "Coalition to Fight the GS!'." Globe and
Mail. 21 October 1989, A7. NAC's intervention on GST is in Summary of Discussion and Decisions.
PCN, Eighth Assembly, Ottawa, 10-11 June 1989~ the decision to launch the GST campaign is
recorded in peN Eighth Assembly Summary; on the GST campaign, see also PCN, "Strategy
Timetable." Pro-Canada Network, II January 1989.
62 "New Tax to Replace Revenues Lost in FTA." Pro-Canada Dossier, 18 August 1989.
217
7. The Campaign for Fair Taxes
Perhaps the most important consequence of the PCN's GST campaign through
the fall of 1989 was the momentum it generated for a more ambitious endeavour. By
the end of the year, the CLC's Executive Council had agreed to undertake a major
mobilization against the GST in the coming spring. A proposal was drafted in
December and informally tested with CLC affiliates and the PCN's Steering
Committee. After some amendments based on comments received from these groups,
a plan for a cross-sectoral mobilization against the GST and for progressive taxation
was presented to a meeting convened by the Congress at a Toronto airport hotel. 63
While they were enthused by the CLC's commitment to a major mobilization,
a number ofnon-CLC representatives at the meeting held on 4 January were critical
of the nature of the action as well as the structure being proposed for the campaign.
The proposal reflected very few of the comments gathered at a PCN Steering
Committee meeting in December and forwarded to Congress vice-president Nancy
Riche in a memorandum from Network chair Tony Clarke.64 Specifically, non-labour
organizations were worried that the form ofprotest proposed by the CLC - a one-day
'National Ballot' or referendum on the GST - was too narrowly focused on the
workplace limiting participation within their own constituencies and in communities
across the country.f More broadly, community sector groups participating in the Pro-
Canada Network were concerned that the CLC proposal would lead to a parallel
coalition structure. Their apprehension was fuelled by their limited input into the
63 See CLC, "National Ballot on the GST," Campaign proposal circulated at meeting, Canadian Labour
Congress, 4 January 1990; Pat Kerwin, "January 14 Update on the GST Campaign," Canadian Labour
Congress, January 1990; Kerwin, Interview by author and Clarke, Interview by author.
(>-\ Clarke noted the importance of positioning the GST campaign as part of a broader and longer-term
campaign that would engage the labour movement and other movements. He also emphasized the
importance of a structure for the campaign that would allow for real influence by community sector
groups and provincial coalitions as well as labour. Specific suggestions included the formation of a
national campaign committee as well as sub committee's to deal with communications, media and
logistics. Finally, Clarke tied PCN involvement in the campaign to the availability of additional
resources in a thinly veiled plea for funding. Tony Clarke, Memorandum to Nancy Riche, 20 December
1989. Clarke believed this intervention with Riche was necessary to prevent the CLC from shifting
back towards the 'command-control' model of coalition building that had characterized earlier stages in
the popular sector's development. Clarke, Interview by author.
M See the CLC's original campaign proposal, "National Ballot on the GSr'~ as well as Kerwin,
"January 14 Update on the GST Campaign."
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planning process and confmned by the pre-packaged news release the Congress
intended to issue at the close of the meeting to launch the campaign. From their
perspective, the CLC was circumventing the PCN structure, posing a threat to its
future as a cross-sectoral multi-issue coalition." The fact that the lack of attention to
structure and process evident in the CLC initiative remained even after comments
from the PCN accentuated these fears. At the close of the January meeting, CLC vice-
president Nancy Riche called for volunteers and then proposed to proceed with the
resulting unrepresentative group as a steering committee for the campaign. The issue
was revisited after complaints from a number of groups.
Inviting business groups to participate in the campaign was also a subject for
discussion at the initial meeting. Given the ideological breadth of opposition to the
GST, it was an inevitable question. For some PCN groups it raised the spectre of the
type of bipartite formation reflected in the CLC-initiated Dialogue '86 event. Their
preference for the PCN's 'popular sector-only' model was reflected in their insistence
that the campaign twin opposition to the GST with support for progressive tax
alternatives that would be anathema to most business groups."
Concerns with business participation and the structure of the campaign
reflected a wider sentiment of unease. In essence, community sector groups feared
that the CLC either did not fully understand or did not concur with the new model of
cooperation they felt they were constructing through the PCN.68 Riche and Clarke
subsequently negotiated a series of changes aimed at addressing these concerns. The
changes were described in an update issued by the CLC that dealt withthe issue of the
campaign's structure as follows:
a) It has been noted that we are running a campaign and not establishing a
permanent coalition. At the same time, it is important that we build on existing
networks. Participation is open to any group, including business that supports
b6 Personal interviews with participants.
67 On Dialogue '86, see Chapter 3 above. The reaction of some non-Cl.C groups to the January -lth
meeting is laid out in some detail in correspondence including: John Lang, Secretary Treasurer, CCU,
l.ettcr to Harold David, Executive Assistant, CCU, 8 January 1990 and Raye Anne Briscoe, Executive
Assistant, National Farmers Union, Letter to PCN Chair Tony Clarke, 8 January 1990.
68 Author's interviews with participants.
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the overall objective of the campaign. Business will not be invited onto the
Steering committeej'"
b) The CLC will take the responsibility for organizing the participation of its
affiliates and will work closely with unions which are not affiliated to it to
establish the workplace vote;
c) The Pro-Canada Network will take the prime responsibility helping to
coordinate campaign activities with the non-labour groups [emphasis mine]; 70
d) There will be a National Campaign Group which will be comprised of all
national organizations (labour and non-labour) supporting the campaign and
provincial GST campaign committees.
e) There will be a Steering Committee that will be co-chaired by Nancy Riche.
Executive Vice-President CLC, Tony Clarke, Chair PCN, and a representative
of Quebec Coalition Against the GST. In public events, there will be an
undertaking to include spokespersons from other groups. Membership of the
Steering Committee should be reflective of the different sectors in the national
group.
f) At the provincial level, committees paralleling the national group will be set
Up;?1
g) Within each national group, appropriate coordinating structures will be put
in place."
The changes to the structure provided more clarity and dealt with the specific
concerns ofnon-labour groups and provincial coalitions such as participation by
business groups and provincial structures for the campaign. The campaign's structure
was a variant on the model adopted for the previous budget train campaign, when the
PCN's chair and coordinator joined representatives of the initiating organizations-
NAC and the CBRT - on the campaign committee. In this case, the distinct role
played by Quebec groups was recognized with the appointment of three co-chairs as
suggested by community sector groups at the January meeting. The CLC had also
agreed to expand the 'National Ballot' to cover two days, spanning workweek and
(,'1 This was a direct response to the particular concern of community sector groups that the structure
adopted for this campaign might breach the popular sector model developed by the PCN. See above.
70 This section of the original draft of this document, prior to PCN chair's comments, was considered to
reflect the CLC's lack of sensitivity to the appearance of its dominance or to undervaluing the ACN's
role. It read: "The PCN will take the prime responsibility to contact the non-labour groups. The CLC
will provide funds to PCN to defray the costs of undertaking this task"[emphasis mine]. In Pat Kerwin,
Draft Memorandum, December 1990.
71 The PCN's member provincial coalitions were concerned that, in the absence ofjoint campaign
structures at the provincial level, they would sidelined by the CLC's own provincial federations. The
degree of concern varied depending on the existing working relationship between coalition and
federation in each province. See peN, "Notes from Conference Call with Provincial Coalitions,"
Ottawa, 1I January 1990.
n eLC, "Update on GST Campaign," 14 January 1990.
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weekend, in order to broaden participation. Finally the Congress agreed to consider a
proposal from the PCN regarding the resources it would need in order to coordinate
the campaign. Network Strategy Committee co-chair, and CUPW staff member,
Geoff Bickerton negotiated with the CLC staff responsible for the campaign, Political
Action Coordinator Pat Kerwin and Director of Special Projects Art Kube.73
In the end, the Campaign for Fair Taxes was widely viewed as successful. A
series of coordinated regional and local actions culminated in the collection of over
two million protest cards in communities and workplaces across the country on 7 and
9 April 1990. The card count on 9 April from a downtown Ottawa Hotel was the fmal
event in a five-week long campaign. Coordinated local events - news conferences,
street theatre, seminars - were used to publicize little known facts about the tax
system - business expense deductions, corporate non-payment, etc.- and promote
progressive alternatives. This combination of local actions with a national profile was
considered key to the success of the Fair Taxes protest."
The campaign had a very positive short-term impact on coalition building. At
the national level, a number of new groups and some entirely new constituencies
joined in the Network's activities. Overall, the coalition approach also gained kudos
within the labour movement. For example, in his report to the CLC's executive
committee, Pat Kerwin argued:
Despite all the problems with coalition campaigns, it is fair to say that without
such a structure we would not have achieved the success that we did.75
From CUPE' s perspective, the verdict was also positive.
73 lbid.; In fact. the Network's role also included coordinating the participation of labour groups not
affiliated to the CLC including CCU affiliates and the Canadian Conference of Teamsters. The PCN
developed a $35,000 campaign budget that included expenses for staffing, and the production of
materials. This funding was also used to augment the PeN's meagre office infrastructure and had a
longer-term positive impact. Bickerton, Interview by author and Mandy Rocks, Interview by author,
Ottawa, 20 April 1997.
74 Jim Stanford and Larry Katz, "The Fair Taxes Fight: Ten Lessons Learned from the Campaign to
Stop the GST," CUPE Facts 1990.
7.\ Pat Kerwin, "Campaign for Fair Taxes: Report to the CLC Executive Council," Canadian Labour
Congress, 3 May 1990.
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Work in coalition. Without a doubt this is the most important lesson that we
can learn form the April 7-9 campaign. Organized labour simply could not
have achieved these good results on its own."
The campaign's success at the local level was reflected in the dozens of committees
and coalitions set-up from coast to coast." National and local events garnered
substantial profile for national organizations, provincial coalitions and local groups
involved in the campaign."
Some criticisms were made of the campaign's execution. The Congress had
insisted on a national print media campaign under its complete control. At an
evaluation meeting attended by campaign coordinators from its affiliates, the CLC's
concentration on national media was viewed as much less effective than an emphasis
on community, local, and the movement's own media resources might have been. The
ads themselves were also subjected to withering criticism." In the longer run, reviews
of the campaign and the April mobilization also identified the failure to plan and
facilitate follow-up. This included the inability to put the 2.2 million cards that had
been collected to good use, either through some public display or by developing
mailing lists.8oMost critically, the lack ofplans for follow-up undermined some of the
important gains made at the local and provincial levels." For some critics, the CLC's
76 Stanford and Katz, "The Fair Taxes Fight: Ten Lessons Learned from the Campaign to Stop the
GST," 10.
n The Ontario Coalition for Social Justice claimed the formation of more than two dozen local
committees in Ontario alone, while the coalition in Alberta established several committees in that
province and eleven committees were set-up in Saskatchewan. In Bleyer, "Coalition Building and the
Canadian Popular Sector." See also Wes Norheim, "Prairie Region GST Report," CLC, Regina, 2
March 1990.
78 The PCN member provincial coalitions had identified the potential for grassroots coalition building
through the Campaign for Fair Taxes from the outset. See, for example, Jim Turk, Memorandum to
Local Coalition Coordinators, 19 February 1990.
79 Kerwin, "Campaign for Fair Taxes: Report to the CLC Executive Council"; see also correspondence
between the CLC and the CA W. Derik Hodgson, Memorandum to Nancy Riche, 21 March 1990;
Peggy Nash, Letter to Shirley Carr, 10 March 1990.
80 The Campaign Steering Committee spent hours debating logistical details such as the uses of the
cards. lhe comm ittee eventually decided not to attempt to collect information - names, addresses, etc.
- from the cards. Various minutes of meetings, Campaign for Fair Taxes and author's interviews with
members of the committee.
During the planning process, CLC Communications Director Derik Hodgson had strenuously argued
for a ballot that would include a pro-GST option to prevent being "accused of running an old style
Soviet Stalinist election." Hodgson, "Memorandum to Nancy Riche."
81 Turk, Interview by author.
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failure to prepare beyond the April events was merely a reflection of the campaign's
internal political purpose for the Congress. From this perspective, the timing of the
April mobilization - i.e., prior to the CLC's bi-annual convention in May - was aimed
a staving off criticism of Congress president Shirley Carr's inaction that was coming
from a number of directions within the labour movement. The argument is a familiar
one since the spring has often been the high point in the CLC's action cycle - for
example in 1986, with the initiation of the campaign on Free Trade, Deregulation and
Privatization - as the leadership gears up to face delegates at convention. There was
undoubtedly very limited political capital in planning for high levels of activity in the
Campaign Fair Taxes to continue past early April.
There is nevertheless substantial evidence that the GST campaign influenced
the outcome of the CLC's May Convention beyond securing another term for the
leadership. The main political program document presented to delegates showcased
the campaign beginning with a glowing reference to its success:
The 1990 Convention of the Canadian Labour Congress begins exactly five
weeks after 2.2 million Canadians voted against the proposed Goods and
Services Tax and in favour of fair taxation. This historic protest reflects a
widespread and deeply felt anger and frustration that many Canadians feel.82
Reflecting critiques of the campaign, the two-year Program of Action adopted by
delegates identified the development of regional coalitions as a priority, and the
CLC's Executive Council subsequently decided to focus a National Day of Action
slated for the fall on the tax issue.
Throughout the winter and spring of 1990, as work on the Campaign for Fair
Taxes was underway. internal discussion on the relative merits of coalition building
continued within the labour movement. While this debate was reflected in the varying
commitment of different unions to the Campaign for Fair Taxes, and in the positions
they staked out on campaign strategy and tactics, it was also a central point of
contention in the preparation of the program to be presented to the 1990 CLC
Convention. In a letter to Congress president Carr, CUPE president Jeff Rose states
82 CLC, 'Taking Hold of our Future: Fighting the Political Platform of the Tories and Big Business,"
Document 13: Eighteenth Constitutional Convention. CLC. May 1990.
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his union's preference for the coalition model and critiques the CLC's failure to fully
adopt it:
The overall strategic theme should be something like "Building an Alternative
Future Together" thus hammering home the notion that if we are serious as a
movement about winning, we must work together with our coalition partners
and change the terms of the political debate in the country. The document we
were presented is not such a document. .. What is required is something which
reflects the need to maintain, strengthen and broaden coalition work. We
should clearly point out and give emphasis to the need to work together with
the Pro-Canada Network and other coalition partners. The document does not
do this sufficiently - in fact, it shift the emphasis to internal adjustments
within the labour movement. .. I think it is wrong (especially now) to see
coalition work and internal labour matters as competing themes. 83
Over the course of the summer the GST gained even more prominence, largely
thanks to the decision ofa committee of the Liberal dominated Senate to hold cross-
country hearings on the issue. By summer's end, battle lines were drawn between
Liberal Senators now anxious to block GST legislation and a Conservative
government moving to fill vacant seats in the upper house to overcome the Liberal
majority. In September, Prime Minister Mulroney invoked an obscure constitutional
provision in order to name an additional eight Senators and ensure passage of the
legislation.f" By this time, the election of an NDP government in Ontario added
another province to the opposition to the new tax measure." As it had in 1988 on the
FTA, the PCN found itself with Liberal Senators and provincial governments as allies.
A plan of action for the Campaign for Fair Taxes drafted by the PCN
secretariat indicates that a flurry of initiatives focusing on the stacking of the Senate
by the Tories was being considered. Some, like a series of print ads, came to fruition,
while others, including a CUPE proposal to travel to London to appeal the
appointment of additional Senators to the Queen, died on the drawing board.86
83 Jeff Rose, Letter to Shirley Carr, President, Canadian Labour Congress, 19 March 1990.
84 "Chretien Urges Election on GST," Toronto Star, 3 October 1990, AI.
x~ "Rae calls on Senate to kill Tories GST," Toronto Star, 22 September 1990, A8.
8!> Campaign for Fair Taxes, "Fall Plan of Action (Draft)," August 1990~ PCN, News Release,
"Network Supports Senate Committee Recommendations on GST," Ottawa. 26 September 1990~ Mike
McBane, Memorandum to Member Organizations, 28 September 1990~ Mike McBane, Memorandum
to Member Organizations, 26 September 1990~ Mike McBane, Memorandum to Provincial Coalitions,
21 September 1990~ McBane, Interview by author.
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Meanwhile, the GST campaign continued to inspire grassroots activism including
symbolic local M.P. recall campaigns and city council resolutions opposing the tax,
culminating in a Day of Action on 10 November. The campaign was also viewed as
an opportunity to build alliances with small business groups; a tactic that met with
some success in specific regions.V
In the period following the 1988 federal election, the Pro-Canada Network
built on its original mandate opposing the FTA to develop a broader range of
engagement of which the campaign against the GST was the most prominent
example. The transition from single-issue coalition to taking on a whole range of
social and economic policy initiatives defmed as part of the Tory/corporate agenda
was relatively smooth. Conjunctural factors including aggressive advocacy of neo-
liberal policies by the corporate sector, their implementation by are-elected - yet
quickly very unpopular - Mulroney government, and the onset of recession in 1990,
all contributed to the apparent ease of this transformation. While much of the
Network's attention and activity were focused on new issues like the GST, free trade
remained the reason for its existence. During the period covered by the following
chapter, free trade will re-emerge at the centre of public debate and return to the heart
of the PCN's activities.
CUPE's strong support for the GST campaign is made clear in correspondence from the unions two top
leaders to all its locals. Jeff Rose and Judy Darcy, Letter to All Chartered Organizations, 4 October
1990.
87 On plans for the Day of Action, see "Putting the Pressure on the GST," Pro-Canada Dossier, 5
November 1990. Relations with small business organizations were particularly strong in Alberta where
various local Chambers of Commerce participated in the Campaign for Fair Taxes. Confirmed in
Royer, Interview by author; see also the interview with the head of the Atlantic Coop, '<GST Would
Discriminate Against Co-ops," Pro-Canada Dossier, 5 November 1990.
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Back to Free Trade
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1. Introduction
While opposing the GST was at the top of the PCN's campaign agenda for
most of 1990, there was a continuing and consistent focus on free trade which was
still very much identified as the core issue for the Network. Like the GST. other new
issues taken up by the Network were introduced, both in public pronouncements and
in internal discussions, in terms of their relationship with the FTA. I
This chapter picks up the thread of the PCN's development as it continues to
expand beyond its original objective and simultaneously returns to the source of its
initial unity as the extension of the ITA to include Mexico comes onto the political
agenda. It follows the Network chronologically through a period of continuing growth
marked by its eventual renaming as the Action Canada Network in April 1991. As a
broader mandate is consolidated through a series ofcampaigns including a notable
intervention in the constitutional debate in 1991-92, the Network also returns to its
roots with campaigns to abrogate the FTA and to oppose the proposed North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The prospect of a continental trade deal leads to the Network's first
transnational movement-to-movement relationships with Mexican and American
opponents of free trade. These relationships, in particular with Mexican allies,
contribute to an increasing emphasis on the promotion of alternatives thus shifting the
Network's discourse on trade. Eventually, U.S. proposals for parallel accords on
labour and the environment. put forward as a means to obtain Congressional sanction
for NAFTA, bring latent tensions between the members of the new trilateral alliance
to the surface.
While this chapter covers a period of increased activity by the Network, it also
draws out some telltale signs of what, in retrospect, we know to have been an
I Discussion of the impact of the federal budget is in Summary of Discussion and Major Decisions,
peN, Tenth Assembly, Vancouver, March 1990. There was discussion of the GST, regional
development and the universality of social programs in this vein at the Eighth Assembly in Ottawa.
peN Eighth Assembly Summary. See also "New Tax to Replace Revenues Lost in FTA" and "Budget
Begins FTA Harmonization.'
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impending decline for this phase of the Canadian popular sector coalition-building
project. After reviewing the major mobilization organized by the ACN and its allies in
the spring of 1993, the chapter concludes with the Network's second encounter with
electoral politics that fall, providing a necessary contrast with the PCN's involvement
in the 1988 campaign.
2. Trade goes Continental
Immediately after the 1988 election, PCN groups identified monitoring the
anticipated impacts of free trade as a top priority.i In addition, two new trade fronts
were rapidly opening up in 1989. First, as the Canada-U.S. FTA was implemented,
American and Mexican trade representatives were already deep in discussions on yet
another building block towards the Reagan-Bush vision of a hemispheric trade block
- a U.S.-Mexico FTA. In early 1990, the Canadian government was on the verge of
throwing its hat into the negotiation of a North America-wide FTA and, by the spring,
informal discussions started between the three countries. Finally, in February 1991 the
Canadian government confmned that it would be a full participant in negotiations
towards a North American Free Trade zone.' Second, the FTA signed by Canada and
the U.S. included a mechanism for its abrogation or termination that had been
flourished by proponents as a viable exit clause. After implementation of the FTA in
January 1989, as the apparent toll of trade liberalization was tallied and the Liberal
Party shifted away from its staunch opposition to the deal, abrogation edged onto the
domestic political agenda.
In their assessment of the failure to defeat free trade at the polls in 1988, PCN
member groups and critics alike identified the lack of significant alliances with
2 PCN Sixth Assembly Summary; this function was largely taken on by some member groups with the
PCN secretariat using its limited resources to ensure that the information was shared with all member
organizations (e.g. through the Pro-Canada Dossier). The CLC and some of its affi liates tracked job
losses and plant closures and launched a new publication Cl.C Trade Watch which provided this
information as did more substantive reports published by the CCPA. In addition to plant relocation and
private sector job losses, the Network and its member groups identified social policy and public sector
employment developments they believed were tied to free trade. See Chapter 5 above.
) Report by the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and International Trade quoted in
Campbell and Pal. The Real H'orlds ofCanadian Politics; Cases in Process and Policy
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American organizations as a key lacuna in the anti-FTA strategy." This critique
assumed that latent American sympathy had remained untapped, or alternatively. that
potential allies were repelled by Canadian nationalist and anti-American rhetoric. In
reality, interest in and opposition to the free trade pact was limited in the United
States, even in likely quarters. While the AFL-CIO was formally opposed to the FTA,
its leadership did not play an active role, nor was there much concern with the deal
among American workers in general. 5 Now, an emerging North American playing
field challenged relative indifference to free trade in the U.S., and opened up a new
axis for cross-national alliances for Canadians.
More broadly, discussions aimed at expanding free trade into a North
American pact introduced a new dynamic for the Canadian popular sector. building,
for example, on previous work in Latin America. In fact, Canadian social justice
advocates "first encountered Mexico on the way to Central America." Canadian
organizations like the Toronto-based Latin American Working Group (LAWG), the
Interchurch Committee for Human Rights in Latin America (ICHRLA) and many
others were deeply involved in solidarity and refugee support work in Central
America through the 1970s and 1980s. As part of this work, they developed contacts
and relationships in Mexico where refugees, as well as the headquarters for most
Central American opposition and revolutionary groups, were located. Canadians also
built relationships with Mexican groups including the left-wing of the ruling Mexican
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).6 Later, in the aftermath of the 1989 federal
4 See Chapter 2 above.
5 "The American Labour movement, while formally opposed to the deal, was only mildly concerned by
it." Ian Robinson, "NAFTA, Social Unionism, and Labour Movement Power in Canada and the United
States," Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 49, no. 4 (1994): 677. In a report on a visit to
Washington early in 1988, John Foster notes that even where there was concern or interest in the FTA
this was quite narrow in scope: "Americans by and large are not aware of the social implications of the
deal. .. the deal is usually wrapped in the glad-bag of 'free trade,' i.e., trade only ... contact was made
with groups including economic advisors to candidate Jesse Jackson." John Foster, "Brief Report on
Fact Finding Visit to Washington, February 21-26, 1988," 19 March 1988. During a previous trip to
Washington in July 1987, with CAFT co-chair Marjorie Cohen and future PCN chair Tony Clarke,
John Foster had concluded that when it carne to free trade in the United States, you could "get the
critical voices into a telephone booth." Clarke recalls numerous attempts to strike up relationships with
US-based groups through a variety of connections but development of "mutual understanding." Foster,
Interview by author; Tony Clarke, Interview by author, Ottawa 1997~ Cohen. Interview by author.
b Foster, Interview by author. Valin and Sinclair describe the development of solidarity projects
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budget, the international development NGOs like Oxfam and Interpares that
gravitated to the PCN also brought with them knowledge and ties to the region.
Together, these organizations fed a seasoned understanding ofLatin American
political economy, and the various forces at play in the region, into the Canadian anti-
free trade movement.
Within the labour movement, institutional relationships between Canadian and
Mexican unions were a mixed bag. The CLC had maintained a civil relationship with
the Confederation of Workers ofMexico (CTM), its Mexican counterpart in the
International Confederation ofFree Trade Unions (ICFTU). As Mexico's official
trade union central directly affiliated to the ruling PRI, the CTM was staunchly pro-
free trade as well as implicated in the anti-democratic abuses of the regime. This
formal institutional relationship made the early stages of Canada-Mexico relationship
building difficult to navigate for the CLC and its affiliates. In contrast, the Quebec-
based CSN had a strong longstanding working relationship with an independent
Mexican trade union central, the Authentic Labour Front (FAT), based on their
common membership in the International Confederation ofCatholic Trade Unions. 7
Given these connections, the Pro-Canada Network's eventual engagement
with trilateral free trade was not very surprising. In addition to a wide range of
sectoral connections, it was facilitated by a keen interest in Mexico from the earliest
days of the anti-FTA movement. For example, in the mid-1980s a series of seminars
with Mexican economist Adolfo Aguilar Zinser were hosted and attended by many of
the key players in the, then embryonic, CAPT. Later, in November 1987, author John
Ralston Saul's presentation to the parliamentary committee studying free trade on
behalf of the Toronto group drew attention to the emerging Maquiladora free trade
zone on the Mexican border with the U.S.8 Finally, on the eve of the federal election
between Canada and Latin America in Fern Valin and Jim Sinclair, "Solidarity, Not Competition," in
Crossing the Line, ed. Jim Sinclair (Vancouver: New Star, 1992).
7 On trade unionism in Mexico, see Alejandro Alvarez and Gabriel Mendoza, "Mexico: Neo-liberal
Disaster Zone," in Crossing the Line, ed. Jim Sinclair (Vancouver: New Star, 1992) and Jack Warnock,
"Workers' and Union Rights Brutally Repressed in Mexico," ACN Dossier, December 1992.
8 Saul's presentation was published as John Saul, "A Gaping Hole in Free Trade," Globe and Mail, 25
November 1987, A7.
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in September of 1988, GATT-Fly led a fact fmding visit to the Maquiladoras." The
potential impact of the Mexican free trade zones was made very real only weeks later
when the 'runaway plant' syndrome first hit Canada. On 4 October, the Fleck auto
parts plant located near London, Ontario was dismantled, loaded on a convoy of
trucks and shipped south to Mexico at the cost of two hundred jobs."
The GATT-Fly visit to the Maquiladoras followed by the Fleck incident laid
the groundwork for a surge in interest in the continental angle on free trade in the
aftermath of the Tory election victory in November. The general feeling among
Canadians active on the Mexican file was that North American free trade would
follow within ten years of the FTA. This notional timeline, and an enthusiasm borne
ofthe sense of some element of victory that coloured the electoral defeat on the FTA,
were the driving forces behind the formation of the Common Frontiers project in mid-
1989.II Common Frontiers was launched by LAWG, one other Central American
solidarity organization - the B.C-based Trade Union Group (TUG) - and GATT-Fly,
and attracted the energies of many CAFT veterans. Former CAFT co-chair John
Foster was a driving force behind the new initiative and CAFT coordinator Scott
Sinclair moved over to staff the new project. Ken Traynor, Sinclair's co-worker at
CAFT would take over at Common Frontiers in the summer of 1990.12
In October 1990, Common Frontiers led a delegation of thirty representatives
from PCN member groups to Mexico for what was billed as the Mexico-Canada
Encuentro: Social Organizations Facing Free Trade. Some of the Canadian organizers
felt they had gone out on a long limb with this initiative and expressed relief and
satisfaction when more than sixty representatives of Mexican groups attended. The
Encuentro laid the basis for an ongoing bilateral relationship and sowed the seeds for
9 "Growth of Export Processing Zones Threatens Canada and Mexico," Pro-t. 'anada Dossier, 4
October 1988.
10 "Free Trade Advisor Closes Plant - Sends Jobs to Mexico," Pro-Canada Dossier, 27 October 1988.
II Foster, Interview by author and Ken Traynor, Interview by author, By telephone, 5 April 1997.
12 Foster, Interview by author; Traynor, Interview by author; and Sandra Sorenson, Interview b: author.
Ottawa, 7 November 1997.
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what would eventually become the PCN's Mexican vis-a-vis, the Mexican Free Trade
Action Network (Red Mexicana de Accionfrente al Libre CommerciotP
The Mexican Encuentro concluded with the release of a statement listing a
series of commitments: first, the Canadians agreed to pursue cancellation of the FTA
and to develop an alternative economic strategy that would both protect sovereignty
and "allow integral national development." Second, the Mexicans committed to
develop a broad national consensus to block a Mexico-U.S. FTA and to "provoke a
national discussion concerning the development model we want to pursue." Finally,
both parties agreed to provide "mutual assistance and to sharing our experiences" in
particular through the creation of a "permanent binational commission." 14 One week
later, the PCN Assembly in Ottawa adopted an action plan on Mexico-U.S. free trade
reflecting the agreements reached in Mexico. 15
In retrospect, the success of the Encuentro reflected the mutual trust that
flowed from previous personal and organizational relationships and augured well for
the future of Common Frontiers. For its Canadian organizers, the Encuentro was an
important step in building a broader continental and trilateral relationship around free
trade. Taking the fITst step in Mexico reflected both the experience of American
indifference in the campaign against bilateral free trade and a vision of "jumping over
the U.S. - the beast in the middle" to first build alliances in a society that also shared
a border with the world's economic superpower."
13 Foster, Interview by author; Traynor, Interview by author; Clarke, Interview by author. On RMALC
which was formally launched in April 1991, see Fronteras Commune/CECOPE, "Fighting Free Trade
Mexican Style," in Crossing the Line, ed. Jim Sinclair (Vancouver: New Star, 1992), 137. RMALC
paralleled the PCNIACN in structure, indeed its founders looked to the Canadian Network as
something of a model. See, for example, Drew Fagan, "NAFTA Fight Draws on Canadian Experience:
American, Mexican Anti-Free Trade Coalitions Look North for Ammunition, Inspiration," Globe and
Mail, 15 February 1993, B1.
14 "Final Declaration of the Mexico-Canada Encuentro: Social Organizations Facing Free Trade,"
Mexico City, 5-7 October 1990; see also Canada Mexico f'ncuentro, List of Canadian Participants,
October 1990; Canada -Mexico Encuentro, Resources/Environment Workshop Report; Social
Organizations Workshop Report; Labour Union Workshop Report; Final Declaration; PCN files.
IS PtN, "US-Mexico fTA Follow-up Actions," Assembly Document, Ottawa, 12-14 October 1990.
te Sorenson, Interview by author.
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Only months after the Mexican Encuentro, in January 1991 PCN
representatives met with key environmental and labour groups in Washington, D.C., a
meeting that is considered to mark the start of the second component ofthe trilateral
relationship. 17 Personal relationships and contacts were once again essential in lining
up a delegation of twenty prominent environmental activists and trade analysts for the
meeting in the Washington office of the NGO Development Gap on Martin Luther
K· D 18mg ay.
Under the auspices of Common Frontiers, contact with Mexican community
and labour groups expanded rapidly through 1989 and 1990. Common Frontiers built
on a model first developed by LAWG in its Central American work where it had
facilitated trips by Canadian trade unionists to the region. Now leaders and activists
from PCN member groups were being exposed to the realities of life and political
engagement in Mexico. As far as the Network's political action coordinator from
1990 to 1993 is concerned, these experiences cemented the commitment of many
activists to the trade fight." The impact of exposure to Mexico was also important for
many top movement leaders. For example, Council of Canadians chair Maude Barlow
was emotionally battered by her first visit to the Mexican border region during this
period. She credits the experience with helping to reshape her political analysis. 20
While Canadians visiting Mexico were keen to learn, they also viewed their
role as warning their hosts based on their experience with the FTA. As one said: "We
were the canaries in the coal mine. We were saying be warned before this happens to
yoU.,,2I Beyond facilitating these exchanges, Common Frontiers played a key role in
17 Foster, Interview by author and Traynor, Interview by author.
18 Mark Ritchie, "Fighting Free Trade U.S. Style," in Crossing the Line, ed. Jim Sinclair (Vancouver:
New Star, 1992); Clarke, Interview by author; Foster, Interview by author; Traynor, Interview by
author. Ritchie and Stephen Shrybman counsel for the Toronto-based Canadian Environmental Law
Association are credited with providing the impetus for this particular meeting.
19 Michael McBane, Interview by author, Ottawa, 15 November 1997.
20 Barlow, The Fight ofMy Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian, 123-30; Personal interview
with Maude Barlow. One key Common Frontiers organizer argues that the strong linkages built
between Canadian and Mexican activists contributed to the less xenophobic response to NAFTA by
Canadian workers than that of their US counterparts. Foster, Interview by author.
21 Foster, Interview by author.
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tracking trade-related developments in the United States. Based on their FTA
experience, some Toronto CAFT veterans felt this critical piece of the strategy should
not be overlooked. The gathering of intelligence in Washington went hand-in-hand
with the process ofknitting together the other connection of the trilateral
relationship.Y
Given the two core functions described above, it is not surprising that
Common Frontiers came to defme its status as something of a "foreign affairs
department" for the Pro-Canada Network. As the coordinator of the project at the time
describes it: "While the PCN delivered the Canadian project, we developed the
international work and reported back to the member groups. ,,23
Beyond reinvigorating the Canadian anti- free trade forces and attracting some
new players to the PCN table, engagement with Mexico buttressed the determination
to promote alternatives to trade liberalization. This resolve is reflected both in internal
and public Network and Common Frontiers materials from this period.i" Beyond their
own sense that the failure to push alternatives had been a major weakness of their
efforts in 1988, PCN activists were also influenced by the predisposition of their
Quebecois colleagues and the explicit needs of their newfound Mexican allies.
Quebec organizations committed to opposing the FTA had from the outset
emphasized detailed policy critique over broad-stroke cultural and economic
nationalist arguments regarding trade liberalization. From this perspective, the
elaboration of policy alternatives was quite simply the other shoe dropping.
:!:! Ibid. and lraynor, Interview by author. For details of US groups such as Development Gap, Public
Citizen, Institute for Policy Studies and others engaged on the trade issue, see Ritchie, "Fighting Free
Trade U.S. Style" and Robinson, "NAFTA, Social Unionism, and Labour Movement Power in Canada
and the United States."
23 Foster, Interview by author and Traynor, Interview by author.
2~ Agenda items for a Common Frontiers meeting on 11 January 1990 included: "Rethinking
development: after free trade what?"; "Finding common ground: developing a continental approach of
our own"; and "Redesigning our options: developing alternatives to Free Trade." See, as well. articles
in the Pro-Canada Dossier, January -February 1991, including "Development and Trade for Healthy
Economies," 'Towards a Just World Trading System," "An African Alternative: Down-to-Earth
Growth."
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Mexican anti-free trade activists were dealing with a society at a different
stage of social and economic development and, consequently, engaged in a debate on
very different terms. The spectre ofjob losses was both real and a powerful tool for
free trade opponents in Canada's advanced capitalist economy. In Mexico, free trade
advocates were brandishing the prospect of production shifting southward as a boon
for domestic employment. In addition, the stakes for Mexicans opposing free trade
were very high since they faced repression and possible reprisals for their stance."
For them, the ability to counterpose alternatives to the pact being promoted by the
three North American governments was nothing short ofessential for political
legitimacy, even survival. This was particularly the case for the country's most
prominent free trade critic, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. The son of a former PRJ president
of the Republic, and himself a one-time PRJ official, Cardenas was widely viewed as
the real victor of the 1988 Presidential election when he ran as leader of the newly
formed Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).26
The Canadian connection with Cardenas was quite strong. In fact,
relationships between members of his inner circle and Common Frontiers facilitated a
series of visits by Cardenas to Canada in 1991. After a speech to the convention of the
B.C. Federation ofLabour in January, he addressed a roundtable ofNetwork groups
in Ottawa in April. In both cases, Cardenas put forward an alternative pact that he
described as follows:
What we are proposing is a more ambitious agreement, wider in its scope,
broader in its social consensus and therefore much more lasting in time .. .If we
make this effort and build this trilateral consensus, our countries will have the
opportunity to decide their future and build a common destiny, not on the basis
of a forces agreement being promoted by narrow corporate and political
interests, but on the basis of our true needs.27
25 Warnock, "Workers' and Union Rights Brutally Repressed in Mexico."
26 Fraud in Mexican elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s is described in Vikram K. Chand,
Mexico's Political Awakening (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 200 I), 47-50.
Specifically, Chand notes "in 1994, the director of the Federal Election Institute disclosed that the
Interior Ministry had decided suspend the count in 1988 because of the panic caused by early urban
returns that indicated that Cardenas was winning the presidential race." Chand, Mexico's Political
Awakening, 49. For an interesting eyewitness account of electoral fraud in 1988 by an IT technician
involved in the tabulation of results. see J. Sanders, "Mexico: IT Worker Speaks Out," Computing, 7
July 1994.
27 Cardenas speech to a roundtable of ACN groups in Ottawa reported in "Development Pact would be
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The sentiment underlying the model promoted by Cardenas is made explicit in a
document describing the PRD's position on trade and development:
The PRD is in no way opposed to the principle of international
interdependence ... We are in favour of a broad trade and development pact.
We want Mexican markets to function. We are in favour ofgreater and more
equitable competition, both in Mexico and between Mexico and the rest of the
world. 28
The message put forward by Cardenas is an important example of the dialogue
on programme and strategy the Pro-Canada Network and its new Mexican allies were
engaged in from the Mexico City Encuentro onward. The move to a trinational
playing field put the Canadian cross-sectoral coalition model in the spotlight. The
PCN served as something of an inspiration for the formation of the Mexican Action
Network and, to a lesser extent, informed coalition-building efforts in the United
States." The new transnational relationship with Mexican groups also influenced the
Canadian Network's own development. For example, it accentuated the emphasis
placed on alternatives, as reflected in this statement by a leading Network actor: "Our
opposition is no longer good enough. We have to be able to say more than 'we told
you so.' We have to give leadership on what the alternatives are.,,30 As we will see
below, the new CanadalMexico relationship would also influence the changing
structure of the peN culminating in its relaunch as the ACN in April 1991, and
reinforce the position of Quebec-based member groups.
"More Ambitious" than Free Trade: PRD Leader," ACN Dossier, May-June 1991; Text of Cardenas
speech to BC Federation of Labour Convention, Novem her 30, 1990 is excerpted in "Our Goal is to
Join lorces with you," Pro-Canada Dossier, January-February 1991.
28 [PRD], "The PRO is in Favor of a Continental Trade and Development Agreement," Mimeo
translated from Spanish original, 199 I; see also PCN, "US-Mexico FTA Follow-up Actions" and list
of eight "US - Mexico follow-up actions" which emphasizes solidarity with Mexican counterparts and
further exchanges in PCN Tenth Assembly Summary.
29 Fagan, "NAFTA Fight Draws on Canadian Experience: American, Mexican Anti-Free Trade
Coalitions Look North for Ammunition, Inspiration."
30 Sandra Sorenson, Executive Director, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives quoted in Jim
Sinclair, ed., Crossing the Line (Vancouver: New Star, 1992), 187. The focus on alternatives is evident
in the January - February 1991 issue of the Pro-Canada Dossier. Another Network leader expresses
the view that budding organizational and personal contact with Mexico, particularly under the aegis of
Common Frontiers. 111 ight have contributed to a less xenophobic response to the prospect of free trade
with Mexico than was exhibited by the Canadians' neighbours to the south. Foster. Interview by
author.
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As the relationship between Canadian, Mexican and U.S. movements grew
from 1991 to 1993, the Common Frontiers project became an increasingly central
component of the PCN's activities. Over time, some important member groups, the
CAWand USWA for example, shifted from their initial roles as funders and clients of
Common Frontiers to become full-fledged participants in the project's decision-
making process by taking seats on its steering committee." Trade union involvement
in Common Frontiers was partly driven by the opportunity the project afforded to
bypass the CLC's notoriously conservative international affairs department which had
previously determined what international work would be undertaken on behalf of all
affiliated unions. 32
3. Abrogation
While the opening up of a new front in the free trade battle created new and
more complex relationships, it also renewed and amplified the attention paid to the
Canada-U.S. FTA. From the outset of the debate on free trade, proponents wielded
Section 2106 of the proposed pact, which allowed for termination on six months
notice, as a safety blanket to comfort Canadians wary ofjoining them for a "leap of
faith." Opponents had derided the cancellation or abrogation option as, first, a poor
alternative to rejecting a flawed pact and, second, a suicidal choice for the junior and
highly dependent partner in a trading relationship. In the immediate aftermath of the
1988 election, discussion ofabrogation was limited to hopeful speculation by shell-
shocked FTA opponents. If anything, the longer-term prospect of campaigning for
abrogation might have served as motivation for a more immediate task taken on by
31 As Common Frontiers outgrew its initial parent organization LAWG it also developed into a
continentally oriented reflection of the PCN. Increasingly, the same groups sat at the two tables and the
respective programs advanced in tandem. While the Common Frontiers model was clearly inspired and
timely, it is worth considering whether the shifting of the nexus for campaigning on trade issues away
nom the Network table might have had a negative impact on the latter over the longer term. This
conclusion would not be without irony given the seriousness with which Common Frontiers treated
both representation and accountability at the PCN table. See Common Frontiers reports to PCNIACN
Assemblies in PCNIACN files.
J] lraynor, Interview by author. Valin and Sinclair describe how the CLC·s refusal to link up with
Nicaragua's Sandinistas and other progressive movements around the world provided impetus to a
variety of alternative projects (e.g. LAWG, Trade Union Group, and others) in Valin and Sinclair,
"Solidarity, Not Competition."
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the Pro-Canada Network - monitoring the impact of the FTA. 33 While abrogation
appeared on the agenda of the first PCN Assembly after the coming into force of the
FTA in March 1989, substantive discussion would only begin close to eighteen
months later, with special meetings convened in March and July 1990. Through this
process, the PCN became committed to developing a national campaign calling for
abrogation and to "take responsibility for keeping abrogation of the FTA on the
political agenda," a position that was reconfirmed at the Mexico City Encuentro in
October 1990.34 In addition, the Network was urged to support specific groups - e.g.
aboriginal peoples - willing to "openly defy provisions of the FTA" and "influence
provincial governments to adopt measures which would directly challenge the
FTA.,,35 The Action Plan adopted by the ACN in May 1991 went a step further and
put "forcing an early election on abrogation of the Free Trade deal and alternative
economic, social and political priorities" high on the agenda. 36
Despite prominent mention in Network planning documents during 1990 and
1991, abrogation was largely overshadowed by the trinational agenda. Enthusiasm for
abrogation as a PCN campaign priority grew in inverse proportion to the federal
Liberal Party's move away from its own commitment to cancel the FTA. With
passing time, as the tally ofjob losses and other social and economic impacts
attributed by them to the FTA grew, opponents felt the prospects for a successful
public campaign for abrogation were improving. 37
The election of Jean Chretien to replace John Turner as leader soon after the
federal election marked the first step in the Liberal Party's retreat on free trade. In
turn, Chretien would name Roy MacLaren, a free trade enthusiast, as the party's trade
critic. The importance of pressing for abrogation was confirmed by a PCN meeting
33 See Chapter 5 above.
'4\ See above.
35 Geoff Bickerton, "Report on the PCN Special Meeting on ITA Abrogation Strategy," Canadian
Union of Postal Workers, Ottawa, 13 June 1990.
J6 ACN, "1991 Action Plan," May 1991.
37 Virginia Galt, --461,000 Jobs Lost, Report Says: Economist Cites Free-trade Pact for Manufacturing
Slump," Gloht' and Mail, 30 January 199:2, AJ.
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with the federal Liberal caucus. Notes from that meeting circulated to member
organizations highlight the new Liberal leader 's superficial and lukewarm enthusiasm
for another pitched battle on free trade. Perhaps more ominously, the document quotes
MacLaren as stating that "three-way negotiations on continental deal would be very
different from the FTA," and more explicitly, "If I were minister of trade I'd see this
. . ,,38
as an umque opportunity.
The last embers of the ant i-free trade fire that characterized the Liberal Party's
electoral efforts in 1988 were extinguished at Aylmer, Quebec in November 1991. A
discussion paper, drafted by MacLaren, entitled "Wide Open" framed the trade policy
discussion at the party's annual policy conference. True to its title, Macl.aren's paper
was an unapologetic paean to trade liberalization arguing that the "free-trade pact with
the U.S. is a done deal and the next logical step is to dismantle all trade barriers." The
Liberal leader summed up his own conclusions after Aylmer as follows: "At this
conference we have learned that the old concepts ofRight and Left do not apply to the
world of today and tomorrow... Protectionism is not right-wing or left-wing. It is
simply passe.,,39 In February 1992, the federal Liberal convention formally shifted the
party's trade position from support for abrogation to endorsing a loosely defmed
process of "renegotiation" of the pact. In an opinion drafted for the Council of
Canadians, former Canadian ambassador to the GATT Mel Clark laid out a blistering
critique of the new Liberal stance. Clark considered renegotiation a "mirage that
ignored the reality of the enormous power the U.S. possesses in bilateral negotiations
3l! Randy Robinson, ''Notes of PCN Meeting with Liberal Leadership," Pro-Canada Network, 25
September 1990. Further signs of the Liberals slide away from ITA abrogation are reported in the Pro-
Canada Dossier over the next year. See, for example, "Liberals Backing Away from Stance on
Abrogation," ACN Dossier, September - October 1991. The Liberals shifting stance on free trade was
foreshadowed by the race for the party leadership. Generally recognized as the leading voice of the
'left' within the party, Lloyd Axworthy withdrew from the race blaming his inability to raise sufficient
financial support. See "Pick Leader Who'll Scrap ITA," Pro-Canada Dossier, 2 March 1990. On
Axworthy's failure to seek the Liberal leadership, see Maude Barlow and Bruce Campbell, Straight
Through the Heart (Toronto: Harper Collins, ]995), ]06-07.
39 Hugh Winsor, "What Does Liberal Mean?" Globe and Mail, 23 November] 99]. A I; Chretien
quoted in Hugh Winsor, "Liberal Conference Tests Icy Economic Waters," Globe and Mail, 26
November 1991, A l. On the Aylmer conference and the Liberal Party's shift on free trade, see Edward
Greenspon and Anthony Wilson Smith, Double J 'ision: The Inside Stan' ofthe Liberals in Power
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada. 1996) and Barlow, The Fight ofMv Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant
Canadian, I 5 I.
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with Canada" as well as going counter to the "experience and wisdom of successive
governments from King to Trudeau.,,40
Reacting to the Liberals about face and emboldened by opinions such as
Clark's, the ACN reconfrrmed its own commitment to abrogation. In March 1992, the
PCN Assembly adopted the following statement:
That the ACN bring forward a program for national recovery and development
as an alternative to the bankrupt corporate policies that have been forced upon
us in the last decade. It must be made clear from the outset that cancelling the
FTA is key to opening the door for alternative policies. As long as the FTA
remains in place our governments are prevented from implementing the social.
economic, environmental and cultural policies necessary for recovery and
development."
The March Assembly marked a period where the importance ofabrogation as an
election issue was highlighted and promoted within the Network and in public.
Enthusiasm for abrogation as an issue was greatest at the core of the PCN's leadership
- egged on by a strong commitment from the Council of Canadians. Council chair
Maude Barlow toured the country with her new book Take Back the Nation in 1991
promoting abrogation. In a report entitled Abrogation for the Nation published by the
CCPA, Barlow's co-author Bruce Campbell argued that "[tjhe abrogation of the
Canada-U.S. FTA is the pivotal issue on which the election and the future of Canada
- will be decided. ,,42 In a covering memorandum to member organizations
accompanying a long promised working paper on abrogation, Network chair Tony
Clarke struck a similar note: "this (abrogation) will certainly be a major issue in the
forthcoming federal election. ,,43
40 Mel G. Clark, Memorandum to Maude Barlow, 16 February 1990. For a discussion of renegotiation
and termination, see Duncan Cameron, "Renegotiation and Termination," in Canada Under Free
Trade, ed. Duncan Cameron and Mel Watkins (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1992). In a
letter to Chretien dated May 15, 1992, Mel Hurtig pointedly presses the Liberal leader to explain the
concept of 'renegotiation.' Mel Hurtig, Letter to Hon. Jean Chretien, 15 May 1992.
41 Summary of Discussion and Major Decisions, ACN, Seventeenth Assembly, Ottawa, March 1992.
Also, "It's Time to Scrap the FTA: ACN," ACN Dossier, March-April 1992.
42 Maude Barlow, Interview by author, Ottawa, 17 March 1997; Bruce Campbell, Abrogation to
Rebuild the Nation (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1992).
43 Tony Clarke, Memorandum to Member Organizations, 13 May 1992: see also "Cancelling the free
trade deal: an ACN position paper," an undated draft attached to the above memorandum.
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While there was official unanimity among ACN member groups on the
commitment to abrogation, perceptions of its importance and realism as an objective,
and consequently the level of commitment, varied quite widely." For some, the
abrogation stance was necessary as the Canadian contribution to the broader
continent-wide battle to defeat NAFTA; for others, it might be considered a "position
of legal necessity rather than of political opportunity.?" Even those espousing
abrogation as a strategic priority were very clear that it did not constitute a standalone
objective. Sandra Sorenson, executive director of the CCPA, argued that "free trade is
like a contagious disease - malaria say or smallpox. If you ask me, what's the
alternative to this disease? I would say, first ofall, to get rid of it. But that on its own
isn't enough.T'" The lead article in the first post-1988 election issue of the Pro-
Canada Dossier anticipated this perspective when it accompanied a call for rigorous
monitoring of the damage caused by the FfA with the following admonition:
Any move to terminate the agreement in the years ahead will have to show
that there are alternatives to greater integration with the U.S.47
While abrogation was a strategic consideration from the moment the FTA was
implemented, the PCN's commitment to this objective came as part of the new
trinational opposition to free trade. This dynamic also influenced the nature of the
Canadian campaign for abrogation. More broadly, the Network's programme and
structure were also affected. For example, the emphasis on promoting alternatives to
liberalized trade as a development strategy was reinforced. Finally, work with
Mexican allies in particular added to the pressure to reconsider the Pro-Canada
Network's name and organizational structure. It is to this process that we now tum.
44 Informally, organizational leaders including some from major trade unions expressed their doubts
about abrogation (evidence from personal interviews). Records from the planning process for the major
pre-election mobilization on Parliament Hill on May 15, 1993 in the minutes of ACN Campaign
Strategy Committee meetings for January - April 1993 indicate that these doubts persisted. ACN files.
45 Foster, Interview by author and Sorenson, Interview by author.
4b Quoted in "Development and Trade for Healthy Economies," Pro-Canada Dossier, January -
February I991.
47 'The Struggle Enters a New Phase.··
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4. Dealing with the 'National Question': The Action Canada Network
The Pro-Canada Network had, by its very nature, been obliged to deal with the
fundamental national cleavage at the heart of Canadian identity. From its inception,
the Network's founders were committed to including popular sector groups from
Quebec within its process. Difficult at the best of times, this accommodation was all
the more so due to the nature of the free trade issue. The revitalized Canadian
nationalism of free trade opponents outside Quebec - at least partially rooted in the
trade, investment and cultural nationalism of the 1970s - contrasted sharply with the
approach taken by the Coalition quebecoise en opposition au libre-echange and other
FTA opponents in Quebec. As the PCN discovered, mobilizing progressive nationalist
opinion in a 'binational' state while avoiding internal antagonism is no simple task. 48
As Council of Canadians co-chair, John Trent recalls discussions around the
Canada Summit as clearly taking into consideration the distinct organizational and
thematic concerns and needs of Quebec groups. In his recollection, they went even
further, to the point of "inventing the idea that there would be two coalitions, there
would be the Quebec coalition and a Canadian network." Quebec participants were
not enthused by the name chosen for the new pan-Canadian body; it is not clear
whether their eventual acceptance stemmed from a lack of alternatives, as suggested
by some participants in the meeting, or following John Trent's account, a more
profound sense that they would in any case be working as a separate Quebec-based
coalition.t"
Concern with the name was more than semantic since the moniker 'Pro-
Canada' had been used by the federalist No side in the 1980 referendum on
sovereignty while most leading anti- free trade organizations in Quebec were pro-
sovereignty. The issue was never far from the surface for the PCN and was again
raised immediately following the 1988 election. At the Network's Sixth Assembly.
representatives of the Coalition quebecoise noted the problems the name caused in
48 On the inclusion of Quebec groups at the outset, see Chapter 4 above.
49 Trent, Interview by author.
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Quebec and called for a re-evaluation. While some Canadian groups expressed
support for this position others opposed it. Reasons ranged from the fear that a change
in name would be seen as implying a specific position on the issue of national unity
(Canadian Teachers Federation) to the concern that a hard-won organizational identity
would be lost (Council of Canadians, Canadian Labour Congress)."
Since tying opposition to the trade deal to nationalist sentiments in the fashion
oftheir counterparts elsewhere in Canada was not an option, FTA opponents in
Quebec focused almost exclusively on in-depth sector-by-sector analysis of the
projected impact ofa bilateral trade agreement. FTA opponents nationwide
considered their work very useful. 51
Given its limited resources, the Network developed a relatively successful
working relationship on this level for the duration ofthe pre-election and election
periods. Bilingualism became a requirement for staff and some attention was paid to
the special requirements of Quebec-based member groups. This included a concerted
effort to include at least one spokesperson from Quebec in all Network public events
and to make all documents available in both official languages. 52 Exceptions to this
positive working relationship pointed to underlying tensions.
Perhaps the most prominent example involved the cartoon booklet. Produced
for the Network by the Coalition against Free Trade, it had been written and
illustrated by two Anglophones and its content - text, illustrations and overall tone -
depended heavily on Canadian nationalist themes and a corollary humour that held
little relevance in Quebec. Nevertheless, many ofthe fmancial backers of the
endeavour were committed by their own organizational rules to distribute documents
to their membership in both official languages" The quandary facing the Network
so PCN Sixth Assembly Summary.
S\ Vezina, "La Campagne d'opposition au libre-echange: bilan et perspectives": Cameron, Interview by
author.
~2 PCN, "Report and Recommendations of the Quebec-Canada Task Force," Pro-Canada Network, 12-
14 October 1990.
S3 This was a constitutional obligation for many national unions.
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reflected the fundamental dilemma at the heart of Canadian identity. As a pan-
Canadian formation, the PCN hoped to develop a discourse that could appeal to all
citizens from coast-to-coast including, of course, francophone Canadians both inside
and outside Quebec.
By the time the cartoon booklet was ready to go to press in September 1988,
plans to develop an alternative Quebec-oriented French language document product
were unfulfilled. Moreover, there was little enthusiasm for such a project as was
evident when it was mooted at the Network's August pre-election Assembly." At the
last possible moment, in order to meet the requirements of some national
organizations, the booklet was translated, adapted and produced in French. While
some groups used it internally, the bulk of the print run was warehoused by
embarrassed Quebec member groups and destroyed after the election. 55
Despite this and other hiccups, until Election Day in 1988 the FTA provided
sufficient justification for a simple accommodation between differing English
Canadian and Quebecois discourses. With all eyes on the common objective of
defeating the Conservative government and stopping the trade deal, it was generally
understood, if grudgingly by some, that the two distinct approaches were essential.
With the electoral results, the subsequent implementation ofthe FTA, and the
broadening of the Pro-Canada Network's agenda, this perspective began to change.
When Quebec voted massively for the Progressive Conservative Party and
consequently - purposefully or not - for free trade, some analysts, in the manner of a
spurned suitor, viewed it as much as a vote 'against Canada' as anything else." But
the coming gradual decoupling of the Canadian and Quebecois popular sector agendas
was more a result of an inward turn on the part of the Quebecois movement caught up
54 Fourth Assembly Minutes.
55 Peter Bakvis, Letter to Peter Bleyer. 4 November 1988; Clarke, Interview by author; Traynor,
Interview by author.
56 See Reg Whitaker, "No Lament for the Nation: Free Trade and the Election of 1988," Canadian
Forum, March 1989 and Phil Resnick, Letters to a Quebecois Friend (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen's, 1990). This theme is dealt with in Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: the Politics ofCanadian
Nationalism, 163 and McNally, "Beyond Nationalism, Beyond Protectionism: Labour and the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement:' ~41 .
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with resurgent nationalism than a negative reaction from Canadian counterparts to the
electoral results. The leadership of Quebec's trade unions and community sector
organizations were now shifting most of their energy and resources into their own
revivified battle for sovereignty.57
Repatriation of the Canadian constitution in 1982 had taken place without the
consent of the government of Quebec kicking off a period of intense conflict between
the Trudeau Liberal government and the sovereigntist Parti Quebecois provincial
government. Three years later, a Liberal government was returned in Quebec.
Meanwhile, Brian Mulroney's federal electoral success in 1984 was built, in large
part, on a combination of support from the two disaffected regions of the Trudeau era,
the West and Quebec. Mulroney made national reconciliation a centrepiece of his
government's agenda and initiated negotiations with the provinces that culminated in
the signing of the Meech Lake Accord in 1987.
The Accord's primary objective was to satisfy the core demands of the Quebec
government to ensure that province's inclusion in the constitutional framework. These
demands included limits to the federal spending power in shared-cost programs, a
veto over constitutional amendments affecting Quebec, and recognition of Quebec as
a "distinct society." The parties agreed to a three-year timeline for ratification by all
jurisdictions.58 While Meech Lake was largely eclipsed by the national debate on the
FTA in 1988, it returned to the forefront in 1989 and, after a series of dramatic
reversals, failed to be ratified by the June 1990 deadline set in the original
agreement. 59
As the Meech Accord returned to centre stage and started to unravel, Quebec
participation in the PCN dwindled. Quebec-based groups were infrequent attendees at
Network assemblies and steering committee meetings and there were often no Quebec
57 PCN Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Assembly Summaries; confirmed in personal interviews.
511 The initial First Minister's meeting regarding the Meech Lake Accord was held at Meech Lake.
Quebec on April 30, 1987. The second was held in Ottawa on June 3, 1987. On Meech Lake, see
McBride and Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order, 94.
59 Introduction to Duncan Cameron and Miriam Smith. eds., Constitutional Politics (Toronto: Jam...'S
Lorimer and Company, 1(92).
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spokespersons available for public events. While they recognized that the neo-
conservative agenda they opposed was continuing to be driven forward at the federal
level, Quebec groups nonetheless paid less and less attention to the PCN. 60 Still,
representatives of Quebec-based organizations raised the thorny issue of the
Network's name again at a September 1989 Steering Committee meeting and a full
discussion of the issue was put on the agenda for the October 1989 Assembly. Based
on decisions at this Assembly, member groups were surveyed on three options:
maintaining the current name, or adopting one of two new names, Canadian Social
Justice Network or Solidarity Network Canada. Responses to the survey were deemed
"inconclusive.,,61
In the spring of 1990, the Campaign for Fair Taxes included an explicit
attempt to improve Quebec participation in the Network's activities. A representative
of the Quebec coalition was made co-chair of the campaign and there were efforts to
coordinate activities in Quebec with work elsewhere. Unfortunately, problems with
the decision-making process and the production of materials afflicted the campaign
and, in the final analysis, it would become another focal point for criticism from
Quebec groups rather than a step towards a new and more positive relationship.f''
Against the background ofMeech Lake, grievances around the Campaign for
Fair Taxes were the [mal prod to a systematic examination of Quebec/Canada
relations within the Network. Many issues, including the Network's choice of name,
had been put aside in the heat of the battle against the FTA. The decision to form a
joint Quebec/Canada committee was taken at the Network's Eleventh Assembly held
in Quebec City in June 1990. With equal representation from English Canada and
60 See PCN Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Assembly Summaries; confirmed in Clarke, Interview by
author.
o l This judgement was expressed by chair Tony Clarke in a memorandum to member organizations.
Tony Clarke, Memorandum to Member Organizations, 24 January 1990. Discussion of the Network's
name is reported in PCN Tenth Assembly Summary.
62 Peter Bakvis, Memorandum to Tony Clarke, 27 October 1990: Clarke, Interview by author.
The Quebec Coalition's nomination of economist Ruth Rose to co-chair the Campaign for Fair Taxes
was viewed bv SPI11t' as reinforcing the sense that the PCN was not a high priority. Rose was a
relatively prominent activist but from the perspective of several other participants she did not carry the
institutional support or decision-making power necessary to make the Cf'T structure effective.
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Quebec, the committee's mandate was to review working relationships around
education materials and action strategies, propose a new model for future working
relationship between Quebec-based coalitions and the PCN, and make a specific
proposal concerning changing the name of the Network." During the course of three
meetings, the committee considered a number of different proposals dealing with its
mandate. Three comprehensive models were examined: minor adjustments to the
status quo, recognizing the 'special status' of Quebec groups in a pan-Canadian
network, and adopting a binational model. The committee's report, adopted by the
ACN's Thirteenth Assembly, proposed a series of changes along the lines ofa
'special status' model." These included increased representation for Quebec groups
within the Network's bodies, specifically the Assembly and the Steering Committee,
as well as a new name - the Action Canada Network. According to their report,
committee members viewed this as the most appropriate approach "in the current
political context.Y" In the announcement of the Network's renaming, this "context"
was described as including a "shift towards Quebec sovereignty.T"
63 PCN, "Report and Recommendations of the Quebec-Canada Task Force" and PCN Tenth Assembly
Summary. Committee members were Maude Barlow (Council of Canadians), Julie Davis (Ontario
Federation of Labour), Duncan Cameron (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives), Monique Simard
(Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux), Madeleine Parent (Solidarite populaire Quebec), Raymond
Johnston (Centrale des enseignants du Quebec), and PCN chair Tony Clarke in an ex-ojJicio capacity.
In PCN files.
64 While the 'English Canadian' representatives on the committee had been receptive to proposals to
establish a binational structure, Quebec representatives were reticent to move in this direction. One
concern on their part was the FTQ's unwillingness to participate directly in the existing broadly based
Quebec coalition Solidarite Populaire. The PCN was a circuitous route to ensure the FTQ's
participation since it was the provincial affiliate of the Canadian Labour Congress. Barlow, Interview
by author; Cameron, Interview by author; Clarke, Interview by author; Peter Bleyer, Memorandum to
Tony Clarke, July 1990.
While the committee finally arrived at a consensus it was apparent that perceptions of the problem at
hand differed greatly: "The basic assumptions representatives of Quebec member groups make
concerning the very nature of the PCN differ from those made by non-Quebec groups and for that
matter with contemporary reality. For the Quebec side, the PCN remains an informal information-
sharing network as it was at its inception and, in fact, as it remained until well into the 1988 Election
Campaign. The rift between the Coalition quebecoise and the PCN began at this point, with the shift in
orientation towards action. It continued when the PCN moved quickly in December 1988 to extend its
mandate to actively oppose the broader conservative/corporate agenda as a whole." Bleyer,
"Memorandum to Tony Clarke."
65 peN, "Report and Recommendations of the Quebec-Canada Task Force." See also Chantal Hebert,
"La CSN et la CEQ redeviennent canadiennes Ie temps de faire la guerre aux politiques federales," Le
Devoir, 6 avril 1991, A2 and Carol Goar, "Why Pro-Canada Group Changed its Name," Toronto Star,
6 April 1991.
Comments by Monique Simard, vice-president of the CSN and a member of the Quebec/Canada
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In her work on the Canadian women's movement, Phillips points out that the
"relationship between francophone and anglophone organizations is a constant
concern in Canadian social movements. ,,67 Among member groups of the PCN this
was certainly the case. These concerns ranged from intra-organizational relationships
between Quebec and other sections, to each organization's stance vis-a-vis the
constitutional debate. On this question positions varied widely. Some groups had
historically been strong supporters of federalism, this was the case, for example, for
the Council of Canadians; others, like the CCU, had adopted policy positions
supporting Quebec's right to self-determination.i" A number of the Network's pan-
Canadian member organizations faced protracted internal debate on this issue; still
others developed specific organizational compromises to deal with the issue.i" For
example, while it did not openly support self-determination, the Canadian Conference
ofCatholic Bishops maintained fraternal relations with a Quebec body viewed as its
de facto equal. 70
Committee in the verbatim record of the January 1991 Assembly hint at the ambiguous perspective
from Quebec: "In Quebec, sometimes we need a different public approach or to adapt our strategy and
tactics. We are not really a separate network. We didn't want to lose the connection. All of the issues
will be worked in Quebec inside the network and adapted. Let's take free trade with Mexico; we have
to do a special adaptation. The PQ is already pro-deal. We have to take a different approach; we need a
different packaging in Quebec." In ACN, Thirteenth Assembly, Verbatim transcript of discussion,
January 1991, ACN files.
66 ACN, "Introducing the ... Action Canada Network," (Ottawa: 1991).
67 Phillips, "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the Network of National Canadian
Women's Organizations," 770.
68 In a move that can at least partly be attributed to the impact of working in a broader popular sector
and specifically the Pro-Canada Network, the Council's Board of Directors adopted a "three founding
nations" stance in the fall of 1990. Barlow, Interview by author; see also Chapter 6, "A Constitution for
All Canadians" in Maude Barlow and Bruce Campbell, Take Back the Nation (Toronto: Key Porter,
1991 ).
69 On NAC and Quebec, see Heather Jane Maroney and Meg Luxton, eds., Feminism and Political
Economy:Women's Work, Women's Struggle (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1987); Phillips,
"Meaning and Structure in Social Movements: Mapping the Network of National Canadian Women's
Organizations"; Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women Mattered: A Political Analysis of
the National Action Committee on the Status ofWomen. On the CLC and Quebec, see Canadian Labour
Congress, "The CLC and the Constitutional Package:' Ottawa, 31 August 1992.
70 Clarke, Interview by author. Records of an in-depth discussion of the political situation in Quebec at
the Network's Ihirteenth Assembly (January 1991) reflect some continuing reticence to accept the
sovcfI.'ignist message com ing from Quebec groups. Summary of Discussion and Major Decisions,
peN, Thirteenth Assembly, Ottawa, 11-13 January 1991.
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5. Entering the Constitutional Fray
The Pro-Canada Network was formed only days before the initial First
Ministers Meeting that would lead to the Meech Lake Accord." Given this timing and
the Network's narrowly focused mandate, it is not surprising that the Accord did not
appear on its agenda. Even as the deadline for ratification approached and the Accord
and its travails became a virtual national soap opera three years later, the Network did
not take up the constitutional file. As the Dossier argued in retrospect, the PCN's
"hands were full" with "fallout from the FTA and opposing the GST."n In fact, many
member organizations had taken positions on the Accord and they were far from
unanimous in their opinions. The groups opposing Meech did so on a variety of
grounds. The Accord did not meet the minimum requirements for self-determination
set by many Quebec-based organizations and the Assembly ofFirst Nations. The
closed-door model of executive federalism that had given birth to Meech was of
concern to other organizations. NAC, for example, focused its critique on "eleven
white men deciding Canada's future behind closed doors.?" In addition, while the
Meech Lake Accord reflected the Conservative government's calculation that
"success on the constitutional front, a considerable prize in its own right would be
enhanced to the extent that the agenda was limited," its strong bias to provincial
powers and decentralization made it a fitting partner to the FTA.74 Advocacy groups
were very concerned that the 'opting out' clause included in the package would lead
to the erosion of social programs in some provinces.F While there was little
enthusiasm for the Accord, some PCN groups accepted it as an opportunity to bring
about reconciliation with Quebec."
71 Held at Meech Lake, Quebec on April 30. 1987.
72 'The ACN and the Meech Lake Accord," ACN Dossier, July-August 1991.
73 Ann Molgat with Joan Grant Cummings, "'An Action that Will Not be Allowed to Subside': NAC's
First Twenty-five Years," NAC, 5 June 2000 <http://www.nac-cca.ca/about/his_e.htm>.
7-1 McBride and Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order. 94-95~ Breton and
Jenson, "After Free Trade and Meech Lake: Quoi de neuf?"
7.~ "The ACN and the Meech Lake Accord."
70 Prominent examples were the Canadian Teachers' Federation and the Canadian Labour Congress.
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The state of play within the Network began to shift early in 1991 when the
Mulroney government mooted a new set of constitutional proposals and launched the
Spicer Commission to sound out public attitudea " The failure of the Meech Accord
had upped the constitutional ante; Quebec's conditions for accession to the
constitution were now farther reaching and backed by a commitment to a provincial
referendum by the fall of 1992. The federal package prepared in response largely met
Quebec's demands and included broader and more explicitly neo-liberal elements
such as enshrining property rights, eliminating interprovincial trade barriers and a
focus on competitiveness. Cameron and Smith describe the political logic of this new
constitutional offensive as follows: "They offered something to each of the regions
and key groups that have supported the government in the past, or that pose a
potential threat to its constitutional objectives." Specifically, this included catering to
the hankering in the corporate community for a dramatic withdrawal of the state from
the economic realm through decentralization, deregulation and privatization.i" Prime
Minister Mulroney sketched out the new constitutional course in two major addresses
in February 1991. His musings on the constitutional measures necessary to enhance
Canada's "international competitiveness" were noted in a lead article in the Pro-
Canada Dossier that also identified a marshalling ofcorporate support for the Tories
emerging plan. 79
While the Pro-Canada Network did not have the interest, the mandate or the
resources to deal with the Meech Lake Accord, the newly minted Action Canada
Network was in a somewhat different position. Meeting in January 1991 against the
backdrop of a rekindled constitutional debate, the Network's Assembly agreed to a
new name and structure. The new name was, in part, intended to clarify the Network's
lack of affinity with the traditional national unity implications of the Pro-Canada
n The proposals were published in September 1991 as Shaping Canada '.'I Future Together' Proposals,
Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991.
78 Cameron and Smith, eds., Constitutional Politics, 6-7. For a review of the neo-liberal economic
elements of the package, see McBride and Shields. Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New H'orld
Order. 104-05.
N "Tories Prepare Corporate Constitution." .·leN Dossier. March-April 1991.
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moniker.i'' Also, in the opinion of some, the Network's name had proven to be
something of a liability in the process of building alliances in Mexico and the United
81States.
Renaming also marked a commitment to the broader agenda and membership
that the group had moved towards since the 1988 vote. As a flyer produced for the
launch of the ACN three months later explained, "the political challenge of the
corporate agenda has also become more sharply defmed. The task of the Network is to
develop a large movement of social solidarity that can effectively challenge the
corporate agenda of the Mulroney government and big business. This means reaching
out, to broaden and deepen the participation of people's organizations.t''f
The momentum that led to its renaming carried the Action Canada Network
into the thick of the constitutional debate. After a celebration of the Network's new
identity, the April 1991 Assembly mandated the Steering Committee to develop, "a
set of proposed strategies for the participation of the ACN and its member
organizations in the forthcoming constitutional debate.,'&3 Delegates at the Assembly
were reflecting a number of developments. First, sympathy for both Quebec and the
First Nations in a number of organizations had, until then, been expressed in largely
ritualistic resolutions affirming the national right to self-determination. Daily events
and the increasing optimism of Quebec nationalists about the prospects for
sovereignty now challenged this stance.i" At both the January and April 1991
Assemblies, representatives of trade unions and social organizations expressed their
quandary in different ways. Some indicated their organizations were taking steps to
80 Goar, "Why Pro-Canada Group Changed its Name."
III The comments of one trade unionist at the Thirteenth Assembly are apposite: "I'm glad to see the
name change. The perception is that we had a narrow nationalistic focus ... what we're concerned about
it's the destruction of society. I'm happy about the name change because it makes it easier to work with
Americans and Mexicans." ACN, Thirteenth Assembly, Verbatim transcript of discussion, January
1991, ACN files.
82 ACN, "Introducing the ... Action Canada Network." See also Goar, "Why Pro-Canada Group
Changed its Name."
83 Noted in the introduction to "The ACN and the Constitutional Debate: A Set of Proposals:'
84 In their interventions at Assemblies in during this period, Quebec delegates indicated they felt
sovereignly was little shy of inevitable; for example, CSN representative Monique Simard gave a
verbal report on the "state of the sovereignist movement." PCN Thirteenth Assembly Summary.
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clarify or advance their positions. Perhaps most importantly, with a dynamic new
president, NAC had taken a strong stance against the federal proposals. Led by Judy
Rebick, NAC saw the Network as the only table in the country that brought together
labour and social organizations from both Quebec and the rest of Canada and thus the
obvious place to take up the constitutional challenge.f
At the same time, the Mulroney government's now more aggressive ly neo-
liberal approach to the constitutional file fit right into the renamed Network's mandate
and work plan. In March 1991, before the Network's renaming at its April Assembly,
the Dossier referred to "weakening the federal government and eliminating
democratic control over the economy" as the "key planks in Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney's plan to revamp Canada's constitution.t''" Later, in reporting the ACN's
entry into the debate, the Dossier would refer to the Tory proposals for a "corporate
constitution" and argue that "many of the governments specific proposals are
designed to respond to the requirements of the Canada-U.S. FTA.,,87 The apparent
renewal of the constitutional brinksmanship that characterized the Meech Accord
melded with dissatisfaction with Tory social and economic policies to give the
Mulroney government extremely low public opinion ratings in the winter of 1991.88
Moreover, by that summer close to 70 percent of Canadians viewed the constitution
(40 percent) and national unity (29 percent) as the top issues on the public agenda. 89
All of these factors contributed to a crescendo of support for a constitutional
intervention by the Network in the lead up to a meeting of its Steering Committee on
16 May. While the pressure to take an active role was led by NAC and Quebec
organizations, with forceful presentations by Rebick and CSN vice-president Monique
Simard, it also came from others, including trade unions that supported self-
85 Ibid.
86 "Tories Prepare Corporate Constitution," 1.
87 "Network Edges into Constitution Debate," ACN Dossier, July-August 1991,9 and "Political
Proposals Reflect Economic Restructuring," ACN Dossier. September-October 199I. 1.
88 The same polls ranked the NDP as the most popular federal party in January 1991. The Reid Report.
May 1993.
89 The Reid Report. May 1993.2.
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determination and social groups concerned with the impact of the 'opting out' clause.
The minutes of the meeting indicate that the chair was also very much in agreement:
Clarke is feeling strongly about the urgency of getting the Network primed for
intervening in this debate. As it is framed now, it is designed to camouflage
some ofthe deeper economic and political issues. Mulroney is leading a free
trade driven constitutional agenda. We have to develop progressive positions
in relation to that dynamic.90
6. The Charlottetown Referendum
At its Fifteenth Assembly (9-11 August 1991), the ACN confirmed
constitutional work as part of a "three-pronged action plan.'?" Over the fall, ACN
leadership and staffparticipated in a number of initiatives involving a range of think
tanks and independent academics. All of this activity culminated in the publication of
a position statement on the constitutional debate. 92 This document also laid out a
strategy for intervening in the series of constitutional conferences planned by the
federal government for early in the New Year. The Network focused a substantial
amount of energy on ensuring and coordinating participation by its member groups
and other like-minded organizations in conferences held in Halifax, Montreal,
Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver.93 An ACN staffer at the time acknowledges that
while the group's tactics "sound benign" these were "truly effective interventions.,,94
Certainly, the ACN and some of its member groups received a large amount of media
profile around the conferences and, in some cases, credit for the eventual outcome. As
McBride sums up: "In general the items related to the five areas of the federal
constitutional proposals most relevant to the neo-conservative agenda were not well
received by the constitutional conferences.'?"
90 Minutes, ACN, Steering Committee, Ottawa, 16 May 1991.
91 ACN, "Report on Fifteenth Assembly," 29 August 1991.
92 ACN, "Taking Charge of our Political Future: Working Paper on Constitutional Development.,"
December I991.
'13 Based on information in ACN files December 1991 - February 1992 as well as interviews with Mike
McBane and Tony Clarke.
l).j McBane, Interview by author.
95 McBride and Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order. 111. McBride and
shields provide a more detailed discussion of the dulling of the neo-conservative edges of the federal
governments position. Maude Barlow gives her own interpretation of the constitutional conferences in
her autobiography: "what started as a series of dry, tightly controlled gatherings of the country's
The constitutional process re- initiated by the Tories in 1991 culminated with a
fmal package of proposals in July 1992 that was put to a national plebiscite in October
1992. Along with federal government, both the Liberal opposition and the federal
NDP advocated a yes vote in what became known as the Charlottetown referendum.
The ranks of the popular sector, and with it the ACN, were split between Yes and No
camps." For NAC, "the issue was the weakening of the federal government and loss
of national standards. Women in Canada know that without national standards and
important programs being administered by the federal government the situation of
women would worsen." Like the NDP, the CLC felt the proposals, while imperfect,
provided a necessary compromise to satisfy the demands of Quebec. 97
While the ACN Assembly did take positions on aspects of the referendum
process - for example opposing the referendum legislation as based on inadequate
attention to fundamental democratic principles - differences in the ranks kept the
Network on the sidelines for the campaign and vote. Nevertheless, many participants
were very pleased with the role played by the Network and tended to view the
referendum as a moment of maturing for it,98 On the eve ofthe vote, member groups
engaged on different sides of a vigorous campaign came to the following conclusion
regarding the ACN's role:
anointed, turned into a boisterous and disorderly outbreak of democracy, as citizens advocacy groups,
coordinated under the ACN, turned back the corporate agenda so openly at work." Barlow, The Fight
ofMy Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian, 119-20.
Examples of media coverage of the three nations position put forward by the ACN include: "Left's
Proposal Envisions Three Nations," Globe and Mail, 16 December 1991; William Johnson, "Skewed
Agenda: Three-founding-nation Group Shrieked about Free Trade and Ignored Meech Lake," Montreal
Gazelle, 7 February 1992, B3. For reports on the impact of ACN participation, see Carol Goar, "Did
Left Really Orchestrate Montreal Conference?" Toronto Star, 6 February 1992, A19; Deborah
Dowling, "Coalition of Lobby Groups Hijack Government's Agenda: Alliance to Press for Social
Charter," Ottawa Citizen, 3 February 1992, A3; Linda Hossie, "Grassroots Groups Altered Content of
Unity Debate," Globe and Mail, 25 February 1992, A7.
96 Among ACN members, the CLC and CTF were in the YES camp; NAC and the Canadian Union of
Postal Workers on the NO side while a number of other groups remained neutral (e.g. National I Inion
of Public and General Employees, Canadian Union of Public Employees, National Farmers Union,
Canadian Federation of Students, Public Service Alliance of Canada). ACN, "Notes on Referendum
Discussion at Nineteenth Assembly:' -l October 1992.
97 Ann Molgat with Joan Grant Cummings, '''An Action that Will Not be Allowed to Subside': NAC's
First Twenty-five Years:' NAC, 5 June 2000 <http://www.nac-cca.ca/about/his_e.htm>; see also Judy
Rebick, "Why Not Women?" Canadian Forum, October 1992: the CLC's position is set out in
Canadian Labour Congress, "TIle CLC and the Constitutional Package."
98 Author's interviews with various ACN participants.
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The Assembly serves as an ongoing forum for the direct exchange of views on
the constitutional question. Member organizations were able to speak to the
context of their respective position on the referendum. This in itself is a
contribution to the debate. Aware ofthe potential for division and
misunderstanding, a wide-ranging discussion took place with full respect for
different organisational, sectoral and regional perspectives.99
They concluded further that "regardless ofthe outcome, we stand united with our
common concerns about the corporate economic and social agenda; the Network has
an important leadership role to play in 'picking up the pieces' once the divisive
referendum and its polarized yes/no politics run its course."IOO
7. Back to NAFTA
When negotiators for Canada, the U.S. and Mexico initialled a draft NAFTA
after an around the clock session in Washington early in August 1992. they set the
stage for a yearlong endgame in the battle over continental free trade. In Canada, the
ACN kicked off a flurry ofanti-deal activity as the smoke from October's
Charlottetown referendum was clearing. At a news conference on 12 November, the
Network tried to turn its divided ranks during the constitutional plebiscite to
advantage, in order to highlight the collective commitment to take on NAFTA. Joined
by CLC president Bob White and NAC president Judy Rebick, representing groups on
either side of the referendum divide, Council of Canadians chair Maude Barlow told
the media: "We are serving notice that we have regrouped... and we're going to fight
this very hard." I0 I
99 ACN, ''Notes on Referendum Discussion at Nineteenth Assembly." ACN Staffer Randy Robinson
offers the foIlowing assessment: "Ultimately, the ACN member groups took different positions on the
October 1992 referendum, but the ACN kept civil communications alive between member
organizations on opposite sides of the YesINo fence." Randy Robinson, "Democracy from Below,"
Canadian Forum, April 1993, 12.
100 ACN Seventeenth Assembly Summary.
101 "Coalition Ready for Fight Over Free Trade Deal," Ottawa Citizen, 13 November 1992, A4; see
also "White Blasts Free Trade:' Financial Post, 13 November 1992, A4; "L'opposition s'organise
contre I'adoption de I'ALENA," Le Devoir, 13 novembre 1992, AS and Jonathan Ferguson, "Free Trade
Driving Jobless to Suicide, Angry White Says," Toronto Star, 13 November 1992, A 14.
In an op-ed published in the Globe and Mail, Clarke builds on the majority of ACN groups'
sympathetic view of the NO position arguing that NAFfA had more dramatic negative consequences
that the economic union in the Charlottetown package. Tony Clarke, "NAFfA: A New Constitutional
Trap," Globe and Mail, 18 December 1992.
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In reality, while the constitution had drawn a large amount of attention from
the Network and from some of its member groups in particular, the focus on trade had
been sustained thanks to the Common Frontiers project and the Network's secretariat.
With FTA abrogation garnering little interest, the trinational trade negotiations
quickly became the priority. After the U.S. Congress gave President Bush 'fast track'
negotiating authority for NAFTA on 23 May 1991, negotiations were underway. 102
For its part, the ACN organized nationwide anti-NAFTA protest activities on 1 June
in advance of the first negotiation session to be held in Toronto on 12 June. The .fast
track' decision gave a new momentum to opposition in the U.S. leading to the
formation of two new groupings, the Citizens Tradewatch Campaign and the Alliance
for Responsible Trade (ART). As Robinson notes, "these efforts created, for the first
time, something that the ACN recognized as a counterpart to its national network.,,103
In conjunction with its American and Mexican allies, the ACN began
assiduously following the negotiations. As sessions moved from city to city, NAFTA
opponents from the three countries were on-site, sharing strategy and staging joint
actions challenging their governments. 104 Between sessions, Common Frontiers, the
ACN and their trinational allies focused on obtaining as much information about the
content of the talks as possible. More than once their efforts were rewarded with the
delivery of 'brown envelopes.' Most notably, in March 1992, they obtained the full
text of the draft agreement, which was quickly made public. A detailed analysis was
102 At a news conference in Toronto to mark the 'fast track' decision, Common Frontiers
representatives argued that the US would use new negotiations to seek further Canadian concessions
and noted the trilateral work trade liberalization opponents had done toward an alternative Continental
Development Pact. "Round Two Begins," ACN Dossier, May-June 1991.
103 Robinson, "NAFTA, Social Unionism, and Labour Movement Power in Canada and the United
States," 678. See also Ritchie, "Fighting Free Trade U.S. Style"; and "June 1 Events Mark Start of
Round Two," ACN Dossier, May-June 1991.
Ill-! Negotiations took place in Toronto (June 1991), Seattle (August 1991), Zacatecas (October 1991),
Chantilly, Virginia (February 1992), Montreal (April 1992), and finally the historic Watergate Hotel in
Washington (August 1992).
Actions around the Montreal negotiations are described in "Network Keeps Heat On," ,.leN Dossier,
March-April 1992 and "Hold Talks in Public, Unions Say," Montreal Gazette, 7 April 1992. A2;
Seattle in "Groups Demand Open Negotiations," ACN Dossier, July-August 1991: and Chantilly in
"NAFTA Draft Stays Secret," A( 'N Dossier, January-February 1992. See also Barlow, The Fight ot My
Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian, 131.
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prepared by Common Frontiers and published by the CCPA though only several
weeks later, 105
Events around the Zacatecas negotiations were especially significant. An
international citizens' forum was convened with more than 300 representatives.
mostly Mexican but including fifteen Canadians and a few Americans, Zacatecas was
considered an important 'coming out' for the Mexican Network; the ACN Dossier
claimed that the event "put Mexican opposition on the map" and went on to explain:
The media coverage of the event was a first and gave a lot of visibility to the
Mexican network, Also, the delegations from Quebec, Canada and the United
States gave an international character to the event and reinforced its
dibili 106ere 1 1 tty.
The Mexican Network felt it had benefited from three key factors: public exposure
through Mexican and international media, broad representation of Mexican society,
and the presence of key political leaders such as Cardenas and the opposition
candidate for Governor in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi. 107 Significantly, after
a public confrontation between ACN chair Tony Clarke and Canadian Trade Minister
Michael Wilson led to a brief private meeting between the two, both the American
and Mexican negotiators sent representatives to meet with Clarke's U.S. and Mexican
counterparts. This bestowed instant recognition and credibility on the Mexican
coalition turning Zacatecas into its "launching pad.,,108
8. From Parallel Accords to Social Agendas
Despite Minister Wilson's meeting with Clarke at Zacatecas, much like its
U.S. and Mexican counterparts, the Canadian government hoped to limit discussion
105 "Trade Text No Big Deal, Wilson Says, Opponents Fear Loss of Canada's Sovereignty," Ottawa
Citizen, 25 March 1992, A4; "NAFTA is a Very Big Deal," ACN Dossier, March-April 1992; The
detailed analysis of the NAFTA text was not prepared with the same urgency as were the various
reports based on the ITA text in 1988. There is evidence of interorganizational tension between the
ACN. CCPA. and Common Frontiers. Duncan Cameron, lnterview by author, Ottawa 1997; Clarke,
Interview by author; Traynor. Interview by author.
106 Randy Robinson and Louis Poirier, "Event puts Mexican Opposition on Map," ACN Dossier.
November-December 199 J. 4; Traynor, Interview by author;
107 Sinclair. cd.. Crossing the Line. 140.
108 ACN Dossier. November-December 1991; Clarke, Interview by author; Foster, Interview by author;
Traynor. Interview by author.
257
and debate on the new trinational deal. As it had in 1988. the Network aimed to
achieve exactly the opposite result. 109 Following more or less the same model, the
ACN produced a detailed analysis and critique of the NAFTA text and planned
dramatic protests to counter the federal government's public relations offensive. Most
notably, on 17 December a number of ACN leaders disrupted a NAFTA signing
ceremony staged on Parliament Hill. 110 The Ottawa ceremony was one of several
staged by the three governments anxious to promote the agreement. A signing event
in San Antonio, Texas in October appeared designed to help president Bush defend
the merits ofNAFTA in the run-up to the American federal election. While Bill
Clinton, the Democratic challenger, was prone to pulling his punches on NAFTA,
Ross Perot, a maverick business executive, mounting a third party challenge under the
banner of the Reform Party campaigned directly against the agreement as a threat to
American jobs. NAFTA posed something ofa dilemma for the Clinton Democrats
who were committed to trade liberalization but equally concerned to hang on to their
traditional liberal support base. To resolve this conundrum, Clinton seized on the
parallel accords on environment and labour first introduced by President Bush in an
attempt to insure passage ofNAFTA by the U.S. Congress. Clinton promised to
revisit NAFTA to obtain stronger and more effective side agreements as he looked to
firm up support from the labour movement and environmental groups. As a result,
when the Democrats took the presidency in November 1992, the NAFTA story
entered a new chapter. The parallel accords opened the door to a period of intensive
trinational action and lobbying largely focused on the Congress. The accords also
posed the most significant test to date for the relationship between free trade
109 Maude Barlow refers to the record of a Government strategy session published in the newsmagazine
Maclean 's. It was the "transcript of telephone call involving more than a dozen senior Tory aides
during which they planned a costly and extensive campaign to discredit us." Barlow, The Fight ofMy
Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian, 133.
110 ACN, News Release, "ACN Demands Full Public Hearings on NAFTA," Ottawa, 12 November
1992; ACN, "Tories Have No Mandate to Impose NAFTA: A Joint Statement of the Action Canada
Network." Public Statement, Ottawa, 12 November 1992; Ian Austen, "Protests Mark Start of Trade
Hearings," Edmon/on Journal, 18 November 1992, A3; "Free-trade Flag Flap," Ottawa Citizen. 18
December 1992, AI; "Free Trade Free-for-all," Ottawa Citizen, 18 December 1992, FI; see also
account in Barlow, The Fight ofMv Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian, 133-34.
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opponents in the three countries, as well as creating an additional internal challenge
for the ACN.
The promise of tougher parallel accords on labour and the environment was
well received by most u.s. anti-free trade groups but the response north of the forty-
ninth parallel was very different. While Jim Jontz, the former congressman from
Indiana who was national coordinator ofthe Citizens' Trade Campaign argued that
NAFTA must "either be fixed or defeated," the ACN's Tony Clarke summarized its
stance succinctly: "[Y]ou can't fIX NAFTA with side-bar deals or parallel accords.,,111
In the United States, support for the accords was rooted in a moderate and
increasingly marginal labour movement and large environmental organizations, both
with strong ties to the Democratic Party. I 12 The Canadian position on parallel accords
evolved out of a combination of factors. It was informed, in part, by a continuing
debate concerning the value ofthe social charter adopted by the European
Community, driven by the Canadian labour movement's historic relationship with
European trade unions and social democracy. Interest in the European social charter
was generally less than enthusiastic, while scepticism regarding the model was
reinforced by the experience ofcoalition politics through the PCN/ACN. The
Network also provided space for non-CLC unions and CLC affiliates alike to express
their opposition in a more forceful manner than would otherwise have been the
case.!':'
111 Both are quoted in "NAFTA News Summary," Trade News Bulletin.
112 On differences between the Canadian and US labour movements and specifically the inclination
toward social unionism in the former and to business unionism in the latter, see Robinson, "NAFTA,
Social Unionism, and Labour Movement Power in Canada and the United States."
I D For statements of the Canadian critique of the accords, see ACN, "A Position Statement on NAFTA
and the Side-bar Negotiations," Ottawa, 2 April 1993 and "Open Letter from Council of Canadians and
Prominent Canadians: Side Deals Can't Fix a Bad Agreement," Canadian Perspectives, Autumn 1993.
The Canadian position was that parallel accords could not be made effective without reopening the
NAFTA text itself for renegotiation. To whit, "the core elements in NAFTA will simply override
anything that may emerge from these side-bar negotiations." In ACN, "The NAFTA Sidebars - an
Exercise in Political Deception':" Ottawa, undated.
The Canadian debate on the European social charter is reflected in "Lessons from Europe: The Fe
Charter: a Symbolic Victory Only? Or a Foot in the Door," AeN Dossier, May-June 1991.
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From the vantage point of the Mexican Network. the parallel accords were an
opportunity to deal with a difficult domestic political situation. The impossibility of
outright opposition to trade liberalization and NAFTA had driven the Mexicans to
promote and counterpose to it a broad alternative model for development; an approach
that was coined the 'social agenda.' While the ACN was sympathetic, and indeed
influenced in terms of its own outlook by the Mexican emphasis on alternatives, there
was concern that the 'social agenda' also "lent itself to quick fixes such as the side bar
agreements.v'!" A memorandum from the Mexican Network to the ACN, dated as the
deadline set for the parallel accords by President Clinton approached, appears to
confrrm this assessment:
We are perfectly aware of your position on the parallel agreements, and we
respect it. We are also aware that time is running out. However, we still
believe that it would be advantageous for the networks of the three countries
to not let these negotiations slip by without taking some kind of action. Would
it not be possible, in accordance with your position and in keeping with your
own conditions, to hold some kind of activity in solidarity with the proposals
we presented to the Mexican, Canadian and US delegations? (Translation from
the Spanish originalj.i "
For similar reasons, the parallel accords further stoked tensions between
English-Canadian and Quebec-based NAFTA opponents. Particularly in the aftermath
of the failure ofMeech Lake followed by the No vote in the Charlottetown
referendum, labour and social organizations in Quebec were preoccupied with the
ongoing debate on the national question. As we have seen above, opposition to free
trade in Quebec had always been tempered by the aspirations for Quebec sovereignty
harboured to greater or lesser extent by most popular sector organizations in the
province. The Mexican social agenda approach also fit into the worldview of groups
like the CSN, which, in fact, participated in its development through an ongoing
dialogue with Mexican organizations like the FAT and that was now expanding to
include groups in other Latin American countries.
114 Clarke, Interview by author.
115 RMALC, Memorandum to ACN, 18 May 1993; the role of the Mexican Network in working with
US groups to "push parallel accords on labor and the environment through the U.S. Congress" is
confirmed in The Mexico Weekly Report: ..In on-line summary and analysis ofthe week's most
important newsfrom Mexico (April 1996 [cited 21 April ~OOO]); available from
www.mexicoweekly.com/ArchiveJMWRAl1996.
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Further confusing matters, by mid-1992 the ACN was fmally preparing a
domestic campaign for abrogation of the Canada-U.S. FTA in line with its
commitment at the initial Mexico City Encuentro. This position had never been of any
great interest to the Network's U.S. interlocutors who had largely ignored the FTA in
the first instance. Now, the Americans were in hot pursuit oftough side agreements
for NAFTA and free trade opponents in Quebec and Mexico were attracted by the
potential for advancing a social agenda through the opening created by the parallel
accords.
Through the opening months of 1993, all eyes were on Washington as activists
from Canada and Mexico joined U.S. groups in lobbying Congress and attempting to
shift American public opinion against NAFTA. 116 While key ACN and Common
Frontiers actors including Clarke, Barlow, Traynor and others travelled to Washington
more than once during this period, support for efforts in the U.S. did not come at the
expense ofdomestic action planning. On the home front, the ACN was gearing up for
a major mobilization. 117
9. Another Free Trade Election?
Other accounts broadly confirm the assessment that at the ACN's January
1993 Assembly, "discussion and commitment to action was at its highest level since
the 1988 election period. National organizations and provincial coalitions indicated
their willingness to work toward a major mobilization around the corporate agenda
with the centrepiece being the FTA/NAFTA." 118 Delegates were energized by
successful actions against NAFTA in the late fall and early winter, and nourished by
widespread public dissatisfaction with the Mulroney government mired at 20 percent
or less in public support now for three full years and approaching the end of its
116 Fagan, "'NAFTA Fight Draws on Canadian Experience: American, Mexican Anti-Free lrade
Coalitions Look North for Ammunition, Inspiration"; Traynor. Interview by author and Barlow,
Interview by author.
117 ACN, "Action Plan '93 Update," 16 February 1993 lays out plans for this period in detail.
118 Introduction to ibid.: confirmed in personal interviews with participants.
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mandate. I19 Out of this charged atmosphere came extensive and ambitious plans to
ramp up the anti-NAFTA battle through 1993. Over the next few weeks. member
groups considered these proposals to determine the degree to which they might
participate and provide support. The response of the CLC was by far the most
important. Congress representatives had participated in the January Assembly that had
generated these plans and the message sent by the recent election of CA W president
Bob White to head the CLC no doubt played some part in invigorating the meeting.
Nevertheless, a full commitment by the Congress to the ACN's plans required
approval by its Executive Council with representation from its affiliates. In a letter to
affiliate leaders, Bob White called for support for a major commitment of resources to
the plans for mobilization. He concluded:
There is no question in my mind that if we decide as a movement to
participate in such a demonstration and commit the necessary resources to
organize it, it will be a huge success. We cannot leave the March meeting
without a decision on this matter, so I urge you to come prepared to spend the
necessary time on this issue and to make a decision. 120
At the subsequent meeting of the CLC's Executive Council, White got affiliate
support for a major labour movement investment in a spring mobilization. A two-
track process ensued with the Congress leading on preparations for a large rally on
Parliament Hill and the ACN handling plans for a coast-to-coast caravan - this time
by road, but again loosely styled on the 1930s "On to Ottawa" Trek. The caravan
brought out supporters in dozens of communities across the country and garnered
tremendous local media attention and the 15 May rally brought between sixty and one
hundred thousand demonstrators to Ottawa.l"
119 A video including footage of the disruption of the Ottawa NAFTA signing ceremony was played for
delegates at the opening of the Assembly.
120 Robert White, Memorandum to CLC Executive Council, 23 February 1993.
I~ I Jean Swanson, "Report on ACN Caravan," ACN, June 1993 reports a generally very positive
response. Media coverage included "Anti-Free Trade Caravan Heads for Ottawa," Vancouver Sun, 19
April 1993, A2; "Cross-country Caravan Targets Free Trade Deal," Lethbridge Herald, 28 April 1993,
; Carol Goar, "The Angry Spirit of 1935 Rises Up Again," Toronto Star, 15 May 1993, : "Anti-FTA
Caravan Stops in Fredericton," The Daily Gleaner, 12 May 1993,8; "NAFTA Protest Travelling
Country." The Evening Telegram. 26 April 1993.3. fditorial support for the demonstration came in
'Time to Protest and Celebrate,' Ottawa Citizen 1993, 14 May; see also "60,000 Iurn Hill into
Carnival of Protest," Ottawa Citizen, 16 May 1993, and "Fed up," Ottawa Sun, 16 May 1993, 1,4-5.
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10. The 1993 Election
The ACN's presence during the 1993 election campaign would pale in
comparison to a dynamic pre-election period culminating in the cross-country caravan
and large labour-backed rally on Parliament Hill. While the campaign launch garnered
respectable coverage in the media, in the end, the Network's electoral footprint was
very limited. 122 As in 1988, the Network secretariat produced materials for use by
member organizations during the campaign. Network leaders such as Tony Clarke and
Maude Barlow were invited to address meetings and conventions of member groups
and a few community forums on NAFTA were convened in conjunction with regional
and local coalitions. 123
Driven by the afterglow of the cartoon booklet's success in 1988, there were
two attempts to develop and widely distribute a publication in 1993. First, author Rick
Salutin was approached to develop a tabloid modelled on his original cartoon booklet,
this time focusing on NAFTA. Salutin's prototype generated only limited interest
beyond the core ACN leadership, and sparse fmancial commitments from member
groups. In addition to some doubts about the importance of free trade as an issue in
the election campaign, most thought the publication was "too text heavy and under-
illustrated." In the end, less than three hundred thousand copies were printed based on
$67,000 in fmancing, a far cry from the 1988 effort. The new publication had none of
the media and public impact of the earlier cartoon booklet. 124
Midway in the campaign, a satire of Canada's national newspaper of record,
the Globe and Mail, was produced by Guerrilla Media, a Vancouver-based group of
media activists. Activists shoved approximately twenty thousand copies of the four-
page broadsheet into Globe and Mail paper boxes in fifteen communities across the
country. Anxious for a major intervention in the campaign, the ACN leadership
J.2l On the low profile of free trade and 'nationalism' in the campaign, see Michael Valpy, "A Lonely
Walk for the Nationalists," Globe and Mail, 21 October 1993, A2.
123 Events are tracked in the relevant issues of the ACN Bulletin, which was published weekly starting
in August 1993 and for the duration of the election campaign.
124 ACN. "Election '93 Activities: Preliminary Notes prepared for the ACN Campaign Strategy
Committee," 5 November 1993.
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approached key member groups to consider broad distribution of the satirical tabloid
in target ridings. The idea was tested in a meeting with the co-chairs of the NDP's
campaign who agreed to approach their provincial campaigns to gauge their
interest.!" The ACN proposed to print one million copies and succeeded in raising
$50,000 from trade unions to this end. The print run was eventually cut in half
reflecting less than anticipated interest from the NDP's provincial offices. 126
Whether they attributed the recession that hit Canada from 1989 to 1991 to the
FTA or not, by 1993 Canadians most certainly viewed Prime Minister Mulroney and
the Tories as the villains. The FTA, the GST and the Bank of Canada's zero inflation
policy were all blamed for slow growth in 1989 followed in 1990 by a full year of
economic contraction; no real recovery had yet been felt at the time of the 1993
campaign. The prime minister's February resignation and June replacement by Kim
Campbell, a one-term cabinet minister, led to a brief summer flirtation between voters
and the Conservative Party. Whether as a result of stumbles by the new leader or a
failure to convince Canadians that new leadership had cleansed the party of blame,
Campbell led the Tories to their worst electoral defeat ever winning 16 percent of the
popular vote and only two parliamentary seats. 127
With an ant i-Tory wave sweeping the country, the ACN's participation in the
1993 campaign was hamstrung by the complexity of its objectives. In addition to a
third consecutive Conservative majority government, the ACN also feared the
possibility of a Tory minority that could govern with the support of the right-wing
populist Reform Party. Finally, a Liberal majority government was added to the list of
unacceptable outcomes. A working document presented to the June 1992 Assembly
125 This was in keeping with the general thrust of the NOP's campaign efforts. In his study of the
NOP's campaign in 1993, Alan Whitehorn argues that the party was intent on compensating for its
performance in 1988 by dealing with free trade in a "more forthright manner." Whitehorn, "Audrey
McLaughlin and the Decline of the Federal NOP," 48. Party staffer Ian McLeod adds: "Ever since
1988, the NOP's election planners had worked with two cardinal rules: keep the next campaign open
for consultation, and don't ignore free trade." Ian McLeod, Under Siege: the Federal NDP in the
Nineties (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1994), 100.
126 ACN, "Election '93 Activities: Preliminary Notes prepared for the ACN Campaign Strategy
Committee"; and Rocks, Interview by author.
127 Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett, and Anthony Westell, eds., The Canadian General Election 0/1993
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994).
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concluded: "There seems to be a general consensus that either one of these scenarios
would amount to the election of a right-wing government and the extension of the
t d ,,128corpora e agen a.
As the scale of ant i-Tory sentiment became clear during the election
campaign, ACN chair Tony Clarke signed a fundraising letter that reflects a
refocusing on the threat ofa Liberal majority government:
The challenge of the '93 election is clear. We must do everything we can to
see that the ingredients are there to form a progressive minority government
following October 25th. To do so, we must ensure that a significant number of
New Democrats are elected to form a minority government with the
Liberals. 129
A somewhat more tentatively worded news release made the same case: "[t[he
election of a Liberal-NDP government may be the key to blocking NAFTA and
saving Canada's social programmcs.t'{"
The electoral landscape was further complicated by the presence of the
fledgling National Party led by Council of Canadians founder Mel Hurtig. While the
new party "sank without a trace" in the course of the campaign, Hurtig's foray into
electoral politics was an additional consideration for the ACN, and above all, for the
Council of Canadians. 131 Hurtig and his main fmancial backer Bill Loewen did their
utmost to convince the Council of Canadians to support their endeavour. The Council
declined to support the National Party arguing that the only likely consequence of its
presence on the ballot was to split the anti-free trade vote. 132 For the ACN as a whole,
Hurtig's party posed less ofa quandary given the overwhelming support for the NDP
128 ACN, "Election Strategies," Working Document presented for discussion at the ACN Assembly, 5-7
June 1992.
12
1
) ACN, Fundraisinu Letter, 4 October 1993.
110 ACN, News Release, "Minority Government Key to Saving the Country," Ottawa, 21 September
1993; "Liberal Minority Best Hope," Cape Breton Post, 18 September 1993, 1.
13\ See the assessment of the National Party in Frizzell, Parnmett, and Westell, eds., The Canadian
General Election o11993. For Hurtig's own account of the formation and short history of the National
Party, see Hurtig, At Twilight in the Country, Memoirs ofa Canadian Nationalist, 355-93.
112 "Council Says Votes Wasted Supporting National Party," Edmonton Journal, 2 October 1993, A3.
See also I lurtig, At Twilight in the Country, Memoirs ofa Canadian Nationalist. Maude Barlow
discusses the formation of the National Party and the rift both personal and organizational this caused
between her and Hurtig in Barlow, The Fight ofMy Life: Confessions ofan Unrepentant Canadian,
157-60.
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from most member organizations with partisan leanings. Nevertheless. particularly on
Hurtig's home turf in Alberta, the presence of the new party did affect the ACN. In
Edmonton. Hurtig's hometown and the NDP's stronghold in the province, ACN-
Alberta attempted to broker a deal between the NDP and the new party. Co-chair
Maureen Werlin wrote to candidates in Edmonton East and Edmonton Northwest
urging them "to meet and endeavour to resolve this dilemma so that the anti-free trade
vote in these constituencies can be mobilized and made effective." While neither
party responded positively to the initiative, the NDP was incensed that the National
Party even considered standing against its lone Alberta incumbent in Edmonton East.
133
The ACN approached the federal election in the fall of 1993 with some
optimism. Since the 1988 vote, the Network had grown in membership, increased its
profile and met a series of challenges. Its stature had been enhanced by its role in the
constitutional debates the previous year and in the campaign against the GST prior to
that.!" Meanwhile the political opportunity structure facing the Network was now
substantially altered. The ACN could no longer count on the Liberal Party as an ally
though it could rely on the NDP to take the issue of free trade more seriously. In
addition, the Network now had allies in Mexico and the U.S. as part of a trinational
coalition. Most importantly, as a report to the ACN Assembly in Vancouver in June
1992 put it: "We have public support, they (the public) understand the issue but it is
up to us to take advantage of this opportunity. The context for this round of the free
trade debate is dramatically better.,,135
133 Maureen Werlin, Co-chair, ACN Alberta, Memorandum to Edmonton East and Northwest NDP and
National Party candidates, 24 September 1993.
1,4 In particular, the ACN's ability to coalesce different sides from the constitutional battle was noted
by the media. "Putting aside their constitutional differences, leaders of national labour and social
groups vowed Thursday to unity to fight the North American Free Trade Agreement. Some of these
groups found themselves on opposite sides of the campaign leading up to the October 26 plebiscite on
the ill-fated Charlottetown accord. But now, says Tony Clarke, leader of the ACN a united front has
emerged to oppose NAFrA." "Coalition Ready for Fight Over Free Trade Deal."
135 Common Frontiers, "Update to ACN Meeting," Vancouver, 5-7 June 1992.
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By the time a federal election was called in the fall of 1993, this optimism was
tempered. Widespread public concern with the state of the economy generated a wave
of anti-Tory sentiment rather than a more specific reaction to the FTA and NAFTA.
As a result, Canadians flocked to the one party they felt was most likely to defeat the
Conservative government. As Alan Whitehorn posits in his study of the campaign, the
NDP's focus on free trade was simply "one election too late." He adds that "even
nationalist allies such as the Council of Canadians seemed less able to arouse the
public on the issue in 1993.,,136 Frizzell et al. identify a substantial change in voters'
assessment of the importance of issues between the 1988 and 1993 campaigns.
Whereas free trade was considered the most important issue by a stunning 88 percent
of the electorate in 1988, it was only viewed as such by 2 percent of voters five years
later. At the same time, a more general concern with unemployment and jobs went
from 2 percent all the way up to 49 percent in 1993.137
Despite the NDP's twin commitments to campaign against NAFTA and to
remain open to "consultation" in developing its plans, and notwithstanding the web of
'interlocking directorships' linking the party to the ACN, relations between the two
fluctuated between warm and cool over the course of the campaign. Correspondence
between Tony Clarke and the NDP's campaign co-chairs hints at some of the points
of friction. The annoyance of party officials is almost palpable when they challenge
Clarke on the ACN's position:
[Y]ou favour the election of a minority government. This may not be helpful
at the level of the individual voter. since we know that Canadians vote for
did .c... 138can 1 ates, not lor mmonty governments.
In response, Clarke expresses his frustration that the NDP has not commented earlier
since ''there is nothing new about (the ACN's) strategy" and concludes with a
description of the limitations faced by the ACN vis-a-vis partisanship and electoral
politics. 139 One issue did see the federal NDP and ACN very much united: both had
136 Whitehorn. "Audrey McLaughlin and the Decline of the Federal NDP," 48.
137 Sec table 7 in Frizzell, Pammett, and Westell, eds., The Canadian General Election of 1993, 152.
D8 Fraser Green and Julie Davis, Letter to Tony Clarke, 25 September 1993.
139 It is worth recalling that one of the NDP campaign co-chairs was Ontario Federation of Labour
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high expectations for interventions by provincial NDP governments on NAFTA
during the campaign and neither was satisfied with the late and limited initiative
announced by Ontario Premier Bob Rae. 140
In the period following the mobilization against the GST, the Pro-Canada
Network engaged a series ofcritical issues and moved from campaign to campaign,
building both an impressive public profile and a broad political discourse. Still,
despite an intensity of activity that would have been hard to predict from the vantage
point of the PCN's humble beginnings in April 1987, the ACN's second engagement
with electoral politics would be much less impressive than its first. As Tony Clarke
wrote to the ACN Operations Committee on 30 June 1993:
A year ago at the Vancouver Assembly I was given a clear mandate to
continue at the helm of the ACN up to and through the federal election. One
year later, I fmd myself preoccupied with the question of whether the ACN
will be able to emerge from the '93 election on a solid footing for the political
challenges that lie ahead. 141
The next chapter will review the development of the Network focusing on a
few key themes and issues in an attempt to understand this progression.
Secretary Treasurer Julie Davis who, at the same time, was chair of the Network's operations
committee.
140 On the Ontario Government's initiative including of variety of anti-NAFTA measures and a court
challenge, see "Remarks by the Honourable Bob Rae, Premier of Ontario and Minister of
Intergovernmental Affairs: Statement to the Legislature Regarding the North American Free Trade
Agreement," 13 October 1993~ On the federal NDP's reaction, see McLeod, Under Siege: the Federal
NDP in the Nineties. The ACN put as positive a light on the Ontario initiative as possible in its official
response, see ACN, "Ontario Court Challenge Key to Stopping NAFTA," 13 October 1993.
Assessment of ACN reaction is from personal interviews with key participants. Earlier ACN hopes for
provincial government action to buttress opposition to NAFTA is expressed in "Round Two Begins"
and was an ongoing element in the Network's anti-NAFTA campaign through 1991-1993.
141 Tony Clarke, Memorandum to Operations Committee, 30 June 1993.
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1. Introduction
As in December 1988, the top item on the agenda for the ACN's Twenty-
second Assembly (5-7 November 1993 in Ottawa) was a review of the just concluded
federal election campaign and its results. Whereas the election ofa majority
Conservative government in 1988 was a clear defeat for the PCN and its opposition to
the FTA, in 1993 Canadians overwhelmingly rejected the same government, whose
agenda and policies the Network had contested for half a decade. The majority
popular vote for parties opposed to the FTA was the silver lining in the 1988 results
for the PCN. Perhaps just as importantly, the anti-free trade movement felt it had
played a central role in initiating a public debate that was unprecedented in recent
Canadian history. In contrast, the 1993 contest delivered a solid majority government
to a political party the Network no longer viewed as an ally, after a campaign that
lacked the broad public engagement and passionate debate that took place five years
earlier.
The post-election assembly was held within weeks of the election in keeping
with a decision made in early October 1992. 1 The event was well attended with
representation from most member groups and featured a panel presentation by leaders
of some major national organizations. CLC president Bob White pledged continuing
support for coalition building and the ACN against the backdrop of the NDP's poor
results, which he viewed as a major setback for the labour movement. White,
simultaneously, expressed satisfaction at "dumping the Tories" and questioned the
prospects for continuing opposition to the Canada-Ll.S. FTA.2 Speaking for NAC,
Vice-President Sheilagh Day raised concerns about representation at the Network
table. Her comment that "there is a problem with who is here and who is not here,"
I The ACN National Campaign Plan presented to the Nineteenth Assembly (October 2-3, 1992 in
Charlottetown) included a commitment to hold an Assembly within two weeks of a federal election to
develop post-election strategy. In contrast, in Novem her 1988 the continued existence of PCN was not
universally assumed.
2 In his address to the Assembly White remarked: "the trade agreement has integrated us with the U.S.
and frankly I don't think we are going to be able to undo it." From a verbatim transcript of the panel
session at the ACN's Twenty-second Assemblv. November 1993.
. .
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reflected her organization's passionate commitment to 'cultural diversity. ~ Day also
argued that any further organizational consolidation of the ACN should proceed
cautiously, if at all. In her own words, "we work best when we come together on a
specific issue, the extra parliamentary voice must be fast moving and free wheeling."
Meanwhile, a representative of the Coalition quebecoise suggested that its
relationship with the ACN once again be reconsidered, inferring that a more clearly
binational structure might now be preferable.'
Along with the election results, the tone for the Assembly was set by Tony
Clarke's resignation as ACN chair. After the high point of the cross-country caravan
and Parliament Hill rally in the spring of 1993, the Network had gone through a
difficult summer period. With an election looming, a number oforganizational issues
and tensions reached the boiling point prompting Clarke to tender his resignation to
take effect after the campaign. Clarke's departure was a spur to some soul searching
on the part of delegates, aided by his parting reflections presented to the Assembly
and released as "Action Canada: the Makings of a Movement."
Clarke's paper and presentation avoided some of the specific issues and
tensions that had prompted his resignation. Instead, he broached larger questions
reflecting both his own continuing dedication to the project of building a national
coalition with a broad mandate and his growing doubts about similar commitment
from some key national organizations. Clarke argued that it was time to ask whether
the "member groups have the political will and commitment to ensure that the ACN is
equipped to carry out this mission."s
3 From a verbatim transcript of the panel session at the ACN's Twenty-second Assembly, November
1993.
oJ As early as August 1992 there was a shared sense among its leadership that the ACN was not well
prepared for upcoming challenges. From Clarke's perspective, "NAFTA was barrelling down the tracks
and we weren't confronting it very effectively." Quoted from Clarke. Interview by author. A special
two-day strategy session was convened though correspondence in ACN files indicates that opinion was
divided on its usefulness.
5 Tony Clarke, "Action Canada: the Makings ora Movement." ;\CN, Ottawa, November 1993; Clarke,
Interview by author.
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To understand how the Network moved so rapidly from success to an apparent
'fall from grace,' this chapter will review the development of the PCN/ACN focusing
on its evolving mandate, discourse, structure and resource base. It will trace these
questions through three roughly determined periods in the Network's short history:
from its formation to the 1988 election, from the post-election decision to broaden the
mandate until Tony Clarke's assumption of the position of chairperson on a full-time
basis (Summer 1992), and fmally, from that point until the post-election Assembly
held in November 1993. Following these themes through the phases of the Pro-
Canada!Action Canada Network's development will lay the basis for a return to the
questions concerning the potential of coalitions of social movements to constitute
political agency that were posed at the outset of this paper.
2. From the Canada Summit to the Free Trade election
2.1 Mandate and Discourse
The Pro-Canada Network was formed around a single issue with a narrow
mandate to oppose the proposed Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement." Two dominant
organizations guided a cautious approach to alliance building. The CLC insisted on
defining the endeavour as a network rather than a coalition, while the Council of
Canadians, the sponsor of the Canada Summit, was animated by a relatively narrow
nationalist agenda." Nevertheless, an advancing FTA and the Network's own
successes rapidly expanded its tactical repertoire transforming it from a place for
information sharing to the locus for collective analysis of the agreement and the
formulation ofjoint communication and action strategies.
At this early stage, the PCN's discourse largely reflected the consensus
established at the Canada Summit in April 1987. Its public pronouncements and
publications referred to the FTA as the "Mulroney-Reagan deal" or the "Mulroney-
Reagan agreement." This nomenclature was chosen for a number of reasons. First, the
6 See PCN ..( 'anada Sumrn it Declaration."
.
7 See the section on the Canada Summit in Chapter 4 above.
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personalization of the agreement was an attempt to benefit from the increasingly poor
public perception ofPrime Minister Mulroney. Second, and similarly, the reference to
U.S. president Reagan was a simple means to label the FTA as a product of the neo-
conservative worldview." In addition, the Reagan administration's record in
revitalizing U.S. interventionism and imperial aspirations, most notably in the
Americas, was particularly worrying from a Canadian nationalist perspective.
Stamping the agreement in this way also echoed the general reticence of opponents to
directly challenge the concept of free trade. At a superficial level, they were wary of
its positive connotations. More fundamentally, key sectors and organizations
remained undecided about trade liberalization per se. Their commitment through the
PCN was to opposing the specific bilateral agreement between the American elephant
and the Canadian mouse. The CLC and the Council of Canadians, among others,
remained generally positive about the prospects for multilateral trade negotiations
under the aegis of the GATT. 9
As the FTA came closer to fruition with the completion ofa draft text, and as
a federal election approached in 1988, references to the Free Trade Deal became more
frequent. This shift stemmed in part from recognition that campaigning on the issue
had boosted its profile and that public opinion was gradually turning against free
trade. Though the PCN's primary focus was increasingly on the threat posed to
Canadian social programmes, despite the contention of some observers, including
from a class-analytical perspective, the Network's critique of the FTA was never
entirely limited to a defence of social entitlement. 10 Certainly the theme in the anti-
free trade repertoire that most clearly struck a chord with public opinion quite
naturally came to dominate the PCN's pronouncements, and thus its nascent
discourse. Nevertheless, the internal analysis and critique of the FTA undertaken by
8 This is in keeping with Breton and Jenson's argument that "in terms of the anti-deal campaign,
government and business enthusiasm for free trade was an expression of neo-liberal faith in market
forces. and in particular the 'Reaganesque' version of that faith." Breton and Jenson. "After Free Trade
:U1d Meech Lake: Quoi de neuf?" ~09.
ij, boSec Chapters 3 and ·t ave.
10 For the class-analytical critique of the PCN and its politics, see Chapter 2 above.
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the Network was both broader and more nuanced. It could hardly have been otherwise
given the variety of sectors engaged in the process and the influence of groups that.
like GATT-Fly, brought with them radical critiques of trade liberalization. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the mingling and melding of different sectoral
perspectives with traditional nationalist and other progressive worldviews created a
learning process and a dynamic of discovery and radicalization.
Meanwhile free trade opponents emphasized traditional democratic themes in
their contestation of the FTA; the demand for a federal election before signature of the
treaty was followed by the call for an election before implementation once the parties
initialled the agreement. The repertoire of tactics employed to advance these demands
ranged from petitions and lobbies of parliamentarians to public events, all supported
by a collective pool of research and analysis.
2.2 Structure and Resources
The new Network's structure reflected both the limits of its mandate and its
evolving role. By the fall of 1987, three working committees (research,
communications and strategy) were added to the broader Assembly of all member
organizations. Like the Assembly, these committees constituted the "neutral territory"
where difference could be viewed creatively rather than as a threat. I I This was no
small feat since the PCN faced the decidedly mixed legacy of coalition building, a
variety ofconflicts between and within sectors, as well as serious discrepancies in
power between member groups. 12 The overwhelming size and potential strength of the
CLC was a concern, but so was the tendency of the Toronto-based CAFT, with its
strong organizational backing and key actors, to dominate the agenda. 13 Despite these
II From a phrase used by Laurell Ritchie to describe the objectives of the founders of the Toronto-
based CAFl quoted in Chapter 3 above.
I'
. See Chapters 1. 2 and 3 above.
\) Based on personal interviews with various participants. Tony Clarke. for example. recalls a critical
moment during the planning of the May 1988 parliamentary lobby when the eLC and the CAF I
clashed. "The big player at this time. organizationally. was certainly the CIC. The ditliculty was that
no one player should be able to call all the shots. We had to make sure that there were ways that we
could work out problems. tensions and conflicts. Some organizations had as much to contribute in
terms of ideas. proposals. participation of their own people to some extent. but could not mobilize the
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challenges, the PCN table soon became recognized, as one activist put it, as "the one
place in the country where we could all come together." 14
After the Canada Summit, the inclusion ofprovincial coalitions in the fall of
1987 was the next key moment in the development of the PCN. Provincial
participation made the Network more representative of Canadian geographic, and
consequently political, reality thus enhancing its legitimacy. IS In turn, the PCN's
capacity to act was increased, improving its ability to deliver a nation-wide campaign
and bolstering its credibility in confronting a neo-conservative project built, in part,
on regional antagonisms. 16 Bringing provincial coalitions to the table also introduced
a new structural complexity - in effect, two tiers of membership - to an extremely
flexible organizational configuration. In response, a new Steering Committee was
formed with representation from all participating sectors as well as the Ontario and
Quebec coalitions. 17
At this stage in its development, the PCN's structure included an explicitly
collective leadership model. Two co-chairs of the Assembly were joined by four
spokespersons reflecting sectoral diversity, as well as co-chairs for each of the
committees. While collective leadership reflected the cautious approach and narrow
mandate adopted at the Canada Summit, it also served a number ofother objectives.
financial resources or the numbers of people that the CLC could. We also had to deal with the tendency
for the Toronto coalition with a strong set of actors to set the agenda. So there was a lot of balancing
and there were moments where the thing almost fell apart. One of these came around the planning of
the May lobby meeting on Parliament Hill. There were different models. The CLC came in with a
model. The Toronto CAFT came in with a different model. There was a real clash and we had to have a
special meeting to hammer it out in Toronto. Even then the resolution wasn't satisfactory. We were
feeling each other out. It was very difficult to keep the egos and the organizational power struggles in
check." Clarke, Interview by author.
14 Bob Ages, Interview by author, Winnipeg, 7 December 1991.
15 A similar process took place with addition of explicit regional representation to the NAC executive.
As Vickers et al. conclude, "NAC recognized that organizing women across space was almost as
important as organizing them across time." In Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women
Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 286.
I () See Chapter 4 above.
17 Compared to the variety of groups and individuals included in NAC's membership the Network's
two tiers could hardly be considered a serious obstacle. On the structure of the National Action
Committee, sec Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis oj
the National Action Committee on the Status oj Women.
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First, collective leadership and diverse representation advanced the coalition building
process by providing member organizations and some of their leaders with public
visibility. Second, multiplying the number of positions within the Network was useful
in maximizing volunteer commitment. Last but far from least, assigning several
spokespersons from different sectors was a means to make 'the medium the message'
in external representation ofthe Network. The underlying premise was that the PCN's
breadth and diversity was an inherent strength. More specifically, the multi-sectoral
and broadly based nature of the opposition to the FTA, as reflected in the Network's
membership, was an indicator of the scope of the flaws in the agreement. In the same
vein, PCN news releases consistently referred to the "more than 10 million
Canadians" represented by its member groups. 18
But for some of those relating to the PCN the collective model of leadership
was not always entirely welcome. For example, while the media might be impressed
by the size and scope of the coalition that had been assembled, participating in news
conferences with a multiplicity of spokespersons was another matter. In a study of the
UK peace movement the media's instinct is neatly summarized as follows: "Faced
with a demonstration, the first thing ... ajoumalist is trained to look for is a leader.,,19
Over time, the pressure of traditional media demands would take their toll on the
PCN's leadership model.
In contrast to most Canadian organizations - and indeed to the vast the
majority of its member groups - the PCN engaged in decision-making by consensus.
The process was a far cry from the often paralysing quest for consensus in radical
feminist practice and much closer to the decision-making and leadership style
developed in the coalition building work of the ecumenical social justice sector.i''
18 Based on a review of news releases issued by the Network between 1987 and 1993 in peNtACN
files.
19 Quoted in M. Helen Brown, "Organizing Activity in the Women's Movement: An Example of
Distributed Leadership:' in Organizing for Change: Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the
United States. cd. Bert Klandermans. International Social Movement Research (Greenwich Ct: JAI
Press, 1989).
20 See Chapter 3 above. On feminist decision-making models and leadership styles. see Vickers,
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Tony Clarke - Network co-chair from fall 1987 to summer 1988, acting chair from
summer 1988 to fall 1988 and chair from fall 1988 to fall 1993 - was a key actor in
ecumenical coalition circles." As practiced by Clarke, consensus building was a pro-
active and time-consuming task. The objective was to build a consensus that was
expanding in scope and in content, not to identify and lock-in a 'lowest common
denominator' agreement.f
While encouragement and support greeted the convenors of the Canada
Summit, the fmancial resources to get the Network off the ground were far less
forthcoming. During its first six months, the PCN received funding from half a dozen
organizations though the bulk of its backing came from the Council ofCanadians,
including $28,000 and in-kind staffmg. Other funds came from the Canadian Labour
Congress ($5,000), the performers' union ACTRA ($5,000), the Canadian Teachers
Federation ($1,500), the Quebec coalition ($3,000) and the ecumenical coalition
GATT-Fly ($500). In the following six-month period - November 1987 to May 1988
- the Council added a further $6,000, and the CLC another $5,000. Additional
contributions were also received from ACTRA ($5,000), the Quebec Coalition
Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National Action
Committee on the Status ofWomen; see also Brown, "Organizing Activity in the Women's Movement:
An Example of Distributed Leadership."
21 Following his election as chair of the Council of Canadians in the Fall of 1987, John Trent submitted
his resignation as PCN co-chair to the Steering Committee. Tony Clarke accepted the committee's
offer to replace Trent and recalls setting a number of priorities. These included, a broadening of the
Network to include regional coalitions, limiting the importance of 'personalities,' emphasizing
facilitating participation by member groups, and his own preference not to be involved in external
representation. After deciding to seek a Liberal nomination, Maude Barlow resigned as the Network's
second co-chair in June 1988. At this point Tony Clarke remains as 'administrative co-chair' and a
proposal to appoint four sectoral co-chair/spokespersons is ratified. From Clarke, Interview by author
and Trent, Interview by author.
22 Participants in the process praise Clarke's ability to generate a consensus that went beyond the
lowest common denominator. Clarke's personal commitment to a broadly mandated coalition of the
popular sector was evident during the pre-PCN period. See Chapter I above.
The concept of leaders as 'bridge builders' described in the American context provides an interesting
parallel to the facilitating role favoured by Clarke during this period. See Brecher and Costello,
Building Bridges: the Emerging Grassroots Coalition ofLabor and Community (New York: Monthly
Review Press. 1990),335.
In a study of the US Rainbow Coalition, Collins elaborates as follows: "Bridge-builders must not only
buck the structural arrangements designed to isolate racial/ethnic communities from one another. but
the internal defensive mechanisms built into each oppressed community that make it hard for it to enter
into power-sharing arrangements with others." In Sheila D. Collins. The Rainbow Challenge (New
York. N.Y.: Monthly Review Press. 1(86), 115.
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($3,000) and the National Federation of Nurses Unions ($1,000) for total annual
revenues of $63,000.23 At the Fourth Assembly in June 1988 member groups were
notified that last minute contributions from the Federation of Women's Teachers of
Ontario ($10,000) and business executive Frank Stronach ($5,000) had staved off
insolvency." During the summer of 1988, the Network benefited from a direct mail
fundraising campaign coordinated on its behalf by the Toronto-based CAFT with in-
kind assistance from a number of member groups."
With limited resources, the Network was largely dependent on a variety of in-
kind contributions. According to a report to the Sixth Assembly in December 1988
these contributions were generously considered equal to between six and nine full or
part-time staff from November 1987 to November 1988. The Network was equally
reliant on member groups for its physical space. For its first year, the PCN was run
out of the small Council ofCanadians' Ottawa office, moving into the library of the
CCCB Social Affairs office after the hiring of its first full-time staff person in July
1988. Finally, with preparations for the federal election well in train, the PCN took
over the storage space in the office of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives as
its 'headquarters' one month later. There, the Network's activities rapidly expanded,
eventually filling half of the space in the CCPA's locale."
Other in-kind contributions included office materials, translation and printing
services. Last but certainly not least, Toronto-based GATT-Fly produced and
distributed the Pro-Canada Dossier, until March 1988 as its own independent
publication under the title Free Trade Action Dossier. GATT-Fly put forward two
central reasons for the name change. First, to draw attention to the broad nature of the
proposed FTA that was not so much about freeing up trade between the two countries
as it was about full-scale economic deregulation. Second, GATT-Fly hoped to
~3 PCN, "General Review of Finances and Resources," December 1989.
.'·1 Fourth Assembly Minutes.
~5 Traynor, Interview by author.
26 Barlow, Interview by author: Clarke, Interview by author: Diane Iouchette, Interview by author,
Ottawa, 5 April 1997.
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establish the Dossier "as the link between all the national and regional organizations
fighting the Mulroney deal that are part ofthe Pro-Canada Network." At the same
time, GATT-Fly reiterated that the Dossier "would not necessarily represent the
official position of the Pro-Canada Network" but rather be a contribution ~10 the
collective effort through the Pro-Canada Network to defeat the Mulroney- Reagan
deal.,,27 This was an important distinction since from the Dossier's inception GATT-
Fly had put forward its support for an economic development strategy rooted in self-
reliance and critiqued multilateral trade liberalization through the GATT in its
pages." Two issues after being renamed, the Dossier sported the Pro-Canada
Network's logo on its front page." Then, after the December 1988 Assembly decision
to maintain the Network and enhance its capacity, production of the Dossier was
transferred to the PCN's Ottawa office, though GATT-Fly continued to contribute an
analysis section for the next few months. A new web of in-kind resources was
established to assist with production: CUPW provided access to equipment necessary
to desktop publish the Dossier while printing was done by the PSAC.3o
3. Post-Election to the Summer of 1992
3.1 Mandate and Discourse
From the explicitly limited commitment to opposing a bilateral free trade
agreement noted in the "Canada Summit Declaration," the Network extended its post-
election mandate to engaging in "a struggle to ensure that Canada's future is shaped
by and for people not profits. ,,31 This shift was assisted by two important factors.
First, participants in the campaign against the FTA had been marked by the extent of
the intervention by the Canadian corporate sector. This glimpse ofeconomic power
27 "From the editor. .." Pro-Canada Dossier, 4 March 1988.
28 For an example of this usage, see "GATT Will Get Us Too," Free Trade Action Dossier, 18
December 1987.
2Q Pro-Canada Dossier. 29 April 1988.
30 Howlett. Interview by author; Clarke, Interview by author; Rocks. Interview by author.
31 The Pro-Canada Dossier's masthead adopted this statement as of March 1989.
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openly wielded to influence a democratic decision-making process had a tremendous
impact. Rather than leading to a retreat into apathy, the experience underscored the
large stakes involved in the FT A fight making different sectors more receptive to a
systemic or structural analysis.Y
Second, in the aftermath of the election and the implementation of the FT A
beginning in January 1989, labour and social groups were shifting their focus to their
own defensive struggles. The Pro-Canada Dossier anticipated this development when
it argued the case for solidarity through coalition in its post-election issue:
Consciousness-raising about social and economic issues related to the free
trade deal is not enough. It will be important to develop the capacity to
respond collectively to plant closures, threats to regional programs or farm
marketing boards, and so on. We must not allow capital to divide and conquer.
Many are going to be hurt by the FTA experiment. We need to pull together in
defending against these attacksr"
The Dossier's message centred on the specific consequences of the FTA but also put
forward a more fundamental objective -linking the "changes which happen as a
result of the FTA" with the "overall neo-conservative agenda of Canadian and U.S.
capital. ,,34 The first "fightbacks" supported by the PCN were responses to direct and
immediate consequences of the FT A such as plant closures and job losses. Soon these
were planned in reaction to public policy measures that were related to the FTA or
simply part of the broader social and economic model with, as the PCN now argued,
free trade at its centre." Organizations brought specific issues to the Network table
and, where possible, through discussion and active intervention by the chair, linkages
were developed resulting in collective interventions or campaigns. For example,
women's program and VIA Rail cuts in the 1989 federal budget led to the Campaign
to the Get the Budget on Track in 1989. 36
32 See Chapter 5 above.
33 "The Struggle Enters a New Phase."
34 Ibid.
J~ Clarke, Interview by author: see also Chapter 2 above.
Jb Groups formed out of the culture of support for citizen's participation of the Pearson and early
Trudeau eras and dependent on state funding or otherwise prey to government interference were
particularly vulnerable during this period (see Chapter I above). Even before cuts to NAC's budget in
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The call for defensive mutual support issued in the post-election Pro-Canada
Dossier was rooted in the politics of social solidarity advocated by GATT-Fly and the
broader ecumenical coalition sector. Social solidarity was also an important element
in the development of the broader popular sector leading to the formation of the
Working Committee for Social Solidarity (WCSS) in 1986 and the launch of the
declaration A Time to Stand Together ... A Time for Social Solidarity in December
1987. Rather than a simple defensive rational choice response to a perceived threat,
social solidarity was premised on a collective commitment to transformative social
change and to the convergence of interests and movements as the agency or vehicle
for this change." As Tony Clarke would later write in "Action Canada: the Makings
ofa Movement":
The capacity and strength of the ACN to carry out its mission always
depended on its member organizations and constituencies. From the
beginning, it was understood that no one sector or organization could
effectively fight the corporate agenda alone. Only in unity would there be
strength. The central organizing principle has been 'social solidarity.v"
Beyond a reflexive solidarity, attention to sectoral fightbacks reflected the
commitment to movement convergence as the vehicle for confronting a common
enemy and bringing about social transformation. Including the specific defensive
struggles waged by member groups on the collective agenda was viewed as helpful to
insuring support for the Network per se since its broader program was more attractive
when it connected directly with the shorter term internal priorities of member
organizations. Moreover, support was often dependent on the peN's plans appearing
to build on existing campaign efforts and resource allocations rather than opening up
new obligations for these groups."
February 1989 (see Chapter 5 above) the involuntary resignation of Dale Goldhawk as president of
ACTRA, the union representing most Canadian performers on November 23, 1988 following an
ultimatum from his employer the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was heralded as "the Tories first
reprisal." ACTRA had been an active member of the Network. "The Tories First Reprisal," Pro-
Canada Dossier, 16 December 1988.
~7 On the Working Committee for Social Solidarity, see Chapter I.
3M Clarke, "Act ion Canada: the Makings of a Movement."
,ll Clarke, Interview by author; McBane, Interview by author.
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Until the 1988 Federal Election, explicit support for social solidarity and its
implications for movement building and convergence came largely from within a few
sectors and organizations, and often only from specific individuals including those
participating in the WCSS. Collective analysis and coalition work around free trade,
in the face of a dramatic closing of ranks by Canadian capital, contributed to a broader
acceptance of a more radical critique of the social and economic conjuncture. It also
further shifted support to movement building as the preferred political response from
the Left.
By June 1990, when joint PCN and WCSS meetings were held outside Quebec
City, the Network's expanding mandate, tactics and shifting discourse had blurred the
distinction between the two projects. Shortly thereafter, Mike McBane, formerly on
staff with the CCCB and subsequently working part time for the WCSS, was hired as
political action coordinator for the Network. McBane's move proved to be the last
straw for the WCSS as well as a symbolic passing of the torch to the PCN. Where the
WCSS had been limited to a small group of activists working with limited resources
at arms-length from the day-to-day struggles of popular sector groups, the PCN now
combined direct engagement in campaigns far beyond NAFTA with a nascent focus
on policy alternatives. 40
The renaming of the Network in April 1991 was emblematic of a continuing
tension between defensive struggles building on the FTA experience, and the
commitment to developing a new social project closer to the objectives of the WCSS.
The newly minted Action Canada Network reaffirmed the defensive function as part
of its core mandate, if anything deepening this commitment by making explicit its
40 As late as December 1990 the WCSS was still meeting and debating its future. In reality, deprived of
resources and in the PCN's growing shadow the Committee had few options. See WCSS, Minutes of
Meeting, 1J December 1990. A confidential memorandum between labour officials provides a vivid
picture of the background negotiations around the WCSS. Its portrayal of intra-labour disagreements
with regard to the WCSS and more specifically coalition-building writ large is particularly interest ing,
For example, the author indicates that the Cl.C's representative at a WCSS meeting suggested that the
Congress "had to be concerned about conserving its resources for the big election campaigns and that it
therefore had to be careful not to exhaust its limited resources in support of coalitions." John Calvert,
CUPE, Memorandum to Peggy Nash, CA W, 10 April 1989.
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intention to use these activities as a tool to attract new sectors and organizations to the
fold. 41 Identifying no less than nineteen different "fightback struggles" that its
member groups were engaged in, the ACN's May 1991 Action Plan was framed as an
attempt "to pull all of this together into a common action campaign that is focused on
Canada's future. ,,42
The increasing scope of the Network's mandate after the 1988 election
brought with it a shift in discourse. Opposition to the threat posed by the "Reagan-
Mulroney agreement" gave way to a wider though clearly still defensive battle against
the "Tory agenda.T:' With its renaming, the Network confirmed the place of the free
41 See the statement released by the ACN at its launch, "Introducing ... the Action Canada Network,"
Ottawa, April 1990; see also Goar, "Why Pro-Canada Group Changed its Name."
42 ACN, "1991 Action Plan."
Despite these grand ambitions the most important example of support for member groups initiated by
the ACN was marshalled for strikes by two public sector unions, CUPW and the PSAC, both already
strong supporters of the Network. Nevertheless these strikes were noteworthy both for the innovative
approach employed to demonstrate cross-sectoral solidarity and for the success of these efforts as
judged by the unions themselves.
The discussion of plans for solidarity with CUPW is in PCN Thirteenth Assembly Summary;
Development of plans for support to PSAC, including a pamphlet linking the "corporate agenda to the
attack on the public sector" and an ad featuring ACN member group leaders stating their support for
the PSAC in PCN Thirteenth Assembly Summary; see also various minutes of Steering Committee
Meetings in ACN files.
In "Coalitions Deliver for Postal Workers," ACN Dossier, May-June 1992, CUPW vice-president
Deborah Bourque describes the solidarity pacts her union signed with other ACN member groups. The
union agreed to deliver pension and social assistance cheques while on strike and oppose closures to
rural post offices and "in return, each of these groups made a commitment to CUPW to talk about our
issues within their organizations, to encourage their members to refuse to be used as scabs... and to
support us on the picket line." Bourque concludes that while the ''the expression of solidarity largely
ignored by the media, it provided an important message for our members, who now feel more at home
with coalitions." While the solidarity pacts were suggested by ACN chair Tony Clarke, CUPW was no
stranger to work with community sector groups. Bickerton, Interview by author. See Chapter 3 above
on the union's groundbreaking strike for paid maternity leave in 1982. As Bourque points out, CUPW
continued to work in coalitions, in 1984-85 with unemployed workers and in 1987-88 as part of a
campaign to protect and expand postal service.
Similarly. reviewing his own unions experience in 1991, PSAC president Daryl Bean concludes "our
experience working within the ACN during the 1991 PSAC strike augurs well for the future." In Daryl
Bean, "Standing Together for Public Services," ACN Dossier, May-June 1992.
·nTerminology usage was not entirely consistent. While the term "Tory Agenda" appears most
frequently there are also references to the ''neo-conservative agenda" in various materials and in
particular in meeting reports. Use of this latter term reflects the direction of the underlying shift in the
Network's consensus: i.e., toward a more systemic or structural critique. The shift is summed up in a
report from a labour representative to her union's national leadership on the PCN's status in late 1989:
"We all seem to be on the same wavelength (i.e., free trade isjust part of the Tory agenda. It helps
them to achieve their goals for a more market oriented society) but our efforts seem a bit fragmented
and uncoordinated." Peggy Nash, Memorandum to Bob White. Bob Nickerson, and Sam Gindin, 24
October 1989.
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trade deal as the "centrepiece of the corporate agenda.?" By the spring of 1991, the
Network was also focused on remedying its widely acknowledged failure to move
beyond a defensive posture vis-a-vis the FTA in 1988, when it was "united around a
defence of what had been, rather than an alternative vision of the future.'?" As the
announcement of the launch of the 'new' Network argued: "Since the signing of the
Free trade Agreement the Network has continued to develop a critical analysis of the
corporate agenda and mobilize public support for alternative economic and social
policy directions.'?" By this time, the new relationship with Mexican free trade
opponents was goading forward the ACN's consideration of alternative models for
trade and development and the Network was on the eve of welcoming discussion and
debate of substantive alternative constitutional models (i.e., three nations and
asymmetrical federalism) to its table.
While the progression was far from uninterrupted, the Network's agenda was
shifting from a reactive single-issue basis for unity to a larger mandate that identified
a broad social project as its target and attempted to develop and articulate alternatives
both in the form and the content of its activities.Y Still, overwhelming defensive
demands were everywhere: the driving force behind the Network's trade work was
opposition to NAFTA while its engagement with the constitution was inspired by the
federal government's introduction ofpackage of reforms with strongly neo-
conservative policy objectives.
3.2 Structure and Resources
The December 1988 Assembly decision to broaden the Network's agenda and
continue its activities was accompanied by a determination to expand its
41 ACN, "Introducing the ... Action Canada Network."
I~ Jane Jenson and Rianne Mahon, "Legacies for Canadian Labour of Two Decades of Crisis," in The
Chalh'n~{' ofRestructuring: North American Labor Movements Respond, ed. Jane Jenson and Rianne
Mahon, Labor and Social Change (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 85.
46 ACN, "Introducing the ... Action Canada Network."
47 The ACN Action Plan adopted in August 1991 proposes a "three prong campaigning agenda"
including trade, solidarity or fightbacks and the constitution.
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organizational capacity. The Assembly adopted a proposal for a six-month operational
budget of $40,000 though hopes were expressed that it could be amended upwards. In
order to give the Network a more substantial and permanent institutional base. the
Assembly also agreed to seek regular sustaining funding from member
organizations." The newly formed Operations Committee chose to maintain a pay-
what-you-can structure for membership contributions from labour and community
groups despite arguments for a more formalized system." Within this framework. a
conscious effort was made to balance more plentiful labour dollars with support from
community sector groups. Specifically, the committee targeted a 60/40 split between
labour and community funding. As the cuts in funding to advocacy groups in the 1989
federal budget took effect, this ratio shifted closer to 70130.50
Fundraising was further complicated by the responsibility the Network now
assumed for the $1OO,OOO-plus debt incurred through the production and distribution
of the cartoon booklet. This was a sizable burden for an organization trying to raise a
semi-annual operating budget of less than $50,000. As a first step, some member
groups - the CAW in particular - were convinced to carry the debt interest-free. Once
this was accomplished the debt was owed to key member groups on whom the PCN
also depended for a large part of its for sustaining funding making a clear
compartmentalization ofdebt repayment and operational funding essential.
The cartoon booklet debt was a new and important factor forcing the Network
to engage in debt reduction and colouring future organizational and strategic
decisions. The spectre of the debt became an increasingly important disciplinary tool
wielded by the chair of the Operations Committee. Dealing with the debt became an
ongoing long-term test of the PCN's organizational credibility as well as a collective
48 PCN Sixth Assembly Summary.
49 For example. the Manitoba Coalition against Free Trade called for "a flexible sustainer system of
grants with organizational commitments in writing." Other suggestions included an annual levy based
on membership (i.e .. per capita). In ibid.
~() PCN, Operations Committee Notes, January 1989; this downward trend did not end since in 1992
more than 80% of membership revenues were obtained from labour groups. ACN files.
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psychological millstone; a mantra to be recalled and recited before any new
substantial project could be considered." Paradoxically, the debt might have also had
a positive effect on the PCN' s growth by providing a fiscal rationale for the further
development or, at the very least, the maintenance of organizational capacity. The
commitment to pay back the debt created a constituency ofnarrow self-interest among
groups to whom the debt was now owed, on top ofthe broader self-interest of
participants hoping to protect the Network's credibility within their own sectoral
organizations, and a collective sense of obligation.52
The December 1988 Assembly had expressed enthusiastic support for building
the PCN's organizational base, accepted responsibility for the cartoon booklet debt,
and committed to fmding the resources to meet both objectives. 53 However, only four
months later, as debt repayment slowly proceeded, the Network faced a severe crisis
in operational funding and the prospect of a shut down of its operations. 54 The
enthusiasm expressed at the Assembly was proving difficult to translate into real
resources. Serious fmancial constraints limited the ability of most community sector
groups to contribute and, in many cases, their situation worsened after the February
1989 federal budget.55 There were also considerable obstacles to raising funds within
the labour movement. Unions were anticipating their own fmancial difficulties as
trade liberalization and an economic slowdown drove employment down, deeply
affecting their dues base. There was also wariness about the prospect of a well
resourced and consequently somewhat less dependent PCN from the CLC leadership
and some major trade unions affiliated to the Congress.56
51 Traynor, Interview by author; Rocks, Interview by author.
52 The debt was finally retired late in 1992. Julie Davis, "Operations Committee Report to Twentieth
ACN Assembly," Ottawa, 29-31 January 1993. Debt repayment took place gradually fuelled by a series
of in house direct mail campaigns. The revenue from these mailings was kept scrupulously separate
from operational funds. Rocks, Interview by author.
~.l PCN Sixth Assemblv Summary.
~4 Sec Tony Clarke, Memorandum to Member Organizations, 2.f May 1989.
~5 See Chapter 5 above.
~l> Bickerton, Interview by author and Turk, Interview by author.
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In response, the Network appealed to the labour movement for funding
targeted at campaigns rather than general operations. This approach garnered some
support for the 1989 Budget campaign but was most notably effective with the
Campaign for Fair Taxes. " Combined with some growth in membership
contributions, campaign funding contributed to the Network's growing organizational
capacity through 1989 and 1990. By 1991, the PCN sported its own national office.
three full-time staff persons and a projected total operating budget of$162,352.58
The broadening of the Network's mandate from 1988 to 1991 had, in turn,
attracted a somewhat larger membership. The Campaign for Fair Taxes was
particularly important in this regard, rekindling the involvement of some member
groups and attracting some new support. By engaging activists at all levels of the
labour movement, the campaign increased pressure on some unions to support the
PCN and participate in its activities leading to involvement from unions like the
Canadian Conference of Teamsters and the United Food and Commercial Workers
(UFCW). At the same time, a number of non-labour groups worked with the Network
for the first time under the banner of the Campaign for Fair Taxes."
While PCN publications repeatedly claimed a growing membership during
this period, the process is more accurately portrayed as an ebbing and flowing with
gains that were often short-lived. By 1991, the Network was marginally broader in
terms of sectoral participation and total membership, though the level of commitment
and participation by new sectors and organizations varied widely, as it also did for
some sectors and groups that had been at the table from the start.60
57 See Chapter 5 above.
58 ACN. "Operating Budget:' 1991.
59 See list of participating organizations, PCN files: Cooperative Housing Federation. Federation
nationale des associations de consommateurs du Quebec, Movement for Canadian Literacy. Canadian
Federation of Students. Canadian Day Care Advocacy Association, Don't Tax Reading Coalition.
Coalition of Provincial Organizations for the Handicapped. Federal Superannuates National
Association.
60 Based on records of attendance at Assemblies and the list of member organizations maintained by the
Network secretariat. For example. both the Canadian Teachers Federation and the National Farmers
Union downgraded their involvement while the Business Council for Fair Trade was an early casualty
of the broader post-1988 Network agenda.
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This period of growth in mandate, membership and resource base was also
marked by changes to the Network's structure. At the leadership level, Maude
Barlow's decision to seek the Liberal Party nomination in an Ottawa riding in the fall
of 1988 left the PCN with one co-chair through the election period. While unplanned
and not formally acknowledged, this led to the effective abandonment of the co-
chairing model. In addition, the need and the opportunity for the Network to develop
its organizational profile and the pressures of the mainstream media drove a gradual
shift away from the collective approach to external representation.
With the notable exception of the formation of a new Operations Committee
reflecting the commitment to growth in organizational capacity, the working
committee structure developed little during this period though the Network's
campaign activities did lead to some structural experimentation. For the Campaign to
Get the Budget on Track, member groups, in this case NAC, and to a lesser extent the
CBRTGW, initiated an action and looked to the Network to provide coordination. The
Campaign for Fair Taxes built on this example generating a new organizational model
for campaigns. Its structure, topped off by three co-chairs representing the PCN, the
CLC and the Quebec coalition, was something of a compromise. According the CLC
equivalent status with the Network as a whole reflected a realistic assessment by
community groups of their relative lack of resources. It also assured the most
important funder a high profile in the campaign. Similarly, accepting the Network on
par with the Congress stemmed from the labour leadership's recognition of the value
ofjoint mobilizing with the community sector. Finally, the inclusion of the Quebec
coalition grew out of some understanding of binational realities by all parties.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Campaign for Fair Taxes model only developed
following a negative reaction to the CLC's initial proposal for a campaign against the
GST, and as a result ofa subsequent intervention by the Network's chair, serves as
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yet another a potent reminder of the tenuous and contingent character of the coalition
6\process.
The ACN played a very different role on the constitutional issue where it was
prevented from organizing, or leading, a campaign by the absence of a membership
consensus. The Network parlayed its neutral territory, first, into a tool for generating
interest in the Charlottetown Accord and, second, by dint of facilitating debate and
discussion within the popular sector during the referendum campaign, into what some
considered to be moral or de facto support for the NO position.f
The renaming and apparent restructuring of the Network in April 1991 would
appear to constitute the most fundamental change to the Network's organizational
structure during this period. The implementation of the recommendations of the Task
Force on Canada-Quebec Relations was a result of a growing comprehension of the
binational dynamic at the heart of the popular sector. However, the actual model
adopted - i.e., according a form of special status to Quebec groups within the
Network - seemed predestined to perpetuate confusion rather than lead by example.
The new format changed very little in terms of day-to-day operations and proved far
more symbolic than substantive in all other regards. As we will see below, the few
material changes that were implemented - e.g. increased representation for Quebec on
the Steering Committee, a Quebec-based spokesperson for the Network, and a Quebec
version of the Dossier - either failed to get off the ground, or quickly foundered. In
this instance, it would appear that the Network failed to move much beyond a lowest
common denominator consensus - albeit on a complex matter and facing a number of
difficult variables. Still, given the critical historical juncture, it is possible that a
significant opportunity passed without being seized.
61 Sec Chapter 5 above.
62 Mcbane. Interview by author; see also Chapter 6 above.
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4. From Full-time Chair to No Chair
4.1 Mandate and Discourse
One year after its renaming, the constitution and NAFTA topped the
Network's agenda. Tony Clarke agreed to take up the role of chairperson on a full-
time basis in the early summer of 1992. Embroiled in internal battles at the Canadian
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Clarke had negotiated an eighteen-month leave of
absence from his position as co-director of the Social Affairs Office. 63 The shift in
Clarke's status had far-reaching consequences for the ACN. While his greater
availability increased capacity, it also dramatically raised expectations. Requests for
representation and outreach, both domestic and trinational, were particularly pressing
and occupied an increasing amount of the chair's time.
Clarke's role began evolving before he took up the chair on a full-time basis.
The trinational relationship built up around NAFTA aided Clarke in overcoming his
original reticence to represent the Network publicly. Beyond Canada's borders, the
less than glamorous day-to-day difficulties associated with holding together a
coalition of national organizations while armed with inadequate resources were
largely left behind. When Clarke led delegations made up of leaders of major
Canadian trade unions and other member groups he was much more likely to be
regarded by Mexican and U.S. counterparts as the capo di tutti capo than would be
the case on the home front."
The most dramatic change in the Network's mandate took place immediately
following the 1988 federal election campaign, and the transformation ofPCNIACN's
discourse - i.e.. from anti-FTA to anti-Tory to anti-corporate - was largely complete
by 1992. Indeed. the demands made on Clarke once he assumed the ACN chair on a
full-time basis were a reflection of the breadth of mandate and discourse. During this
6.\ Clarke was to receive 40 percent of his pay during this leave. The strain in Clarke's relationship with
his employer was based in large part on his increasingly prom inent publ ic role with the Network.
Clarke, Interview by author; see also Clarke, Behind the vtitre: The .\font! Leadership Crisis in the
Canadian Catholic Church.
l>-l Sorenson, Interview bv author.
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next period, both were consolidated and deepened through campaigns and
engagement with a wide range of issues. Nevertheless, as NAFTA moved to the
forefront, the defensive battle against a trade agreement returned to centre stage. As
the Conservative government approached the outer limit of its mandate, the demands
of oppositional electoral politics undermined the nascent focus on alternatives that
had been cultivated within the Network.
4.2 Structure and Resources
While Clarke's work as full-time chair did boost resources for the Network,
the additional support garnered was far from exponential and consisted largely, if not
entirely, of funding for specific projccts.'" Reflecting the failure to gain additional
core funding and resources, a report on the state ofthe ACN concluded that
"successful national campaigns and a high media profile have combined to encourage
unreasonable demands on a group of the most dedicated and capable individuals in
the country. ,,66
In June 1993, hard on the heels of some of the ACN's most significant
achievements, Tony Clarke informed the Operations Committee of his intention to
resign. Clarke indicated that he was willing to continue as chair until after the next
federal election if certain conditions were met.67 Later, in a memo to the committee,
Clarke laid out the "measures that need to be taken to strengthen the capacities of the
ACN through this election period." These included immediately initiating a structural
review, including an examination of the Network's relationship with Common
65 See, for example, the ACN Caravan and 15 May event above.
()() Geoff Bickerton, "Report on ACN Issues," June 1993; the focus on project funding was in part
making a virtue of necessity. Nonetheless, Mike McBane (political action coordinator 1990-1993)
concedes that seeking both political and financial support on a project-by-project basis fit with his own
preference for a task-oriented approach to coalition work. McBane, Interview by author.
Network membership revenue remained more or less static between 1991 and 1993 (i.e., ranging
between $149,258 and $157,400). The fact that these revenues subsequently declined dramatically (i.e..
1994 - $147,826, 1995 - $139,158, 1996 - $121,325, and 1997 - $109,000) is worthy of note though
beyond the purview of this account. In contrast, campaign funding rises from $45,000 in 1990 to
$110,304 in 1993, dropping back to under $1,000 in 1994. Suzette Wollinger. Memorandum to Mandy
Rocks, I February 1997.
b7 .' .Interviews with meeting participants.
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Frontiers, the CCPA as well as the Council of Canadians and the Ecumenical
Coalition for Economic Justice (a renamed GATT-Fly); revitalizing the
communications and research committees; and increasing clerical support and
coordination in the ACN office. Finally, Clarke called for the reinstitution of the
"Chair's travel fund.,,68
Clarke's frustration had been mounting for some time but came to a head over
this last, to all appearances minor, issue. When he first approached theACN Steering
Committee with the suggestion that he might take on the chair on a full-time basis in
May 1992, Clarke asked groups around the table to attempt to replace some of the
CCCB resources that had supported his work for the Nctwork.i" Within weeks, CLC
special projects director Art Kube convinced his organization to provide Clarke with a
credit card to be used for ACN travel expenses. As was often the case with Kube's
attempts to extract resources from the labyrinthine Congress bureaucracy, there
appears to have been little paperwork or procedural clarity to this agreement. Close to
one year later the credit card became the focus of contention with some Congress
insiders claiming that it had been abused. By June 1993 the card was withdrawn
literally immobilizing the ACN chair.70
At Clarke's behest, Geoff Bickerton, research director for the CUPW and a
member of the Operations Committee, drafted a report following up on Clarke's
memo of30 June. A subsequent committee meeting received both Bickerton's report
and an immediate response from Clarke. The committee agreed to follow up on the
68 Clarke, "Memorandum to Operations Committee." Participants in the meeting confirm that Clarke's
threat was taken seriously. Indeed, a 'constitutional procedure' for dealing with the chair's resignation
was hurriedly drafted by the Operations Committee and adopted by the next Assembly (Winnipeg,
June, 1993). The episode serves to underscore the fact that procedural clarity and transparency had not
kept pace with the growth in the Network's campaign activities. ACN Operations Committee,
"Constitutional Procedure," June 1993 and Summary of Discussion and Major Decisions, ACN,
Twenty- first Assembly, Winnipeg, 18-20 June 1993. By late September 1993, a selection procedure for
new co-chairs for the Network was in place and an Administrative Transition "earn was established
shortly thereafter. Julie Davis, Memorandum to Member Organizations, 21 September 1993: Minutes.
ACN, Steering Committee, Ottawa, 4 October 1993: and Administrative Transition Team documents in
ACN files.
69 . . . . .Interviews WIth meeting participants.
70 Clarke, Interview hy author; Tony Clarke, Memorandum to Bob White, 25 June 1993.
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human and other resources Clarke was requesting for the run-up to the federal
election. Jim Turk, OFL research director and a member of the Committee, was asked
to lead a taskforce to examine "structural improvements" for the Network and to
report within two to three weeks. One participant in the meeting concluded: "1 think
Tony's 'conditions' will work for the election period.':"
Taken together, Clarke's memos to the Operations Committee, the two reports
drafted in response during the summer of 1993, and Clarke's fmal report to the
November 1993 Assembly provide a substantial overview of the organizational state
of the Network at the time. 72 In his first missive to the committee, Clarke draws a
picture of an organization that is little short ofdysfunctional and questions the ACN's
ability to survive in its existing form. Astonishingly, only one month after one of the
ACN's most successful endeavours, Clarke writes that "it is obvious that the ACN
research committee has been virtually non-existent and non-functional for several
years" and, that the "communications committee was largely dormant during the
period of the caravan and the mobilization for 15 May."73
While the recommendations of the Bickerton Report are couched in diplomatic
language they nonetheless implicitly confrrm many of the organizational weaknesses
catalogued by Clarke. Bickerton identifies the need for clerical support for the ACN
secretariat, confrrms the lack of"clarity as to the role and responsibility of the ACN in
determining research priorities," and calls for the restructuring of the communications
committee. In addition, the report highlights concerns with the relationship between
the ACN and Common Frontiers, the need for more support for regional or provincial
coalitions and returns, at some length, to the issue of the CLC credit card.74
71 Michael McBane, Memorandum to Mandy Rocks, 15 June 1993.
7~ Sec Action Canada Network, "Report of the Task Force to Review the Operational Structure of the
ACN," Ottawa, 22 July 1993; Bickerton, "Report on ACN Issues": and Clarke, "Action Canada: the
Makings of a Movement."
73 Other participants differ only in the degree to which they agree with Clarke's assessment. Various
personal interviews.
71 Bickerton, "Report on ACN Issues."
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The Report of the Task Force to Review the Operational Structure of the ACN
reflects the opinions of a panel ofthree ACN 'veterans' representing a range of
sectors and regions." The report unequivocally reasserts the collective model of
leadership the Network had originally operated under. It argues specifically for a
reinstatement of two co-chair positions, more precisely "one male, one female, one
from labour and one non-labour," along with maximum terms of three years in order
to "allow the broadest possible participation of member groups in leadership of the
ACN.,,76 The report's authors also proposed that the Network return to external
representation by committee. They describe their prescription as follows:
It is important that the public face of the ACN reinforce the fact that it is a
broad coalition representing major organizations. To help achieve that goal,
the assembly should designate a certain number of spokespeople who are the
people delegated responsibility for speaking on behalfof the ACN. The
number should be large enough (perhaps eight) to allow gender balance and
sectoral and regional diversity. 77
The report also recommended "reinvigorating" a Steering Committee that "met
inconsistently and lacked clarity about its role and composition" and clarifying
eligibility requirements for membership in the ACN. 78The picture painted by the task
force of a collective and broadly participatory model of leadership that had fallen on
tough times was a viewpoint that was widely shared. Some participants suggested that
it appeared that less effort was being expended on consensus building and that
decision-making was taking place in smaller, less inclusive circles. As a result, it is
not surprising that the level of participation in Network meetings was, on average,
decreasing during this period. Two conflicting rationales are put forward for this
downturn in participation. On the one hand, that it was a logical consequence of
75 Along with Toronto-based Turk who was very active with the Ontario Coalition for Social Justice,
the taskforce members were: Lorraine Michaels, a staff person with the Ecumenical Coalition for
Economic Justice and past coordinator of the Newfoundland Coalition for Equality; and Barb Byers,
president of the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour and, by extension, a general vice-president of the
Canadian Labour Congress.
76 Action Canada Network, "Report of the Task Force to Review the Operational Structure of the
ACN."
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
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frustration at decision-making taking place at arm's length from committee meetings.
On the other hand, that it reflected a feeling among some that the Network was "in
good hands" freeing them up to deal with other pressing demands within their own
• • 79
organizations.
5. People Power
The impact of Tony Clarke's imminent departure as chair of the ACN serves
to underline an important and continuing theme in the development of the Network:
the critical role of individuals and personal relationships. Beyond the length of his
term as chair, Clarke was recognized for the valuable skills he brought from his
background in ecumenical coalition building. In the opinion of many, Clarke's
contribution was an essential ingredient.80 The phenomenon however was not limited
to Clarke alone. From the outset, other individuals also played key roles in the
Network's progression. While Maude Barlow and John Trent at the Council of
Canadians generated momentum towards the formation of the PCN, engagement with
trade liberalization per se was advanced by the work of Marjorie Cohen ofNAC and
John Dillon and others at GATT-Fly. Meanwhile Duncan Cameron at the CCPA
guided the analysis of the FTA text, which played such an important role in
mobilizing various sectors.
An organization-by-organization review of the Network's membership brings
to light the essential part played by specific individuals in ensuring their
organization's support and participation. In some cases, this role was of dramatic
import for the Network as a whole. For example, as the PCN moved beyond its
narrow FTA focused mandate and attempted to boost its organizational capacity, Art
Kube, CI,C director of special projects and representative to the PCN from late 1988
79 Both arguments were supported in personal interviews with participants.
80 The degree of respect for Clarke's abilities in this regard garnered from personal interviews is
overwhelming. One described the "importance of good leadership that knows how to keep people
together. keep your eye on the target know where you want to go but you know when to compromise
and how important the consensus process is:' Another commented on the "highly sophisticated manner
in which Tony Clarke tended to political relations."
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onward, played an increasingly prominent role despite a continuing wariness towards
the process on his organization's part. Working against the current, Kube obtained
funding for the ACN's coordination of the Campaign for Fair Taxes and continued to
facilitate CLC support and resources for the Network culminating in the travel credit
card episode recounted above."
Kube's value to the PCN lay, above all else, in his own ability and willingness
to alternately manipulate and circumvent bureaucratic decision-making processes
within the Congress.Y His importance to the Network was thus derived from the fact
that he did not faithfully represent and was not effectively accountable to an
organizational leadership which itself either lacked direction or disagreed with the
coalition building strategy. Ironically, while CLC president Shirley Carr was far from
a dynamic leader and did little to support coalition building or the PCN/ACN, because
ofKube's presence the relationship between the Congress and the Network was
arguably more productive and less problematic than it later was under the leadership
of Bob White. While the link between the CLC and the Network appeared more vital
with White in office, this was not reflected in the day-to-day working relationship. Art
Kube's role as an independent advocate for the Network within the Congress
81 While the CLC would allocate $35,000 to the PCN for its role in this campaign, the Congress spent
over $500,000 on its own Campaign for Fair Taxes activities. Most of this amount went towards a print
media advertising campaign over which other PCN member groups had no influence and whose merits
were widely challenged both inside and outside the labour movement. CLC, "Report on Affiliates
Communications Directors Meeting," Ottawa, May 1990.
The CLC's concessions to the PCN were, of course, not entirely a result of Kube's efforts. For
example, resources for the Campaign for Fair Taxes and the joint leadership model were only obtained
following strenuous lobbying and demands from other member groups and the ACN leadership. Kubc,
Interview by author; Wagg, Interview by author; Riche, Interview by author. See also PCN,
"Administrative Committee Agenda." Pro-Canada Network, ]7 August 1989 and Winsor, "Free Trade
Conference Lets Nationalist Genie Out of Bottle."
It is important to note that free trade was the last priority of the CLC's three-pronged deregulation,
privatization and free trade campaign initiated in ]986. Insiders point out that by the time free trade
became the prime concern most of the funding allocated had been spent. Personal interviews with
senior CLC officers and staff including Kube, Interview by author; Wagg, Interview by author; Riche.
Interview by author.
Xl Kube's attitude drew on his own history as a senior elected official prior to becoming a staff person
at the CLe, as well as his strong personality. See Chapter 2 on the BC solidarity experience; Kube,
Interview by author.
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bureaucracy appears to have been more valuable than the new president's formal
commitment to the cause.83
In their study ofNAC, Vickers et al. suggest that accountable representation is
not necessarily the norm for coalitions of social movements. As the authors conclude,
"the original assumption that each delegate would represent the views of the group
that sent her to NAC in whatever way the group saw fit proved to be more fiction than
fact.,,84 The Kube example points to an equally fragile relationship between
representation and accountability in the case ofthe PCN/ACN.
The process of rapprochement between the PCN and its Quebec-based
member groups that culminated in the renaming and restructuring of the Network was
also facilitated by "the force of personalities.t'f CSN vice-president Monique Simard
had a longstanding personal commitment to coalition building as well as an
understanding of and affmity for her English Canadian colleagues. When Simard
resigned her position at the CSN in 1993, a gaping hole was left in the Network's new
model relationship with Quebec. As Tony Clarke acknowledges, "basing something
on one individual person and personality may have been naive. When Monique left it
created a vacuum that was not really filled. ,,86
83 This opinion was shared with the author by several participants including some holding senior
positions within CLC-affiliated unions. The high expectations for White's term at the CLC from the
left in the labour movement and Network supporters were not fulfilled during this period.
84 Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as ifWomen Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National
Action Committee on the Status of Women, 196.
85 Clarke, Interview by author.
86 In a letter to CSN Secretary Treasurer Pierre Paquette, Clarke laid out his concerns with the
degenerating relationship between the Quebec organizations and the ACN. Tony Clarke. Letter to
Pierre Paquette, Secretary Treasurer, CSN, 16 June 1993. Clarke recalls a subsequent meeting in the
fall of 1993 when the parties "had it out." Clarke, Interview by author.
In an interesting parallel, during the debate on the PCN's relationship with Quebec, the Canadian
Teachers' Federation representative on the Network's Steering Committee, Harvey Weiner, was an
ardent proponent of maintaining the status quo. As a teachers' union leader in Quebec in the 1970s and
early 1980s, Weiner had been an active participant in debates around sovereignty on the federalist side.
His stand at the PCN table ten years later clearly demonstrated his own continuing commitment to this
position, but while it was likely somewhat reflective of the essence of his organizations' stance, the
emphasis and passion he accorded it was unlikely to represent the importance or priority the CTF
attached to this issue. See reports of various PCNIACN meetings and Harvey Weiner, Interview by
author, Ottawa, 6 May 1992.
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Like Kube, Simard, and Clarke, many representatives at the PCN table had
been longer-term participants in popular sector coalition building. Research for this
study has identified an impressive web of personal relationships that evolved through
the 1980s, in many cases with roots in the 1970s, in some cases even earlier. There is
no doubt that like the key role played by specific individuals these relationships were
an important facilitating factor in the development of the Pro-Canada!Action Canada
Network.V
6. The Implications of Federations
In the case of the PCN/ACN, representation and accountability were further
complicated by the dynamics and demands of Canadian federalism. Geography alone
posed important logistical limitations, for example, severely restricting face-to-face
broadly based decision-making when resources were limited. 88 Effective pan-
Canadian campaigning was hampered by the nature ofpolitical jurisdictions,
specifically the binational federal system.V The intricacy ofprovincial jurisdictions of
varying size, economic strength, and other regional differences was further amplified
by the unresolved co-existence of two nations and the First Nations within one federal
state. These variables were reflected in the difficulties faced by individual popular
sector movements and organizations and highlighted in the context ofwhat was in
effect an umbrella network ofumbrella networks. Regarding the women's movement,
Phillips argues:
National organizations operate primarily as political pressure groups focusing
their attention on policy and advocacy of the federal, and occasionally
provincial, governments. However, their connections with grassroots issues
and social needs are narrow, because they are filtered through member
87 See Chapters I and 3 on the development of the popular sector prior to the Canada Summit.
8ll This limitation was particularly keenly felt by the provincial coalitions. As a representative for the
Manitoba Coalition against Free Trade put it: "I think coalitions were really underestimated within the
PCN. We were all pissed off that we only got 10 minutes on the agenda. We were the backbone. but
many times provincial coalitions felt like an appendage. Part of the problem was that we were always
meeting in Ottawa." Spratt, Interview by author.
119 As Miriam Smith notes: "a broad range of empirical studies have suggested that federalism has
significant effects for the organization of collective action." Miriam Smith, "Interest Groups and Social
Movements," in Canadian Politics in the Twcntv First Century. ed. Michael S. Whittington and Glen
Williams (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1999). 181.
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organizations rather than being built on direct, multifarious ties with
community groups. In order to avoid severe detachment of national and
grassroots activity, it is essential that linkages between the national
headquarters and local member groups within federations be highly
integrated."
This lack of integration with, it should be added, the inevitable danger it posed
to representation and accountability, led, not without irony, to the conclusion by one
national organization leader that the "strength of coalitions is that they're often closer
to what's happening in organizations than the leadership of the organization
themselves"?" Indeed, the inclusion of provincial coalitions in the PCN planted the
seed for a broadening of its mandate and by the same token posed a challenge to
national organizations. Several provincial coalitions had mandates that went far
beyond free trade; in any case, they were all forums for the coming together of
activists who shared interests and commitments much broader than opposition to the
FTA.92 The coalitions also provided an internal accountability check of sorts for
national groups. Information could now flow to grassroots activists both through
national sectoral groups and through provincial cross-sectoral coalitions. This
structure also gave activists an alternative to their own intra-organizational process for
exerting pressure on their national leadership, often to the latter's dismay"
This dynamic was replicated in the relationship amongst federated national
organizations that sat side by side with their member groups - for example, the CLC,
NAC, and the Canadian Environmental Network - though it was clearly most
significant for the labour movement. In fact, one ofthe earliest points of conflict in
the history of the Network was the CLC's opposition to the presence of its own
affiliated unions at the table. This recurring objection on the CLC's part was
so Phillips, "How Ottawa Blends: Shifting Government Relationships with Interest Groups:' 776. As
one provincial coalition representative argued: "a number of national groups that joined the PCN didn't
bring their provincial counterparts into the provincial coalitions. That should have been one of the
responsibilities of membership." Spratt, Interview by author.
91 Cohen, Interview by author.
92 Bleycr, "Coalition Building and the Canadian Popular Sector."
9.1 This theme arose in personal interviews with trade unionists from Cl.Cvaffiliates as well as
provincial coalition activists.
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repeatedly rebuffed by its affiliates with the support of other member groups. From
the PCNIACN perspective, the affiliates participation, much like the earlier inclusion
of provincial coalitions, was a precondition for its survival and success. The affiliates
were essential to ensuring that the labour movement actually delivered 'on the
ground' in terms of mobilization and resources. Moreover, without them at the table
the CLC was likely to revert to its more traditional conservatism both on trade
liberalization and on movement and coalition building. For CLC-affiliated unions like
the CAW, CUPW and CUPE, the Network provided a forum to influence and
sometimes even override the Congress leadership. As one affiliate official politely put
it, "the Network was helpful in overcoming inertia and/or trepidation around certain
issues at the Congress. ,,94 The perspective ofaffiliated unions on the value of the
Network helps to explain the CLC's caution and concern vis-a-vis the PCN/ACN,
despite its own influential role in Network decision-making throughout the period
covered by this research.
Beyond the challenge to federal bodies like the CLC, the complexity of intra-
organizational structures combined with the important role played by a few
individuals together hint at other potential problems in the PCNIACN' s coalition
dynamic. Building on an initial contribution by Piven and Cloward, MacAdam
describes the phenomenon of oligarchization in the context of social movements as
follows:
The establishment of formal movement organizations may create a certain
class of individuals who come to value the maintenance of that organization
over the realization of movement goals. In such cases, the insurgent potential
of the movement is sacrificed to insure the survival of its organizational
offshoot."
The narrow base of individuals representing many organizations at the PCN table
created fertile ground for Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy as well as a tendency
towards an 'elite accommodation' model of coalition politics.
--- - ------- ---
')·1 Katz, Interview by author.
95 MacAdam, Political Process and the Development ofBlack Insurgency, 55~ originally argued by
Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements (New York: Pantheon. 1977).
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Participation in coalitions can also serve as an alternative to intra-sectoral
organizational development and mobilization. As MacAdam argues, again following
Piven and Cloward, "[t]he fmal danger inherent in the creation of formal movement
organizations is the dissolution of indigenous support ... As insurgents increasingly
seek to cultivate ties to outside groups, their indigenous links are likely to grow
weaker.,,96 One PCN participant expressed the concern that "coalitions sometimes
serve as excuses for inaction," while another pointed less diplomatically to the
Network degenerating into a "talking shop for labour lefties who can't move their
. ,,97
own uruons.
Finally, cooptation - another likely consequence of the formalization of
organization according to Piven and Cloward - would appear, on the basis of the
PCN/ACN case, to be less likely in the case of coalition formation by movements and
their organizations. At a minimum, the tendency to cooptation is probably mitigated
by the distance of the coalition process from the service delivery function of any
specific sectoral organization. In the case of the multi-issue, cross-movement
PCN/ACN, it is difficult to imagine what the state could deliver to satisfy the
Network's radicalized post-FTA objectives. The combination of long-term
organizational and personal relationships in the developing popular sector with the
flow of information promoted by the Network's relatively non-hierarchical structure
could be considered a built-in self-defence mechanism against cooptation."
Nevertheless, the possibility that the PCN/ACN's own agenda would be moderated
through engagement with opposition political parties and their parliamentarist
priorities should not be overlooked. In fact, one important example points in an
opposite direction. In the case of the debate on the constitution in 1990-92, the ACN
96 MacAdarn, Political Process and the Development ofBlack Insurgency, 55.
97 Personal interviews with participants.
98 The Network's Assembly was highly valued by participants. In particular it was viewed as an
opportunity to obtain and share a wide range of information. Even as participation in the peN At''\'~
committees declined, beginning in 1989 but more dramatically in 1992-1993, attendance at ,\ssclllblles
remained relatively high. Provincial coalition representatives in particular valued the access to .
information. By levelling organizational and geographic distances, the Assembly provided a useful
counterpoint to the stresses associated with an expansive, federally structured society.
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appears to have helped to ensure ongoing debate and dissent not only in the popular
sector as a whole but within the labour movement as well. While the NDP and
Ontario's Rae government in particular were successful in bringing the CLC into the
Yes camp for the Charlottetown Referendum, the ACN table remained a space for
dissident voices throughout the campaign. 99
To sum up, in the case of the Pro-Canada Network the impact of
oligarchization, the potential placebo effect of coalition work - replacing the
sometimes-bitter pill of internal mobilization - and the threat ofcooptation were
mitigated by a structure that placed representatives from various levels within similar
organizations at the same table with theoretically equal status. Thus, the structural
complexity that national organizations sometimes viewed as a threat was helpful in
limiting the potential gap between the Network's decision-making Assembly and its
grassroots base.
7. Facing Parliament
In a system dominated by brokerage politics and first-past-the-post polling it
has been argued that the "growth of citizen's groups challenges the legitimacy of the
party system" as these movements seek to "enlarge the parameters of what is
considered political." 100 In the Canadian context there is plenty ofevidence to support
claims of a decline in the legitimacy of the party system. Clarke and Kornberg
identify the "decidedly unflattering images Canadians have of their political
parties.i"?' Two major government inquiries reporting in 1991 arrived at equally
damning conclusions. The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party
Financing noted that:
Canadians appear to distrust their political leaders, the political process and
political institutions. Whatever the cause, there is little doubt that Canadian
99 See Chapter 6 above.
100 Galipeau, "Political Parties, Interest Groups, and New Social Movements: Toward New
Representation," 411.
101 Ilaroid D. Clarke and Allan Kornberg. "Evaluations and Evolution: Public Attitudes toward
Canada's Federal Political Parties. 1965-1991," Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science XXVI, no. ~
(1993), 290.
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political parties are held in low public esteem, and that their standing has
declined steadily over the past decade. They are under attack from citizens for
failing to achieve a variety of goals deemed important by significant groups
within society.102
While, in a similar vein, the Citizens Forum on Canada's Future (1991)
reported:
One of the strongest messages the Forum received from participants was that
they have lost their faith in both the political process and their political
leaders. 103
Adding further that,
the actions of the government, once in power, seem to bear little resemblance
to the party platform in an election campaign. Major government policies are
developed and enacted during a mandate which either were never mentioned
or received little attention during a campaign. 104
Nevertheless, challenging a still firmly entrenched parliamentary system is a
daunting task for single-issue movements and organizations. As Hirst points out, "any
political 'alternative' that does not compete for the vote as the parties do and yet seeks
to change the political agenda is in danger ofpolitical exclusion." 105 The presence of
the ACN consolidated space at the federal level for social movement organizations to
move beyond lobbying and participation in bipartite and tripartite forums to collective
political action. Similarly, the Network fostered the development of a common public
profile for these groups. While the process began long before the Pro-Canada
Network was formed, the consistent presence of a cross-sectoral, pan-Canadian
coalition significantly advanced it. In this respect, the PCN/ACN can be said to have
made a tangible contribution to a reconstruction of political identities by broadening
the scope of legitimate political activity and discourse.
102 Reforming Electoral Democracy: Report ofthe Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party
Financing quoted in Jeanine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen: Stability and Change
in Brokerage Politics," in Canadian Politics in Transition, ed. Brian A. Tanguay and Alain G. Gagnon,
(Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1996),67.
103 Canada, Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future (Spicer Commission), Report to the People and
Government ofCanada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 96.
104 Ibid., 101.
105 Paul Hirst, Representative Democracv and its Limits (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 4.
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As the PCN developed an independent public profile and some organizational
capacity, it also equipped popular sector groups with a common voice vis-a-vis the
partisan political realm. In a parliamentary system that insists on dragging parties
away from movements, this was a significant development. Building on the
legitimacy first gained through analysis of the FTA, and enhanced by the ability to
deliver a campaign against the FTA and then on other issues, the Network developed
strong working relationships with the two federal opposition parties from 1987 to
1993. These relationships, in turn, helped to legitimate the Network as a bona fide
political actor.
From the beginning, the Network demonstrated a sophisticated understanding
of the value of parliamentary allies in its quest to stop the FTA. The minutes of the
PCN's First Assembly record agreement with the following assertion:
The Parliamentary process can assist us, if there is such public outcry that the
opposition will create an impasse by obstructing the business of the House.
We need to be aware of the complimentary role played by an extra
parliamentary movement such as our own. Parliament needs public opinion,
needs public actions, if it is going to take the actions we want. 106
While the PCN identified, for example, the tactical importance of supporting the
initiative by Liberal Senators to obstruct the FTA implementing legislation, its
broader strategic orientation continued to emphasize public education and
mobilization.
The concept of a political opportunity structure proves useful as a framework
for examining the relationship between the Network and the parliamentary-electoral
realm. 107 The variables Tarrow identifies as defining political opportunity - including
divisions between political elites, instability of political alignments, existence of allies
and support groups, degree of openness or closure of the polity - seem particularly
apposite to the circumstances of the Canadian free trade debate of 1987-1988. 108 In
106 peN First Assembly Minutes.
107 See Chapter 2 above.
10M Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements. Collective Action and Politics.
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fact, in addition to Tarrow's more narrowly political variables, it is tempting to
suggest that the political opportunity structure facing the Pro-Canada Network in
1987 was characterized by a more fundamental systemic crisis. The postwar order
built around the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) was already well into its
disintegration and a new hegemonic project had yet to be consolidated. 109
The strong anti-FTA stand taken by the Liberal Party led by John Turner was a
symptom ofdivisions between elites, the instability of political alignments and the
conjunctural crisis facing Canadian capital and the state. Vituperative denunciations
ofTurner by his peers in the Canadian corporate elite marked a deep, though as it
turned out brief, feud within the political establishment and economic elite of which
Turner and the Liberal Party, as 'Canada's natural governing party,' were charter
members. While there was substantial opposition to Turner's position on the deal
within the Liberal Party itself - including former Trudeau cabinet ministers Donald
Johnston and Donald Macdonald - this was muted by the pragmatic calculation that
electoral success depended on drawing some of the centre-left electorate away from
the NDP. 110
The divisions within the Liberal Party and competitive jockeying between the
two opposition parties on the trade issue reflected what has variously been referred to
as an "alignment shift" or a "dealignment" in Canadian politics. I I I Tilly argues that
electoral instability and competition is more likely to create political allies for social
movements. 112 In the European context, Kriesi points to the competitive dynamics
109 On this theme, see Breton and Jenson, "After Free Trade and Meech Lake: Quoi de neuf?" and
Chapter 2 above.
110 Clarkson points out that 'left-nationalist' Liberal caucus members were more and more in control of
the Party's policy agenda by late summer 1987. Stephen Clarkson, "The Liberals: Disoriented in
Defeat," in The Canadian General Election of 1988, ed. Alan Frizzell (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1989),32. This followed Turner's decentralization of control of the caucus, the appointment
'left-nationalist' Lloyd Axworthy as trade critic and the resignation ofleading free trade advocate and
former Trudeau Treasury Board president Donald Johnston. Doem and Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The
Free Trade Story, 230-32.
III Johnston, Letting the People Decide: Dynamics ofa Canadian Election; on dealignment, see Clarke
et al., Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections; and on electoral instability in
general, see Forbes, "Absent Mandate '88? Parties and Voters in Canada," 7.
112 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 213-14.
305
between parties of the left as a variable affecting social movement mobilization. I 13
Finally, Jenkins argues that the American Democratic Party was pressed into
relationships with social movements by electoral calculations. I 14
By 1993, the usually relatively tranquil Canadian parliamentary landscape had
been transformed and was on the eve of further and more dramatic change. Over the
course of the twentieth century, change had for the most part been limited to the rise
and fall of a series of minor parties. Now, the Progressive Conservative Party - one of
the two major brokerage parties - faced virtual electoral annihilation as its coalition of
regional dissent dissolved into two new regionally based political forces. Meanwhile,
the Liberal Party prepared itself for a return to its rightful place as a 'reliable'
governing party under the leadership of Jean Chretien. The Liberals abandoned their
staunch opposition to the FTA and, as a matter of course, the more progressive
elements of the party's social and economic program. At the same time, the Liberal
Party's discourse retained its traditional centre-left tilt designed to ensure electoral
success. I 15
The results of the 1993 federal election campaign further altered the ACN's
political opportunity structure. With the Liberals now in power, the task of opposition
was left to two new parties, the sovereignist Bloc Quebecois and the Western Canada
based right-wing populist Reform Party, neither one a likely ally for pan-Canadian
progressive social movements. At the same time, the consignment of the NDP to the
parliamentary minor leagues served to delegitimize progressive policies and discourse
creating an atmosphere that was far less propitious for the Network's activities. The
113 Chapter 3 in Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni,
New Social Movements in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1995). In the European context this competition was most often played out between
Socialist and Communist parties, at least until the emergence of Green and alternative left-wing parties.
In Canada, the dynamic only took hold in the interregnum following the breakdown of the postwar
KWS consensus and the momentary 'dealignrnent ' that saw the Liberal Party shake loose of the
nascent neo-liberal continentalist project.
114 J. Craig Jenkins. The Politics ofInsurgcncv The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s (New York:
Columbia Press. 1985).
II~ S boec Chapter 6 ave.
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Liberal Party's ability to shift substantially rightward was itself partly facilitated by
the ongoing crisis facing the New Democratic Party. While the party's poorer than
expected showing in 1988 led to introspection and critique, five years later the NDP
still reaped its worst electoral showing ever. I 16
The limitations of a political opportunity structure approach become apparent
when it comes to evaluating the relationship between the Pro-Canada!Action Network
and the NDP. While the Network's attitude towards the NDP was defmitely coloured
by shorter-term tactical considerations, it was much more profoundly determined by
the commonalities in the projects the two groups were advancing. This dynamic is
beyond the scope of an analytical framework rooted in a rational choice paradigm that
fails to fully consider the interests and ideologies of movements.
As Boggs documents in the case of its European representatives, modem
social democracy has entertained a love/hate relationship with social movements. 117
Wainwright elaborates the argument while broadening its scope:
Both kinds of parties (social democratic and communist), for instance, have
traditionally tended either to take social movements under their wing: "our
women's/peace/tenants' movement", "this Great Movement of Ours", or. if
the movement is too stroppy to be embraced, to give them leper status and
treat them as "outside our movement", and presumably doomed. I 18
Mirroring Boggs' conclusion that the relationship becomes more difficult as social
democratic parties win electoral office, the NDP's rapport with progressive social
movements became strained in the run-up to the 1988 federal election, undoubtedly
the party's closest ever brush with federal power. I 19 The relationship later plunged to
116 The Report of the CLC's Special Task Force on Labour-Party Relations set up to in 1989 reaffirmed
labour's commitment to .. the concept that labour and the NOP are partners in the pursuit of social
justice" while at the same time calling for a number of changes in the relationship. Elaine Bernard.
"Labour, the New Democratic Party, and the 1988 Federal Election," in The Challenge of
Restructuring: North American Labor Movements Respond, ed. Jane Jenson and Rianne Mahon, Labor
and Social Change (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 139.
117 Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power.
118 Wainwright, Arguments for a New L4i: Answering the Free-Market Right, 213. Galipeau makes a
far less dramatic Canadian comment on this theme: "The NDP often claims a special role for itself as
vanguard parliamentary party representing new issues and new social demands." Galipeau, "Political
Parties, Interest Groups, and New Social Movements: Toward New Representation," ~21, footnote 8.
119 Bernard notes a "lively anticipation of power" among NDP strategists at the time. Bernard, "Labour,
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the depths of acrimony with the imposition of the .social contract ~ on public sector
workers and the abandonment ofa number of prominent campaign promises by the
Rae NDP government in Ontario (1990-95).120 Conflict was particularly fierce within
the labour movement whose members bore the brunt of these policies. For those on
the pro-NDP side of the rift in the labour movement, "coalitions" writ large and the
ACN became handy scapegoats for their party's woes. 121
The openness of the Turner-led Liberals to challenging the bilateral free trade
project was essential to the Pro-Canada Network's early credibility and legitimacy.
Ironically, the PCN's early relationship with the Liberal Party established the basis for
the Network to become an interlocutor with the New Democratic Party, the political
the New Democratic Party, and the 1988 Federal Election," 142. On the relationship between social
democracy in power and social movements in the European context, see Hanspeter Kriesi, ''New Social
Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands," American Journal ofSociology 94, no. 1 (1989):
296-97.
120 Walkom, Rae Days: The Rise and Fall ofthe NDP.
121 Peter Bleyer, "Coalitions of Social Movements as Agencies for Social Change: the Action Canada
Network," in Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice, ed.
William K. Carroll (Toronto: Garamond, 1997), 147. Long-time NDP member ofParJiament for the
riding of Winnipeg-Transcona, BiJJ Blaikie, drafted the classic statement of this negative perspective
on the ACN and coalition building writ large. In a widely circulated mimeograph, Blaikie argued that
the PCN/ACN had undermined support for the NDP: "Imagine if all the work that went into the anti-
free trade movement over the last decade by various groups and individuals had gone into the federal
NOP as the only political party committed to abrogation of the ITA and non-implementation of
NAFTA. Instead, by 1993, the NDP had been variously attacked, ignore, or insulted, not to mention
frustrated, by the never ending dithering of such groups in deciding whose position on the issues was
superior and who deserved their support." Bill Blaikie, M.P., "Political Movements for the Right;
Social Movements for the Left," February 1996.
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party that carried overwhelmingly more sympathy among social movement groups.
Similarly, while an analysis of the political opportunity structure facing ITA
opponents in 1987-88 clearly draws out the importance of the Liberal Party's stance
in the emergence and formative stages of the Pro-Canada Network, it provides a less
convincing framework for understanding the subsequent expansion of the Network's
mandate and discourse. From the NDP's perspective, the Pro-Canada Network was at
first viewed with scepticism because of its apparent relationship with the Liberal
Party. Later, the PCN was viewed as a threat when its mandate and discourse moved
beyond a social democratic framework turning it into an apparent competitor for the
mantle of political agency ofthe Canadian Left.
Conclusion
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1. Theory Meets Practice
During the period from its formation in April 1987 to the federal election
campaign in the fall of 1993, the Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network developed
beyond the expectations of most participants. The Network also defied most of the
prognoses established from within the analytical frameworks reviewed in this paper,
as it moved relatively seamlessly beyond the initial single-issue rationale for its
formation. The PCN's discourse quickly evolved from a relatively narrow critique of
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement to opposition to a broader political agenda. At
first, this agenda was defined by association with the party that was promoting and
implementing it - the Tory agenda - but later characterized in more structural terms
as the corporate agenda.
From the perspective ofResource Mobilization Theory (RMT) there is little
incentive for the formation and consolidation of social movement coalitions. The
RMT approach does however provide a helpful emphasis on continuities in social
movements both through its focus on organizational forms and activities, and its use
ofa historical method to provide a firm basis for comparison over time. I This accent
on continuity rather than difference is certainly appropriate in the case ofthe
evolution of the Canadian popular sector that culminated in the formation of the Pro-
Canada Network. Nonetheless, RMT's rational choice roots show through in the
calculus that leads to the conclusion that coalitions are unlikely to be enduring and
that competition is at the very least equally likely.'
In contrast, New Movement Theory (NMT) identifies a rupture between older
and newer movements in terms of issues and values, as well as tactics and
organizational forms. While this particular emphasis ofNMT is vigorously
contradicted by this case study, the accompanying stress on the formation of social
identities is certainly an asset when considering coalition formation among social
I laid and McCarthy, and Tilly and Tarrow respectively.
2 Klandermans and Staggenborg.
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movements and their organizations. Unfortunately, this framework's stress on
discontinuity between old and new movements includes the implication that 'identity
politics' are solely the domain of the latter. As Jenson points out, all politics have
always been about identities."
The inclination to celebrate and, at times, reify difference tends to exclude
movement convergence as a form of political agency from consideration within NMT.
A prominent exception is the 'radical pluralism' advocated by Laclau and Mouffe
who "construct the political as the site of identity formation, contestation and
renegotiation.?" Yet, here again, concepts that appear helpful to a theorizing of
convergence are undermined by an emphasis on "discursive articulation" at the
expense of "concrete political-economic structurea"
From a class-analytical perspective, the prospects for a continuing Pro-
Canada!Action Canada Network are of less interest than the nature of any enduring
alliance, its basis for unity, and objectives. Specifically, would the coalition develop
the potential to transform social relations or, more likely from this point of view,
become stalled in a social reform dynamic. A framework that privileges class above
other societal cleavages and challenges the transformative potential of non-class based
movements can logically be expected to question the transformative potential of a
cross-movement coalition. Nevertheless, .all forms of class analysis are not necessarily
mired in the economic determinism and political substitutism that have characterized
most of its dominant political manifestations. A broader vision and politics includes
Marx's own identification of the fulsome emancipation of humanity as the objective
with the liberatory potential of the working class assigned as the means to this end. In
a contemporary rearticulation, Rustin speculates that a "chain of equivalence" afa
.\ Jenson, "Representations in Crisis: The Roots of Canada's Permeable Fordism."
.j Anna Marie Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: the Radical Democratic Imaginary (London: Routledge.
1998), 125.
5 Carroll, "Social Movements and Counterhegemony: Canadian Contexts and Social Theories," 30.
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Laclau and Mouffe might be located in "resistance to capital" rather than in class per
6
se.
Critics working from within different analytical frameworks made specific
prognostications regarding the Pro-Canada Network. From the viewpoint of pluralist
political science, Doem argued that the end of the battle to block the FTA would lead
the groups making up the PCN to return to their traditional relationship to Canadian
politics. From a class-analytical perspective, Albo and Swartz anticipated a similar
denouement given the PCN's lack of a "coherent general view.?" A more optimistic if
nuanced forecast was put forward from a neo-gramscian point of view. For Carroll
and Mahon, the breadth and scope ofengagement by various social actors in the
Network - including but not limited to the labour movement - allowed for some
hopefulness regarding the potential for the constitution of an organic alliance (Mahon)
or a counterhegemonic project (Carroll).8
2. Explaining the Pro-Canada Network
Over the course ofthis study, different analytical frameworks have been
employed in an attempt to best understand the PCN/ACN experience. Considered by
some a variant of RMT and by others a distinct framework for the study of social
movements, the political process model can identify some of the key factors that
facilitated the formation of the Pro-Canada Network." Yet the prism of the political
opportunity structure fails to reflect the underlying conjuncture of systemic crisis.
Electoral dealignment did create willing political allies for the SMOs uniting to
oppose Canada-U.S. free trade; while growing anti-party sentiment, the erosion of
faith in the political process and developing interorganizational and personal
6 Rustin. "Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist Concept of Hegemony," 171.
7 Albo and Swartz. "The Free Trade Papers," 156.
8 Doern and Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story: Mahon. "Post-Fordism: Some Issues for
Labour."
'I AyTeS employs a political process model to assess the PCN/ACN. See Ayres, Defying Conventional
Wisdom: Political Movements and Popular Contention against North American Free Trade.
313
relationships combined to produce some receptiveness to social movement alliances
as a form of political agency. But partisan instability and the convergence of sectoral
concerns among social movements also reflected of deeper structural developments.
The permeable fordism that characterized the Canadian postwar development
model limited the effectiveness ofKeynesian demand management. Already half-
hearted, attempts at nation-building through industrial policy were compromised by
continentalism while economic crisis south of the forty-ninth parallel spread rapidly
northward. Responding to a deepening crisis, including increasing industrial militancy
and social demands, Canadian capital changed its strategic orientation in the mid-
1970s. Through new and revitalized collective organizations, Canadian corporations
mounted a counter-mobilization aimed at re-stabilizing and enhancing profitability.
Capital pressed for a shift in economic development models: an abandonment of
expansionary fiscal policy and a centralist state in favour ofa decentralized market-
driven approach to industrial and economic policy. As a result, mild interventionism
would give way to deregulation and privatization.
With continuing public support for welfare state programs obstructing the
implementation ofa full neo-liberal policy turn during its first term (1984-88), the
Mulroney government turned to the bold continentalism that also characterized
capital's new strategic direction. The Canada-U.S. FTA would provide a
"conditioning framework" for the Canadian economy and society. 10 In this sense, the
agreement was not merely, nor in fact primarily, about trade per se, although the
discourse around it was carefully formulated to emphasize the supposed benefits of
reduced tariffs for workers and consumers. Carroll describes the FTA as an "attempt
to win the people to the historical bloc" with an appeal based on jobs and low prices. II
At the same time, the centrality of the FTA in capital's plan for a post-
Keynesian era created a powerful focal point for contestation. First as an issue, then as
--------
10 Grinspun and Cameron, "The Politics of North American Integration: Diverse Perspectives,
Converging Criticisms."
II Carroll, "Restructuring Capital. Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada."
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the working text of an agreement, and finally as an implemented bilateral treaty, the
FTA condensed and distilled a wide range of issues and themes, crystallizing the
social, economic, environmental, and cultural concerns of many sectors in society.
The centrepiece in the plan to stabilize capital's prospects through a neo-liberal
continentalist model of development became a potent symbolic, as well as material
target for its critics. As participation in the April 1987 Canada Summit indicates, and
the early membership list for the PCN confirms, concern with the implications of
bilateral free trade cut across many different constituencies. In many cases, the FTA
would serve as an entry point into a broader political engagement for movements and
their organizations.
Focusing on three movements that played important roles in the development
of the PCN - labour, women and ecumenical justice - this study has identified some
key factors that worked in tandem with the trade issue and the FTA in facilitating the
coalescing of movements and their interests, and in subsequent broadening of the
resulting discourse beyond a single-issue focus.
First, all three of these sectors were ideologically predisposed to taking their
engagement with the FTA beyond narrow constituency self-interest. Important
elements within these movement sectors brought with them pre-existing commitments
to shared objectives for social change. In line with the broad discourse of Canadian
second wave feminism, and the important influence of a socialist feminist politic
within it, NAC elaborated a gendered cross-sectoral critique of the FTA while
pressing for alliances beyond its own constituency to bring about social
transformation. Similarly, the ecumenical justice movement was deeply influenced by
liberation theology and arguments for economic self-sufficiency and completely
invested in a coalition building strategy to bring about social change. As we have
shown, from the outset GATT-Fly and other groups in this sector defined their
engagement with the trade issue in the broadest of terms. Finally, the relative strength
of social unionism, as opposed to a narrower economistic conception of unionism,
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within the Canadian labour movement meant that the initial emphasis on the
implications of free trade for its member's jobs was quickly widened.
Second, the focus on free trade and the founding of the PCN took place at a
moment when the personal and organizational relationships developed within the
popular sector had achieved a certain critical mass. While it was preceeded by other
initiatives such as the 1981 Coalition on Interest Rates, the release of Ethical
Reflections on the Economic Crisis stands out as marking the onset of this phase of
social movement politics. Ethical Reflections was particularly influential in drawing
the labour movement into a broader framework for alliance building. In conjunction
with the negative incentive provided by the Macdonald Commission and its report
released in the fall of 1985, Ethical Reflections laid the groundwork for a series of
popular sector events culminating with the Dialogue '86 conference and the formation
of the Working Committee for Social Solidarity. A renewed nationalist movement led
by the Council of Canadians and, most importantly, this group's turn to alliance
building in 1987 provided the last critical ingredient.
To sum up, the confluence of social movements and the formation of a cross-
sectoral or cross-movement coalition was the result of a propitious basis for unity-
the Canada-U.S. FTA - emerging at a fertile moment in the development of a
collaborative environment among social movements and SMOs. This environment
was, in tum, greatly influenced by the ideological commitment of important elements
within this evolving popular sector to an alternative, or at the very least a
complement, to social democratic electoralism as political agency. Like the
emergence of the FTA as the centrepiece of a continentalist neo-liberal strategy. the
popular sector was the cumulative result of a set of political responses to the transition
from an economic model in crisis.
The nature of free trade as an issue also facilitated the Network s transition
beyond a single-issue mandate. Beyond crystallizing the concerns of a number of
constituencies. reflecting its role as a "conditioning framework" the FTA condensed a
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broader economic agenda. 12 As a result, free trade was positioned at the centre of the
political economy master frame or "general conception of injustice," described by
Carroll and Ratner. 13 The PCN's evolving discourse was then reinforced by the
practice ofcross-movement collaboration up to and including the 1988 federal
election campaign. 14 Author Rick Salutin reflected the feelings of many other anti-
FTA activists in his account of the campaign:
Could this be the first step toward a new kind of politics in Canada, based on
issues and popular mobilization around them? For a while we'd had an
election that was not a substitute for a deeper, more participatory kind of
democracy, but a foretaste of it. IS
As another commentator quipped, "1 went to an election and politics broke out." Even
a senior labour leader and committed NDP supporter ventured the opinion that the
Network had been "building a new political culture."
This positive experience of movement-based political action was further
buttressed by the contrasting experience ofactivists engaged with the NDP during a
campaign where the party failed to seize the opportunity presented by the FTA. The
NDP's failure dealt a serious blow to the labour movement's loyalty to social
democratic electoralism as its preferred form of political engagement. While the pull
of labour's ties to the NDP was somewhat mitigated by the upsurge in social
movement activism during the 1970s - including a radicalization ofthe labour
movement itself - and by cross-movement relationships in the popular sector during
the 1980s, the impact ofthe 1988 campaign should not be underestimated.
As we have seen, the ground for the broadening of the peN's mandate in 1989
was well tilled far earlier. This fact is perhaps all the more important when
12 Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron, "The Politics of North American Integration: Diverse
Perspectives, Converging Criticisms."
13 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in Contemporary Social
Movements"; Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegernony: Political Sensibilities in
Contemporary Social Movements."
1·1 In this sense the PCN/ACN supports the claim that "master framing and cross movement networking
probably condition each other. Carrol1 and Ratner, "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking
in Contemporary Social Movements," 616.
15 Salutin, Jrailingjor Democracv A Citizen's Journal. 263.
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considering the Network's re-mandating as it was for its formation. Alone,
cooperation on the campaign trail, the aggressive counter-mobilization by capital and
the cold shower ofneo-liberal po licy implementation would not likely have led to the
same result without the prior development of the popular sector, and more specifically
the attention to both trade and political agency identified in this paper. In the case of
groups like the CAW and GATT-Fly, internal documents and publications indicate
that the single-issue PCN was considered as a possible stepping stone to a coalition
with a much broader agenda very early on. GATT-Fly's perspective was significant
since the group had broad influence through the Pro-Canada Dossier. Later,
worldviews that included North/South solidarity and critiques ofthe capitalist model
of trade and economic development would influence the ACN's engagement with
trilateral free trade (NAFTA). Here, conjunctural factors, like the tension between
Quebec-based organizations and groups in the rest ofCanada, were equally important.
The political economy master frame now articulated around free trade also
gained purchase for three reasons. First, the geographic extension represented by the
inclusion ofMexico in trade talks; second, the widened ambit ofNAFTA which went
beyond the FTA to include tough measures to liberalize investment; and third, the
explicit linking of new issues beyond the scope ofthe FTA and NAFTA to the two
pacts (e.g. GST, cuts to social programs, constitutional reform). Moreover, as a cross-
movement network with some institutional materiality, the PCN/ACN created space
for discursive and organizational struggle and learning. In this sense, the development
ofa structured agency, however incipient, contributed to an evolving common
discourse. The organizational consequences of cross-movement interaction were
equally significant. The PCNIACN was a laboratory where different organizational
practices and styles were shared and to some extent reconciled, pointing to the
potential for a common practice across movements.
3. Understanding the limits
Just as a positive political opportunity structure facilitated the PCN's
formation and development. changes to it would take their toll on the coalition. The
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Liberal Party's shift away from an anti-continentalist platform after 1989 set the stage
for its allegiance to the neo-liberal free trade model after its election in 1993. The
competitive dynamic that had developed between the NDP and the Liberal Party on
trade issues, and which had created valuable opportunities for the PCN/ACN, was put
to rest as Jean Chretien came to power. While the 'alignment shift' in the party system
continued through 1993, the consequences were now very different: the new parties
entering parliament were unlikely to become allies of the anti-free trade movement.
The Network's development was also hindered by other factors. Not least of
these was the ongoing tension between electoral and movement-based conceptions of
agency. During the 1988 election campaign, this tension was effectively mitigated by
the NDP's failure to satisfy its labour movement support base and its thirst for a focus
on the FTA. As a result, trade unions gravitated to the PCN and the form of agency it
represented both during and after the campaign. Still, attempts to promote some form
of tactical voting towards the end of the campaign highlighted the continuing conflict
as they would again in 1993.
Although the combination ofdefensiveness and domineering that
characterized the Canadian Labour Congress leadership's attitude to coalitions
softened over time, it remained an important factor in the internal dynamics of the
Network. Even as it abandoned the "language of domination and manipulation," the
CI,C remained cautious in relinquishing control and sharing resources. 16 This was
perhaps most clearly reflected in the launching of the Campaign for Fair Taxes in
1990 and when a dispute around the CLC credit card allotted to long-time ACN chair
Tony Clarke contributed to his eventual resignation in 1993.
Thanks, at least in part, to the active approach to consensus management -
termed "the tending of political relations" by one participant - practiced by Clarke
and a succession of staff members, consensus was rarely left to chance. Consequently,
the ACN avoided the complexity and inefficiency of much consensus-based decision-
16 Turk, Interview by author.
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making. 17 Whether despite or because of this approach to decision-making, the
Network's organizational structure remained stunted and failed to keep up with its
growing mandate. Support for further development of the coalitional structure and
capacity from some participants (e.g. provincial coalitions) was offset by strong
counter-pressure from other SMOs concerned with the implications of such a
consolidation (e.g. Canadian Labour Congress). For federations like the CLC, the
democratization of the Network was viewed as a particular threat given their tenuous
internal structural dynamics.
Whatever its causes, the stalling of the Network's democratic development
was at the very least a major contributing factor and perhaps even a fatal flaw leading
to its eventual decline. Kriesi suggests that structural development is a requisite for
SMO success over time adding that while "internal structural deficits" restrict
political success, the inverse "contributes to the stabilization of an SMO in periods of
organizational decline.t''" Expanding on this micro-level perspective it is reasonable
to suggest that the failure to continue to develop democratic structures, and thus
ensure the twin functions ofaccountability and representation, feeds a crisis of
legitimacy within a social movement coalition. Nevertheless, in the case of the
PCN/ACN the evidence is somewhat contradictory. While we might assume that the
lack of structural clarity or transparency was a constraint on the mobilization of
resources, we have also shown that in at least one important case (i.e., the CLC's
particular relationship with the Network) circumventing procedures and structures
within a member SMa resulted in the maximization of resources for the Network.
In any case, two conclusions can be drawn with some confidence here. First,
deficient organizational capacity left the Network overextended. This was the case,
for example, when the ACN attempted to engage the second phase ofNorth American
17 della Porta and Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 162.
III Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context,"
in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilization Structure and
Cultural Framing, ed. Doug McAdam. John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge
I lnivcrsity Press, 1996), 155. Kriesi sets out parameters to evaluate the degree of "internal
structuration" of an SMO. These include the formalization of structures, rules and procedures,
professionalization, and internal differentiation.
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free trade on two fronts - campaigning for FTA abrogation at home and against
NAFTA's implementation abroad. In the end, the domestic campaign was
overshadowed.
Second, stalled structural development constrained an evolving common
discourse. Leo Panitch has suggested that coalitions such as the PCN/ACN have been
largely limited to a form of elite accommodation politics - "popular front-style
strategic networking between the top leaderships of the various organizations."19 On
the evidence presented here Panitch's contention is too strong though far from
wrongheaded. Grassroots participation in the activities and decision-making of the
PCNIACN was enhanced with the inclusion of provincial coalitions. Moreover. some
member groups made serious efforts to involve their members in coalition work and
engage in political education. Most notable in this regard were the exchanges of
workers and social activists organized by Canadian unions, church groups and others
with their Mexican counterparts. Still, the advancing consensus produced through
coalition activities remained relatively rarefied and might very well have been
deepened more evenly by stronger mechanisms for representation and accountability
within the Network. Indeed such processes would, at a minimum, help to ensure an
internal level playing field given the dramatic discrepancy in power and resources
between participating SMOs. Not surprisingly, the smaller, resource-poor national
groups as well as provincial coalitions tended to favour initiatives to enhance
participation including pooled travel costs.
Both in its engagement with trade liberalization and on other issues, the
PCN/ACN's discourse advanced beyond a shared critique ofneo-liberal policy
initiatives. Movement to movement relationships with Mexican free trade opponents
provided additional incentive for a shift in the Network's discourse on trade towards
the articulation of alternatives. Similarly, on the GST and in the constitutional
debates, the PCN/ACN played either a direct or indirect role in developing and
19 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, "The Political Legacy of the Manifesto," in The Socialist Register /998
(UK: Merlin Press. 1998), ::'::'.
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advancing alternatives to the policies being put forward by the state and promoted by
the corporate sector. As it added the formulation of alternatives to its contestation, the
Network adopted a deeper critique of political-economic structures and named a
broader opponent - i.e., the corporate agenda - in its discourse. Yet, the Network's
critique of Westminster-style representative democracy remained underdeveloped,
and this despite at least two significant opportunities: the Mulroney government's
unprecedented stacking of the unelected Senate in order to insure passage ofGST
legislation, and engagement with the constitutional debate.
While the PCN/ACN's discourse can be said to have grown towards a nascent
anti-capitalist perspective, the defence of the Canadian KWS that remained at its
centre complicated this trajectory. The high priority accorded to defensive struggles
around state programs may also help to explain the Network's lack ofemphasis on
democratic reform; the additional complexity of binational federalism, reflected in
proposals for "asymmetrical federalism" was also a mitigating factor here. Finally, the
broader "political economy frame of injustice" that appears to have been so dominant
in the popular sector may, somewhat ironically, have served to reduce the importance
attached to more 'narrowly political' reforms. In any case, the Network was arguably
most effective when its campaigns were constructed around the broadest possible
basis of unity and initially defensive objectives (e.g. against the FTA and the GST).
4. Claims and Contributions
The general hypothesis that an approach combining the strengths of a variety
of different analytical frameworks would best explain the formation and development
of the PCN/ACN has been assessed in this paper." This study underlines the
importance of a holistic approach, consideration of both structure and agency, as well
as a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between them. Specifically. it
20 Meyer and Rochon argue "each analytical framework is constructed to throw light on a particular
aspect of a social or political protest." David S. Meyer and Thomas Rochon, "Toward a Coalitional
Theory," in Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons ofthe Nuclear Freeze. ed. David S.
Meyer and Thomas Rochon (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienncr, 1997),250.
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reaffirms the value of a political economy analysis without accepting a "transmission
belt' relationship between economic structures and social phenomena. The PCNIACN
and the Canada-U.S. FTA can best be understood against the background of political
responses to structural contradictions and economic crisis as the era of the postwar
KWS ended.
A political economy lens brings into focus the most evident example of the
importance of Canadian specificity in the emergence of the PCNIACN. Canada's
relationship with its powerful neighbour to the south - economic, political and
cultural- spurred the rise of a nationalist movement in the 1970s and 1980s along
with a nationalist discourse with historical roots and broad public resonance.
Together, nationalist movement and discourse would provide a necessary, if
insufficient, foundation for the subsequent cross-movement mobilization against the
FTA. Similarly, the organizational and ideological character of the women's and
labour movements - two key elements in the narrative of the popular sector and
PCN/ACN - were both shaped by Canada's proximity to the United States. The
presence of a social democratic political party - limited by rather weaker ideological
and popular roots than its European cousins - should also be noted here. Finally, and
critically, the formation of the Pro-Canada Network came in reaction to proposals for
a bilateral free trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. As the centrepiece of
the Canadian neo-liberal response to economic crisis, free trade wove nationalist
themes together with the grievances and demands of popular sector groups.
Other aspects of the specific Canadian context also appear as important
variables in this account of the PCNIACN. While the constraints imposed by
geographic expanse seem self-evident, other related factors carried more contradictory
implications. For example, the binational state added to complexity and divisions
among popular sector groups, yet may have contributed to a general understanding of
the importance of the negotiated partnerships essential for coalition formation.
Similarly, the Canadian state's federal structure opens the door to intergovernmental
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decision-making that is increasingly distant from popular contestation, while, the
replication of this federal structure within SMOs "may inhibit effective concerted
action by all members of the group across territorial boundaries.?" Still, once again,
this additional complexity of state structures might lead to a more propitious political
opportunity structure, with different levels of government as potential allies for
movements, as well as creating internal checks and balances that could contribute to
the necessary process of democratizing a cross-movement coalition such as the
PCN/ACN.
In spite of its strengths, political economy suffers from a general silence on the
question of agency. A neo-Gramscian framework serves as a helpful corrective to this
quiescence and to the confusion on the question of agency within NMT. Despite
attention to discourse and identity formation and Laclau and Mouffe's concept of
'chains of equivalence,' which, exceptionally within this framework, takes a step
towards rearticulating diverse identities, the emphasis on difference within NMT
seems particularly inappropriate in light of the evidence in this account.
Notwithstanding many twists and turns, the development of the Canadian popular
sector highlights continuity, unity and convergence of interests and identities, as well
as movements and organizations. It is tempting to suggest that this pattern is a
reflection of the specific types of social movements and organizations involved.
However, in their study of social movement activists in Vancouver, Carroll and
Ratner found not only that a "political economy master frame of injustice" was "by
far the most prevalent" used by their subjects but that this was also the case for
gay/lesbian activists, a group most NMT literature tends to associate with identity
politics. 22 The political economy master frame included assumptions that power is
systemic and that power structures are articulated with each other entailing, according
to the authors, a "broadly socialist political sensibility.?"
21 Miriam Smith, "Interest Groups and Social Movements," 182.
21 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary
Social Movements," 4 17.
23 Ibid.: 416.
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Like Carroll and Ratner's conclusions, this assessment of the PCN/ACN
provides support for an analytical perspective that maintains an attentive eye to the
role ofclass. Both in its organizational and its discursive development, the PCNIACN
draws attention to the continuing importance of the organized working class - i.e., the
labour movement. Labour's key role in the Network was certainly aided by what are
in North American terms relatively high levels of unionization, political education and
activism. More generally though, despite recent hard times, the level of organization
and consequent potential for mobilization achieved by trade unions remains matched
by few other SMOs. Finally and more fundamentally, beyond its subordinate position
within capitalist social relations, it is the position ofpotential power the working class
occupies by virtue of its ability to withdraw labour power that guarantees its crucial
place in any potentially transformative political project, let alone any effective social
movement coalition.24
The importance of elite divisions, alignment instability and the presence of
allies in the political sphere to the emergence of the PCN affirm the value of the
political process variant ofRMT, albeit with some Iimitations.f The case of the Pro-
Canada Network also indicates that changes to the political opportunity structure
affect the degree to which coalition participants pursue internal rather than collective
objectives. After 1988, without the pressure of an impending electoral contest that
would likely determine the fate of the FTA, the competing urgency of the specific
demands facing each movement and SMO was reinforced. This was particularly the
case given the combination of an economic downturn and the systematic
implementation of a range of nco-liberal policy measures that impacted directly on
specific SMOs (e.g. funding to women's groups) and on their constituencies (e.g. cuts
to Unemployment Insurance coverage and benefits).
24 Panitch, "The Impasse of Social Democratic Politics," 24; Bleyer, "The New Realism: A Socialist
Response to the Crisis in Britain:' 84.
2~ In Chapter 7 above I point out the weakness of this approach when it comes to understanding the
relationship between the popular sector/PvN and the NDP.
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Resource Mobilization Theory's micro-level focus on movement organization
and activity also proved useful for this case study, which, in turn, supports some of
the central arguments elaborated in RMT literature. First, the development of the
Canadian popular sector, and out of it the formation of the PCN, underline the
continuity in social movements both across movements and over time. From the
reinforcing waves of the women's movement, represented, for example, in evolving
feminist organizations such as NAC, to the relative similarities of perspective and
organizational structure between the key social movement sectors that together
formed the PCNIACN, continuity far more than rupture has marked the Canadian
social movement scene. Moreover, like Carroll and Ratner's work on master framing,
the evidence here does not support the notion ofa dramatic break between the
practices of so-called 'old' movements such as the labour movement and new social
movements. Canadian social movements, both new and old, are for the most part
engaged on a terrain that includes interaction with the state as well as activity within
state structures themselves in the defence of acquired rights and to make new gains.
Second, beyond identifying continuity, a focus on organizational detail leads
to an emphasis on linkages between movements which is reflected in a series of
concepts elaborated in the literature including, social networks, multi-organizational
fields, and alliance systems. By tracing the roots of the PCN/ACN in earlier popular
sector developments as well as considering three key sectors in some detail, this study
has underlined the importance of personal and organizational relationships, including
'multiple affiliations' of activists, to successful social movement alliances.
Specifically, the existence of "solidarity links which have already been activated"
facilitated both the Network's formation and its further development." In addition, in
keeping with the implications of Carroll and Ratner's study of activists in British
Columbia, the hypothesized importance of the "relative stability of solidarity links
-----------
26 della Porta and Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 131.
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based on previous shared experiences or on adhesion to certain visions ofthe world
[emphasis mine]" is sustained by this study.27
While this account of the PCN/ACN affirms the value of Resource
Mobilization Theory's emphasis on organizational linkages, it directly challenges the
narrow economistic rationale for coalition formation identified in the few RMT
studies of this phenomenon." Outside of more recent developments in frame
interpretation, RMT's focus on material resources leads it to miss the critical question
ofconsciousness. Yet, the attention to structures and resources within this approach is
ultimately important to the task; resources are necessary not only for mobilization but
also, in the case ofa coalition of organizations that bridges different movements, for
the creation of the organizational space where interaction takes place laying the basis
for ongoing discursive and political convergence.
Thus placed in context, RMT's overriding emphasis on resource maximization
also proves useful in interpreting the PCNIACN experience. It can be argued, for
example, that participation in the Network created opportunities for SMOs to
maximize resources. However meagre, the collective resource base of the Network
allowed less well-resourced groups to participate in campaigns and take more
effective stands on issues that might otherwise have been beyond their reach. A more
complete picture of the maximization process can be drawn with a broader definition
of resources. For larger trade unions, at whose expense the collective financial and
material resource base of the Network was largely achieved, the maximization of less
tangible resources is a benefit." They gain access to more extensive communication
and research networks, a deeper pool of skills and experience in these areas, and a
broader base of support for their own sectoral struggles.
.'7 lbid., 133.
]S Sec Hathaway and Meyer, "Competition and Cooperation in Social Movement Coalitions: Lobbying
for Peace in the 19805."
~') Klandermans, "Linking the "Old" and "New": Movement Networks in the Netherlands."
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Beyond expanding the range of resources being maximized, the ACN was
engaged in the more or less explicit and direct redistribution ofresources within the
popular sector. The scope of this redistribution was restricted by the limits of the
Network's democratic development as in the relatively informal and erratic pay-what-
you-can membership fee 'structure' that provided the bulk of the Network's operating
budget and the contribution of in-kind services.
This is perhaps an appropriate juncture at which to consider the value of the
distinctly Canadian descriptive term 'popular sector' as an analytical concept. The
constituencies identified by Drache and Cameron as part ofthe popular sector engage
in discursive struggle initially through a series of relatively ad hoc relationships, both
organizational and personal, and later in more formal relationships which are
themselves issue of this struggle. As they form coalitions around single issues and, at
times, on the basis of a broader common agenda, these actors engage in the defmition
and redefinition of their own social and political identities and discourses, as well as
the collective identity and discourse of these specific moments ofconvergence and of
the popular sector as a whole. An emerging and evolving common discourse
combined with developing personal and institutional relationships lays the basis for
yet further identity formation and for collective action.
Defming the space collectively occupied by social movements and their
organizations as the popular sector draws attention to linkages and continuity.
Nevertheless, a framework that aspires to predict the outcome and understand the
scope and complexity ofcoalition formation must also be informed by the micro-level
focus of organizational theory. A similar nomenclature alone is not sufficient to
imbue the popular sector concept with the elements oforganizational theory that
allow the RMT approach to highlight the structure ofagency thus drawing attention to
the contingent nature ofthe development ofagency.
Conversely, neither the formation nor the further development of the
peN/ACN can be understood without reference to the critical variable of
328
consciousness - a major deficiency of RMT. The ideological commitment to a
broader emancipatory project that has imbued a long history of socialist and radical
theories and practices was a key feature of the Canadian popular sector. Moving
beyond both the limited rational choice conception of resource maximization and
crass Marxian economism as the sole relevant calculations ofcollective action means
going further than a politicized defmition of self-interest. Contrary to the atomized
identities and discourses implied in much ofNew Movement Theory, the discourse
and policy positions of many popular sector groups include explicit commitments to
broader emancipatory goals for their own constituencies as well as for others.30
This account supports the contention that a whole system perspective linked to
a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between agency and structure offers
the best prospect for analyzing contemporary social movement coalitions. More
broadly, Carroll suggests a Gramscian reinterpretation of political economy that "may
be said to mediate between abstract structures of capital and concrete instances of
agency" and, consequently, generates an analysis of the transformation ofcapital and
consent, as well as an appraisal of "the opportunities that these changes present for
emancipatory movements. ,,31
The value of a neo-Gramscian framework for the task of assessing a coalition
of social movements is reflected in the fact that projections for the PCN/ACN's
ability to weather a re-mandating process and its longer-term survival were most
accurately made from this perspective (e.g. Mahon and Carroll). The combination of
attention to structure, agency, and their interaction, as well as openness to discursive
issues, proves particularly valuable for understanding the PCNIACN.32 Furthermore,
the neo-Gramscian insistence on the specific nature of counterhegemony as rooted in
30 See Chapters I and 3. This assessment is reinforced through Carroll and Ratner's elaboration of the
political economy master frame.
.11 Carroll, "Restructuring Capital. Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy and Canada,"
393,90.
12 The neo-Grarnscian approach is less prone to the dramatic polar opposites (i.e., reform/revolution,
structure/agency, macro/micro, movement/institution, state/civil society) that tend to be drawn in other
frameworks. Bogus, Social Movements and Political Power, 19.
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a material base of social- i.e., extra-discursive - conditions, is highly preferable to
the more open-ended discourse-theoretical interpretation." The counterhegemonic
project is thus safeguarded from the excessive enthusiasm generated in a less than
fully elaborated and explicitly normative popular sector concept. Indeed, Jenson
suggests the popular sector consensus remained "underdeveloped and defensive" and
therefore cannot be considered a "clearly articulated paradigm for future social
I · " 34re ations.
Despite the limits to the popular sector's discourse there is evidence to
substantiate Drache and Cameron's claim that a universalistic concern for social
justice emerged out of the practices of the movements involved." This account of the
PCN/ACN indicates that coalition practices were equally influential in producing this
convergence. The collective spaces created out of the popular sector appear to have
contributed to the transformation of existing movements. Offe and Wiesenthal's
suggestion that the main task of social movements is, in fact, the "discursive
formation of preferences and identities which transforms the consciousness of isolated
social actors into a collective or general will" seems particularly apposite to coalition
formation." As Adkins argues in her study of coalition work between trade unionists
and environmentalists in Southern Ontario, "it is also in the context of alliances with
other oppressed social groups that union leaders and members come to develop more
radical critiques of capitalist society and more coherent visions ofa different
world. ,,37 Certainly the important influence of feminist principles and organizational
33 Carroll and Ratner, "Between Leninism and Radical Pluralism: Gramscian Reflections on
Counterhegemony and the New Social Movements," 20.
.~ Jenson, "All the World's a Stage: Ideas, Spaces and Times in Canadian Political Economy," 65.
35 Drache and Cameron, eds., The Other MacDonald Report.
1() Claus Offe, "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements Since the
I960s," Social Research 54, no. 4. Winter (1985): 183. Scott adds that this process also takes place
within collective action and "not merely as an exogenous variable." Scott, Ideology and the New Social
Movements, 12~ .
.17 Laurie Elizabeth Adkins, "The Prospects for l.co-Socialist Convergence" (Doctor of Philosophy
Dissertation. Queen's University, 1989), 32.
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styles on other movements over the course of the 1970s and 1980s is a notable
characteristic of the Canadian popular sector."
Moreover, the evolution of the Network's mandate and the collective
discourse it adopted supports the notion that the various sectoral movements were
converging towards anti-capitalist and pro-democratic values. This observation also
reinforces claims regarding the unifying effect of capitalism's increasingly totalizing
dynamic, an argument of increasing relevance as a global movement around anti-
capitalist/anti-globalizat ion themes takes hold at the beginning of a new century.:"
Notwithstanding its various strengths, a neo-Gramscian framework built
around the conception of counterhegemony remains limited as a tool for the
evaluation of specific instances of movement convergence such as the PCN/ACN. As
employed by Carroll and Ratner, the master frame concept with its roots in RMT
provides an empirical basis for evaluating counterhegemonic potential or, as they
themselves put it, a "cognitive aspect of counterhegemonic politics.T'" Still, master
framing alone cannot completely correct the macro-level abstraction a neo-Gramscian
framework is prone to. The specific micro-level strengths ofRMT with its attention to
organizational forms, structures and processes allow for an equally critical focus on
the structure ofagency.
38 Among others, see Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal, and Hilary Wainwright, Beyond the Fragments:
Feminism and the Making ofSocialism (London: Merlin, ]980); Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail,
Feminist Organizingfor Change; Chapter 1 in Vickers, Rankin, and Appelle, Politics as if Women
Mattered: A Political Analysis ofthe National Action Committee on the Status of Women; Jo Freeman,
"The Tyranny ofStructurelessness," in Women in Politics, ed. Jane Jacquette (New York: John Wiley,
1974); Maroney and Luxton, eds., Feminism and Political Economy: Women's Work, Women's
Struggle; and White, Mail and Female: Women and the Canadian Union ofPostal Workers.
,9 See Chapter 2 above. See for example Rustin, "Absolute Voluntarism: Critique of a Post-Marxist
Concept of Hegemony"; and Frank Cunningham, "Radical Philosophy and the New Social
Movements," in 7/1(' Real World ofDemocracy Revisited and Other Essays in Democracy and
Socialism, ed. Frank Cunningham (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1994), 125. Others have
argued that these anti-capitalist and indeed proto-socialist ideals are amply present within the 'new
movements' and 'identity politics.' See for example Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and
Counterhcgcmony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary Social Movements," 426-27 and Barry
Adam and Alan Sears, Experiencing HIT~ Personal. Family and Work Relationships (New York:
Columhia University Press, 1996).
40 Carroll and Ratner, "Master Frames and Counterhegemony: Political Sensibilities in Contemporary
Social Movements," 412_
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Taken as a whole, the experience of the Canadian popular sector and the
peN/ACN poses a direct challenge to the standard pluralist assumption that "only
parties can aggregate disparate interests around common purposes, forcing single-
issue groups to take into account other viewpoints and considerations. ll41
Nevertheless, this account of the PCN/ACN also draws attention to very real
limitations facing coalitions of social movements as they attempt to hold together a
confluence of actors, let alone try to lead a convergence of interests and agendas that
might constitute adequate agency or a counterhegemonic project.Y
In the context of societies whose political organization revolves around
institutions of representative democracy, it would be foolish in the extreme to ignore
the importance of the political party and its functions. However, the relationship
between movement and party is too often rendered as a stark polarity of points at
either end of a continuum of institutionalization. Much like the equally reductionist
class/party relation posed within Marxism, this simplistic categorization obscures
more than it illuminates.
As Dalton argues, "the most direct challenge to the political order by the new
movements lies in the entry of movement parties into electoral cornpetition.T'' In fact
this "new' form of political agency (i.e., the movement-party) also poses a test for the
polarized conception of the movement/party relationship. In the Canadian context,
first-past-the-post elections made the emergence of a movement/party on the model of
the European Green parties of the 1980s far less likely. Nonetheless, an interesting
parallel, if less bold, claim might be made on behalf of the PCN/ACN: that the
emergence of a broad coalition of social movements in the form of the Network might
have re-instituted the movement-party dynamic present at the formative stage of most
41 G. Grant Amyot, "Democracy Without Parties: A New Politics?" in Canadian Parties in Transition,
ed. Brian A. Tanguay and Alain G. Gagnon (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1996),528.
·Il Miliband, Panitch, and Saville, "Problems and Promise of Socialist Renewal.'
41 Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, "New Social Movements and the Political Order: Inducing
Change or I .ong Term Stability?" in Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political
Movements ill Western Democracies, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, Europe and the
International Order (London: Polity Press, 1990),297.
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social democratic parties." Of course, in the case of the PCN/ACN the movement
was both formally non-partisan and structurally fully independent from the party.
Although this critical distinction might have provided the movement with important
opportunities and protected it from absorption into a narrower parliamentary-electoral
sphere, it likely also compromised its capacity to transform the NDP. Still, just as the
electoral system made a movement-party an unlikely endeavour, the tableau of
political responses to social and economic crisis beginning in the late 1960s, layered
on top of postwar social, economic and political developments, shaped a terrain where
only some political projects would be possible.Y
While the way out of the crisis of political agency facing the Canadian Left
remains less than entirely clear, a basic precondition for its resolution is surely
acceptance of the "irreducible tension" between the politics of movement
mobilization and the quest for 'state power. ,46 This by no means implies abandoning
the pursuit of a mechanism that combines the social engagement and style of
movement action with the "necessarily instrumental concerns of winning, securing
and administering political power."?"
5. Future Directions
It is perhaps inevitable that this account of the formation and development of
the Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network has produced more questions than answers.
44 As Bottomore points out, "in the case of socialist parties ... the party was very largely an extension of
an existing mass movement into the sphere of electoral politics." Bottomore, Political Sociology. I have
suggested this point regarding the ACN and the NOP elsewhere. Bleyer, "Coalitions of Social
Movements as Agencies for Social Change: the Action Canada Network," 147.
I" Phillips discusses the limited recent Canadian experience with movement parties. These single- issue
parties (i.e. green or feminist) were either extremely short-lived or electorally insignificant, or both.
Susan O. Phillips, "Competing, Connecting, and Complementing: Parties, Interest Groups and New
Social Movements," in Canadian Parties in Transition, ed. Brian A. Tanguay and Alain G. Gagnon
(Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1996).
4b Poulantzas refers to « unc certaine tension irreductible entre les partis ouvricrs et les mouvements
sociaux. » Nicos Poulantzas, Reperes: Hier ct aujourd'hui (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1980).
47 Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power, 78. In this same vein Hall suggests "the necessa.lJ'
tension in the contradictory relationship between civil society and the state is what socialist plurahsm
in a real dernocracv will he like." Hall, "Face the Future:' 39.
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Nevertheless, some important lessons can be drawn on the basis of arguments
presented here.
Academics seeking to understand and predict the outcome of cross-movement
coalition formation should equip their analytical toolboxes with care. While this paper
makes a strong case for a synthesis of macro and micro-level theory, it also suggests
that elements of certain analytical approaches should be handled with great care if not
avoided entirely. This includes New Movement Theory with its reification of
difference against agency, obsession with discourse at the expense of structure, and
failure to recognize the continuing importance ofclass. Ofcourse, a perspective that
privileges class at the expense of all other social cleavages proves equally
problematic, as does the 'rational choice' calculus within Resource Mobilization
Theory and interest group theory. In this last case, a stark movement/institution
dualism and a simplistic understanding of social mobilization compound the damage.
At the macro-level, the political process model probes too superficially given
the deep context necessary in order to assess social forces and their prospects in a
given conjuncture. Meanwhile, political economy, though it does allow for the depth
of background needed to understand conjuncture, fails to give due weight to the
question of agency.
Some signposts for future attempts at cross-movement coalition building can
also be drawn from the experience of the Pro-Canada!Action Canada Network. The
emergence of the PCN/ACN out of the Canadian popular sector points to the potential
for social movement convergence leading to the construction of adequate agency. At
the same time, the extraordinary conjunction of factors that allowed for the Network's
formation and evolution underlines the important and perhaps insurmountable
obstacles to such a project, as does the ACN's eventual decline.
Beyond the obvious conclusion that those advancing such an undertaking must
proceed with premeditation and be prepared to 'seize the moment,' a number of
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tensions require attention. This account of the PCNIACN has highlighted the critical
importance of leadership in the construction of social movement alliances. More
precisely, it identifies a form of leadership that balances the facilitation of consensus
essential to fashion and maintain unity with the drive for convergence. This implies
the active management of consensus to avoid a lowest-common denominator cul-de-
sac making use of the coalition as a space for the formation of social identities and
discursive struggle. A second, related, balance must be found between the initial
inevitably defensive stance of movements and their interests as they coalesce, and the
articulation of an alternative discourse essential to convergence. Third, continuing
structural development must be a priority even in the face ofopposition from member
SMOs in order to create some independent organizational capacity, as well as to
address the key variables of representation and accountability. The tension, in this
instance, is between avoiding a process-induced paralysis while, at the same time,
evading an equally immobilizing crisis of legitimacy.
Areas for research to further contribute to the investigation of the potential of
cross-movement coalitions are relatively easy to identify. First, the timeline of this
study of the PCNIACN could be extended to cover the period from 1994 to its
renaming as the Solidarity Network and de facto dissolution as a functioning coalition
with a shared program ofaction in 1997. Second, given the multiplication of trade and
other international agreements that condense a broader neo-liberal social and
economic agenda, the continuing importance of these agreements for Canadian and
global social movement politics should be considered. Alliances, often including
many of the same groups that made up the membership of the PCN/ACN, were
formed in the case of campaigns around the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAl), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). But these alliances appear to have fallen far short of the scale of endeavour
represented by the Network. Instead, the central role previously played bv the
ACN/PCN was assumed by some of its one-time member SMOs, specifically, the
Council of Canadians and the Canadian Labour Congress. While the Cl.C's
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leadership role is not surprising, the development of the Council of Canadians into a
citizens' organization with 100,000 members and a broad radicalized mandate is
worthy of note. The contrasting trajectories of the Council and the Network, i.e., the
decline ofa cross-movement coalition and the flourishing ofan SMO with general
public membership, might provide further evidence of the difficulty of multi-issue
coalition formation and convergence despite the continuing travails of social
democratic electoralism and party politics in general. In fact, the downturn in the
fortunes of the New Democratic Party continued through to the end of the decade with
two more poor performances at the polls in 1997 and 2000, at which point the Council
of Canadians could claim a larger membership than the party."
In addition to a longer timeline, this study of the PCNIACN would be further
complemented by research on a larger number of the coalition's member SMOs. Not
least among these would be the Council of Canadians focusing both on its
participation in the Network and on the relationship between its improving fortunes
and the latter's decline. More attention might also be paid to the various provincial
coalitions and sectors beyond those emphasized in this account. Provincial coalitions
are particularly interesting because they constitute regionally specific microcosms of
the broader Network and can, to some extent, serve as comparators. Popular sector
developments before the formation of the PCN draw attention to the transformative
impact of cross-movement discursive struggle, this examination could further assess
the impact ofPCN/ACN participation on member SMOs - focusing on their own
organizational capacity, the breadth of their discourse and mandate, and any change in
their approach to the question of political agency.
Finally, the PCN/ACN's engagement with NAFTA raises the subject of cross-
national social movement alliances, as well as the "cross-national diffusion of
protest. ,..49 Evidence of sharing and learning between movements in the North
48 Both elections confirmed the decline of interest in party politics with record low levels of voter
turnout. Brian A. Tanguay, "Canada's Party System in the 1990s: Breakdown or Renewal?" in
Canadian Politics. ed. James Bickerton and Alain G. Gagnon (Toronto: Broadview Press, 1999). 325.
49 See chapter 8 in t lanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni,
336
American case is reinforced by the experience of global campaigns against the M.v
and the WTO. Furthermore, while the PCN/ACN was relatively unique as a cross-
movement mobilization around trade and investment, the subsequent development of
campaigns around NAFTA, the MAl, and WTO in other national formations raises
the prospect of cross-national comparisons, as well as contributing to the
understanding of cross-national diffusion.
This course of inquiry would add to the burgeoning academic attention to
"global civil society," "transnational social movement organizations," "transnational
advocacy networks," "global social movements" and "globalization from below. ~·50
Meanwhile, it is tempting to extrapolate somewhat from this account of the
PCN/ACN. There can be little doubt that many challenges facing coalition formation
'in one country' would be magnified at the transnational and global level. Relatively
straightforward concerns include the logistical barriers posed by distance and
jurisdictions, as well as the need to generate resources to meet high costs. Differing
perspectives between North and South and other cleavages will put the strains of
Canadian binational federalism into proper perspective. The tension between the
defensive logic of coalition formation and attempts to advance alternatives is also
likely to present an even greater challenge at this level. Recent debates and schisms in
the 'anti-globalization' movement - for example, over the question of violence - may
New Social Movements in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1995); J. Craig Jenkins, "Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State:
An Agenda and Comparative Framework," in The Politics ofSocial Protest; Comparative Perspectives
on States and Social Movements, ed. Bert Klandermans and 1. Craig Jenkins (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1995); and Donatella della Porta and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Social Movements in a
Globalizing World: an Introduction," in Social Movements in a Globalizing World, ed. Donatella della
Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).
50 For global civil society, see Kaldor, "Civilizing' Globalization? The Implications of the 'Battle in
Seattle'"; for transnational social movement organizations, see della Porta and Diani, Social
Movements: An Introduction; for transnational advocacy networks, see Margaret Keck and Kathrvn
Sikkink, eds., Activists Bcvond Borders (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); for
globalization from below: see Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith, Globalization From
Below: the Power ofSolidarity. (Cambridge, Mass: South End Press, 2000); and for Global Social
Movements, see Robin Cohen and Shirin M. Rai, eds., Global Social Movements (London: The
Athlone Press, 2000). For a more critical view of the potential for transnational solidarity. see Andre C.
Drainville, "The Fetishism of Global Civil Society: Global Governance, TransnationalLJrbanism and
Sustainable Capitalism in the World Economy," in Transnationalismfrom Below, cd. Michael Peter
Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. Comparative Urban and Community Research (New Brunswick.
N.J: Transaction Publishers. 1(98).
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be an indication of the extremely difficult task of maintaining unity over tactics. let
alone constructing a consensus around an alternative project at the global level.
Finally, the difficulty in developing a structured agency that can deal with the issues
of representation and accountability at the national level will clearly be amplified.
This largely nationally focused account of collective contestation of trade
liberalization might also serve as a helpful corrective to an apparent fixation with
global and cross-national activity both in social practice and in academic inquiry. The
continuing relevance of the nation state has been vigorously argued against the
globalization thesis that has dominated the past decade." Insofar as there has been a
process of deregulation at the global level, this process has been aided. abetted and
enforced by nation states.52 Moreover, any future regulation at the global level will
succeed "because the major nation states agree to create it and to confer legitimacy on
it by pooling sovereignty.Y' At the same time, as Rucht points out, as a result of the
"limited power of international institutions, transnational movements continue to
consider national governments as important and, in many cases, even primary
targets.,,54 In a contribution to the same volume, Koopmans ends a cross-national
comparison of social movement mobilization with the conclusion:
As long as nation-states remain the most important actors on the international
stage and the dominant frame of reference for political debates, this situation
is not likely to change... a New World Order is still more fiction than fact.55
51 The literature on globalization - too vast to note here - is summarized in Held, David, Anthony
McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and
Culture (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, ]999). Prominent "sceptics" include contributions
to Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., States against Markets (London: Routledge, 1996), and Paul
Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
52 Panitch argues that "there is a tendency to ignore the extent to which today's globalisation both is
authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing, rather then by-passing, states." Leo Panitch.
"Globalisation and the State," in Socialist Register 1994: Between Globalism and Nationalism, ed.
Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (London: The Merlin Press, 1994),63. Surely the neo-liberal policy
straightjacket adopted by many governments should be added to the list of causes of the declining
legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions. Clearly, what in many cases amounts to a 'unilateral
disarmament' by the state has contributed to cynicism regarding the value of representative democracy
53 Paul Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism: Democracy, Civil Societv and Global Politics (London: UCL
Press, 1997),239.
5·1 Dieter Rueht "The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes. Problems," In Social
Movements in ~ Globalizing World, ed. Donatella Della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rueht (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 209.
55 Ruud Koopmans, "Globalization or Still National Politics? A Comparison of Protests against the
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In any case, the argument in favour of retaining the nation state as a focal
point does not rest on a sceptical stance in the debate on economic globalization. The
national project remains an essential building block for any wider, inevitably more
fragile, international or global venture. Constructing counterhegemony or adequate
agency at the global level is an unlikely enough endeavour in the first instance,
without a firm foundation at the national level it becomes a chimera.
Gulf War in Germany, France. and the Netherlands, " in Social Movements in ~ ?lobllli=ing Worl.l, ed
Donatella della Porta. l lanspetcr Kriesi and Dieter Rueht (New York: St. Martin s, 1999) 70.
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